(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 35 and 36 in this group, which are in my name. What I say is entirely without prejudice to what I said on the last group: changing the procedure does not make it acceptable for statutes to include fundamentally inappropriate delegations such as are included in the Bill. Nevertheless, we are now considering the Bill and the breadth of the powers as currently drafted, particularly those in Clause 2.
In that context, I draw attention to the use of the ghastly phrase “for example”, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, drew attention on Tuesday. To allow for the widest possible powers, and then to introduce them in a clause that starts:
“Regulations under subsection (1) may, for example”,
showing therefore that the powers are entirely unlimited, is completely unacceptable. However, that is the background against which we are considering the question of the appropriate procedure.
I do not believe that any regulations should be made under the Bill unless they are made by affirmative resolution. Should the Government come back on Report with a Bill in which the powers of the Minister are appropriately circumscribed, there may be a case for some regulations of a minor nature to be amenable to the negative resolution procedure.
In particular, I listened with care to what the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said when he drew a distinction between rolling over agreements that already exist in the regulations in relation to the EU-EEA-Switzerland agreements and others that we already have, and making new agreements and regulations in relation to them. That may be a point on which a distinction can be drawn, and no doubt the Minister and her colleagues will consider it as a possible distinction. Generally speaking, however, regulations of this type ought to be by affirmative resolution.
If, later on, we are looking at a very different Bill, I ask the Minister and her colleagues to consider the Delegated Powers Committee’s Guidance for Departments when determining how the procedures should be adopted, which procedure should be adopted, and the criteria that should be applied in choosing them.
My Lords, I will speak briefly on my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendments 27 and 41. Noble Lords will know that because of my role as a Minister up until the end of last year, I find some of the provisions in the Bill rather more defensible than do other noble Lords, and I know that that is a minority opinion. Nevertheless, the Minister has said that she will reflect on the House’s strength of feeling, and of course she has much greater wisdom than me on these matters.
I was struck by some comments made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern on the last group, when he talked about the scope of the Bill; that is relevant to the context of the amendments laid by my noble friend Lord Lansley. That is the point I was trying to make on Tuesday: there is no reason a priori why the Bill should not have a broader scope. As my noble friend pointed out, in other contexts, the House is arguing that similar Bills ought to, but it follows from that that the functions carried out as a consequence of the Bill are of two distinct types. One concerns what my noble friend called rollover Bills, to provide continuity with the EEA and Switzerland; the other concerns new arrangements—not necessarily with new countries but of a new and deeper kind. Clearly, that will be taking on a relationship that does not have precedent when it comes to dealing with individual countries, even if it has precedent as modelled on those available with the EEA and Switzerland.
My noble friend’s logic in thinking about how the regulation-making power ought to reflect that distinction is therefore sound. Clearly, there needs to be sensitivity. That is reflected in the timeliness and urgency of what we need to do for one set of circumstances and what we might want to do with the longer-term global role.
I am sure that the Minister will reflect carefully on the amendments. If the goal of the Bill should be to give us the broad scope, as I still believe, not only to deal with the consequences of leaving the European Union but to build a different, broader, more global set of relationships, which I think is the kind of network the House supports, there is a compelling case for my noble friend’s argument for a differentiated approach. Whether the specifics are right, I do not know; others will be in a position to judge. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on the amendments.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt is right that Clause 1 allows the Secretary of State to make payments out, but the point is that the regulations in Clause 2 provide for giving effect to a healthcare agreement. A healthcare agreement, as defined, allows reciprocity. My concern is that if we enter into healthcare agreements giving reciprocity on terms that are disadvantageous to the United Kingdom, that could involve our giving cheap access to the NHS.
This is a reciprocal healthcare Bill, after all. Let us separate out the point that the noble Lord is making about non-EEA countries for a moment. First, why would a Government—any Government—want to make such an agreement? It is meant to be reciprocal; it is not reciprocal if it is heavily one-sided. Secondly, why on earth would the House of Commons, which has the power to reject such a Bill, accept it? It is like saying that we would trade one thing for something entirely different because it is logically possible. Well, possibly, but that does not mean that anyone in their right mind would do it.
My noble friend could not have been clearer in everything she said: this Government, whose motives the noble Lord is impugning, would not act in such a way. The insinuation he is making simply does not follow from the Bill.
The noble Lord makes the point that whatever innocuous motivations may be expressed by Ministers at this stage, the powers in the Bill go far further. If there comes a stage where a Government are not so benign and have motivations that are political and unhelpful to the NHS—those could be, as I suggest, trade motivations—that presents a real risk. If easy access is given to the NHS in return, for example, for trade deals—