(4 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the provisions in the Bill dealing with the authorisation of CDCs are based on the equivalent provisions of the 2015 Act. We all know that those provisions have not been brought into effect and we therefore have no firm evidence as to whether they are robust, but there is a genuine problem with the way in which they are designed to work.
The powers conferred on the regulator appear to be confined to the initial authorisation of a collective money purchase scheme—I am talking specifically about the fit and proper persons test. The powers given to the regulator by Clause 11 are tied specifically to Clause 9, which, as noble Lords will see, is about the decision on the initial application to authorise a collective money purchase scheme. What is going to happen if, as inevitably will happen at some future date once the scheme has been authorised, there is a change in the trustee membership of the scheme, or if any of the other persons referred to in Clause 9 change? It is not at all clear that the Pensions Regulator at that subsequent point has the power to determine whether that person is a fit and proper person to act in any of the capacities referred to in Clauses 9 and 11.
The regulator has the power in Clause 30 to withdraw authorisation from a collective money purchase scheme if he or she regards the authorisation criteria as not being met. That might include, for example, that a trustee or any other person is not considered to be a fit and proper person. Clause 29 allows the regulator to issue risk notices if there is a prospect of the authorisation criteria being breached—that, again, might include that one of those persons is a not a fit and proper person. However, the power of the regulator at that point is to withdraw authorisation for a collective money purchase scheme; it is not to make a determination about whether anyone is a fit and proper person. It is really a sort of nuclear option, which is to withdraw authorisation from the entire scheme. That clearly cannot be appropriate; it would not be in the best interests of the scheme members.
I acknowledge that my amendment is almost certainly imperfect—let us get that issue out of the way—but it is designed simply to allow us to have a discussion. I hope that the Minister can reassure me that I am completely off beam, but is it not better to have it made explicit in the Bill that it is in respect not just of the initial application that such judgments have to be made about fit and proper persons but of each subsequent appointment?
My Lords, I have put my name to this amendment for the clear reasons that have just been stated. There should be a continuing obligation to make such a judgment, because, between decisions and determinations, many sorts of things could happen to the individual involved. Be it an annual event or a one-time event, there needs to be an ongoing obligation for a judgment to be made.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there has been a great deal of rhetoric surrounding this Bill. Some of the claims for the Bill may be far-fetched, but in one respect they probably are not. Many people have claimed that the reforms in the Bill constitute the biggest shake-up of our pension system for 100 years. If that is true, it is incumbent on the Government to have a clear plan—rather as my noble friend has indicated—for keeping Parliament abreast of the impact of those changes and reporting appropriately on it. None of us knows at the beginning of the extraordinary journey on which we are embarking what will happen and what will be the consequences of giving pension savers these significant new freedoms and flexibilities. It is quite likely that these are responsible people. They have been saving in workplace schemes, in some cases, for decades. Perhaps they are not going to blow their pension pots in a reckless spending spree at the end of their working lives. I tend to agree with that, but we simply do not know. Whereas giving choices is a great policy and one that I can support, it competes with another policy that has similar standing: that is, we must ensure that people approach and enter retirement with enough income to meet their lifestyle requirements.
As has been said by many others in the course of this debate and in another place, these two policies are, to some extent, competing with each other through the Bill. My noble friend’s amendment is really seeking to do one important thing, which is to ensure that there is a proper appreciation of the risks inherent in this approach to the new legislation and a willingness to keep Parliament informed of them. If we get this wrong, not only are we going to impoverish future generations of retirees, but there is, as we know, some risk that the costs of that will fall back on to the shoulders of taxpayers. Either of those two outcomes would be a terrible result of these new freedoms and flexibilities which, in principle, I strongly support.
I hope that the Minister will be able to respond positively to my noble friend’s amendment. I suspect he will say that there is something wrong with the drafting of the amendment. We have all been there before and we know how this process unfolds. If he is not prepared to accept the amendment I hope that he will at least give the House some indication of what reporting the Government are planning to embark on so that future legislators will be able to look back at the detail of this legislation and conclude at some point whether it is working or not. If it is not working, we will have to change it. If it is working, we will all celebrate one of the great reforms of the Government. However, it is clear at the moment that there is no indication, either in the Bill or elsewhere, of what plans Ministers have to keep Parliament abreast of the impact of these changes, given their significance and importance. It is necessary that we hear from the Minister today what the Government’s plans might be.
I will speak in favour of my noble friend’s amendment and address two points. The first is the point my noble friend raised about tax leakage and the risks of salary sacrifice arrangements. I draw the Minister’s attention to Clause 54, which looks at the issue of independent advice and provides, not unreasonably, that that will not be a taxable benefit. However, it precludes it from that exemption if it is the subject of a relevant salary sacrifice arrangement, which is defined in the Bill. Rather than rely on a reduction in the annual allowance as, seemingly, the protection against salary sacrifice arrangements and tax leakage, why not simply adopt the same formulation that is adopted in Clause 54 by precluding salary sacrifice arrangements being available on appropriate definitions?
My second point is to try to get a better handle on the Government’s assessment of behavioural change in the early years as a result of these flexibilities. We can do no better than to focus on the tax projections in the Red Book for March 2014 and the Green Book for the Autumn Statement because those must have been underpinned by some detailed calculations. I am not sure that we have seen that detail to date. I hope that the Minister will follow up in writing if he is not able to deal with all the detail today. How many cases of individuals taking lump sums or other drawdown arrangements rather than annuities are included in those estimates? That must have been the basis on which they were adduced. What is the additional aggregate taxable income expected each year until 2020? How many individuals are estimated to pay tax at higher rates as a result than they would under normal annuitisation? We probed this matter on Report in the Commons but did not get a reply. It would be helpful to have that detail as it would give us an understanding of the Government’s assessment of behavioural change and the number of people who will take more of their pension pots under these flexibilities than would if the annuity arrangements only had been available.