Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Owen Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Renton of Mount Harry]

I only make the point, before I give way to others, that it is very interesting to see just how many people voted on the AV matter and all that a few days ago: just 42 per cent. One may think that most of the public are longing and waiting to have a vote; it is not true. Most members of the public are very difficult to interest in politics and many members of the public would much rather only have to vote once every five years rather than every four.

[Lord Owen]

My Lords, I would like to inject, not legal points, but a few raw political questions. Why are we being asked for this legislation? It is because a coalition was formed. If we go back to the circumstances in which that coalition was formed, the general view was that the purpose of that coalition, above all else, was to deliver a programme, over a fairly long period, to deal with the very serious economic situation, namely, a structural fiscal deficit. It seems to me not an accident that in the discussions that took place—perhaps we should call them negotiations—the person who was in favour of five years was the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, according to the report we have had. I think that was a very reasonable assessment of how long it would take to deal with the economic problems. Given the present situation, where the Government’s forecasts are already not fulfilling the growth which they themselves predicted, we may well find that this goes on for longer than five years.

The political reality is that coalitions like fixed-term Parliaments. Why? Because they know that, unless there is a restriction on a Prime Minister’s right to call for an election, which by common precedent the Queen or monarch grants after a period of six months of government, in order to curb that one of the coalition partners, namely the most junior or smaller coalition partner, wants to be sure that the Prime Minister cannot cut and run when the opinion polls are in favour of the majority part of the coalition at the disadvantage of the minority part of the coalition. You can have all the legal arguments that you like but this seems to me purely practical, sensible politics. It would be quite wrong to deprive the coalition—if it wished it, which is what this is predominantly about—of the ability to exercise its right to go for five years, which is the constitutional precedent. It wishes to lock itself into a situation where only under rather exceptional circumstances can an election be called during the five-year period. That is perfectly legitimate. I am in favour of five years, as the Government wish, and in favour of a fixed-term Parliament as a mechanism for making coalitions successful. In Europe we have seen that coalitions can be successful but they need certain parameters, one of which is knowing how long they are likely to last.

The wider question, which is really the issue of debate, is: should the period be four years or five? I am not sure. The great advantage of the British constitution has been its flexibility. Most people consider five years the limit but, for a variety of very good reasons, Prime Ministers with large majorities, both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, have chosen to go after four years—broadly speaking, for the benefit of the country as a whole. I am against putting restrictions on this, so I am open-minded about trying to retain some flexibility within a fixed-term Parliament. I am therefore not convinced by the argument that we should choose four years. I am attracted to an interesting amendment that is to be moved later, although I do not want in any way to pre-empt it.

My fundamental point about fixed-term Parliaments, if we are making this legislation for the future, is that this is a profound constitutional change. It deserves a referendum—a proper referendum. What we have just experienced was not a proper referendum but a rigged one. If we had had a proper referendum, there would have been three options on the ballot paper. I do not know what the right choice is for a referendum on fixed-term Parliaments; some people may say that it is three years, others four or five. Maybe there should be only two options. However, if there is a body of opinion in the country that thinks that, like Australia, you should have only a three-year term, that should be represented in a referendum.

Referendums are not to be part of a political fix; they are part of our constitutional future. If we are to have fixed-term Parliaments—I hope that eventually we do; I would support them—then let us have a proper referendum, let the period be something that people can reflect on and make their judgment, and let it not be handed down to them as a political fix. There is a big warning in the referendum that we have just gone through. The country spotted a manipulative political fix of a referendum. People knew and felt that they ought to have been given the choice of whether there should be proportional representation. Furthermore, they also spotted something else: they should have been given that choice after the coalition had been in office for at least a period of three to four years so that they could make a judgment on coalitions. Let us have an end to rigged referendums. Let us accept referendums on major constitutional questions, and let them be open and proper choices. Since I think that ultimately we will have to have another referendum on European entry—I do not particularly relish it, but I suspect that it is coming—let us learn that that referendum must be a proper choice too.

On the question of sunset clauses or anything like that, I see great flexibility when an incoming Government are formed. I like the idea that when they are formed they choose under what restriction they will operate. If they are a coalition, as likely as not they will choose that they wish to have the rigidity, if you like, of a fixed term, and let them choose whether it will be three years, four years or five. That seems to me to be their choice. If they come in with a large majority but do not want to have the inability to call an election earlier, I am not sure that that should not be part of the flexibility of the constitution. If they have a full majority, they can legislate for it anyhow. We might do better to recognise this.