Police Act 1997 (Authorisations to Interfere with Property: Relevant Offence) Regulations 2025

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome and support both these orders. The first statutory instrument adds offences under the National Security Act to the list of relevant offences in the Police Act 1997, enabling the use of counter-drone powers by police and other authorised officials. This means they will have the power to use counter-drone technology and to take action against unmanned aircraft or drones which are being operated in an area around a prohibited place or a cordoned area without authorisation.

As has already been noted by noble Lords, we have seen an exponential increase in the use of drones in crime. It makes perfect sense to empower the police to tackle this rising threat. It is consistent with the evolving threat reflected in the debates on the National Security Act, which passed through this House last year.

I turn to the draft National Security Act 2023 (Consequential Amendment of Primary Legislation) Regulations 2025, which are also supported on this side of the House. As the Minister explained, this is a consequential amendment to the Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2019. One can understand how these incidents occur, and it is clearly appropriate to make the order that is sought.

The National Security Act was a landmark achievement for the previous Conservative Government and passed with a good measure of parliamentary support across both this House and the other place. It reflected the evolving national security threat that our country faces. It places Britain at the forefront of efforts to protect our citizens, businesses, institutions and defence establishments from the ever-changing threats posed by hostile actors, cyber threats and covert intelligence measures. The only question I have for the Minister is: when does he estimate that the National Security Act will be fully in force?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the contributions from His Majesty’s Official Opposition and the Liberal Democrat Benches. I am grateful for the Opposition’s support for both orders, which are relatively straightforward and, I hope, totally uncontroversial. I hope that this House today, as well as the House of Commons in due course, will support them.

I will start with the extremely important and valid points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. The first relates to the potential for individuals not to know about a site or for the site sensitivity not to be obvious. The Government have considered that, where appropriate, steps should be taken to ensure that all prohibited places are clearly signposted for the benefit of the public. They will remain discretionary for a time, because it will not always be appropriate or practical for security reasons, but the prohibited places offences under the National Security Act 2023 take account of this. Whether or not signage is in place depends on the circumstances, and that would then determine whether or not an offence has been committed. For most places, signage is in place. There will be a limited number of places where there is no signage—but, again, it is not appropriate, even today, to talk about what types of prohibited places they may be, for reasons that are obvious.

The National Security Act 2023 protects our most sensitive sites against activity, which is why we welcomed it when it was introduced by the previous Government. Section 7 of the Act sets out what the prohibited places are, including certain Crown land in the UK, the sovereign base areas, defence establishments, and areas for the defence of a foreign state or the extraction of material for UK defence purposes, as well as sites owned or controlled by the UK intelligence services and used for their functions. Such prohibited places are inherently sensitive and therefore may be at risk. An offence might be committed under Section 5 if a person carries out unauthorised conduct in relation to that prohibited place. As has been mentioned, there would be a defence under legislation for that.

The noble Baroness asked, quite rightly, who has the responsibility of dealing with unidentified drones around these sites. The police forces play a major initial part in protecting UK defence sites from drone misuse, but responsibility for that misuse will depend on the site and its specific circumstances. The Home Office is trying to support the development of the national police counter-drone capability, which has taken place over the last five years. The SI provides greater assurances and outlines circumstances where action can be taken in relation to cordoned-off drone areas.

The noble Baroness specifically mentioned Chinese matériel. The National Police Chiefs’ Council is looking at, and collaborating with, military partners and other state drone operators to make sure that we align security standards. That means that we are looking at a national procurement framework that includes drones as part of this, and we are engaging with police forces to ensure that the suppliers added to the framework meet the required security standards.

Again, that will determine whether drones of any particular provenance are allowed to be used by UK police forces and others. That security assessment will, I hope, reassure the noble Baroness.

The final question, from the noble Lord, was about the full implementation of the National Security Act. I have to say to him: when parliamentary time allows and when government decisions have been taken. I will inform him when that moment is due to arrive.