Belhaj and Boudchar: Litigation Update

Debate between Lord Murphy of Torfaen and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As I indicated, the conclusion of the mediation was, among other things, that there was no admission of liability. However, the noble Lord will recognise the concern that the Prime Minister and the Government felt over the events that led to the detention of Mr Belhaj and Mrs Boudchar. I hope that the Prime Minister’s clear apology will speak for itself.

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, about a decade ago, I had the privilege of chairing the Intelligence and Security Committee, which produced a report on rendition. I assume, therefore, that all of the information that the Minister has given us today in this Chamber, and which the security services and the Government have given to the ISC, comes under a different regime. The committee now has more powers of greater strengths. Will the Minister tell us when the ISC is likely to report on this matter?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, I am not in a position to determine the timing of the ISC report, but my understanding is—and the expectation is—that it will be published later this year.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Murphy of Torfaen and Lord Keen of Elie

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 31st October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. She played an important role in the course of this Bill in reminding your Lordships of the need to deal with the liberty of the citizen. But the greatest threat to the liberty of the citizen is the threat to life. This Bill, which is now in its final stage, is extremely important in ensuring that in future our citizens are protected against terrorism and the threats that face this country and beyond.

Of course, there were and are still issues that need to be taken very seriously with regard to the liberty of the subject. But in all the years that I have been in Parliament, I have not seen as much scrutiny of a Bill as this one. Not only did the Joint Committee, which I had the honour to chair, go through all the details of the Bill over a number of months, the other committees in Parliament also dealt with it, not least the Intelligence and Security Committee.

I commend the Government—not something that I usually do, but I will on this occasion—on accepting a great number of amendments to the Bill, which have improved it in the sense of ensuring that our liberties are safeguarded but that the basic thrust of the Bill remains the same. This has been a tremendous exercise in parliamentary scrutiny. As my noble friend Lord Rooker said, it is Parliament’s Bill as much as it is the Government’s.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for making his point at this stage. This is an important Bill. It will update the framework for the use of investigatory powers to obtain communications for the foreseeable future. But it not only provides powers, it provides safeguards that are clear and understandable: the double lock for the most intrusive powers; the creation of a new Investigatory Powers Commissioner; important safeguards on oversight in respect of legal professional privilege and in respect of journalistic material; a government response to David Anderson’s review in respect of bulk materials; and extensive consultation with the bodies affected by investigatory powers.

What we have today is the product in this House of cross-party collaboration. The parties opposite have taken an incredibly constructive and reasonable approach during the Bill’s passage and we are sending a significant number of changes back to the House of Commons. But those changes are evidence of the constructive engagement from all sides in this House. I particularly note the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Rooker and Lord West, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and from the Liberal Democrat Benches the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Carlile and Lord Lester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, also contributed to our debates on this matter. Of course, members of the ISC and Members on the Cross Benches have taken a great interest in the passage of this Bill. I cite the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and I am sure that I have missed many others. But this expression is intended for all Members of the House who have taken this matter forward and produced a Bill that we can send back to the other place with confidence, subject possibly to one amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Murphy of Torfaen and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall add some points to what my noble friend has just said. During our rather long deliberations this evening and afternoon, I went to the Library to look up the definition of “draconian”. It seems to me to be very harsh, very severe. Apparently, it goes back to ancient Greece, where Draco was the statesman who decided that every single crime would be dealt with by a death sentence. It is not a good description of the Bill and the shadow Home Secretary is unfair and, I think, mischievous in what she said, because the Bill is significant, extremely serious and very difficult. It tries to balance the importance of security in our country, which was discussed at some length today, and our liberties.

