Health Service Medical Supplies (Costs) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord O'Shaughnessy
Main Page: Lord O'Shaughnessy (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord O'Shaughnessy's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Warner, for his amendment and for the opportunity it has provided to have this discussion. I had a feeling that this one might lead to a wide-ranging debate that would probably go well beyond the remit of the Bill. Indeed, I had that sense when I had meetings with him and other noble Lords. I am grateful to the welcome that has been extended to me and I have been looking forward—if that is the right phrase—to having this opportunity to discuss the Bill.
It is worth stepping back for a moment as we start. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Warner, will agree with the characterisation of this amendment by my noble friend Lord Lansley that it is more of a statement of intent than a concrete desire to change legislation. But, given that that is a decent characterisation, it is worth reprising what the Bill is trying to achieve. There is widespread support for many elements of the Bill.
We need to ensure that we have the right level of information to provide for three things: first, an accurate reimbursement of community pharmacies; secondly, information for price control schemes—and there are a variety of them, as we discussed—and, thirdly, the ability to get value for money and to ensure that, in relation to those instances that end up in the CMA, we are able to do something about them beforehand, because it takes a long time to get to that point. While it is important that that sort of back-stop provision is there—the big stick at the end of the road—ultimately, we do not want to get to that point, as it is an admission that we do not have the system right and have not controlled prices earlier on.
If those are the shared aims of the Bill, it is also important that we will the means. We cannot just say that we do not like these things and then not do anything about them. The question in regard to willing the means—and that is the main question about the Bill, and was so at Second Reading, when I listened as a Back-Bencher—is whether the provisions of the Bill are proportionate. That is the right question; “proportionate” can mean all sorts of things in different contexts, but it can mean proportionate in terms of the burden on firms, proportionate in terms of what it delivers in savings to the NHS, and so on. That is what sits behind many of the amendments that have been tabled by noble Lords, and we will have lots of opportunities to discuss them.
I think it is worth pointing out that the Bill does not introduce any new information requirements to the medical supplies industry, but rather clarifies the requirements and offers reassurances that provisions will be enacted only through regulation, which is a consultative process. Section 260 of the NHS Act 2006 already provides the Secretary of State with the power to make the medical supplies industry keep and provide information —the conception is that this has been extended to that industry. This power has not been used but, as we will discuss later, the instances where unjustified price rises have come about have happened in unbranded generics. That is one reason we are now acting as we are—because we did not have the power in advance. Of course, one can never anticipate all circumstances and instances in which that might happen.
I mention that only by way of a mini Second Reading debate and to reprise the purposes of the Bill and give background. It will also, I hope, give noble Lords an understanding that I know what the pressure points are and understand the balance that we have to draw between the two. As several noble Lords have pointed out, and following historical precedent, my particular policy brief does hold both the responsibility for a flourishing life sciences sector and for medicine pricing and regulation. I am acutely aware that those are two sides of the same coin and can be in tension with one another. The goal is to have a win-win situation in which the NHS gets good prices, new drugs come through the system and the life sciences industry feels that the United Kingdom is a place where it wants to do business. Pricing is one part of that, but there are lots of other factors, such as the ability to carry out clinical trials, R&D, the environment and so on.
While the Government agree with the underlying principles behind the amendment and the two arms of the legal duty, we are not convinced that a legal duty is the right approach. We recognise the vital role that the life sciences sector has in our economy. Thanks to the research and development efforts of the life sciences industry, which contributes £56 billion and tens of thousands of jobs to the UK economy every year, our understanding of diseases and the best way to treat them has improved dramatically over the past 20 years.
As several noble Lords have referenced, the Government launched today a UK-wide industrial strategy, which is a critical part of the Prime Minister’s ambition to build an economy that works for everyone. It is not about picking winners but about making sure that we play to our strengths and build on the comparative advantages that we have. I am therefore grateful for the opportunity to talk about the commitment to the life sciences industry, which I know was one of the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, in tabling the amendment, and to re-emphasise the Government’s commitment.
The UK has one of the strongest and most productive life sciences industries in the world. Technology and commercial pressures are transforming the field of healthcare technology and the Government’s ambition, as set out in the life sciences strategy of 2011, is to anticipate and react to these changes while building on existing strengths. Innovation, funding for scientific research, aligned regulatory systems and access to the best people and talent all have a role in supporting a flourishing life sciences sector that goes beyond the prices paid for medicines and medical supplies.
In the context of the industrial strategy that was launched today, there will be a sector-specific life sciences industrial strategy to follow in due course. That will be an opportunity to make sure that we are able to address the concerns that exists in the life sciences industry, which are not peculiar to the Bill but are around, for example, the pricing environment and Brexit, which is a continuing concern. It may not always be popular to say so but it is the view of the Government that Brexit offers a number of opportunities as well as challenges. We will be seeking to make the most of those in our own regulatory system and in how we can provide exactly the kind of fertile ground that the life sciences industry needs to flourish in this country. There is a deep commitment to making that work.
I turn now to the second arm of the duty: making sure that the Secretary of State has regard to ensuring that patients have speedy access to NICE-approved medicines. We believe that this duty is also unnecessary. As noble Lords will know, NICE technology appraisals provides robust, evidence-based guidance for the NHS on whether drugs and other treatments represent a clinically effective and cost-effective use of NHS resources. NHS commissioners are legally required to fund treatments recommended in NICE guidance, usually within three months of the final guidance. This legal requirement is also reinforced in the NHS constitution as a right to NICE-recommended drugs and treatments.
We recognise that there is a remaining challenge in encouraging practitioners to use NICE-recommended treatments. The latest data from the innovation scorecard shows that the rate of uptake and utility of new medicines recommended by NICE are increasing. I acknowledge the picture indicating that we are lagging behind where we should be, so there is no complacency on that point. We are working to improve the scorecard to make it a more effective, accessible and useful tool to identify unjustifiable variation in the uptake of innovative new products.
The Government and their arm’s-length bodies are also taking forward a number of actions to improve access to, and uptake of, new medicines. The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency—the MHRA—has initiated an early access to medicines scheme, providing a platform to bring drugs that do not yet have a licence to patients at a much faster rate than before. The scheme is making a real difference, as 25 promising innovative medicine designations and 10 positive scientific opinions have been awarded by the MHRA since the launch of the scheme in 2014. We also have the NHS test beds programme, which is supporting the testing and uptake of innovations across the NHS, and the accelerated access review, which has been published and which the Government will respond to as part of their industrial strategy.
I would also like to take the opportunity to address a number of points raised by noble Lords during this very informative and useful discussion. We will no doubt come back to these things on other amendments. We have talked about CMA fines and what we might do further upstream. There was a question mark over changes to the statutory scheme and whether there had been proper consultation. There will be further consultation on the implementation of the statutory scheme later this year, in addition to the consultations that have taken place. I should also point out that I intend to meet all the relevant industry groups, which I have not had the opportunity to do yet, to make sure that I hear first-hand about their concerns. I am endeavouring to do that in between Committee and Report so that we have the opportunity to have that personal dialogue—one that will reflect on the decisions we make today and on Wednesday about what the right approach is.
