(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, regarding Amendment 22, I am concerned at the failure of the Bill to deal adequately with the problems of child trafficking. I was also concerned at Second Reading that the Minister’s only reference to child-related crime was a mention of the exploitation of children for sexual purposes. This is not the same as child trafficking; the two are separate issues and dealing with one does not necessarily deal with the other.
Because the Bill is silent on child trafficking, it is unclear where responsibility is going to lie. Will it be with CEOP or the new operational command for border policing and immigration crime, or will it be divided between the two? I very much agree with the comments made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that the difficulty is we really need something that deals exclusively with children. The ideal solution would be the establishment of a child-focused operational command within the NCA that could deal with all problems pertaining to child-related crime, including all forms of child trafficking and child exploitation.
Amendment 22 would not force the NCA to establish such an operational command since that is clearly a policy decision. However putting the words “child trafficking” on the face of the Bill would make it abundantly clear that this was a prime duty that the NCA had to address.
From the official statistics, which are woefully inadequate, we know for certain that in the past two years more than 600 children were trafficked into the UK. However, this is likely to be the tip of the iceberg because it is almost impossible to get the real figures. One reason for this is because trafficking legislation requires evidence sometimes called double intent, which means that it is necessary to prove both an intent to transport and an intent to exploit. Often, evidence exists of one or the other, but seldom both. For example, trafficking legislation cannot be used if a child arrives in UK with an adult but there is no evidence to prove that the same adult will exploit the child during its time in the UK. Such cases are usually prosecuted under immigration legislation. They are then not recorded as child trafficking, they do not go into the official statistics, and the official figures therefore hugely underestimate the problem.
The types of child exploitation are varied. Domestic servitude is a major issue and always has been, but looking after cannabis plants—I think it is called “cultivation”—is a major issue for children, particularly those brought in from Vietnam. Vietnam has consistently ranked in the top two countries for child referrals since 2009 when the national referral mechanism began. Despite this, there has not been a single prosecution under UK law for the trafficking of children for forced labour in cultivating cannabis, although Vietnamese children are regularly arrested and prosecuted in the UK for drug-related offences.
I urge the Committee to support this amendment. If we can get the words “child trafficking” on the face of the Bill, it will elevate the problem to a major responsibility of the NCA and something that has to be taken very seriously, that cannot be split between different operational commands and cannot just be pushed to one side. This is a very serious problem and it needs to be seriously addressed.
Will the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, say that his amendment is essential in relation to the directive? In other words, if his amendment were forgotten about or did not exist, would the Bill contain provisions that have the same effect, or are his provisions critical to the UK’s ability to carry out its duties under the 2011 directive?
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am most grateful for the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, because I entirely agree with what he said. I am concerned that this notion of picking out one group of officials has been made by a private Member of the House of Lords proposing this amendment without any examination of why that group should be supported and not others. As I understand it, the Home Office, over a period of months, intends that there should be a thorough review of the across-the-board powers of entry of numerous officials connected with various departments and that it should not be a question of suddenly determining that a particular group of officials should be specially mentioned in legislation and not others. That is my concern and I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, for bringing the matter out.
It is not suitable for us now without any review of across-the-board powers of entry to isolate one set of officials against another. The review emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, which was mentioned by Ministers in the debate in the other place, is vital before one starts getting into the detail of what powers of entry should be permitted and what should not.
My Lords, we should take this opportunity, which follows the vote on a previous occasion when the House by a majority voted in favour of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. We now have a revised and better version of his amendment. But it has not been treated with enormous respect in the other place, which had a debate but no vote. We have had a letter from the noble Lord, Lord Henley, dated 27 March. The letter says that the amendment is “well intentioned” —so the majority of the House had good intentions when it came forward with this little bright idea. The letter states that these proposals, if legislated for,
“could hinder rather than help … Our issue with the amendments is not with their underlying aim, but with the blanket approach they adopt”.
It is about time that something is done. There could be a two-year inquiry—that could be doubled or quadrupled —and no pending Bill in front of the House. We have a Bill. Let us take some action, follow the amendment, repeat what happened last time and send it back again to the other place.
