Local Government Finance Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord McKenzie of Luton
Main Page: Lord McKenzie of Luton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord McKenzie of Luton's debates with the Department for Transport
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 2, 3 and 4. At the start of our deliberations, it might be helpful if I set out our approach to these Committee proceedings. This is a framework Bill. A tremendous amount is being left to regulation-making powers in the Bill—at least a couple of dozen powers on my count—which comprises just 19 clauses. We accept that the framework has been filled in in part by recent statements of intent and that there is a plethora of technical and other papers, but that is not the same as having a complete set of draft regulations. We will therefore use the opportunity of this Committee to probe the detail of what is intended and get as much as we can on the record. We will also seek to insure, where appropriate, that those regulation-making powers give the maximum opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny, hence these amendments.
Clause 1 introduces new Schedule 7B, which contains the nuts and bolts of the business rate retention scheme. It provides, among other things, for certain of the new regulations to be by way of the affirmative procedure and the rest by the negative process. This group of amendments adds to those that should fall into the affirmative category.
Amendment 4 concerns paragraphs 37 and 38 of the schedule. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that regulations made by virtue of paragraph 39 should be subject to the affirmative procedure because they impose a liability on a billing authority. This is what the amendment seeks to achieve. Paragraph 39 refers to regulations under paragraphs 37 and 38, and it is presumably those that should be subject to the affirmative procedure. Although we will want to discuss the detailed provisions later in our deliberations, we assume that the Government accept the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendations on this matter, even if not our precise wording.
Amendment 1 deals with paragraph 6. This requires, following a local government finance report, payments of the central share of non-domestic rates to the Secretary of State. However, the regulation-making power includes the power to define what non-domestic rate income is and what adjustments can be made to amounts payable. We will discuss some of the detail of this later, but the power to define what income is for the purposes of the local/central split, including judgments about authorities acting diligently, is, we suggest, significant and should be subject to the affirmative procedure, at the very least on its first use.
Amendment 2 seeks to bring the provisions concerning payment on account under the safety net arrangements within the affirmative procedure. Again, we argue that this is much more than a mechanistic provision concerning calculation. It is potentially very significant for some authorities. It covers the circumstances in which safety net payments might come about. We welcome the fact that other regulations relating to the levy and safety net are to be subject to the affirmative procedure and consider that the same should apply to paragraph 26. So far as we can tell, the issues around payment on account are not covered in the statement of intent or in the government response to the resource review consultation. The consequences of catastrophic reductions in year of a business rate base, likely to be accompanied also by an upsurge in eligibility for council tax support, need serious consideration and should be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Finally, Amendment 3 focuses on paragraph 30, which deals with transitional protection payments. These are existing arrangements designed to dampen the effect of changes to business rate liabilities arising from revaluation. This could have a significant implication for the business rate retention scheme, and it is proposed to take the effect of this outside of the scheme. This requires regulations concerning calculations of a billing authority’s deemed rate in income and actual rate in income, including judgments about whether an authority has acted diligently. This is, again, a very significant provision, which should be subject to the affirmative procedure. We are in uncharted waters over lots of these areas, on a range of key issues, and we should do all we can to strengthen the parliamentary scrutiny. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, said, this is framework legislation—as indeed is Local Government Finance Act 1988, which precedes it. It is therefore to be expected that there will be a number of detailed matters which will be dealt with in regulations. The appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny for each set of regulations will differ depending on the precise subject matter at hand, and we have carefully considered the appropriate level of scrutiny for each of them.
This is why provision is already made for a number of regulation-making powers in the Bill to be subject to the affirmative procedure, as the noble Lord acknowledged. Regulations under paragraphs 8, 20 and 23, for example, which all deal with the calculation of various payments under the scheme, will be under affirmative order. The Government have made these regulations in particular subject to the affirmative procedure in recognition of the need for the highest level of parliamentary scrutiny over such types of finance provisions, given their significance and impact within the rates retention scheme.
Similarly, the tariff and top-up payments that will flow to and from local authorities will be determined by the local government finance report for a year, which must be approved by resolution of the House of Commons. That again affords the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny over key payments within the scheme.
All other regulation-making powers in connection with the non-domestic rating in the Bill are subject to the negative resolution procedure, as the noble Lord said. This is in line with the approach that is currently taken in the existing Schedule 8 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988, and also reflects the more technical or administrative nature of those powers. These include the regulations specified by the noble Lord in his Amendments 1 and 4.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, as the noble Lord has acknowledged, has carefully considered the Bill in advance of our debate today. The fourth report of the Committee, published on 21 June, considered that not only is the balance in new Schedule 7B between provision in the Bill and provision in delegated legislation “about right”, but also that the level of parliamentary control over regulations set out in the Bill is, subject to one exception which I will come on to in a moment,
“appropriate according to the relative significance of the various powers conferred”.