As the noble Lord, Lord Young, said, there is a case for action here. The question is always whether what we are doing is proportionate, so I thank him for that support. I was not aware of the issue about clinical pharmacology and will certainly look into it. If he and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would like a meeting about this to help me understand that better, I would be delighted. It is clearly an important part of having the right approach.
The work on antimicrobial resistance is being taken forward with great gusto by my colleague the Chief Medical Officer, Dame Sally Davies. She generously gave me a copy of her own book to read about that the other day—which I dutifully did, quickly, so that I could answer questions on it. We are putting forward a candidate to run the World Health Organization, Dr David Nabarro, who is deeply committed to this. We obviously hope that his candidature will be successful. I reassure the Committee that that work very much goes on.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked about the nature of the pricing and control scheme. I am grateful to her for sharing her knowledge in a personal meeting. There is a tension between getting the right deal and disincentivising investment in the life sciences. It is always a fraught point—as my noble friend Lord Lansley said, every time we have one of these negotiations the balance is slightly different—but I am aware that it is an important balance to strike throughout.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Redfern for her support for the Bill and for the importance of driving value. We will have an opportunity to discuss ring-fencing shortly. I do not want to get ahead of myself on that, but we will address it. I had the great pleasure of working for my noble friend Lord Lansley when the Conservative Party was in opposition and I know that he has been very committed for a long time to value-based pricing and getting a good deal. I am grateful for his knowledge on that. Again, we will have the opportunity to talk about those things in a group of his amendments, so I do not want to spend any more time on that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Masham, asked particularly about pricing differences in England and Scotland. I think that we will address that at a later point. There are differences in how drugs are priced according to packs versus units, the starting point and so on. The picture is quite good when you look at it in the round for particular products, but I would be delighted to discuss that with her further, if she wants.
Finally, on the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I have tried to express again why we think that the Bill is necessary. The noble Lord talked about the open-ended nature of the Bill, which we will look at in amendments at the end of the process. Clearly, we do not want a declining UK sector or rationing. That involves, first, a proper life sciences industrial strategy, which we will have. I would like to think that that is not just the preserve of the governing party but something to which all parties would want to contribute. I look forward to working with noble Lords, who have tremendous experience in this area, to gain their ideas to help us with that.
We also need to drive access through the system. That is one part of an industrial strategy. It cannot be done just by diktat. We rightly put clinical decision-making at the centre of our system, but there are things that we can do beyond what we are currently doing to improve access, which I would be delighted to talk about and work on further with noble Lords as we draw out that life sciences strategy.
I apologise for the slightly long contribution, but I wanted to take the opportunity to respond to noble Lords and to set the scene. While we support the principles of the amendment on the duty, I do not believe that the aim is best achieved through having a legal duty. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Let me thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply and for his openness in discussing things with us all. He talks about having discussions with the industry. I hope that he is aware that there is a move by the industry to consolidate into three major hubs, or potentially four. The fourth would be the Oxford-Cambridge-London axis, the other three being those in Boston, in California and in Basle in Switzerland. We are at a critical time, because a lot of change is going on—hence the motivation for so many of us to support the amendment, as we are aware that things are potentially fragile.
I thank the noble Baroness for that point, with which I completely concur. This is obviously a big moment in time, for several reasons. Our current price regulation systems for pharmaceuticals run until the end of 2018 and, in 2019, we will leave the European Union. These things are bundled together and co-dependent; making the right decisions on each of the factors will have a knock-on effect on the rest. I very much understand the point. As I said, my job has the tension of both responsibilities, including health, and the trick is to square the circle.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response but I was not convinced and I am not sure that the industry will be convinced. Over time, the industry is seeing the legal requirement to implement NICE being watered down by NHS England in effect introducing a cost-control system on top of the legal requirement. It is seeing the Government fixated with cost rather than innovation and patient interest. Companies are seeing their investment drop and their involvement in this country being called much more into question by their boards. That is the issue. It is not about whether the Minister can convince me or this Committee; it is whether he can convince the outside world in this sector. At the moment, I am inclined to pursue this on Report, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
There is a risk of going on about this, but the structure of the amendment in the context of the PPRS as presently constructed is illogical, because the PPRS is constructed around budget control. The point, however—we will no doubt come back to this, not least on the next group—is that we should be thinking about how we can arrive at a negotiated price for the NHS to buy medicines which may well be marketed initially or globally at a given price, but the amount that the NHS should pay should reflect value. I have said it before and I will keep coming back to it.
I would not be as disparaging of the current consultation between NHS England and NICE at the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. It could have the effect that he describes: adding additional jeopardy because one has to meet not only all the normal criteria for an effective medicine but the NICE threshold, and NHS England might step in with hobnailed boots and say, “But we are not going to make it available and you must change the funding direction”. But it might recognise reality. The consultation, in my view, may have the effect of avoiding arbitrary post hoc rationing of medicines, because the NHS should be up front, negotiating price discounts on medicines, regardless of the rebate. That means engaging with the industry at an early point.
If the industry understands the consultation properly, it will understand that the budgetary impact for the NHS under current circumstances cannot be ignored. The best way to deal with that is not to go through all these processes and then find, at the end of the day, that the NHS cannot afford it, or that NICE has to say no through the application of the threshold. Rather, it is to use the pharmaco-economic evaluation and the health technology assessment properly alongside NHS England and say: “Here is something that is valuable and we want to be able to use it, but we must recognise the budgetary impacts”. There may well therefore be some risk-sharing processes or discounting processes to enable the product to be available to the NHS at an early stage and to give industry and the NHS all the information they need subsequently to be able to make sure that they have got the pricing right.
I thank noble Lords for these amendments and for the discussion that has followed. I will come back to the issue of budgetary control raised by my noble friend Lord Lansley. I do not think it is enough simply to say that it should not be a factor. It is a factor and I will talk about how that interacts with the current system in my response.
Our concerns with these amendments are twofold—one is a matter of principle and the second is a matter of practice. In my short period in the office I have already had an opportunity to talk about ring-fencing on at least one occasion. Noble Lords understand that the Government’s policy is not to ring-fence with budgets set by politicians but rather to give money to the NHS and its constituent parts and to trust clinical judgment on commissioning health services in response to the regulatory regime that is set up to hold them accountable. I have not yet heard from anybody who disagrees with that fundamental principle.
Amendments 2 and 4 are unnecessary, therefore, because all the income and savings from the PPRS and the statutory scheme are already invested in NHS services. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, the anticipated income from the PPRS and the statutory scheme are put into the NHS baseline. That baseline is the figure above which we will be spending the additional £10 billion by 2020-21. That money is already in the baseline and it is there to be used with the discretion of clinicians within the system.
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 requires the Secretary of State to promote the autonomy of NHS England and clinical commissioning groups. This includes their decisions as commissioners about priorities for funding. That is because it is a fundamental principle of the NHS that funding should be allocated according to clinical priorities based on the judgment of clinical commissioners. That might include new treatments but it might include scaling up older, effective treatments or investing in staff. The proposed amendments would result in the income received from a voluntary or statutory scheme being used solely for the purposes of reimbursing the NHS for medicines and medical supplies. It is perhaps worth highlighting to noble Lords that the NHS spent over £15.2 billion on medicines in 2015-16—far in excess of the cumulative income received from both schemes.
