(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs when the next bilateral is planned between the United Kingdom and French governments on security issues, and whether it will involve the President and Prime Minister as well as the two foreign secretaries.
My Lords, last week, the Prime Minister and President Macron spoke on illegal migration and European security. On Thursday, I will speak to Foreign Minister Séjourné at the G7. I am confident that the Prime Minister and President Macron will meet again in person before too long. My colleagues, the Defence Secretary and the Home Secretary, and their teams similarly maintain regular, action-orientated dialogue with their French counterparts.
In light of the forthcoming elections in the United States and the constant reiteration of senior Russians that tactical nuclear weapons should be used in their invasion of Ukraine, would it not be a very good thing if the French and British Heads of Government got together and discussed their own targeting strategies for the nuclear weapons they possess in Europe and give some guidance—to Europe, to the rest of the world, and, above all, to the Russians—about their attitude to this constant invocation of nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine?
I thank the noble Lord for his question; he clearly has huge experience in this area. The Lancaster House agreement that I signed with President Sarkozy in 2010 expressly sets out areas where Britain and France will collaborate, including the most sensitive areas of nuclear weapon research and nuclear weapons. If what he is saying is that we need to enter into deeper dialogue to think about these things in the future, I agree. Britain’s nuclear deterrent is declared to NATO, and I am in favour of us having deeper conversations with the French about that.
I still maintain that one of the aims of NATO is, as Pug Ismay put it,
“to keep the Americans in … and the Russians out”.
That is still absolutely key to NATO’s future. I missed out a bit of that quotation, the noble Lord will be pleased to note. One of the things we must do is to make sure that we are talking to all parts of the American system, to make sure that NATO is in the strongest possible shape in its 75th year, with more members and more members reaching 2%, so that whoever becomes President at the end of this year can see that NATO is an institution worth investing in.
(7 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI am confident that a date will be set, that an excellent venue will be provided, and that the meeting will be a great success. We found that in the early part of the year there was a bit of a traffic jam of summitry. So many summits were coming at the same time that finding the right time where the leading people who needed to be there could be there was a challenge. However, we are very close to meeting that challenge, and I will update the House as soon as I can.
My Lords, on the question of the manufacture of weapons and munitions for Ukraine, is the Foreign Secretary aware that there is great concern that there is a depletion of these weapons in this country? Can he assure us that manufacturing in this country of weapons and munitions for Ukraine will be stepped up considerably over the next few weeks and months?
I think I can give that undertaking. The Prime Minister announced the package of support for Ukraine, at over £2.7 billion, which will ensure that it has the support it deserves from the United Kingdom. The Government are fully aware that we need to step up production, not just for Ukraine but to make sure that we deal with our depleted stocks. However, at the same time, there is a real task to be done across all the countries that support Ukraine to look at any weapons systems that are close to their expiration date. We will not be able to use them, but it could use them now.
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberFirst, I would say to the noble Lord that we have trebled the amount of aid that we are putting into Gaza. I very much take on board what he says about the pressure we need to put on not just the Israeli Government but other Governments in the region to get more aid in. Right now, as we speak, nine out of 10 people in Gaza are living on less than one meal a day. It is that serious. That is why I have had repeated conversations with the Israelis and set out a whole series of bottlenecks that need to be relieved. We need Kerem Shalom open all the time. We need the Nitzana checkpoint open all the time. I would like to see the port of Ashdod opened in Israel so that aid can get into the country through maritime routes and more swiftly into Gaza.
Crucially, we will not see more aid get to the people who need it unless the United Nations inside Gaza has the vehicles, the people and the fuel to get it around. Those permissions need to be given. I have had these conversations most recently this morning with the new UN aid co-ordinator, who I am confident will do an excellent job. We will keep up the pressure for this, because, as I have said, an immediate pause to help get that aid in and to help get hostages out is essential.