Noble Lords will not therefore be surprised when I say that I agree with the conclusions of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on this point and therefore cannot accept their amendments.
We have carefully considered what the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny should be for each regulation-making power in the Bill, and our approach is supported by the findings of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, whose responsibility it is to consider such issues. However, I hope that the noble Lord’s disappointment in my response will be tempered by my confirmation that we will bring forward an amendment at Report to make those regulations made by virtue of paragraph 39 subject to the affirmative procedure. I think that that is what the noble Lord was looking for. This is the exception to which I referred earlier, and in line with the recommendations. With those explanations, I hope that the noble Lord may feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. Of course, I will withdraw the amendment given where we are. I am pleased that the Minister has confirmed that government amendments will be tabled to deal with the recommendations from the Select Committee. But I shall dwell for a little on two provisions to try to explain further why we believe that their significance is such that they should be subject to wider parliamentary scrutiny.
On payments on account of the safety net, the provision was put in the Bill, as the Minister knows, to give local authorities that are suffering in year from a significant downturn in their business rates an opportunity to get support during the year rather than wait until after the year, which is the general structure of the scheme. In the circumstances in which those opportunities present themselves, it is of crucial importance to local authorities to know what the rules of that provision are. I would have thought that it was also important for our scrutiny of something of that magnitude, which is not simply an issue of narrow accounting but an issue of real substance as to how a key part of the business rate retention scheme will work. I shall not dwell further on the paragraph 6 issue, other than to say that this is not just about accounting for the debits and credits; it is about a definition of income for the purposes of these provisions. I am sure that I will not manage to change the Minister’s view on the matter this afternoon, but we would like to reflect on it because these are significant provisions that deserve wider parliamentary scrutiny. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 5 I shall also speak to the other consequential amendments—Amendments 55, 57, 58 and 60—in this group. The amendments would defer the introduction of the business rate retention scheme for at least a year, as determined by a resolution of Parliament. We recognise that the Secretary of State already has power in the Bill to defer its introduction until a later year, but all the indications are that he has no intention of doing so. The Minister will no doubt confirm that.
My noble friend Lord Smith’s Amendments 6 and 7, which we support, are very much an alternative formulation. If passed, they would require the Secretary of State to defer the introduction.
This is not about seeking to wreck the proposal or to kick it into the long grass. We support a localist approach and the concept of a business rate incentive scheme, so why should we defer? First, and very importantly, we do not yet have legislation; it will be October or even November this year before the Bill becomes law. I am bound to say that it seems somewhat discourteous of the Government to prejudge what might come out of your Lordships’ deliberations. To be clear, we are intent on proper scrutiny of the Bill but are not trying to slow it up. The Localism Act, of which I am sure we all have fond memories, ended up in a completely different place after it had been through your Lordships' House. I do not predict quite the same rate of change on this one. However, it seems to me that we should wait to see the final shape of the legislation—to pre-empt it would be unfortunate.
My Lords, may I pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about reserves? I hope that when the Minister replies to that point, as she was asked to do, she will include within it how the strong reservations of the accountants’ organisation CIPFA about how much local authorities should hold in reserves will fit in with what the Secretary of State has apparently said. I hope that she will talk about specific reserves as well as unallocated reserves. It would be great if this could be clarified at some stage.
My Lords, before the Minister replies, perhaps I might return to the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, to London Councils. I accept entirely that London Councils has changed its position on deferment of the business rate component of this Bill—the briefing that we had a month ago certainly put us in a different slot—and I was not seeking to suggest otherwise. However, I was seeking to relay what is still its current view, as I understand it, which is that the scheme needs to be urgently revamped if it is to produce the radical shift in the structure of local government funding that the Bill proposes. I do not know what process the noble Lord might feel there is to achieve that if there is no deferment of the Bill. Are we going to follow up with an amendment Bill next year? How is it actually to come about? What is there within the Bill that would enable that radical restructuring that is apparently wanted? I do not know whether that is what the noble Lord supports.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving me an opportunity to explain. I referred a few moments ago to the number of amendments tabled on the first part of the Bill that would make quite substantial changes, particularly about the division between the central and local shares of business rates revenue. That would be a change that, if my noble friend Lady Hanham could persuade her colleagues that it might be accepted, would go a long way towards meeting the concerns not only of London Councils but of the Local Government Association and local authorities generally, which are anxious to see a faster process of the localisation of business rates revenue. I will no doubt have an opportunity to talk about this a little later, but I do not think that the questions of timing and of the changes that we are proposing are in any way inconsistent. As my noble friend Lord Tope said, there would be some regret if this were to be delayed. I think that both he and I were making that point. Perhaps that is a way of explaining to and satisfying the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, that there is no inconsistency in what we were arguing.