I come to a couple of points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The first, as I mentioned, is on budgetary control. The second is that if additional money were spent, it could be recycled back into funding for innovative drugs. I am not sure. I have not had the opportunity yet to consult with the boards of life sciences companies, but I am not sure that there is an open-ended commitment there either to continue spending money in the NHS. There is a need for budgetary control on both sides. I appreciate—and it is a strong theme in this debate and was in the previous debate—the need to do something about access. The ability to access drugs and to access them quickly is both good for patients—because clearly those drugs are being approved because they are an improvement largely on what has gone before—and also good for life sciences. If we are in the game, as it were, of trying to find a win-win out of the changes we make now or in future, clearly access will be a clear part of that.
My noble friend Lord Lansley touched on a practical objection. It is the potential unintended consequence of ring-fencing the income from schemes specifically for certain types or categories of medicines. The income from the PPRS and the statutory scheme can fluctuate, so allocating the income to a specific area, such as new medicines, brings risk. This could potentially disadvantage patients by making treatment dependent on income from medicines pricing schemes, thereby producing inequities. At the moment the Department of Health manages that risk. The proposed changes would move that risk on to the NHS—which, as we know, is already under a great deal of pressure.
I understand the intention behind the amendments, but I am not convinced that the Government predetermining clinical decisions and clinical priorities for spending on medicines and medical supplies is the right way to go. We believe that the current PPRS is designed to incentivise companies to bring new medicines to market. Companies with mainly new medicines in their portfolios pay less than companies with mainly old medicines, and as part of the PPRS, the Government have made a number of commitments around NICE decisions and the funding of NICE-approved products in order to support access to new medicines.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, skipped over the first part of Amendment 3. For the sake of completeness, I shall dwell on it briefly. The amendment would circumvent an important part of the checks and balances around prescribing systems. It would basically do away with the NICE process by going straight from licence to availability with clinicians, which we do not think is the right approach.
The second part of Amendment 3 would link the payment mechanisms for the statutory and voluntary schemes, and Amendment 5 would require us to secure equivalent terms for both schemes. The Government’s intention is for the two schemes to deliver a broadly equivalent—I emphasise “broadly”—level of savings as a proportion of the total sales covered by each scheme. However, to require the terms of each scheme to be the same, which is what the amendments denote, would be inappropriate and would severely restrict the scope for the two schemes to operate in a complementary manner. The idea of equivalence is too strong and would involve there being similar processes, whereas the alignment approach outlined in the Bill would allow for similar outcomes, which is ultimately what we are driving at and would not undermine the complementarity of the two approaches.
The voluntary scheme is a matter for negotiation with industry. As such, there is scope to include a range of measures that reflect the priorities of both sides. To give an example, the current voluntary scheme, the PPRS, includes a range of provisions developed through negotiation with industry that sit alongside the payment mechanism. They include price modulation, which enables companies to put prices up and down as long as the overall effect across their portfolio is neutral. This has commercial value to companies, who may be willing to accept a higher payment percentage as a result.
To give another example, while new medicines in the PPRS are excluded from the PPRS payments, the PPRS payment percentage level is set to achieve the agreed level of savings across both old and new medicines. This means that each company’s share of the income due to the Government will vary depending on the balance of new and old products in their portfolio, with companies which have mainly new products paying less than companies with mainly old products—there is obviously value in that for encouraging innovation.
However, it would be very challenging to replicate this model in the statutory scheme, as many fewer companies are affected by the statutory scheme regulations than are members of the PPRS. As a result, there is a smaller pool of companies with older products. To achieve the same level of savings overall from the statutory scheme as from the PPRS while exempting new products would require an extremely high payment percentage—I think that my noble friend Lord Lansley conceded that point. This provides an example of where minor differences in terms may be required to deliver an equivalent level of savings across the two schemes overall. The detail of how a future statutory scheme would work will be subject to further consultation that will take place this year.
The freedom to be able to negotiate the voluntary scheme has been valued greatly by both industry and government. We would intend that any future voluntary scheme is established through negotiation in this way, but linking the payment mechanisms as described in the amendments would inevitably place a restriction on that freedom.
Amendment 6 would mean that the Secretary of State’s powers to operate a statutory scheme would be permitted only while a voluntary scheme was in operation—a point that has already been raised. It is clear that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, is keen to retain a voluntary scheme in future and we know that industry values the agreement, which began 60 years ago in 1957 and has been of benefit to both government and the life sciences sector over that time.
The current scheme, the 2014 PPRS, and its predecessors show how government and industry can work together to develop solutions on a voluntary basis for the benefit of patients. Like the noble Lord, I am keen to continue the collaborative and productive relationship that the Government currently have with the pharmaceutical and life sciences industries. With the life sciences industrial strategy coming up, and reflecting on the debates that we have had, it is clear that there is a lot more we can do to enhance that relationship.
However, the amendment would have the effect of giving industry no incentive to agree a voluntary scheme, as there would be no fallback to a statutory scheme in the event of failing to agree a voluntary scheme. Without a voluntary scheme in operation, there would be no scheme to control the cost of medicines—so it would in effect tie one hand behind our back in any negotiations.
The statutory scheme and the PPRS both include provisions for controlling the maximum price of medicines, and these prices are the starting point for negotiation of supply contracts between the NHS and suppliers of medicines. As I think all noble Lords would recognise, removal of both schemes would risk significant price rises.
I am sympathetic to the noble Lord’s intention in tabling this amendment and welcome the opportunity to reassure him and other noble Lords that the Government are committed to continuing a collaborative approach to future medicines pricing arrangements. We firmly believe that it is beneficial to collaborate with industry to develop the successor arrangements to the 2014 PPRS. This legislation should provide the widest possible range of options in order that the best arrangements, whether voluntary or statutory, can be put in place for the benefit of NHS patients.
However, the amendment would have the opposite effect by removing a key incentive for industry to collaborate, and would bring significant risks to the control of the cost of medicines. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
My Lords, we tabled Amendment 7 to probe the Government on why, in their new draft regulations, with 25 pages just on the branded medicines proposals, they seek to alter the current arrangements for exempting low-cost presentations from the price-reduction requirements of the statutory scheme. As the Minister will know, the existing regulations specify as an exemption a low reimbursement price of either under £2 an item or low primary care sales to NHS England of less than £450,000 a year. The provision has been there to protect the commercial viability of low-revenue or very low-cost medicines. It therefore seems somewhat counterintuitive to remove this safeguard at a time of such significant uncertainty for the pharmaceutical industry, particularly in the face of what could be a highly disruptive withdrawal from the EU.
Under paragraph 11, the proposed revised regulations give the Secretary of State the power to exempt a manufacturer or supplier where he considers that an exemption is necessary to ensure adequate supplies of medicines for health services purposes. This changes the current arrangements to give the Secretary of State a discretionary power that he may use in certain circumstances, rather than the automatic exemption that currently operates for £2 per item or a £450,000 annual sum. The current provision is important in maintaining adequate supplies to the health service of the medicines in question.