Will the Foreign Secretary consider very seriously creating a UN protection force for humanitarian relief? That was done successfully in the winter of 1992 in a very difficult situation, with no ceasefire, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I recommend that approach. Although a ceasefire is essential, it is not in the immediate future very likely, but the humanitarian crisis is getting worse every day. They cannot get relief in without some form of protection from UN forces.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is a very clear need throughout the allied world for unity, and I shall therefore deal very quickly with the Irish protocol. I believe that there is no way that this country will accept abandoning a treaty by an Act of law without first a serious attempt at arbitration. That is why we have the Vienna conventions, and it is in my view inconceivable that this legislation should be presented to this House without a very serious attempt at achieving international arbitration.
Now to the main issue, which is the Falklands—sorry, not the Falklands, but that is perhaps in a way rather an interesting lapse. It is rather nice in this country to come back to a situation where you can say that the British Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence have acted throughout intelligently and with courage, and we should be grateful for that. The issue of Ukraine has not been at all easy. We can all praise the President of Ukraine, who has shown remarkable courage and intense skill. I still believe that his biggest moment is yet to come, when he decides to open negotiations with the Russians for a peace settlement.
A peace settlement will have to end this but, frankly, it will not come from suggestions in this House or anywhere else, and nor should it. It should come from that country that was very nearly, on the second invasion, eradicated. It has the right to be supported by us, and we have quite correctly supported it within the limitations of NATO being a defensive alliance. We have not crossed that border, and we should not cross it. As for this loose talk about nuclear weapons and tactical use of weapons, of course that hangs and lurks as an ever-present danger. But that issue is primarily between two people: the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation. If President Putin feels that he wants to cross that threshold, he will endanger his whole country—but it is not an issue for NATO; nor, frankly, one that is helped by being discussed in this House either.
What we have to do now, as a number of noble Lords have made clear, is to strengthen our contribution. That means strengthening our contribution in weaponry, as we are entitled to do as a defensive organisation, and strengthening our economic sanctions, which are all the time being reduced. The good things that have come out of this dreadful war are few and far between. However, one fact is that we have seen the strength of NATO and the wisdom of Truman when he insisted that the boys could not come home in 1945 as he had promised them; in 1946 they were to stay.
We have heard a lot of trash and nonsense talked about European Union defence. A defence organisation has to have an inbuilt authority—a command structure. We have in NATO a proven command structure. We have the capacity to use the strength of the greatest military power still in the world, the United States, and to do so with discussion, democratic debate and, finally, military decision-making. I hope that President Macron has learned that it is not brain-dead and I hope that France stops trying to eradicate or even undermine NATO. That is the fundamental issue and we have seen it in this example.
For the future, it is extremely important that the Russian people believe that we are not antagonistic to them and that we do not want to humiliate them. They have a lot of economic and deep-seated military problems. Some of us—myself included—thought that their defence capacities and their armed forces were a lot stronger than they have proven to be. We must achieve a negotiated settlement that must come from Ukraine, but in the process of getting that settlement we must understand the Russian people and not permanently alienate them. That is a hard task but it is the task in front of us.
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very sad, as I think many people in the world are, about the deterioration in relations with China. It will not be easy to engage President Xi on the issue of Hong Kong. It is very sensitive. In the past, contact groups seemed to have some success; I have been involved with both of them. The first was in South Africa in 1978. Eventually, Namibia moved to independence as a result of that contact group’s work, although it took 12 years. The other was in the Balkans in 1994 and undoubtedly helped to lay the foundations for the success of the Dayton accords and all that had gone before in the negotiations. Assembling many countries to work together is difficult. The key aspect of a contact group is that it does so at all levels: politicians, diplomats, lawyers and sometimes even the military. That is one of the most practical ways of proceeding.