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s reassurances that information will be in the hands of local authorities—we will test that on Report in October when we can see what happens. I do not think that I ever said that I wanted this provision to be deferred; I simply made the point that a stage will come when it is too late. The Minister herself said that, in using the word “extremes”. I would be interested to know what those extremes might be that would delay the provision from 1 April. She also thinks that there could be circumstances that lead to delay. My point was very simple: as long as the information is available so that we can put it into place, that is fine. But we will obviously be able to test that out.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response to the amendment, which I will in due course withdraw. I follow on from the wise words of my noble friend Lord Smith, who has incredible practical experience of leading a major council. I was unclear from the Minister’s reply whether we had the assurance that all draft rates will be available by the time we get to Report, or all the information needed. There is not necessarily a position on that; all the information that somebody needs is one thing, but seeing it in terms of regulations that will, we hope, in due course go through the parliamentary process is something else. The Minister said that the timeframe is consistent with the current timeframe of the local government financial settlement. Well, yes—but this is not a routine local government finance settlement. It is a significant change, so aligning it timewise is not necessarily appropriate. The noble Lords, Lord Tope and Lord Jenkin, both said that there would be disappointment if there was a deferment. That may be the view of some but I know that it is not the view of everyone.
I am not sure that we fully covered the issues raised by my noble friend Lord Beecham and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about reserves, particularly the issue around CIPFA advice. It would be good if the Minister covered that before we put this matter to bed.
The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, again made a very powerful point. I was struck by his contribution at Second Reading. Summarising the concerns, he said that risks are about to be bestowed on billing authorities but the maintenance of the tax base is with central government. That mismatch is a real issue. Later in our deliberations we will come to some amendments that may enable us to go into that, but I am not sure that there is not a broader issue about having the ability to test the appropriateness of the rating system to bear the weight of this new way of dealing with local government finance. However, we will have to see when we get to those amendments.
Perhaps the noble Baroness would deal with the issue of reserves and clarify whether we are talking about draft regulations or about information in another form. We have had lots of statements of intent, which have been very helpful, but they do not amount to fine detail. If we have draft regulations by Report, when is it expected that they will come into effect? What is the rough timetable?
My Lords, the regulations that are going to be of significance will be in draft form. I guess that that will be most of them and any that are not will not be worrying us. I think that I can give the Committee an assurance that the draft regulations will be available for us to consider by Report. That is what I would want to happen and I take that on board.
I apologise for not having picked up my noble friend Lord Palmer’s comment about reserves. I shall have to write to him about that, although I ought to know how they are interlocking. Unfortunately, I did not hear the Secretary of State’s speech at the local government conference but I am sure that, whatever he said, he was not getting at local government in any way. However, there are a number of aspects of reserves—main reserves and specific reserves—and perhaps I may write to Members of the Committee before the next stage to give them the information that I think they are looking for. I hope that that will satisfy that aspect of their queries.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her further explanations on that. I propose to withdraw the amendment. In doing so, I would just comment that I did not refer earlier to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, on deferral of the council tax benefit support scheme. I think that that might be more fruitful territory when we reach that provision. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 8 would introduce a new clause concerning a reset of the system. A reset would involve reassessing individual authorities’ baseline funding levels and a recalculation of tariffs and top-ups. The technical paper issued last year on establishing the baseline suggested that a reset might involve a completely new method of assessing relative needs and resources, but the purpose of this amendment is not to stray into that territory. The purpose of this amendment is to cause there to be a mechanism that would allow local authorities to make representations on whether they believe a reset of the system is required. Such a mechanism would include an obligation on the Secretary of State to report to the House of Commons on representations received and decisions made thereon, with reasons.
In their response to the consultation on the business rate retention proposals the Government made clear their aspiration for the reset period to be 10 years, and they have stated that they do not propose to reset until 2020 at the earliest—an aspiration, we should note, that would extend to the end of the next Parliament and beyond. However, they have acknowledged that in exceptional circumstances a reset could be required within the 10-year period. Will the Minister tell us what would count as exceptional circumstances?