I have to say that in 30 years in Parliament I do not think I have seen a Bill which has been scrutinised quite as well as this—not just by the Joint Committee that we were on in November and December but by other committees as well and, indeed, what we have seen in this House and the House of Commons. Nevertheless, the Joint Committee, at the very end of its deliberations, knowing full well that there would be an enormous amount of scrutiny, looked at what could happen in terms of review of the Bill. The Information Commissioner, indeed, gave evidence to the Joint Committee indicating that he thought there should be a sunset clause. The then Home Secretary, who has gone on to greater things, indicated that this was not appropriate, but the committee believed that parliamentary review of the operation of what will then be an Act should take place within six months after five years. That has been incorporated into the Bill and it is the most important type of scrutiny that could happen, because that would be a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, one hopes, which could look at how the Bill has operated. The reason the Joint Committee said that was because of the hugely grave and serious nature of the Bill—not just because of the way it touches on the liberties of the subject, but protecting the subject as well.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we remain sympathetic to the desire for ongoing scrutiny of the Bill, and this is already provided for. In these circumstances we suggest that these amendments are not necessary. The Bill requires that the operation of the Act will be reviewed after five years, which is an entirely appropriate period. It is also consistent with the recommendation, as indicated, of the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill. We must ensure that, before a review takes place, all the Bill’s provisions have been in effect for a sufficient period that a review is justified and can be meaningful. A review after three years, as provided for by Amendments 258A and 258B, runs the risk that this would not be the case.

We also fully expect the review after five years to be informed by a report of a Joint Committee of Parliament, in line with the recommendation made by the Joint Committee. In addition, concurrent with such a review the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament would have the opportunity to assess the more sensitive aspects of the operation of the Act. Let us remember that, in addition, the exercise of the powers provided for under the Bill will of course be subject to the ongoing oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who will be obliged to make an annual report to the Prime Minister.

The Government have listened to the previous debates in Parliament and amended the Bill to ensure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must, in particular, keep under review and report on the operation of safeguards to protect privacy. Furthermore, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s reports must be published and laid before Parliament, providing Parliament with ongoing scrutiny of the operation of the Act. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Murphy of Torfaen and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

The whole purpose of this legislation, whether we agree with it or not, is that there should be a double lock. When I was signing warrants for intercept, it was left to me entirely as Secretary of State. There was no involvement of the judiciary or anybody else, other than the security services providing you with a great deal of information on why you should take a particular decision. The principle behind the Bill is that a judge should look at and review the decision of the Secretary of State. The argument both in the Joint Committee and in the other place has been about whether the judge should take into account necessity and proportionality—which would have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in taking the decision in the first place—in the same way as the Secretary of State, or whether they should look at it simply through the eyes of a judge.

One of the most interesting sessions of the Joint Committee was in the Committee Room upstairs where we interviewed a judge from New Zealand—it was 5.10 am when the judge very happily came to address the committee. That is obviously a very different sort of country. With a couple of million people, they obviously do not have the same number of warrants to deal with as we do in this country. It seemed, however, from what the New Zealand judge was saying, that there was a happy relationship between him and the appropriate government Minister in New Zealand, in that when they looked at a warrant, they did so with the same eyes.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is saying that if you take into account modern judicial review principles, you also take into account proportionality and necessity. But that has to be made clear. I understand that the Government made some changes in the other place with regard to this matter, but the precise role of the judge needs to be made clear. Does he or she look at a warrant simply as a judge or as a human being, and is it in the same way as the Secretary of State does?

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with some of the observations made in your Lordships’ House regarding judicial oversight. On the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, I have a double lock on my front door. The two locks work differently but they are equally effective. That really is the point of the double lock in the context of this legislation: the locks do indeed work differently but they are equally effective at the end of the day. I would adopt the observation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that judicial oversight as it has developed provides us with a flexible standard of oversight, which in many senses is wide-ranging, as has been observed. But, of course, it is judicial oversight, and that is what we have to emphasise.

Turning to a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on working days a week, we consider that the present provision is appropriate. As to the calculation of the working day, the third working day will be calculated from the day after the warrant is issued. For example, if a warrant is issued on a Monday, it must be authorised by the commissioner by the close of Thursday. So it is the date of issue plus three working days.

