Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Morgan
Main Page: Lord Morgan (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Morgan's debates with the Home Office
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this country has for centuries—going back 800 years to Magna Carta—recognised the rule of law. Part of the rule of law is that those who are tried for crime must be convicted in court by a judge. For a criminal conviction, there must be evidence beyond reasonable doubt that a defendant who is charged with terrorist action cannot be convicted of it if there is reasonable doubt as to his involvement. Under the rule of law, those who are convicted of misconduct short of crime may be subject to civil penalties. I know that terrorism is a terrible crime. I accept that someone who is found to be guilty of terrorism on the balance of probabilities but cannot be held to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt should be subject to civil penalties such as TPIM notices, even though those penalties are very serious.
What I do not accept is that penalties as serious as those imposed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, or those that are to be imposed under the TPIM Bill, can be imposed by a Secretary of State, who is the prosecutor, without the prior approval of a judge. It is an absolute principle of British law that trials must be fair. I refer to chapter 9 of the late Tom Bingham’s classic book, The Rule of Law. A case where the prosecutor is also the judge cannot be fair, even if a court has a power subsequently to quash the measure if the court finds the application to be obviously flawed—whatever that may mean. It is very far from obvious.
This is doubly the case if, as in this Bill, the defendant does not know what the evidence is against him and cannot therefore provide any evidence to be heard in the process against him. It cannot be fair for someone who is not found by a court to be guilty on the balance of probabilities to have TPIM notices imposed on him. Before a notice can be imposed, there has to be at least a probability of terrorist action. If there is a possibility short of probability, it is surely a matter only for surveillance and not for TPIM notices.
I note with great interest the extremely powerful report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights published this morning at 11 o’clock. I refer to three extracts from that report. Paragraph 1.6 states that,
“the well-established principle is that executive restrictions on liberty are such a radical departure from our common law tradition that they always require prior judicial authorisation after proper legal process. It is for the Government to justify this Bill’s departure from that fundamental principle”.
There is a fundamental principle, and I can see no justification for the departure from it. We, as Members of the House of Lords, should recognise that. Paragraph 1.8 states:
“We also note that Lord Lloyd has tabled amendments to the Bill which have the effect that TPIMs are imposed by the court on the application of the Home Secretary. We support those amendments which in our view replace executive orders with prior judicial authorisation of the kind which both human rights law and our common law constitutional tradition require”.
Surely we all recognise that we in this country recognise as part of our common law what is spelt out in paragraph 1.8.
Finally, before I move elsewhere, paragraph 1.14 states:
“In our view, reasonable belief is too low a threshold for the imposition of such intrusive measures as are envisaged in the TPIMs Bill. The standard should be the balance of probabilities. We support the amendment to clauses 3 and 6 to be moved in Committee by Lord Lloyd, to the effect that the decision of the court as to whether the individual is, or has been involved in terrorism-related activity is to be taken on the civil standard of proof, that is, the balance of probabilities”.
Again, that is a fundamental matter. There must be a balance of probabilities. It is no good saying that this might be probable; there has to be a balance of probabilities. Those whose cases fall short of the balance of probabilities are not to be treated to orders or measures under the TPIM Bill; that is a matter only for study and surveillance.
I completely support what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. I have known him for many years. He has been one of the outstanding judicial figures in this country in the past 20 or 30 years.
Britain has a great tradition of recognising the rule of law. We are failing that tradition if the proposals made by the Secretary of State do not have to have the full support of a court and may be imposed on people whose actions fall short of the balance of probabilities. In March 2005, during the final stages of the passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act of that year, the greatly missed Lord Kingsland, leading for the Conservatives, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and I, leading for the Liberal Democrats, tried to ensure that control orders could be imposed only by a court. We failed. Six and a half years later, we have a chance to achieve what we failed to achieve then. Let us, in these difficult times, not lose that.
My Lords, I have attached my name to the amendments and shall speak briefly about them. I am not a lawyer; there are distinguished and learned lawyers in this House. To me it is a simple matter of justice. That is why I support the amendments. That is why I am in the Labour Party. The Labour Party I thought of believes in justice. That is why I am still a member of it, and I look forward to the Labour Party reflecting that outlook in our discussions and votes on this measure. It just seems to me profoundly unjust that someone who is innocent under the law, who is shown to have committed no offence, should be treated procedurally and in his mode of life in this way. It is basically unjust.
Which was one of the reasons why it was so unjust, because a very large number of people were made the subject of Regulation 18B and almost none of them had any evidence of any kind whatever against them. When we are dealing with TPIMs or control orders, we have individuals against whom there is very robust intelligence. I do not think my noble friend has had the opportunity to read that intelligence, but had he done so he would undoubtedly be so satisfied, being a reasonable person.
I do not propose to review the noble Lord’s review of my version of history, but I think it worth pointing out that the ignorance of the evidence against them is precisely one of the problems in this case. The noble Lord rightly says that there is intercept evidence, but it is evidence denied to the person. I agree that the person is not incarcerated but he is seriously restricted.
I do not know whether the noble Lord has studied the effect of the case of AF (No. 3), but if he were so to do, he would find that there is a requirement for the court. Successive Home Secretaries, close to whose department I have worked, have always been assiduous to ensure that there was sufficient material—particularly since AF (No. 3)—so that the individual concerned knew the case he had to meet, at least in gisting terms. I urge the noble Lord to read the Green Paper published today by the Ministry of Justice, Justice and Security, which deals in part with these matters.
I would like to move on to the substance of these amendments. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, called into his argument the requirement for a court to approve a derogating control order under the 2005 Act. In deploying that argument, surely we should remember that, first, there have been no derogating control orders under the 2005 Act; and secondly, had there been a derogating control order, it would have been so dramatic that we would have had to derogate from part of the European Convention on Human Rights. This would have required, in effect, a change to our constitution which plainly ought to be passed through the courts at the earliest possible phase. I am afraid that, with real respect, I reject that argument.
In dismissing deportation applications and deportation decisions that are made daily by Home Secretaries, the noble and learned Lord said that they are made against foreigners so it is less significant, but if he thinks back to the Belmarsh case that was decided at the end of 2004, he will recall that the Judicial Committee of this House, of which he was a most distinguished member at one time, held that discriminating in that way against foreigners was unlawful. Indeed, the so-called Belmarsh provisions were struck down because they were disproportionate and discriminated against foreigners by treating them differently from United Kingdom citizens.
Is my noble friend aware that the view he has expressed is totally contrary to those of such figures as Attlee and Aneurin Bevan, who were among the founders of the National Council for Civil Liberty, which discussed the rights of working men, including the right to demonstrate and the right to speak? He is taking a contrary view, which is very sad.
I have no doubt that the views that I am expressing are not in line with those of a great many people, but perhaps they did not have to deal with the situation that we face today—the threat of acts of terrorism. I repeat that we regard this as a ministerial decision. It should be made by a Minister responsible for national security, accountable to Parliament and the electorate, and open to challenge in the media. Such a decision is subject to scrutiny by and in the courts but it is the Secretary of State who should make the decision. The Government, not the courts, will be held accountable for the top priority of protecting the public from terrorism. Governments, not judges, pay the price for failing to protect the nation from terrorism, and people look to their Government, not the courts, to protect them from acts of terrorism.