We acknowledge that certainty over not only the quantum but the period of an opportunity will enhance the incentive. The longer the period between resets, the greater the likely incentive for business growth, as local authorities will retain the benefit of the growth for longer and it will be more encouraging of longer-term investments. That is notwithstanding the fact that the legislation would permit a reset on an annual basis.
There is, however, another side of the coin. Long periods between resets could lead to circumstances where the baseline funding position of an authority does not reflect its funding needs. Population movements, which the Government themselves identified in their response, could lead to the level of resources diverging significantly from core service pressures. We have a debate next Thursday on funding for adult social care, which is a clear example of pressure on services. Setting needs for a decade based even on an updated formula grant for 2012-13 might not be the firmest foundation.
Absent resetting, how could local authorities address the divergence experienced between needs and resources? With the safety net only being available when the business rate base falls by a certain amount and with restrictions on council tax rises—even if those were possible—where can authorities look? We will soon be debating how the Government intend to deploy the 50% central share of business rate, so I would be interested to know the basis on which that might occur longer term.
This amendment seeks only a modest but formal process for local authorities to propose a partial or full reset of the system. Of course there will always be informal opportunities to press a case, but in the interests of transparency we argue for the amendment. I beg to move.
Yes, I will. We feel that this would be overly bureaucratic. As I laid out in my response, this can happen. If somebody has a reason or a need for a reset, or they think that they have, they can make representations. I do not think that that requires legislation. I do not intend, unless I am pushed at another stage, to accept that it is necessary at all, as such provision already exists. There is already a process by which that can happen.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. We have probably aired this enough, at least for this occasion. I am grateful in particular for the acknowledgement that exceptional circumstances exist when issues are out of line with need. That begs a whole range of other questions, but having that on the record is useful. We might want to explore it further at a later stage, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, there are a number of propositions on our agenda concerning the local/central share. We welcome the opportunity to probe all of the issues, as indeed we have done in this debate, and I hope to focus on a consensus for the next stage of our deliberations on Report. I am happy to work with the noble Lords, Lord Jenkin and Lord Tope, to try to achieve just that.
The central share and its application is one of the more troubling aspects of this part of the Bill. It is troubling in the sense of lacking considerable detail, certainly beyond the early years of the scheme. It may be that all of this detail is tucked away in the plethora of documentation provided to us, and doubtless the Minister will point us in the right direction if it is. But there is not much light shed on the subject in the revised statement of intent of last month. Our concern, which has been echoed today, is that the central share will be used in whole or in part to fund matters that would otherwise have been funded by central government. Another concern is clearly the basis on which the central share is to be returned to local government, and there is of course the quantum of the share—the 50:50 split. But these issues about where the money will go and where it will end up clearly troubled the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and others who have spoken.
What is driving the local/central split is the Government’s desire to control the overall envelope of local authority spending, routinely determined through the local government finance settlement. What this is currently controlling of course is the formula grant and its distribution. There is a range of other funding available to local government—its own fees and charges and council tax—as well as hitherto a series of grants, some non-ring-fenced and others which are. These grants do not all fall within the orbit of CLG. Such grants are controlled through the usual departments’ DEL processes. Although we have challenged the Government’s draconian cuts for local government—28% in Wigan, as we heard—we were not proposing to open up a broad debate on this aspect except to say that, by the reduction in the control total, the Government have added to the certainty that the business rate in aggregate will exceed the control total.
Of course, currently the whole of the business rate collected is returned on some basis to local government through the formula grant. Indeed central government tops that up with revenue support grant as well as formula police grant. We are now told that for the key year of 2014-15, which has the lowest spending control total, business rates will exceed that total and, therefore, cannot just be left uncontrolled in the hands of local government. A percentage will be peeled away to be applied to local government by central government.
For the record, perhaps the Minister would set down how the 50% has been calculated. What is the forecast of national business rates for 2014-15 and the extent to which that exceeds the control total? How is the 50:50 local control share split derived from that? The technical paper 2 sets out how that will be done and which multipliers are to be used, but some work must have been done to derive the 50:50 proposal. It would be very helpful if we could have that detail. Please can we be given the figures? How much headroom have the Government given themselves between the control totals and the local shares for 2014-15? The intention is that local authorities will be kept whole for 2013-14, based on the application of the formula grant. Can the Minister say whether it is expected to utilise the whole of the central share for that year in this way?