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I suppose I had better make a declaration of interest in case I upset the noble Lord, Lord Pearson. I have a minuscule pension that comes from the National Assembly for Wales, and that might be interpreted as colouring my views on some of the matters in these amendments. Be that as it may, I am very glad to see not only Amendment 24C, which picks up some of the points that I introduced in Committee with regard to regional policy, structural funds and agriculture, but the response of the Government, which has included these points, as Minister underlined in her opening contribution. Perhaps I could press a little further on those aspects.
The Minister referred to the fact that Amendment 24B(1)(a) covers structural funds and agriculture. Perhaps she can clarify whether that would be the intention of interpreting the effects of changes arising from our withdrawal from the European Union on structural funds in specific areas—that it is not just the overall picture but the picture as it impacts on those regions that are beneficiaries of structural funds. Quite clearly, the effect can be different and we could well make a case that there might be an overall UK benefit but a disbenefit for the regions concerned.
Likewise, in the case of agriculture, questions such as the issue that is dominant in Wales at the moment in a European context—the sheep meat regime—can impact regions very differently. Obviously, regions such as eastern England would have a much greater interest in the grain-producing industries and the effect that pulling out might have on them. I would be very glad to know that there will be more than just the overall interpretation of the effect when that appraisal is undertaken.
Secondly, I would like to pick up the question of engagement with the devolved Administrations. For that engagement to be meaningful, and for the devolved Governments to be able to put forward their own statements on their interpretation of the effect of withdrawal on matters of concern to them, it would be necessary for them to have some detailed information on how the negotiations have gone and how the points have emerged during those negotiations. Therefore, there would be a requirement for the devolved Administrations to be pulled into the discussions as they were going along, and not just to be told at the end, “This is what we’ve negotiated. You say what you like about the effects on Wales, or Scotland, or Northern Ireland”. If that is the case, if it is possible for the devolved Administrations to be involved in the negotiations—even if only to know, step by step, how they are moving forward—can the Minister give that reassurance to the House, and tell us at what stage she will start to negotiate, or discuss, these matters with the devolved Administrations to ensure that they are involved from this stage forward, and do not just come in at a very late stage?
Clearly, what we are concerned with here are the effects of withdrawal on various aspects of policy, as detailed in Amendment 24C. A number of the instances raised in that amendment are not covered in Amendment 24B, as far as we know. Perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, whose name is on Amendment 24C, will address this matter if she speaks to this group of amendments. I would have thought that clarification was needed on other points in addition to structural funds and agriculture, for which Amendment 24B does provide, at least to some extent. We also require clarification on the matters covered by Amendment 24C. None the less, I welcome the fact that the Government have moved on this subject, and I hope that the clarification provided will add to my contentment.
My Lords, I would like to make points of general application to all the amendments. I have read all the debates that have taken place on this subject here, and it seems to me that it is time for the House, way before we get into any ping-pong, to ask itself what its role is in relation to this legislation.
I gave evidence to the Select Committee in another place, at a time when it looked as if the referendum might be transparently rigged. There was the question of the independence of the Civil Service, and its involvement—and also the question of how long a time would have to elapse between the announcement of the results and the time when the referendum would take place. In fairness to the Government, and in the light of the Select Committee, I must say that most of the major issues of fairness were dealt with, and I thought that we were accorded a judgment in favour of fairness, which I strongly uphold. That, certainly, is the duty of this House.
However, we must now look at the debates, and the direction in which they are going. I agree with the statement already made that it is patently obvious that a lot of the substance of the amendments and the arguments is an attempt to shift the debate. That does happen in these situations, and we cannot stop it. But it does mean that we are talking ourselves into a situation of legitimacy in terms of intervening in the referendum in ways that would be not only absurd but dangerous for this House to adopt.
We have already taken one decision in recent weeks: I voted for it myself, but only after very careful consideration as to whether we were overstretching our powers. I will not go into that debate now, but I was confident that what we were doing was just about acceptable. But to delay the referendum is not acceptable. To do anything in this House, either through ping-pong or otherwise, that would delay the undoubted constitutional right of the Prime Minister to choose the timing of his announcement—and therefore, following his announcement, the timing of the referendum—would be absurd.