We are concerned about the significant impact that the removal of the current arrangements will have on manufacturers producing the common, low-cost generic branded medicines in question, such as those for hypertension. Although it is not always the case, the producers of such low-cost medicines are often small businesses operating on small margins. If they are not exempted from paying a rebate on those medicines, many will struggle to maintain current low costs, resulting in a consequent rise in costs for those medicines.
It is also important that the regulations accompanying the Bill maintain a specific exemption from the statutory scheme in the case of supply shortages, as currently. Amendment 8 would therefore formally place this duty on the Secretary of State. This is particularly important given the concerns of GPs and other health professionals, who have voiced frustration about having to prescribe “second choice” medicines because their preferred drug is out of stock. Representative bodies have also expressed their concern about the removal of the current exemption.
The amendments do not call for anything new but for some of the current regulations to be maintained and—where the Secretary of State believes that there is a case for it—strengthened. I look forward to hearing from the Minister the Government’s reasons for seeking to change the current regulations. Has any work been undertaken to assess the potential impact on the future availability and cost of the medicines that will be affected, and on future supplies? Is this designed to save costs—and, if so, what is the expected level of savings to the NHS?
Noble Lords may feel that there is a case for debating the long-term place of such exemptions in the regulations, but now is clearly not the time to pull the rug from beneath the producers of low-cost medicines, or medicines at risk of supply shortages. Instead, it is important that the status quo is maintained until such time as the Government can be clear about the consequences and the benefits of any change. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, for raising important issues through these amendments, both of which relate to the operation of the statutory scheme. I will turn to each separately.
Amendment 7 would set an exemption for low-cost presentations, defined in primary legislation as those presentations,
“of less than £2 per unit or with sales to NHS England totalling less than £450,000 per annum”.
This is similar to the exemption that exists in the current statutory scheme for presentations with a reimbursement price of less than £2.
Officials have continued to have constructive discussions with industry representatives and stakeholders throughout the consultation and since publishing the illustrative regulations. Through these discussions, my officials have been listening to views on the illustrative regulations and refining the policy approach for a future statutory scheme. I am sympathetic to the arguments that companies make in relation to these types of low-cost presentations, which could not only lead to direct savings to the NHS when compared to more expensive treatments but incentivise companies to lower prices further to meet the threshold. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, that as a result of the discussions with industry, my officials are already considering a policy approach for low-price presentations.
However, the Government are not convinced that it is appropriate or desirable to have such an exemption set out in primary legislation. Setting out specific thresholds in primary legislation would be inflexible and would limit the Government’s ability to adjust them to account for the economic circumstances at the time. I can, however, commit that an exemption for low-price presentations will be included as part of the forthcoming consultation on the operation of the scheme, which will take place this year. I hope that this provides the noble Baroness and other noble Lords with the reassurance that the Government will fully consider this and take it forward.
Turning to the second amendment, Amendment 8 would place a legal duty on the Secretary of State to make provisions which “ensure adequate supplies” of those medicines in the statutory scheme. The production and supply of medicines is complex and highly regulated, involving materials and processes that must, rightly, meet rigorous safety and quality standards. These complex factors stretch far beyond those that relate specifically to medicine costs. Difficulties in ensuring supply can arise for a number of reasons including manufacturing problems, supply and demand imbalance and issues related to raw materials and regulatory action as a result of, for example, manufacturing site inspections. It is also important to remember the impact of a globalised pharmaceutical industry, which can mean that factors around the world can directly impact supplies of medicines to the UK.
However, I reassure the Committee that the Government recognise the vital importance of ensuring adequate supplies and actively manage and respond to supply issues on a daily basis. The Government have also carefully considered the supply issues in developing policy and regulation. We consider that in most cases, the ability to increase prices, as provided in the illustrative regulations, is the right way to address short or long-term supply problems, where these circumstances are dependent on UK pricing. We also recognise that there may be exceptions to this approach, which is why we included in the illustrative regulations a provision in Regulation 11 allowing the Secretary of State to exempt companies from price controls in the statutory scheme,
“where he considers that an exemption is necessary to ensure adequate supplies of that presentation for health service purposes”.
I understand and am sympathetic to the intention behind the amendment and concerns relating to the supply of medicines in the statutory scheme. However, given the complexities in the provision and supply of medicines, we believe that exemptions for supply issues are best dealt with by exemption, rather than a comprehensive and broad duty. In responding to both amendments, I hope that I have provided the Committee with the assurance that we recognise the concerns and will address them in both primary legislation and the illustrative regulations. I ask that the noble Baroness withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and for the focus that he says that he will give in future to constructive consultation with the industry. There was a feeling that it was not being consulted on these issues, and his reassurances about that are welcome. Obviously, supply in the industry is complex and I will look at what the Minister said. We are concerned about the industry’s fears about the cost of deleting these provisions and we were certainly not advocating putting them into statutory requirements but making sure that the regulations dealt with this issue adequately. For the most part, I thank the Minister for the response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 14, but I also support in principle Amendments 9 and 10A in this group. Each of these amendments does something slightly different and they need some consolidation. They are, however, a reflection of a deep sense of unease over where the Bill is taking us and a strong wish to monitor its consequences. The Government are imposing a lot of requirements on the industry for information. The quid-pro-quo is that we would like a lot more information from the Government on how this has worked in practice.
There seem to be three features that that kind of reporting back should cover. The first is the scale of payments made; the second is the use to which the money has been put; and the third is the impact of the Bill on the access to new medicines of NHS patients. It would not be right to try to draft this off the tops of our heads, but it would be helpful if the Government would accept that there should be some kind of monitoring of key issues around the Bill that are then reported back to Parliament and the public on a regular basis—let us say annually—and if we could get together with the Government to help draft something for Report in this kind of territory.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for raising the issue of reporting requirements. We will address at the end the issue of access and my sympathy to reporting requirements, but I first want to deal with the amendments as they stand.
Under the current PPRS, the Government regularly publish information relating to the operation of the voluntary scheme. Of course, for a future statutory scheme I draw attention to the regulations that we have already discussed, in which there are annual reviews of the regulations and a requirement to publish a report on each review. The illustrative regulations require an annual review that will: set out the objectives of the scheme; assess the extent that our objectives have been achieved; and assess whether those objectives remain appropriate. These requirements will be tested through the consultation on the regulations and we will, of course, take account of those views. I totally accept that reporting is a critical principle, but believe that setting out the requirements in primary legislation is too restrictive because of the potential to change from year to year what the priorities are within a sector and within the NHS.
Turning to the specifics of Amendment 9, I reassure noble Lords that the content of annual reviews would not be restricted to reviewing objectives. They must also be able to address key issues arising during the year that might affect the operation of the scheme, so there is flexibility there. We also intend for the annual review to be published and put before Parliament, so there is the opportunity for that to be seen and discussed. On the details of what it is proposed to report—in particular, how the payments are used—to achieve the specific aims of the amendment, the department would need to ring-fence the funds and monitor where the payments are used. I do not want to rehash our discussion about ring-fencing. I take seriously the point that noble Lords make about driving access to innovative drugs but we do not think this is the right way of doing it.