Appendix A to The Local Government Finance Settlement in England: A Guide to the Basics sets out a complete list of grants for the current year. Can the Minister confirm that, at least in theory, any of those could, in whole or in part, be funded from the central share? If you look at it, you will see that it includes, from the Department for Education, the dedicated schools grant, the pupil premium grant, the early intervention grant, the extended rights for free travel, and from the Department for Health, the learning disability and health reform grant. Those are very substantial amounts of money that concern local government in England and, on the proposition that the Government have advanced today, they could fall within the ambit of that description. If not, it would be good to have a denial on the record.
There is a separate issue about the extent to which the local and central shares are calculated after deducting amounts to cover the new homes bonus and other matters. Reading the various documents, I was a little confused about where the funding for the new homes bonus was ending up. Originally, I understood that it came from central Government and was not part of the local government settlement. On the basis of what we have read, I am not sure whether it is now being met from within the business rate total, the top-slice in a sense. If that is wrong, perhaps the Minister could put me right on that.
If the central share is to be used to replace any of these grants, the distribution of it would presumably follow existing rules, but if we prevent that happening, what other options do the Government have for distributing the central share? That hugely important question has been asked by many noble Lords in this debate. We are entitled to know the basis on which the central share will be made available to local government. At one extreme, which we could probably support, it might be distributed strictly by reference to a needs and resources analysis, such as formula grant, which, notwithstanding tariffs and top-ups, could ameliorate the consequences of the distributional effects of the business rate retention scheme. So it might be good for equity but not as good as an incentive. At the other extreme, it could be distributed in a way that is neutral between authorities or as favours the more advantaged authorities. There are no hard and fast rules and we need some clarity from the Government on this crucial point.
I wonder whether I can help the noble Lord. Does he agree that a further question, in addition to the very detailed ones that he is asking about the different grants, is whether any of this money might be distributed through non-departmental bodies—quangos and so on—such as the Homes and Communities Agency, and whether some of the money that they disperse might come from this source?
That is a very interesting question. We have an amendment coming up which is intended to probe the heads under which various categories of institution are counted as qualifying as English local government. It is a possibility but we can specifically probe that when we come to the next group of amendments.
This really is the most troubling aspect of these proposals. Unless I am missing something, it is an area where we do not have enough information. On one basis, we might be happy with a share that is not 50% but 30%, and on another basis we would not want any central share at all. Under Amendment 9, my noble friend Lord Smith probed why we have that particular formulation. I am sure that the Minister has an answer.
Amendment 17 touches on the hugely important issue of not only having information about the current year but being able to project what is likely to happen in subsequent years, particularly in an environment where councils are having to save every penny they can and take painful decisions about cutting back on services.
Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, seeks to ensure that the quantum of the central share will not grow from year to year. Given the RPI increase in rateable values, this should mean that the percentage of the central share gradually declines.
However, we need to be mindful that all these matters could be achieved by central government charging grants against the national business rate collection so that both central and local shares decline in amount— effectively top-slicing. Perhaps we can have amendments to deal with that, as we need to protect against that possibility.
Amendments 21 and 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, offer a rather novel approach, which dictates a gradually reducing percentage share of a billing authority’s central share and a gradually increasing percentage of a billing authority’s local share, so that whatever is top-sliced—if anything is—what remains is increasingly skewed to the local share. I think that that approach has some real merit. I should be very happy to engage in discussions to see how it might be developed and made watertight if it is to be included in the legislation so that the Government do not have a way round it. Subject to what the Minister says about the distribution of the central share, we would seek to support that.
Amendment 16 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Best, seeks to preclude the determination of a local and central share after the financial year ending 31 March 2015. Whether we can support this depends on what happens to the central share. If its application provides a means of redressing possible adverse distributional consequences of the BRRS, there may be an argument for its continuance. Otherwise, it is the business rate scheme that will drive the distribution of the control total, or its equivalent. Even if the rebasing is fair at the point that tariffs and top-ups are established, the dynamic does not mean that it will continue in that way until the reset date.
I shall comment briefly on a few of the contributions to this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, made the point that whether the figure is 50% or somewhat higher, it will not necessarily change the world for some authorities, particularly smaller ones. I would echo that from Luton’s perspective. My noble friend Lady Hollis reiterated the point about cutting the link between business and local government through the nationalisation. However, we should not berate the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, any further; I think that he has redeemed himself by his approach, and he has certainly done so with his introduction to this debate, which was very constructive.