It is also necessary to remember that there are some differences between the referendum that took place in 1975 and the one that is due to take place on whether we should leave the European Union or remain within it. In 1975, there was no provision in the treaties for a two-year period during which negotiations would be held. This is a very substantive difference. When the then Foreign Secretary, the former Prime Minister, James Callaghan, was asked by a civil servant in the Cabinet Office what he would do in the remaining few weeks of a referendum campaign were the decision to be taken to leave, he made it quite clear that he would be feel obliged immediately to curtail in some substantive measure the powers of the European Union—there could be no delay. That was the right decision, given the nature of that referendum and the fact that there was no two-year period for negotiations. He had to be able to demonstrate forthwith that the powers had changed as result of the referendum.
That judgment was not liked by the civil servants who got it but, as of course they do in these cases, they immediately set about creating the necessary legislation and powers so that had that referendum voted to come out of the European Community, we would have been able to take powers as soon as the referendum was held. That needs to be borne in mind when we discuss some of these very detailed provisions. I cannot help but agree with the noble Lord. Subsection (1)(a) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 24B refers to,
“information about rights, and obligations, that arise under European Union law”.
We could have a cursory glance at that, which I should think would take a White Paper of about an inch thick. A very substantial glance at it would take a White Paper of about five or six inches thick.
We need to keep a sense of proportion here on one particularly important matter: the giving of a referendum is a right for Members of Parliament and nobody else, because it curtails their democratic rights. It is a very serious curtailment of their rights, so much so that, although we call it an advisory referendum, we all know that they accept an obligation to take into law decisions which, as citizens, they may personally have voted against. That is why, in my view, referendums are to be used rather more sparingly than seems to be developing. It is a very considerable infringement on the rights of a representative, elected, democratic Member of Parliament—and, frankly, those rights do not retain in this House.
For example, the mandate, but perhaps more importantly the actual details about who is enfranchised to vote, is a Member of Parliament’s decision and not for this House. We can express views, but the idea that we could hold up a referendum on this issue is absurd. People may say, “We have no intention of doing that. When it comes to the ping-pong, we will accept it and rationalise it. We realise our powers”. It is much better not to embark on this. Ping-pong that is not serious is a waste of everybody’s time. More importantly, it gives an image to the country at large, which does not understand our procedures, that we in this Chamber think we have rights that we do not have. We do not have rights over the franchise for this referendum or over the Prime Minister’s decision as to when he calls to an end the negotiations and puts the issues to the people. He will of course know and listen to all the arguments about the way in which that decision and the facts should be presented.
Again, we have to be honest about this: we have had a long debate on this issue, and not just on this current referendum Bill. After all, it was announced under the previous Government and was in the manifesto. We know the issues and the electorate, because they are not stupid, will take it upon themselves to be cognisant of those factors that concern them in how they make that individual decision. So if I may make a plea, it is that the House will be very careful from now on to not give the impression that we have rights in this debate which we do not have. This is developing on quite a large number of fronts and it is going to end in tears.
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have an important interest to declare, which is that I have been involved in business in Russia since 1995. I started that in the belief, which I still hold, that it is through commercial interchange that eventually we will restore some of the optimism about Russia’s future that many in this House have had for a number of years, although we have certainly found ourselves and our judgment somewhat questioned by the experiences in Ukraine.
We have heard two outstanding speeches. The maiden speech of the noble Earl, Lord Oxford and Asquith, was quite remarkable and I find myself agreeing with almost all of his analysis. I have watched his career with great interest for some decades. He certainly does great service to the memory of his great-grandfather, whom I have been writing about with interest in The Military Conversations of 1906-1914. We look forward to hearing much more from the noble Earl. The other speech that I found myself agreeing with—we do not always agree on these matters—was that of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. His words on sanctions are well worth careful scrutiny. We often embark on sanctions with the best of wishes and intentions, but unfortunately they can yield poor results and they often produce the very effects that we do not want, particularly in the country that is most affected by them. In this case, a great many countries are affected.