My Lords, I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Neill. With this very convenient amendment at this late stage, it seems to me that the time has come for the Government, if necessary, to come forward with a sensible amendment that could be produced extremely quickly. They absolutely do not need two or four years, as the noble Lord, Lord Neill of Bladen, said, to come up with a situation that is obviously not sensible.
I have come from a meeting of the Select Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments where we discussed an order on green bananas, which has a provision to deal with the rights of entry. As it happens, it does not deal with the criminal part of that but Regulation 6 says that there may be an application to a magistrate for a warrant. It does not refer to the circumstances but I assume that they are those in which force is required. At the moment, I cannot see why you have to have a right of entry for green bananas when you can perfectly well get a magistrate’s warrant if it is absolutely necessary. What I am telling your Lordships’ House is that it is going on now and that it is time to stop it.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We reported on this Bill last October. I do not know to what extent Members of the House have had a chance to read that report. I do not think that it has been referred to in previous debates on this subject, but we dealt with this issue in chapter five of the report. The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, have reminded us of my next point. It is ancient common law that there should be effective protection of our right against arbitrary search and seizure. For me it goes back at least to Entick v Carrington in the days of George III and the famous statement of principle by Lord Camden, which was adopted last week by the American Supreme Court in interpreting the Fourth Amendment to its constitution. Everyone knows that the sanctity of the home and the right to be protected against arbitrary search and seizure is enshrined in our common law. It is also enshrined in our constitutional law through the Human Rights Act and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8 guarantees the fundamental right to be protected in respect of one’s private life, one’s home and one’s correspondence. That has been repeatedly interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as giving effective safeguards against abuse of the powers of search and seizure. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires all statutes, including this one, to be read and given effect, if possible, so as to comply with that convention right. Therefore, we are not legislating in a vacuum.
The Human Rights Act ensures that anything in this Bill which becomes law is subject to the right of protection in Article 8 of the convention. In addition, Section 6 of the Human Rights Act requires every public authority—this would apply to a police officer, a trading standards officer or anyone else exercising public powers—to use those powers in a way that is compatible with the convention right in Article 8. Therefore, the fears that have been raised in this debate should be understood in the context of the safeguards that have been put in place across parties by the enactment of the Human Rights Act.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights drew attention to that in its report. Paragraph 116 states:
“We welcome the recognition in the Bill that powers of entry should be strictly limited to those circumstances in which such a power is justified, necessary and accompanied by appropriate safeguards. The decision to review all existing powers of entry is a welcome one … We consider that a review of existing powers of entry offers a clear opportunity to identify where powers of entry continue to be justified, proportionate and necessary”.
We also consider that it would provide greater legal certainty. We said that,
“at a minimum, each power of entry should be strictly defined, including clear limits on the circumstances when the power may be exercised and the identity of the person or body exercising the power”.
That, of course, would be a way of giving more concrete support to what is already in the Human Rights Act and the convention. I should be grateful if the Minister were able, even though I have not given him notice, to deal with this in his reply. We regretted,
“that the review of existing powers was not completed”,
before this Bill was introduced, and in paragraph 118, we said:
“We are concerned that since the review has not yet been completed, the legislation proposed is overly broad and creates a risk that delegated legislation may be used in future”,
in ways that are basically against the public interest.
It would be helpful to know, if possible, the Government’s response to that review. Nothing that I have said leads me to support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, even though I understand his reasons, which I fully respect, for tabling them. I do not think that they are very well drafted or necessary. I think that the safeguards referred to are sufficient but I would be grateful to know more about the review that we asked for as long ago as last October. If the House were asked to divide on this, I would have to vote against the amendment.
My Lords, I would have wanted to vote for the noble Lord’s first amendment, but I can see that there are difficulties and that maybe more time for thought is required. It is perfectly true, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said, that a report has been produced that emphasises the sovereignty, as it were, of the human rights convention, which intrudes—I mean that in a good sense—into earlier legislation and the rights and the protection that are not visible there.