The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, talked about the RSG distribution and the formula grant. I think she was referring to how you set the baseline and the parameters that are going to be used, and we are going to have some debate on that. If the resetting is not going to be for seven or 10 years, getting that as right as possible is hugely important. It might be—we might get some good news from the Minister—that it could be ameliorated in part by use of the 50% central share, but I am not sure that we are going to get that news this afternoon. I am looking forward to the Minister’s reply.
My Lords, so do I. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments. They asked a number of questions, in particular, the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, at the end. Some of them I will be able to deal with, but some I will not. I think the sensible thing is for me to make sure that we give a written response to questions where there is a need for detail so that we can come back to them at the next stage or have discussions in between, if that is necessary on the full information, not all of which I have today.
I shall start with Amendment 9, which was moved very shortly by the noble Lord, Lord Smith, and seems to require about six pages in reply. I am going to have to skim through this extremely important matter which has clearly shaken the tree a bit. On the face of it, Amendment 9 makes a very simple change to the accounting arrangements for the central share but, as the noble Lord, Lord Smith, probably knows, it has a far greater effect than it may seem.
I shall say a little about how the provisions will work. Paragraph 1 of new Schedule 7B requires a “main non-domestic rating account” to be kept for a year. Most payments to and from local authorities in respect of business rates will be made into and out of this account. The exceptions are levy and safety net payments, which we will come on to later.
Paragraph 2 sets out the payments to be credited to, or debited from, the main account. This includes sums received from local authorities in respect of the central share. We have said that the central share of business rates would be used for the purpose of funding grants to local government outside the rates retention scheme. I shall return to that later. The provisions that enable this are set out in sub-paragraphs (3) to (5).
Amendment 9 seeks to make it clear that the sum that can be debited from the account in respect of the central share shall equal the payments received by the Secretary of State from authorities in respect of the central share. That sounds very simple and sensible, but in fact it does not take account of the Government’s intention to use some of the central share money to fund the transitional protection payments provided for in Part 8 of the schedule. This is because, following revaluations, the Government are obliged by current legislation to put in place a transitional relief scheme, so that business ratepayers whose bills increase significantly can see their bills phased in over a number of years. The transitional relief scheme is paid for by similarly phasing down the bills of those ratepayers who see their liability fall significantly as a result of a revaluation. Earlier, the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, was discussing the effect of appeals on precisely this area.
In the context of the rates retention scheme, this means that some authorities could see lower income as a result of the transitional scheme being put in place for ratepayers and some higher as the transitional scheme unwound. That is clearly an untenable situation. Authorities’ income is supposed to reflect their success in promoting development and not the technical vagaries of the transitional relief regulations, so we have always said that we would take transitional relief completely outside the rates retention scheme and provide for a separate series of payments to and from authorities depending on whether they see more or less income as a result of the transitional relief scheme. Part 8 gives effect to this.
The payments themselves, however, will be credited and debited to the main rating account. I hope that the Committee is following this. The scheme will be set up to balance over time but, in any year, we may pay out more to authorities than we get in. So the current wording in paragraph 2(4), which Amendment 9 seeks to change, demonstrates that if there is a deficit, it can be met from central government’s share. In other words, central government will bear that cost. So while central government could choose to debit less than it has received from authorities by way of central share income, it cannot debit more. On the strength of this explanation, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Smith, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I turn now to the remaining amendments in this group. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, explained very clearly and plainly what he is trying to do. Amendments 12 and 21 would effectively mean that the central share could never be increased, since it could never be greater than the previous year’s central share. Amendment 16 would set the central share for the current spending review period only, and Amendments 17 and 22 would fix the central and local share—or a trajectory for them—over a number of years.
The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, and other noble Lords asked about increasing the local share. We have always made it clear that over time we would hope to increase the local share, particularly once we have the finances back on track. It is difficult to see how legislatively we could allow that bearing, in mind that this whole question of the economy is such a difficult area at the moment.
We have also made it clear that in setting up the rates retention scheme, our aspiration is to provide for a long period between resets of up to 10 years. The corollary of that is that the central and local shares and also the tariff and top-up payments will be fixed for the duration of the reset period. By definition, the 50% rate would go on for 10 years unless there is an amendment. Between resets, therefore, we do not anticipate central and local shares changing from year to year. The 50% will last until 2020. That will give local authorities much greater long-term certainty about their financial obligations to central government and the funding that they can expect to receive from government than under the current three-year spending review process. However, the Government must retain the ability to alter the local share of business rates where it is necessary to maintain affordability and protect the interests of the taxpayer and the wider economy. However, it would be imprudent to presume that there might never be a time when we might need to increase the central share.