All the members of the committee deserve to be congratulated on the report and on the tone that they have brought to this discussion. It is very different from the tone of discussion, I dare say, in another place and particularly in the newspapers of this country. We have to change that. We have to develop a much greater understanding of the complexity of the issues and we must do so fairly urgently.
What is Britain’s role? Paragraph 82 of the recommendations and conclusions says:
“As one of the four signatories of the Budapest Memorandum (1994), which pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the UK had a particular responsibility when the crisis erupted. The Government has not been as active or as visible on this issue as it could have been”.
That is a matter of great regret. During the crisis inside Ukraine and in Kiev, the French, German and Polish Foreign Ministers went into negotiations. In the light of the fact that, no sooner was the ink dry on that agreement, it was effectively torn up in front of everybody’s eyes, it may have been quite a good thing that we were not involved in that rather deplorable example of EU negotiations, but staying out of that particular involvement carried with it our then acquiescing in what I think was the brave and necessary involvement of the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany in direct negotiations with Ukraine and Russia.
This country has a responsibility to try to find a way of dealing, in international law, with the annexation of Crimea. This will not be changed, probably for a number of years, but we need to lead the discussion, because eventually it will have to be changed. Of course, if Ukraine and Russia can reach an agreement, it will be settled in international law. That is probably the most desirable outcome and it eventually will have to be part of such an agreement. But to help that process we should point to the necessity of a wider discussion—widening it means that it is always easier to reach agreement—and indicate that one area that could be brought into that discussion is the question of Moldova and Transnistria. Putting that into the international discussions over the annexation of Crimea would be sensible. There is a lot to be said for widening this to all the disputed areas and boundaries in and around Europe and central Asia, which will come back to haunt us if we do not settle them.
Among the other aspects that have been raised in this debate, a great deal has been said about this whole issue of why Russia feels encircled. History shows us exactly the same: if you look to the origins of the 1914 war, there is no question but that encirclement was a big factor. It was felt not just by Russia at various stages but by Germany and by other countries. We need to respect that in international affairs.
One person who does not carry much weight these days in Russia is Mikhail Gorbachev. There is no doubt, in my judgment, that he can fairly claim that, with the full might of the Soviet Union behind him, he could have clamped down and there would have been no unification of East and West Germany. There has been some correspondence recently in the Guardian, on 6 and 9 March, with a NATO spokesman claiming, unwisely I think, to interpret Mikhail Gorbachev’s actual position. Gorbachev was under no illusion during the negotiations that went on following the fall of the Berlin Wall and throughout that period that his sensitivities on behalf of Russia—historic sensitivities—were going to be respected. Reference has been made to Ambassador Braithwaite’s assessment, which I value and trust greatly. More importantly, one should go to the text of the main spokesman for the West, President George Bush Senior, who made important statements and conducted one of wisest pieces of diplomacy in relation to the United States and Russia that we have seen for 50 years. His Secretary of State, James Baker, also made commitments. You cannot tear these up or ignore them, although they are not an excuse. Gorbachev said about the present crisis:
“One of its causes, though not the only one”—
an important reservation—
“is the unwillingness of our western partners to take account of Russia’s point of view, legitimate interests and security. Verbally, they applauded Russia, especially during the Yeltsin years, but in deeds they took no account of it. I am thinking mainly of Nato’s enlargement, the plans to deploy a missile shield, and the west’s actions in areas important to Russia (Yugoslavia, Iraq, Georgia, Ukraine). They literally told us: it’s not your business. As a result an abscess built up, and burst”.
We must return to this area to try to find our way through these difficult questions.
