Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2020

Lord Oates Excerpts

Monday 8th February 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Oates (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as the co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Zimbabwe and, in doing so, I thank the Minister for Africa, James Duddridge for his courtesy in briefing me ahead of last week’s statement on the imposition of specific measures against four Zimbabwe security sector chiefs.

On the detail of the No. 4 regulations, I should be grateful if the Minister could clarify the effect of the power to disapply the relevant prohibitions of the UK sanctions regime in Crown dependencies and British Overseas Territories, if conduct that would otherwise be prohibited is authorised by a licence issued under the law of those jurisdictions. The Explanatory Memorandum sets out that those provisions are necessary to ensure that prohibitions relating to UK persons do not create a double licensing burden on a UK person in the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. Can the Minister assure us, however, that the power to authorise conduct that would otherwise be a contravention of the sanctions regime is operable only where an equivalent prohibition applies under other law—that is, that this is to be used only to prevent double licensing and that it cannot be used by the Crown dependencies or overseas territories to circumvent the application of sanctions?

As we discuss these SIs, it is timely to consider the effectiveness of the sanctions regime that we have operated over the past few decades and how we will take it forward now that we have left the European Union. I see this principally through the lens of the targeted measures we have applied against Zimbabwean politicians, officials and military over the past two decades. In themselves, they are hard to argue with. Who would want gross violators of human rights to be able to travel freely or to make use of UK financial institutions to launder the money that they loot from their people?

There is no doubt that sanctions can be an effective tool as part of wider political, economic and diplomatic approaches, but too often, it seems, they are deployed not as part of a wider strategy but instead of one. Nowhere could that be clearer than in Zimbabwe. In the 32 years since I first went to teach in Zimbabwe and the 22 years since I spent a couple of years working in the first post-apartheid South African Parliament, I have watched with dismay as the UK has squandered its influence in the region and as other players—most notably China, of course, but also some of our European allies—have taken a much more strategic approach.

In his statement accompanying the most recent travel restrictions and financial measures against Zimbabwe security sector chiefs, the Foreign Secretary stated that the Zimbabwe sanctions regime

“seeks to encourage the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and institutions; refrain from the repression of civil society; and to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights.”

If that has been the objective of the sanctions regime over the past two years, who can claim that it has been anything but an abject failure? The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe is as great as it has ever been, the economy has been looted to a state of collapse, corruption is rampant, the rule of law is practically non-existent and gross human rights abuses are routine.

Today, journalists such as Hopewell Chin’ono, who expose corruption, are constantly harassed and regularly imprisoned, while the Ministers they expose walk free. Trade unionists, opposition MPs and activists are abducted, beaten, tortured and then jailed for daring to speak out. As we speak, MDC youth leaders Joana Mamombe and Cecilia Chimbiri languish in the notorious Chikurubi maximum security jail on trumped-up charges, simply for speaking out for a better life for the people of Zimbabwe. The courage and integrity of these individuals cannot be overstated and is testimony to the country that Zimbabwe can become again.

Fundamentally, change in Zimbabwe will come about as a result of the actions of the Zimbabwean people, but we could play a much more constructive role in supporting the rule of law, the restoration of constitutional government and a return to economic prosperity if, instead of signing the latest sanctions regulations and then complacently turning to other matters, we committed to a joined-up economic and political strategy that could give succour to the valiant Zimbabwe people that when they achieve change, their friends in the international community will be there to help them with a comprehensive support package, so that everybody in the region and around the world can see the dividends that democratic government and the rule of law bring.

By all means, let us have sanctions against individuals who brutalise their fellow citizens and loot their country, but let us not pretend that they can deliver a return to democratic norms in the absence of a long-term and creative strategy for democratic renewal in the region. We could start by putting together an internationally agreed Marshall plan, ready to be implemented as soon as constitutional government returns to Zimbabwe. That would offer hope to the people of Zimbabwe as they continue their heroic struggle for freedom.