Nor do I believe that, through these means, it is right to address matters relating to the NHS duty to promote innovation. This Bill is ultimately about controlling the cost of medicines and medical supplies. The NHS Act 2006 puts duties on the Secretary of State to take into account both the need for medicinal products to be available for the health service on reasonable terms and the costs of research and development, which is a big factor in innovation. By taking into account these factors, the Secretary of State is looking at the needs of the industry to support the R&D base as is necessary to support the development of innovative medicines and technologies.
The NHS duty to promote innovation is different. It is about promoting innovation in the provision of health services and there is an extremely broad agenda that goes well beyond medicines. We have already said that we all want to make the UK the best place in the world to design, develop and deploy life sciences products. We do not believe that the Bill will have a negative impact on our doing so. We have also talked about the accelerated access review, so I will not go over that.
Turning to the specifics of Amendment 10A, the supply of medicines is highly complex, and pricing is one part of it. Other issues of course include rigorous safety and quality standards. Difficulties faced in the take-up or availability of medicines can be influenced by a number of reasons which are nothing to do with pricing. There can be manufacturing problems, such as batch failures; changes in guidelines, such as antibiotic switches; and raw material problems, as well as regulatory changes.
For example, in 2015, there was worldwide withdrawal of a branded antipsychotic injection, Piportil, due to a global shortage of the active pharmaceutical ingredient. Sanofi was unable to find an alternative source of this ingredient and had to discontinue the product. I set that out to illustrate the point that it is not always easy to link changes in pricing to issues of availability or access: there are other things to take into account. That is why we do not believe that we should set out, either in primary legislation or beyond the commitments made in the illustrative regulations, specifically to assess the impact on availability, access and so on.
Leaving all that aside and returning to the recurring theme of the debate, I understand the desire for greater transparency, which is undoubtedly the right approach to access. We must think about how we can improve access to innovative medicines for NHS patients and, in doing so, improve the operating conditions, if you like, for the life sciences industry—the win-win situation to which we keep returning. I would be happy to meet noble Lords either individually or collectively to think about what more we could do, whether through the Bill or looking ahead to the life sciences strategy, to ensure that we deliver on this promise. I take very seriously the warnings that many noble Lords have issued; the Government absolutely want to address this. On that basis, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. On the two arguments he put forward against the amendments, he said, first, that primary legislation would be too restrictive and what one might need to report on one year, one would not in another. The three amendments cover payment, supply, R&D and innovation. I do not think that there would be any year in which it would not be appropriate to report on them. He also said that duties in existing legislation cover some of these areas, and that where they do, such as the duty on innovation—presumably in the 2012 Act—they go wider than the intent in the amendments. I fully accept that. None the less, there is a strong argument for progress being monitored and for Parliament to be involved in that. However, I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing to have further discussion about the core issue of access, and I hope that we may take this forward. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for this amendment and I pay tribute to his considerable expertise in this area. We had the opportunity to discuss some of this when we met. I also recognise that the amendment’s purpose is to start thinking ahead to what comes next. It is not so much to define right here and now what is required but to do something which I think he has been trying to do for a long time: to broaden the discussion about how we price value into medicines and bring that broader discussion to bear. I recognise the intention. It clearly is important that we think of these things in the broadest possible sense for the benefit of the most people possible.
Amendment 10 would require the Secretary of State to have regard to factors such as therapeutic benefit to patients, meeting unmet need, wider societal benefits, the promotion of innovation in new therapies and NHS affordability. I would like to draw noble Lords’ attention to the legal duties that already exist, which the Government believe currently achieve the intention behind the amendment. Section 266(4) of the NHS Act 2006 already requires the Government to bear in mind,
“the need for medicinal products to be available to the health service on reasonable terms”,
and,
“the costs of research and development”,
when limiting the price of medicines—something we discussed in the last group. Section 233 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 requires NICE to have regard to,
“the broad balance between the benefits and costs of provision … the degree of need … and … the desirability of promoting innovation”.
In reading out these sections, I am beginning to understand that these Acts are often very, very long. I am thankful for small mercies that our Bill is not, yet.
As part of the NICE clinical and cost-effectiveness assessments, NICE already considers factors such as therapeutic benefit to patients, unmet clinical need and the promotion of innovation, and has recently consulted on new affordability considerations. The point here is that some of the factors that my noble friend is concerned about are already taking place but within the NICE process as part of that assessment.
The Government’s priority is to make sure we get the best possible results for all NHS patients with the resources we have. We will continue to look at how to promote better access to effective medicines through NICE recommendations and guidance to the NHS. In developing that guidance, NICE takes account of all health-related costs and benefits, including the benefits to carers. As I am sure my noble friend will recall, in 2014, NICE considered changes to its methods to better capture the wider costs and benefits to society of new drugs and treatments, sometimes known as value-based pricing. It is only responsible to report that, during the consultation, some significant concerns were raised; for example, about the potential implications for products that offer limited life extension without associated gains in quality of life for those with terminal illnesses. The consultation highlighted a significant diversity of responses, demonstrating that this is a complex issue. The point here is to say that there may be a way through, but we do not yet know what the right way forward is. It is critical that stakeholders continue to have confidence in NICE’s work, and we agree with NICE that these issues require very careful consideration before making changes to the way that we assess medicines.
My final point is on freedom of pricing, an issue that has been raised and which this amendment would have an impact on. Noble Lords will be aware that the Government, when setting prices for new medicines, currently operate a system of freedom of pricing for medicines that are a new active substance. This means that the maximum NHS price approved and published by the Secretary of State is that proposed by companies. NICE will then assess the product and consider whether it is clinically and cost effective. The PPRS allows a company to propose a discount to the maximum price.
We know that this system of freedom of pricing for new active substances is of great value to the life sciences industry, providing commercial flexibility, which is important in a context where other countries may reference the maximum NHS price in their own pricing arrangements—something we know to be of huge value. It does not prevent the NHS securing substantial discounts, which indeed it does, and these form part of the overall assessment of value undertaken by NICE. The amendment could, however, have the effect of removing the principle of freedom of pricing, which has been an important pillar of medicines pricing agreements for years. It would require the introduction of assessments akin to clinical and cost effectiveness when determining price, as opposed to determining through NICE whether it should be used. Such an approach would largely replicate the factors that NICE considers as part of its clinical and cost-effectiveness assessments.
I want to make one final point on the current scheme and looking ahead. The PPRS commits the Government to maintaining the basic NICE threshold and take-up periods until the end of 2018. It is my belief that the right time to look at whether the sorts of factors that my noble friend has raised should be taken into account in medicines funding and pricing arrangements is as part of discussions on a new medicines pricing system, where it can then be looked at in the round. That opportunity will arise when considering what should happen when the current PPRS expires. I would be very happy to explore with him proposals on what any new scheme could look like. I look forward to productive dialogue and to benefiting from his wisdom in the months ahead. On that basis, we believe that the amendment is unnecessary, although we sympathise with its intention. I therefore ask my noble friend to withdraw it.