The contribution of those who have said that Russia has to be part of the solution is also important. The economic strength of Ukraine has to be built up, but it will not be built up just by relying on EU disbursals, the IMF or anybody else. Russia has an interest in Ukraine: it will invest there and will need to become a partner in investment. It is not going to be easy; it will be very difficult to break down the hatreds, almost, that have emerged in the last few years between people in Ukraine and Russia who previously worked evenly and well together. It will take time.
I suggest that Britain’s role is strategic. At the time, I was not keen on the decision at the NATO summit in Chicago to continue with dual-capable aircraft. In retrospect, I believe that it was a wise decision. I agree with those who have said that there is no case for these aircraft to be deployed now to new NATO members, but I believe that Britain should take a very active part in the whole of that issue and discussion. We may have a role to play. That whole aspect of NATO’s strategy has to be looked at again, but we should not consider deploying such aircraft in sensitive areas. These are issues to which we will return.
(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have been involved in business in Russia since 1995—mainly with a steel firm in Stary Oskol, some 600 kilometres south of Moscow—because I believed then and believe now that through business relations we will best establish good relations between the United Kingdom and Russia. I have also been a very strong believer in the Budapest memorandum, which relates to the subject of this debate, feeling it absolutely essential that countries which give up nuclear weapons should be strongly supported and feel that they have some form of military guarantee. It is of course nowhere near as strong as an Article 5 NATO agreement. I agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said just now: it is a great mistake to expand NATO to either Georgia or Ukraine. We were advised about this many years ago by George Kennan; he was completely correct.
Although I disapproved of the way that the former President of the Ukraine was removed from power, I strongly condemned the annexation of Crimea. It might be possible—I said so publicly very soon after it happened—for an eventual agreement, on the lines of the Cuba-US agreement, between Ukraine and Russia over the military base of Sebastopol. I still think that that is one of the routes through. There has to be a resolution between those two countries about Crimea. The world cannot accept that annexation without there being a negotiated settlement between President Putin and President Poroshenko. They are meeting, probably as we speak, in Milan and there is a real possibility of concluding a serious negotiation.
There has been progress made over gas supplies, which is the first essential. The second essential is to get a real ceasefire, which has not yet materialised. The third essential is devolution to east Ukraine. It will never be content without some serious measures of devolution. It is something which we in this country ought not to be standing in the way of but encouraging. The fourth element is getting back into the international community on things like international air conventions. It is still a terrible tragedy that we have not achieved that resolution in the light of those appalling casualties from the shooting down of the Malaysian plane, and we need to know the full facts of that.
However, the essential issue seems to be that the people of Ukraine and the people of Russia have to understand that a peace negotiation and continued and increasing business relations are in both countries’ interests. It is very hard to see Ukraine, with all the financial difficulties that it has had and its considerable and long record of corruption, achieving the economic growth and prosperity that it deserves without co-operation, first, heading towards membership of the European Union, and secondly, retaining good, strong working relations with the Russian Federation. There is no escape from that, and some of the language that we have heard in the past few months, seeming to think that a solid division between Ukraine and Russia is in the interests of Europe, let alone the world, is a great mistake. We need to say that constantly to our Ukrainian friends on this issue. I have always supported the decision by Boris Yeltsin and President Kravchuk to separate out the Russian Federation and Ukraine, but no one could believe that this could be done without full cognisance of the history of those two countries at every stage. Sometimes in our debates we seem to have been blind to that factor.
So I think that a negotiation can be achieved between these two countries. They may make agreements that we in the West would not necessarily make—for example, there is another border dispute involving Russia, and that lies between Moldavia and the Ukrainian frontier. This is an area ripe for negotiation and solution, and might be one of the ways of easing the problem for the Ukrainians of the loss of Crimea. It is in this pragmatic way that I would like to see negotiations.