The percentage approach to the central and local shares of business rates was adopted in response to views expressed in last year’s consultation about the potential risk of being expected to pay a fixed sum in business rates to central government. By sharing business rates on a percentage basis, some of the reward of positive growth, but also some of the risks of negative growth, will be borne equally by central government. The Government have, and always will have, an interest in public spending, and it is unrealistic to expect the Government to take their hands off it completely and to constrain themselves, as Amendments 12, 16, 17 and 21 suggest.
I will have to write to noble Lords about some of these points because I may not have the answers, but I was asked how the 50% share was set. How did we get there? The Government have considered a range of factors involved. If the information about the setting of the 50% share is not available before the next stage, it will be available in the local government finance report in the figures for business rate totals. That may not be soon enough for noble Lords.
Can I just clarify this? The detail of the clarification is to come but, in respect of 2014-15, is it the case that the local share that derives from that calculation is equal to, or about equal to, the control total that the Government are seeking to apply to local government and that there is no extra in there?
It is going to be based on the base from this year. Every local authority will be equal when it starts on this system, but the tariffs and top-ups will bring that to the equality base when there is too much in one and not enough in the other. So that will be the first shuffle to get the equality base across the piece.
If the Minister could just clarify this, it would be really helpful. As I understand it, the local and central shares have been calculated by reference to the lowest of the control total years. I understand why arithmetically that is so. In respect of that year, is the 50% local share that comes from that calculation equal to the control total for that year? Is it the case that there is no extra in the central share and that just enough has been left for 2014-15 to be able to apply the control total and keep it intact, or has central government taken more than that?
The Government will provide revenue support grants to make up the difference between the local share of the business rates and the spending control totals for local government in 2013-14 and 2014-15, having taken into account the amounts needed. Noble Lords asked about the new homes bonus. In future years, the total amount of grant funding will be determined through spending reviews and the Government will set up the base for distribution in the annual local government finance report. I do not think that that will answer the noble Lord’s question, but I will write to him.
And I had better write to the noble Lord, I think. That seems pretty fair.
I was asked about the specific grants. The funding will be from the central share and the finance for specific grants, and that will include the revenue support grant. I will write on the specific grants that already exist and tell the Committee what is included.
The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, asked about the local authorities’ pool and how the money gets distributed if they go into one with others. Frankly, that will be a matter for the pool to decide; they will regulate themselves. We would expect there to be a local government lead on that so that they can receive payments and that formal arrangements would be agreed on the operation of a pool, so it will be governed by some sort of constraints.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, asked who paid and who gained, but that rather depends what you mean by who pays and who gains. We have always said that no council will be worse off as a result of its business rate base at the outset of the scheme. That was what I was trying to explain about the base, the tariffs and the top-ups. I am sorry if I did not come across well, but that is what the situation is. The information that the noble Baroness sought will be available at a point of the draft local government finance report. That will be my answer to some of the questions: that the information will be ready for a bit later on, I hope before we consider this matter further. I hope that that covers the points made.
There have been a lot of discussions, some of which we will come to on further amendments. I note what the noble Lord, Lord Tope, said about local government’s disappointment regarding the split. I appreciate that that is the situation, but we ought not to ignore the fact that by making the local business rate stay with local government, even if things are then done to it, we are setting a very sensible principle: giving the business rate to local government and maintaining it with it. That principle can then be worked on in the future, regarding how much is left. However, I think we have established an important principle here. I hope the noble Lord is happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments 13 and 14. It appears that the effect of the central share is to allow the Government to reduce what would have been grants outside the formula grant—that is, paid for by general taxation—and thus allow the business rates to take up the slack. The Treasury could thus substitute business rates for other taxes. I would like to ask if the Minister agrees that there is a danger of improving central government’s fiscal position at local taxpayers’ expense. That is the crux of this very short amendment.
This would not have an immediate effect; the estimates have been made by various local government bodies that the effect could begin in 2016-17, but it could be a real effect.
The central share will come back to councils, as we have discussed, but not necessarily the same councils, in the form of grants. Other noble Lords have given an example of Westminster and have said that that is why there has to be a reallocation of these moneys. I understand and appreciate that, but the real problem is that one reallocates business rates to give an incentive to local authorities to improve businesses within their areas and improve the economy in those areas. Many of them need that incentive; the current system of business rates whereby you collect the money and keep none of it is not an incentive, which is why this is an improvement. If you take away and redistribute, you lose a lot of that incentive from the places where there could be a great improvement in the economy.