I am grateful to my noble friend for that thoughtful and helpful response. I will say three things. First, thank you for the opportunity to be consulted as the future PPRS structure is developed. I very much appreciate that.
Secondly, on freedom of pricing and introduction, it does not necessarily follow that putting into the legislation the criteria that Ministers should take into account in so far as they exercise their powers has a direct impact. That might be done, as I described, through the mechanism of modulating the rebate, which would not impact on the freedom of pricing and introduction.
My third point is that I did not invent value-based pricing. I may have advocated it for some considerable time—probably 10 years now—but it was advocated before I took it up by the OECD in a wide-ranging report on pharmaceutical pricing internationally and by the Office of Fair Trading in its review of the previous PPRS.
My Lords, this group of government amendments would ensure that, as is the case with the power to control the cost of health service medicines in the NHS Act 2006, the Secretary of State would be required to consult representative bodies before making legislation to control prices of medical supplies.
The NHS Act 2006 contains provision for the Secretary of State to control the cost of both health service medicines and medical supplies. It also contains a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult with the industry body before any cost control scheme for health service medicines is made. There is, however, no requirement to consult before making price controls on medical supplies. The amendment would introduce this requirement.
An amendment was tabled in Committee and on Report in the House of Commons, with support from Labour and the SNP. It would have had a similar effect, but it was not consistent with the existing provisions for health service medicines in the NHS Act 2006. Representative bodies in the medical devices sector have expressed their support for the amendment. I believe that it would improve the Bill by ensuring that appropriate consultation takes place before the introduction of any scheme to control the price of medical supplies. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will be prepared to accept this amendment.
My Lords, I think you only want to modernise something when you are planning to use it. Therefore, I hope the Minister can understand the level of suspicion and worry that we have been hearing from the sector. I understand that the Government want to make the penalty for not complying with the information requirements more proportionate—that is fair enough. But if the Government are not planning to use those powers then why do they want to make that small but fairly significant change?
I am not aware of any competition law action against companies providing medical supplies to say they have abused the system or overcharged. I am aware that an awful lot of the companies producing medical supplies are fairly small and would fall below the £5 million level and therefore not be affected by this. However, some companies that provide a lot of equipment and supplies do come within the scope of what the Government are trying to do, but they are, in fact, very competitive. It is a very competitive market already and, as far as I know, the prices charged are affected by competition. Therefore, to my knowledge, the NHS is not being ripped off. I have asked the Minister whether he has any evidence to the contrary. I have not heard anything yet, but perhaps he will be able to give us something this evening.
I thank noble Lords for the debate on Clause 5. I am also grateful for the tour d’horizon or history lesson on how this has all come about. It feels as though it has slipped through many nets, for which there are multiple responsibilities around the room.
I will first address the point about consultation. Noble Lords will appreciate it when I say that, personally, I have not had the chance of undertaking that consultation but it is something that I am committed to doing. Whatever has gone before, I can at least give the reassurance that I will meet the relevant bodies in the next few weeks and discuss their concerns ahead of Report. At least in a forward-looking way, I can provide that reassurance.
As everyone has stated, the critical point here is that the 2006 Act gives the Secretary of State the power to control the price of medical supplies and to collect information about medical supplies. What Clause 5 does is to ensure that the same enforcement and territorial extent to provisions apply to controlling the cost of medical supplies and health service medicines. It does not give the Secretary of State any new powers to control the price of medical supplies. There are currently inconsistencies in the enforcement and territorial extent provisions. For example, a contravention or a failure to comply with the current provisions in the 2006 Act for medical supplies can result in a criminal offence. By contrast, the equivalent penalty for medicines is a civil financial penalty. Clause 5, therefore, aligns the enforcement provisions for medical supplies with those for medicines and, in so doing, makes them more proportionate, as the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, has pointed out.
With respect to the territorial extent, the power to control the prices of medical supplies in the NHS Act 2006 currently extends only to England and Wales. Clause 5 would extend the power to control the prices of medical supplies to Scotland and Northern Ireland. That would be consistent with the territorial extent of the powers to control the costs of health service medicines. That is an important point.
A number of noble Lords asked why the Government need the powers to control the prices of medical supplies when they do not currently use them nor have ever used them. That is a perfectly reasonable question to raise and one that occurred to me, too. We do not have any immediate concerns about the pricing of medical supplies. It is true that the market for medical supplies is very different from the market for medicines. It is innovative and competitive, and new medical supplies are generally faced with competition much more quickly than is the case for new medicines. However, I remind noble Lords that until recently we did not think that we needed the powers to set the price of unbranded generic medicines. We thought that competition in the market was working well and keeping prices down. When we realised that the market was not functioning as well as we thought with respect to certain products, and we were faced with companies charging unreasonably high thresholds where they had no competitors, we realised that we did not have sufficient powers to intervene when needed. That is of course one of the reasons for the Bill.
A question was asked about thresholds and when such a provision could be triggered, which is a reasonable question. The two examples I can give are when we had evidence from existing data that there may be an issue with pricing—for example, the reimbursement price that we set in primary care is increasing without an obvious reason—or when there is effectively a bottom-up complaint where patients, clinicians, commissioners or industry raise concerns because it is not obvious what is driving a price rise. I want to minimise the need for future primary legislation on medical supplies pricing controls. The Government should have the ability to intervene, but only when the market is not working well. Whether it is for medicines or medical supplies, it is right that those powers exist but are used only when necessary and proportionately. On that basis, I ask the Committee to agree that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I also thank him for his consultation and willingness to meet bodies before Report, which I am sure will be very welcome. I understand the first argument, which is that there is a need to ensure consistency in relation to this Bill and the 2006 Act. I fully understand that. I also understand the change from criminal to civil penalties. But we then come to the issue of whether this provision should be in statute at all. The Minister himself has acknowledged that this is a different market, with competitive tendering. It is very competitive. We can see no evidence that this measure has been used for 40 years, and as far as I can see there is no evidence to suggest that it will be used any time soon.
The Minister said that it was not thought that the switch from branding to generics would arise in relation to medicines, and therefore that we should look into a completely different sector and say that because something might happen in the future we need to have this overarching provision in the Bill. But that is not the right approach. It has become clear that there are two courses of action. One is to take this out of the 2006 Act altogether, which at the moment I rather favour. We should not regulate for something that might happen in the mystical future.
I, too, was a better regulation Minister and it was drummed into me that if you do not need it, get rid of it—and if you do not need it, do not legislate in the first place. In his heart of hearts, surely the Minister realises that this is unnecessary. The alternative approach is to take the threshold he suggested and put it in the form of an amendment so that we have some reassurance on the face the Bill that it will not be used inappropriately. Those are two particular options.
In my tour d’horizon, as the noble Lord said, I came across the comments made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, in 1999 when my noble friend Lady Hayman was taking one of the many health service Bills through your Lordships’ House. The discussion was not about devices but about the PPR scheme, because the then Government had taken powers in relation to prices. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, said that the Government had,
“arrogated to themselves sweeping powers to bring the current voluntary scheme to an end and to control the price of any drug at will. Lower medicine prices are appealing but too much of that will kill the golden goose”.—[Official Report, 9/2/99; col. 118.]