I say this to the Government: only four countries are signatories to the Budapest memorandum: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United States and Great Britain. Quite frankly, we ought to have been involved in the negotiations right from the start. When the crisis blew up on the streets of Ukraine and the President was in the process of being toppled, an EU initiative was taken, with three Foreign Ministers—German, French and Polish—going in and negotiating on our behalf. The Russians were there with an observer, after strong pleas from President Obama. They made an agreement. While the ink was still not dry, that agreement was broken, which did terrible harm to relations. We have to find a better way of dealing diplomatically with the Ukraine and Russia problem.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, must be correct that the procedure that should be followed in a perfect world would be the one that he outlined. The trouble is that we do not live in a perfect world, and we never have done. Europe splits parties and families, and has been doing so for 40 years. That is what we have to grapple with on this issue.
As my noble friend Lord Roper knows, I supported a referendum in 1972, and was defeated in the argument in our group. I resigned over the issue, but it was not really the central core of that question. It is right that there was a vote—but in those days it was a vote on whether there should be referendum then, in that Parliament of 1972 to 1973. I think that this is a gimmick, in many respects. However, why are we here? We are here because successive Prime Ministers have given commitments to hold referendums and then have not done so. The country does not trust us. On this issue of Europe, they have seen party after party manoeuvre and manipulate, and they do not believe it—and they do not actually believe it, even if they say at a general election that there will be a referendum. I was told by the parties opposite at the last election that there would be no top-down changes in the National Health Service. And what have they done? We used to believe that the mandate meant something, but now we are told that the mandate cannot be trusted.
Under these circumstances, it seems not unreasonable for all three major parties to commit themselves to a referendum, because it is a settled will of the British people in my judgment that there should be a referendum. I personally believe that we should start negotiating that now; I do not accept at all that it is not possible to get to a situation in Europe where we could have a referendum in the early part of next year before there is a general election. That would be the best thing; we would have a lot of political parties actually trying to get a serious negotiation. Most people in Europe feel that this issue going on is debilitating to Europe, and damaging to confidence. We have not resolved the issue of the eurozone, which is not yet safe. The whole situation that will come over the next year or so is hanging around—whether or not Britain will or not be in the European Union—is not good for Europe, not good for Britain, and not good for foreign investment or the world economy.
Personally, I do not have any particular wish to have a referendum in 2017. I agree very much with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that that will not happen. There are juxtapositions of presidencies and general elections in Germany, which are crucial, and you would not opt to have it in 2017. So if it comes, it is more likely to be in 2016—but I would far prefer it to be at the end of this year or in 2015.
As to the constitutional process, it would be madness for this House to reject the Bill, and to invoke the Parliament Act would be absurd. It would also be ridiculous for us to be bullied into not having proper constitutional discussions of these very important issues. We are actually saying that we do not like the Electoral Commission set-up on the question. I personally think that there is a very good reason to go along with it; why set up an Electoral Commission and then ignore its advice? The other thing that is absolutely crazy is to go again with what was done over the alternative vote and have a whole year in which you have announced an election. The provision that you must do this by December 2016 seems ridiculous, but I do not get very fussed about it because I do not think that there will be a referendum in 2017. Let us have a proper debate and make time for that. The Government may have to postpone starting the new Session, if it is so important to them.
I believe that what has happened has improved UKIP’s chances. The politics of the Prime Minister’s decision was wrong, I think—but that is his judgment and one for the Conservatives. It is a fact that this Bill comes to us not having been contested in the House of Commons, with great big majorities there. I think that the largest opposition vote was 240 to 30. Neither the Liberal Democrats nor the Labour Party wants to break cover and say that they will not have a referendum, but that is because it is quite obvious that the general public wants one. So my advice is to do it.
The referendum in 1975 settled the issue for a long time, and was salutary and important. We were not going into Europe in 1972 with the whole-hearted consent of the British people—and we did after that. When we were negotiating and when we held the first presidency in 1977, it was an inestimable help to have that referendum behind us. So there is another reason. And then, in the 1983 election, the proposition was put to the country to come out of the European Union without even a referendum. That was blown to smithereens in the election. We will never come out of the European Union without a referendum, and I believe that that is an important constitutional safeguard. So those who decry having referendums on anything, like the noble Lord, Lord Oakeshott, are not living in the modern world. Referendums are here on constitutional questions; they have been incredibly helpful in Northern Ireland and can be stabilising mechanisms if they are used wisely.