My concern is that the ordinary man or woman in the street does not understand the scope of the Human Rights Act and would be outraged to hear that there are 1,200 instances when officials can enter your house—your home—and certainly your business and would wonder how that could have arisen over the years. In the absence of a ministerial explanation, I would be inclined to infer that it would become a habit that if you wanted a power that might be useful one of these days for some of your officials, you stick in a power of entry. Parliament is bereft of any power either because that power is in a statutory instrument and we do not amend statutory instruments, or it is in a bit of primary legislation that goes through with that clause unattacked.
Something clearly has to happen as a result of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, the research by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, which has produced the figure of 1,200, and 500 separate pieces of legislation, as I understand it, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote. My present state of mind is that I am very anxious to hear what the Minister has to say and what amelioration of the situation can be produced. It is not satisfactory at the moment and some quite sweeping amendments will be required, no doubt making due reference to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lester.
My Lords, I, too, have sympathy with my noble friend Lord Marlesford’s amendment in principle. At the same time, I also observe that the review to which the noble Lord, Lord Lester, referred a few moments ago is not required by statute until after this Bill is passed. It is in Clause 42 of the Bill, and Secretaries of State then have two years in which to review the 1,200 powers or however many it turns out to be. It would be helpful to your Lordships' House if my noble friend the Minister could tell us whether the review is already in progress and how many of the 1,200 powers have so far been reviewed in addition to the 15 that are due to be knocked out by Schedule 2. Clearly, the review has reached 15 of the 1,200 in a negative sense, but how many of the others have so far been reviewed?
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI have no immediate answer to that, but at this juncture I would suggest that the initial decision-making process is far better on that basis because that is the most important stage: whether or not you decide that it is appropriate to impose, or seek to impose, a TPIM—with the approval of the court, it must be said.
My Lords, I wish to add my view. I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, moved by way of an amendment. I fully support that and I also support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The basic question is one of justice: where should the order be made that leads to these deprivations of liberty? I have been told that you would have to be in a particular residence for a long period of hours. All those things in orders of that type are grave deprivations of privilege. Here, I agree with what the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, said based on his experience, which is borne out by the material that we are reading now as to where the public place their confidence. Perhaps not surprisingly, journalists come at the bottom. I do not know where lawyers come in but it is somewhere not very high up. Yet the judges seem to have the backing of the public as being in the safest and soundest place for judgments to be made. If those judgments involve the liberty of the subject, as I believe they do in this case, that is where we should put our money.
My Lords, one of the attractions of these debates is that we get not one but many legal opinions—different opinions from distinguished legal practitioners, at no charge and expressed with some force. The effect of many of these amendments is to significantly alter the Bill. One set within the group we are talking about gives the power to impose specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures on an individual to a court, rather than to the Secretary of State. It also appears to require that before such measures can be imposed, the individual concerned has to be or has been involved in terrorism-related activity, which, if that is the case, sounds a bit like shutting the prevention of terrorism door after the horse has bolted. Most people would prefer to see action taken against the small minority minded to commit acts of terrorism before they carry out the deed, rather than afterwards.
The second set of amendments we are discussing continues to give the Secretary of State a role but appears to raise the bar that has to be cleared by the Secretary of State before he or she can impose specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures. As far as the Government are concerned, the bar has already been raised under this Bill from “reasonably suspect” to “reasonably believes”. Amendment 17 raises it higher to,
“is satisfied on the balance of probabilities”,
a term with which the judicial system is more familiar and with which, no doubt, its practitioners are more at ease.
The outcome of all these amendments is quite likely to be that the number of people subject to the renamed control orders is less than it would have been under either of the thresholds—the Government’s proposed “reasonably believes” or the current legislation’s “reasonably suspect”—for the Secretary of State to cross before imposing a TPIM. That may be one, but surely only one, of the intentions of these amendments, since their authors are clearly unhappy with both the present arrangements and the amended arrangements set out in the Bill—so unhappy, indeed, that the first set of amendments largely takes the Secretary of State out of the equation.