If the noble Earl, Lord Howe, were here arguing for this Bill, I think that he would have reflected that the case had not been made for non-health service medicines to be involved. We need to find a way forward between this stage and Report, otherwise the persuasive argument will be to remove the offending sections from the 2006 Act.
Perhaps the Minister will consider the Bill’s definition of “medical supplies”. It states that it,
“includes surgical, dental and optical materials and equipment (and for this purpose ‘equipment’ includes any machinery, apparatus or appliance, whether fixed or not, and any vehicle)”.
That seems to take the Government into any bits of kit—not just ordinary devices as we normally understand them. It covers ambulances and all sorts of fixed equipment in the NHS. Is the Minister really saying that the Department of Health needs a power to cover that range of subjects—I presume that it includes scanners—where competitive tendering may be used, and that the Government reserve the right to intervene in that? That is what the Bill seems to say.
On that specific point, there are number of things—for example, supplements, cosmetics and foods—that fall outwith the categories of health service medicines or health service medical supplies but are sometimes provided or prescribed by the NHS. The intention of the part of the Bill to which noble Lords draw attention is to capture such items when they are provided by the NHS for the benefit of patients—but not in general.
My Lords, we very much support the intention behind this amendment and commend the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her determined and dogged campaigning in highlighting this issue and trying to persuade the Government to recognise the problem. In a Bill designed to close loopholes, this is a particularly important one to address. At the same time, it would obviously save the NHS a substantial amount of money. A BBC investigation six years ago estimated a potential saving of £70 million a year just for England, so it is hard to see why the Government should not want to take urgent action now.
We have heard from the noble Baroness, and from the excellent work undertaken on this issue by the British Association of Dermatologists and other organisations, of the overall costs and substantial savings that could be made on unlicensed medicines. Addressing this issue would be to the benefit of the NHS and the many patients in community and primary care who are denied access to special order medicines because of the way in which the current procurement system operates. The anomaly is that if they were in hospital, they would have stood a good chance of being given the drug.
We have also heard how the current system can result in some suppliers charging hyperinflated costs for specials, particularly when chemists do not buy direct from a specials manufacturer but via a wholesaler which adds its costs to the price. This results in the NHS having to pay the chemist the wholesalers’ rather than the manufacturers’ price, because there is no price tariff on the unlicensed specials. Moreover, prices for specials in the primary care sector are set by reference to the Association of Pharmaceutical Specials Manufacturers, which covers private companies that generally manufacture only smaller and therefore much more expensive quantities of drugs. The whole system, which has one much cheaper and cost-effective system for hospitals and another for community and primary care, surely needs to be urgently addressed.
I ask the Minister whether consideration can be given to the Competition and Markets Authority being asked to investigate suppliers. Why have the Government not looked at and learned from the Scottish system, which takes a whole-market approach in the way that the noble Baroness proposes should operate here? We understand that the Government have proposed a six-month review of the existing and proposed arrangements, but we do not feel that this adequately recognises the urgency and scale of the problem. In the Commons, the Minister, Philip Dunne, acknowledged that the Government have existing powers to address the issue, so why is it not being addressed?
The amendment contains the important provision to require NHS England, as part of its tariff-setting processes, to seek prices from the NHS as well as private manufacturers—the whole market—and we fully support this. If the Minister would at last take the important step of recognising and acknowledging the problem, then work could commence on the procurement process required to bring the new system into effect.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for the work that she has put into investigating this issue, for her amendment and, indeed, the intent behind it, which is to save the NHS money and provide a better bang for our buck. That is something that everyone would support.
I say first that it is the Government’s priority to make sure that we get the best possible results for all NHS patients with the resources we have. That is what the Bill, in its entirety, aims to do. This amendment seeks to save the NHS money on specials by requiring CCGs, hospital trusts and community pharmacies to seek no less than three quotes for non-tariff items, at least one of which should be from an NHS manufacturer and, where possible, to select the cheapest quote. It also requires NHS England to take into account prices of NHS manufacturers when setting reimbursement prices. A special is a medicine manufactured or imported to meet the specific needs of a specific patient. By nature they are bespoke, and therefore they do not have the same economies of scale during manufacture and distribution as licensed medicines. Due to the bespoke nature of specials, the costs associated with manufacturing and distribution will never be as low as the often relatively cheap components that make up the special. I say that by way of background for those who are perhaps not as familiar with the subject as the noble Baroness is.
I turn now to the idea of setting tariff reimbursement prices and including data from NHS manufacturers. In England, reimbursement prices for the most commonly prescribed specials are listed in the drug tariff. Those prices are based on sales and volume data, which the department currently obtains from specials manufacturers under a voluntary arrangement. The new provisions in the Bill would make reimbursement data more widely available and more accurate—which would clearly be a benefit in making sure we get value for money with specials. By setting a reimbursement price, we encourage pharmacy contractors to source products as cheaply as possibly because it allows them to earn a margin, which in turn creates competition in the market and, as a result, lowers reimbursement prices. Since these reimbursement arrangements were introduced in 2011, we have observed that, in England, the average cost for specials listed in the drug tariff decreased by 39% between 2011 and 2016.
In setting that out, I do not disagree with the idea that there are instances of wild variation. Indeed, I ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Wheeler, for any examples and evidence that they have. I would be keen to see them, to better understand instances where it has happened.
Basing reimbursement prices on selling prices from more manufacturers than we do now, which the Bill would allow us to do, would make our reimbursement system more robust. For specials, we currently rely on information from those manufacturers that have signed up to our voluntary arrangement. There have been talks with NHS manufacturers to provide information on a voluntary basis. However, we have not been successful so far in securing data from NHS manufacturers that we are able to use. The Bill would enable us to get information from all manufacturers, including NHS manufacturers, for the purpose of reimbursing community pharmacies—that being, of course, one of the main aims of the Bill. Once we receive data from NHS manufacturers, we will be able to assess whether it is appropriate to include it in calculating reimbursement prices. We are actively looking to see whether we can include data as part of our reimbursement price setting, and the Bill will help us to get it. Consequently, we do not need the amendment.
That is a helpful suggestion. It might not necessarily be defined in regulations, but one might contemplate that the Secretary of State would issue guidance as to what constituted such a process.
I thank my noble friend for his amendment and am very happy to show sympathy with it, as other noble Lords have done. I will start by stating that the Government’s view is clearly that competition and market forces are the best way of delivering value. Wherever possible, we should ensure that competition is there, that it works and that it involves as many participants as possible. In many instances, that is the way to drive better value. That being the case, my first priority is to look at ways of improving how markets operate, before reaching for the lever of regulation. That principle is guiding our work on the pricing and cost control of medicines and medical supplies.
For that reason, I understand the sentiment behind the amendment. The underlying assumption here is that if the NHS tenders for a product in a competitive market, the tender should always secure the NHS the best possible deal, and that there should be no need for further government intervention. However, while that is the case sometimes, it is not always the case. I will give a couple of examples. The department or the NHS may conduct tenders for a number of reasons, including security of supply. Furthermore, EU procurement rules —of course, that may change in future—which have been implemented into domestic legislation pursuant to the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 mean that, for contracts for products over a certain value, the NHS has to tender such contract opportunities in accordance with the requirements specified in the procurement rules.