We are not using the referendum wisely in this case. This is a silly piece of legislation and should not be in front of us. Were we to vote, I would vote rather reluctantly for it, because any other vote shows to the general public that you do not want a referendum and that you are afraid of it. As to the question of how I vote, I would leave that open. I do not think that this renegotiation is trivial; I hope that in the European elections we will have a long period in which people advance their reform agendas. Let us hear what they are, and hear what the Social Democrats want.
On present conduct and performance, I do not think that the present Prime Minister is ideally suited to negotiating a good deal for us. It is quite likely that a new Labour Government coming in in 2015 would be in a far better position, for one practical reason: they are fully paid-up members of the social democratic grouping, which is hugely influential in the European Parliament. That is another thing that has changed dramatically since 1975. You do not make changes nowadays in European treaties or make any major reform without the European Parliament. I regret that, because I think that it has been given too much power, but the fact is that you cannot get through any substantive reform without a fair measure of support in the European Parliament. Therefore, getting a political party like the Labour Party, which can mobilise the Social Democrats, would be helpful. The fact is that the Conservative Party is not able to mobilise the Christian Democrats.
I have spoken for long enough and feel that I have said all that I intend to say on this debate. I do not intend to participate in Committee.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe speech was that of a party leader, not a Prime Minister. What interests me, and, I suspect, interests the country, is what the Prime Minister is going to say when the European Council meets in the summer and, we are told, President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel will be proposing changes in the eurozone. Those changes are essential due to the economic situation—you have only to see the results in America. This economic global situation is still very serious and we need to encourage that process of reform in order to keep the eurozone viable. That is essential in the British interest.
I hope that the coalition will be able to put forward a sensible negotiating position. I suggest that it should be the following. There is no need for an intergovernmental conference but there will be a need for treaty change to reform the eurozone. We in Britain will be helpful in that process. Within the European Council we will contribute to unanimity where there is to be an increase in integration for the eurozone countries. Such treaty amendment would come under the significant clause in the very sensible legislation passed in this Parliament in 2011 allowing for a referendum where there is a transfer of sovereignty which affects this country. However, these transfers of sovereignty will not affect this country and therefore there does not have to be a referendum. That is a practical new idea and a negotiating stance which should be put forward this summer.
At the same time, we must argue—and it is perfectly rational to do so—that you cannot have much greater integration of the eurozone countries without there being a profound impact on the single market and indeed on other aspects of the European Union. That is not a selfish or a foolish view; it is a serious view, and it ought to be represented by some of the diplomats in this House a little more frequently. The fact is that in that debate we will put forward issues. It has been rightly said that it has already been addressed in part, but not sufficiently, in the banking union. If the eurozone countries were to vote en bloc in the single market, as they wanted to do in the banking union, that would have a profound effect. It would mean that all the voting—all the weighting—would be unanimous, even if there were disagreement within the eurozone. That is a profound change.
I believe that the way to deal with this is not with British exceptionalism; it is to accept that the single market needs to be restructured at the same time as there is reform of the eurozone. The best and simplest way of doing that would be to take one single initial step—to ensure that Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which are part of the EEA treaty, which has already separated out the single market from all the other aspects of the treaties, are invited in as full members. That would be a logical development. It would be a recognition of the fact that there are other European countries with interests and involvements in the single market, and it would ensure that Britain was not necessarily always alone because it was outside the eurozone. That is not an exceptionalist position. I believe that it could be argued for and it would be a sensible renegotiation—one which should not wait until after a general election which the Conservative Party may or may not win, but one which should happen now, in the present. That position should be put forward. There are other aspects of the single market that similarly should be addressed.
I remind noble Lords that the time limit for each speaker in this debate is three minutes.