Amendments 39 to 42, 165A, 167 and 168A would significantly change the so-called double-lock safeguard, such that the judicial commissioner would be taking their own decision rather than reviewing the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to whether the warrant is necessary and proportionate. The Committee will appreciate that the issue of authorisation has been a central feature in the debate on the Bill. Perhaps I might just give a brief potted history of its development.

The three reviews that shaped the draft Bill—by David Anderson QC, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and the Royal United Services Institute surveillance panel—made different recommendations in respect of authorisation. One called for full Secretary of State authorisation and the other two called for a hybrid judicial/executive model. It is noteworthy that none of them called for full judicial authorisation for all warrants. The Joint Committee that undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill supported the double-lock approach set out in the Bill, including the use of the well-established principles of judicial review. At Second Reading in the other place, there was very strong cross-party support for a government amendment that preserved the double lock and the role of the judicial commissioner, while linking the judicial commissioner’s scrutiny to the new privacy clause, to put beyond doubt, if it needed to be, that the judicial commissioner would need to apply a sufficient degree of care to ensure that he or she had complied with duties imposed by the new protection of privacy clause in Part 1 of the Bill. So we are on well-trodden ground, and it is clear that there is strong support—including from senior members of the judiciary—for the approach set out in the Bill.

These amendments would confuse the distinct roles of the Executive and the judiciary and undermine democratic accountability—a point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. It is surely right that a Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament and ultimately to the public, should be making the decision as to whether a warrant for the most intrusive powers is necessary and proportionate. Equally, it is entirely appropriate that a judicial commissioner should be carefully reviewing that decision. While the commissioner’s role is to review the original decision, your Lordships should be clear that this is a robust safeguard. Also, the judicial commissioners will have held or will be holding high judicial office and will be familiar with the principles of judicial review.

As amended in the other place, Clause 23 makes it clear that the commissioners’ review must involve careful consideration and ultimately if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner does not approve the decision to issue the warrant, it cannot come into force. The amendments I have referred to would also require the judicial commissioner to consider the reasons given for the decision to issue the warrant. The amendment is based on a misunderstanding of how warrants operate. The Secretary of State will receive a detailed application setting out the necessity and proportionality considerations. If they agree, they will issue the warrant. They do not have to give reasons for the decision beyond confirming that they personally consider that the warrant is necessary and proportionate. The judicial commissioner will review the decision of the Secretary of State based on the evidence provided to the Secretary of State in the application. If the commissioner thinks that the evidence in the application is not a sufficient basis for the decision that has been made, the commissioner will refuse to approve the decision. We would submit that it is in these circumstances that the double-lock mechanism is appropriate in this context, and accordingly I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

On Amendments 16 and 19, I have already touched on the reference to removing the term “working days”. Our position is that that is an appropriate way forward with these provisions, and I again invite the noble Baroness not to press these amendments.

Amendments 97 to 99 would significantly alter the double-lock safeguard for notices, such that the judicial commissioner would be taking their own decision rather than reviewing the conclusions of the Secretary of State as to whether the notice under Part 9 of the Bill is necessary and proportionate. The amendments would accordingly also remove the requirement for the judicial commissioner to apply the same principles as would be applied by a court in an application for judicial review. As discussed during scrutiny by this House of similar clauses in Part 2 of the Bill, these amendments would confuse the distinct roles of the Executive and the judiciary, as I mentioned earlier. It is right that a Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament and ultimately the public, should make the decision whether it is necessary and proportionate to impose obligations on operators through the giving of a notice. Equally, it is entirely appropriate that a judicial commissioner should be carefully reviewing that decision. As I stated previously, the commissioner’s role is to review the original decision, and your Lordships should be clear that this is a robust safeguard.

One of the amendments would also require the judicial commissioner to consider the reasons given for the decision to give a notice, and again as I indicated before, this amendment appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the process of giving a notice because the reasons are not provided. In other words, under the Bill there is no need to give written reasons over and above those set out in the application itself. Again, in that context I would invite the noble Baroness not to press the amendments.