Where there is a sole supplier of a particular product, or other factors such as supply or specificity of products apply, a tender exercise in itself is unlikely to result in significantly lower prices. For example, the department has run competitive processes for von Willebrand factor. This is used to treat patients with a genetic deficiency in the quality or quantity of this protein, which causes problems with blood clotting. Although there are six or seven products that may meet our tender specification, they all have a different concentration of von Willebrand factor, so they are not easily interchangeable. This means that, in practice, the suppliers of such products do not compete on price, knowing that clinicians need access to all the products to select on clinical need and that the department will make awards on this basis.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their many amendments in this group. They cover two very important aspects of the Bill and I am grateful for the opportunity to provide further clarification.
I will look first at the issue of small and medium-sized enterprises. As noble Lords will understand, the medicines sector is very diverse, with companies ranging from the largest global enterprises with multiple interests to very small companies that manufacture specials on a bespoke basis. The Government have no intention to put unnecessary burdens on companies, and especially not on SMEs. The information that we would require them to keep, record and provide would not be more than companies are currently required to keep for tax purposes. For routine collections, we know that they are not an excessive burden on companies. We heard the director-general of the British Generic Manufacturers Association say at the evidence session for the Bill in the Commons that:
“Providing those data is not a big issue for the majority of our members because it is run from their invoicing system”.—[Official Report, Commons, Health Service Medical Supplies (Costs) Bill Committee, 8/11/16; col. 7.]
For non-routine collections, the illustrative regulations specifically make provision for SMEs, defined here as companies with a UK turnover of less than £5 million, which can provide information in the form of pre-existing information such as invoices. This is the method by which we currently collect information from pharmacies, and we know that the process places barely any burden on them. We will consult the industry on the definition of an SME and will look also at the different definitions—I am aware that multiple definitions are being used across government. We would rely on the information provisions in the Bill to be able to obtain information to operate any price and cost control schemes. This definition of an SME would make it impossible to obtain information from certain companies and, therefore, it would be much harder effectively to operate our voluntary and statutory schemes. The amendment has the effect, therefore, of limiting applications of pricing controls set out in this Bill to large companies only.
We have considered carefully the application of the statutory scheme to small companies. Our consultation last year proposed that the exemption threshold for the new statutory scheme should be set at £5 million of branded health service medicines sales. This maintains the current statutory scheme arrangement and aligns, as we are trying to do throughout the Bill, with the current PPRS. Most industry responses agreed with this proposal, and the illustrative regulations published to aid discussion of the Bill show how it would be incorporated into the operation of the scheme.
It is also important to note that this bespoke definition is focused on the level of sales rather than company turnover, ensuring that only those businesses that make branded health services medicines sales of more than £5 million a year to the NHS will be included in the schemes. On that basis, any company, including those which fall within the EU definition of an SME, will be included in the scheme only if their sales reach this threshold. Not only does this align with the current PPRS and the Government’s broader aims to support SMEs but this bespoke definition ensures that the focus is kept on sales of branded medicines to the NHS. More details are set out in the illustrative regulations for the statutory scheme that have been published alongside the Bill.
There would, however, as a result of this amendment, be additional impacts to the reimbursement of community pharmacies and GP practices, which is one of the core purposes of the Bill, and to the collection of information. Community pharmacies purchase the medicines they supply against NHS prescriptions. The drug tariff sets out a reimbursement price that they will be paid for the majority of medicines. The Government have voluntary agreements in place with manufacturers and wholesalers of unbranded generic medicines and specials. They provide us with information on their prices and volumes, which informs our reimbursement prices. As a consequence of these arrangements, the Government have been able to reimburse community pharmacies more robustly for the products covered by the arrangement.
If SMEs, whether defined as set out in the amendment or under any other definition, were excluded from the requirement to provide information, then not all manufacturers and wholesalers would be included. Reimbursement would be based on large company data alone, with the risk that the prices being paid by small and medium-sized enterprises would not be reflected in the reimbursement prices, to their disbenefit.
In order for the reimbursement system to work effectively, appropriate data are needed from all parts of the supply chain, both large and small companies. If the prices charged by larger companies were generally lower, and these would be the only prices used to inform reimbursement prices, we would be systematically underfunding community pharmacies. This in turn could drive them to purchase products from the large companies only. The effect of this could be that small companies go out of business leading to less competition.
The third purpose for collection of information is for the Government to be assured that adequate supplies of healthcare products are available and on terms which represent value for money. We recognise that this non-routine provision of information is somewhat different from that associated with reimbursement and running our price and cost control schemes, and this is exactly why we have made provisions for SMEs.
I hope that I have assured noble Lords that the burden on SMEs has been considered carefully. We have provided bespoke definitions for both the price control schemes and the information provisions, in order that requirements are placed only on relevant companies for essential information. Broader definitions would risk both the price control schemes and critically the reimbursement mechanisms failing to work as well as they do now, let alone how they could work in the future.
I turn now to the other effect of the amendment, which is to limit application of the information-gathering powers to medicines and remove medical supplies or other related products from the scope of the clause. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, I will look at the use of language and definitions subsequent to our debate today and provide reassurance that that is being done in the appropriate way and not to create confusion.
The 2006 Act gives the Government powers to control the price of medical supplies, as we have discussed at length, to collect information on medical supplies and to take enforcement action in the event of non-compliance. The Bill changes the 2006 Act in relation to medical supplies by reducing the enforcement penalties from criminal to civil, and aligns medical supplies provisions with those for medicines.
Clause 6 of the Bill brings together in one place all of the information requirements underpinning the provisions within this Bill. Without that information the provisions cannot apply to those companies. Removing medical supplies and other related products from this clause would therefore mean that we would not have the necessary information to put in place and operate a price control scheme if we wanted to and take specific action against instances of unwarranted price rises that come to our attention, although I appreciate that noble Lords have concerns that those two things will never happen in reality. Finally, it would impede our ability to put in place more robust reimbursement arrangements for medical supplies provided by community pharmacies for all the reasons that I touched on in the context of small and medium-sized enterprises. That is very important information to have to ensure that reimbursement happens properly.
It is right and proper for the Government to have effective powers to gather information regarding medical supplies and other related products in order to improve our understanding of the costs across the supply chain and ensure that those are providing value for money and that we are properly reimbursing community pharmacies. The medical supplies industry is made up largely of SMEs, and my comments earlier reflect my very real concern to ensure that we ask only for essential information that does not provide an additional burden on such companies. On that basis, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Quite honestly, at this late stage, I will not go into the debates that we have already had on the issue of inclusion of non-medicines in the scope of the Bill or of the burden on SMEs. But it is hard to see from the Minister’s response how the Government can say that they are open to ideas and suggestions on how they will reduce the regulatory burden on the medical supplies industry and particularly on SMEs. The Minister knows that we remain to be convinced on this whole area. I hope that we can have ongoing discussions on this matter before Report. We will certainly return to this issue, but meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.