Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse

Debate between Lord Morrow and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 22nd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend is absolutely right that the Westminster strand did not find evidence of a paedophile ring, but it did find deference by the police, prosecutors and political parties towards public figures. It found differences in treatment accorded to well-connected people, as opposed to those without networks and influence, and a failure by almost every institution to put the needs of children first. They are shocking findings; they should give us all pause for thought.

[Lord Morrow (DUP) [V]]

Can the Minister confirm that the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse will include children who have been trafficked? Will the findings extrapolate these figures where possible?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord mentioned something that is very much a concern at this point in time and has been in recent years as well. It is not for me, or indeed the Government, to tell IICSA what it must look into. In the main, it has been looking into institutional failures and problems in institutional settings. But I am sure that it will look into the appropriate issues at the right time.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Morrow and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, on bringing forward Amendments 89 and 91, which I am content to support.

Like the noble Baroness, I scrutinised the Minister’s letter, which I will come back to. The letter makes two key claims with respect to the Channel guidance. First, it states:

“The Channel Duty Guidance is clear that ‘preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology’”.


In this context, the Minister argues that the only point of intervention would be where extremist ideas are used,

“to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups”.

In truth, however, as the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, pointed out, the guidance contains some references to extremism that are not rooted in a necessary connection to terrorism, and it thereby effectively mandates two interventions: one quite properly, where there is concern that the individual in question is being drawn into terrorism, whereas the other is effectively a monitoring intervention to monitor people whose views the state considers extreme but in relation to which there is no need for any immediate connection to terrorism. I assume that the thought is that because they have extreme views, there is a chance that they could at some point show signs of interest in terrorism, but in the absence of anything other than a vague definition of extremism, this opens the door for the state to start monitoring any views its officers decide are extreme. I find this second intervention Orwellian and illiberal.

The current legislation in Section 36 of the 2015 Act provides a clear and narrow remit that is confined to terrorism. It is completely inappropriate to issue guidance that strays into undefined views that the state or its representatives happen to find extreme, unless they are connected to espousing or celebrating terrorism.

This problem is clearly underlined by the fact that paragraph 124 of the new Counter-Terrorism Strategy, published in June, comments on the Channel programme and states:

“Channel is run in every local authority in England and Wales and addresses all types of extremism”.


That tells us all we need to know: it addresses extremism in all its forms, and thus there is no necessary connection of any sort with terrorism. I find somewhat disingenuous the suggestion from the Minister that the Channel guidance is the only guidance that will inform the approach of local government officials in discharging their responsibilities under Section 36. I completely accept that the Channel guidance has been specially developed to help local government discharge its responsibilities with respect to Section 36. It is certainly the guidance to which local authorities refer first when considering their Section 36 responsibilities. However, that does not mean that the other guidance documents to which the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, referred will not be consulted.

The fact that the Channel process is part of the Prevent strategy is spelled out for us by the Channel guidance. Paragraph 7 of Section 1 states:

“Channel forms a key part of the Prevent strategy”.


In this context it would not be at all surprising if the Prevent Duty Guidance was consulted in addition to the Channel guidance to provide a broader context as Channel is, by the guidance’s own admission, part of the Prevent strategy. On the same basis, it would not be at all surprising if a local authority in want of a better understanding of extremism also turned to the Counter-Extremism Strategy, or if a local authority in want of a better understanding of terrorism also turned to the Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This is where Justice Ouseley’s judgment becomes so important.

In her letter, the Minister said:

“The High Court in the case of Salman Butt v the Secretary of State for the Home Department, which Baroness Howe also mentioned, was clear that the Government was fully within its powers to include this form of non-violent extremism within the scope of the Prevent Duty Guidance”.


I accept that it is possible to find a good number of statements in the Prevent Duty Guidance that are consistent with this statement. Take paragraph 38, for example, which states:

“We expect local authorities to use the existing counter-terrorism local profiles … produced for every region by the police, to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism. This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit”.


However, it is also possible to find numerous references to extremism in the Prevent Duty Guidance, where no such distinction applies—for example, in paragraph 106, which states:

“Prisons should perform initial risk assessments on reception, including cell-sharing risk assessments, and initial reception and induction interviews to establish concerns in relation to any form of extremism, be that faith based, animal rights, environmental, far right, far left extremism or any new emerging trends”.


Let us now consider paragraph 109:

“Appropriate information and intelligence sharing should take place, for example with law enforcement partners, to understand whether extremism is an issue and to identify and manage any behaviours of concern”.


Again, there is plainly no necessary link to terrorism here; and let us consider paragraph 131:

“In addition PCTLs should lead the development of, for example, faith awareness or Extremism Risk Screening training of local training and staff development to supplement the Prevent awareness training. This should focus on emerging issues and any new support and interventions that become available”.


I could go on, but in some ways the most damning statement from the guidance is the glossary definition of extremism, which provides the baseline account for the term in the guidance. The glossary in the 2015 guidance, which can be located on page 21, states:

“‘Extremism’ is defined in the 2011 Prevent strategy as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas”.


Crucially, this definition does not require any connection with terrorism. The calling for the death of servicemen is not necessary to meet the definition which also does not require any other link to terrorism. It is this glossary definition of extremism that is being used to broaden the scope of the Channel and Prevent duties. The very moment these duties divert from their primary aim of addressing the risk of people being drawn into terrorism to addressing the risk of people being drawn into terrorism and extremism—where the two are contrasted they clearly are not the same—we are at risk of becoming an Orwellian state.

In this context, it is particularly concerning that, as reported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Dr Charlotte Heath-Kelly at the University of Warwick has warned about her concerns with local authority involvement in Prevent. She said:

“We have found that this leads healthcare professionals and Local Authority processes to enquire into incidences of dissent and illiberal political beliefs—rather than vulnerability to abuse in persons with formal care needs (the legal definition of safeguarding). For example, during our study of local authority owned Prevent work, we found cases where children had been referred to safeguarding teams for watching Arabic television, and where adults were referred for planning pilgrimage trips. While these incidents did not reach Channel, it is crucial that the select committee investigate the low level, and misguided, monitoring of religiosity and political beliefs. People have a right to their beliefs without them being interpreted and medicalized as ‘vulnerabilities’”.


I very much hope that, when the Minister responds to this debate, she will acknowledge that there are real concerns here; I hope she might be willing to meet concerned Members to discuss the matter between Committee and Report about the way the relevant guidance documents handle extremism.

I should say that there are members of the other place who would also like to attend such a meeting with the Minister. They had wanted to raise this matter through an amendment on Report but were somewhat taken aback by the fact that the day the Government announced the date for Report in another place was the very same day as the deadline for submitting amendments. This meant that the only amendments tabled on Report in another place were from the Front Benches, who knew in advance the date for Report and thus the deadline for tabling amendments to explore these issues. There was not a single Back-Bench amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I thank both the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, for explaining the amendments at length. I say at the outset that I am happy to meet with both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord in due course.

Both at Second Reading and today, the noble Baroness mentioned a number of guidance documents and strategies which she suggested had informed the decisions made by local authorities about the referral of individuals to a Channel panel. Among them, she referred to the Prevent Duty Guidance. However, this guidance is not the relevant document which will guide local authorities through this process. The Prevent Duty Guidance concerns a separate duty, the wider Prevent duty, containing Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The proposal in Clause 19 instead talks of the duty of local authorities to maintain a panel to assess and provide support to people who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism; this is commonly known as the Channel panel. The statutory basis for these Channel panels is found in Sections 36 to 41 of the 2015 Act. This is accompanied by its own statutory guidance, issued under the power in Section 36(7), known as Channel duty guidance.