Mention has been made by other noble Lords as to the 50%. I could have come in at that stage, but I thought that I would include it in what I am saying now. There is one other aspect to a 50% share, which has not been broached by other noble Lords—that 50% for the Government and 50% for the local councils is a dangerous percentage. Local authorities will lose, as they have in other instances, the difference between the half-empty and the half-full bottle. You know exactly what it is when it is 50%, but it is more difficult when they start recalculating and the share is 51% and 49%, as has been my experience in local authorities. Measuring the value of local council housing, when the example given by CIPFA was 50:50, when the local authority came to use the calculation they took the wrong half, because it was never 50%—it was always something else. Someone in Whitehall may know how to do it; there is a rumour that that is the case. But there is a danger that when you have 50:50, you will end up with 51:49, which would mean that you would not know which was the Government’s share and which was the local authorities’. I would hope that the larger share would be for the local authorities.
The amendment makes the point that the Treasury will be able to switch grants that have been paid for by general taxation into the rates system and in effect raid local businesses to assist the Exchequer. All this will, of course, be in addition to the cut of £500 million, in terms of the legislation overall. Amendments 10, 13 and 14 seek to protect local councils and central government from that usual thing of temptation, because it is not easy to resist temptation. As Oscar Wilde said, “I can resist anything except temptation”. I do not think that we should put too much temptation in the way of central government. I beg to move.
My Lords, we have Amendments 11 and 24 in this group. Amendment 11 is a very straightforward probing amendment; it refers to paragraph 2(5) on page 20 and is to do with payments to local government in England. Presently it reads:
“The reference in sub-paragraph (3) to use for the purposes of local government in England includes the making of payments under an Act or an instrument made under an Act (whenever passed or made) to”—
then it gives a range of authorities.
My Lords, as I was saying before I was rudely interrupted by the television screen, currently the Government determine how much local government spending the country can afford and they set local government grant totals—both formula grant and specific grants—accordingly. Redistributed business rates income is then used to fund formula grant and any difference is made up from revenue support grant. That is the situation at the moment. The more business rates there are in the system, the less revenue support grant is needed, and vice versa. Therefore, since 1990, business rates have been used in partial replacement of revenue support grant.
Although the mechanism is different under the rates retention scheme, the principle is exactly the same. The business rates retained through the central share will be used to finance both revenue support grant and specific grants in the same way as they are currently used to finance formula grant. Earlier the noble Lord asked me, although I was not able to answer, whether grants relevant to local government from other departments are included. They will be put into that one pot, so all the grants will be relevant. Therefore, we cannot see why the Government would need to accept Amendment 14, as it would place greater restrictions on central government than currently exist. I hope that, looked at in this way, the noble Lord will agree not to press his amendment.
Amendments 10 and 13 accept the principle that the central share should be used to finance other grants but seek to ensure that this happens only if the Government are satisfied that the overall needs of local government will be met. The overall need of local government will be, as it is now, a factor that, along with the wider economic situation, will inform the amount of specific and revenue support grant that government will provide to local authorities.
At future spending reviews, the Government will have regard to the resources available to authorities from their own resources—council tax and, in future, retained business rates—along with the overall spending needs of local government and the fiscal situation of the country, to determine how much grant should be provided.
I hope that, having reflected on the nature of the spending review and the reality that the overall needs of local government will be fully considered as part of that process, the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment. The Bill contains assurances that any money paid by way of central share will be used by government only for the purposes of local government.
On Report in the other place, amendments were made to the Bill to make clearer what was meant by “local government” in this context. The list set out in paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 1, however, was not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, it was illustrative of the sorts of bodies that would be covered by the phrase “local government”. Amendment 11 would have the effect of making the list definitive—something that it was never designed to be, and therefore I cannot accept the amendment. It could otherwise be added to or detracted from and have something else substituted.
Amendment 24 would require the Secretary of State to set out in a local government finance report what payments the Secretary of State had made from the central share. I have rather more sympathy with the principle of this amendment and, although the details are probably over the top, we have discussed it and I think we have said that it will be available just before the local government finance report. However, I must say to noble Lords that the amendment is unnecessary. It will be clear from government accounts how much revenue support grant and specific grants central government have paid out in any year. It will also be clear how much has been collected by way of the central share and debited from the national accounts. It will therefore be obvious whether the Government have used the central share money in support of local government.
Nevertheless, I am prepared to think about whether, regardless, it would be helpful to set this out in the local government finance report in respect of an earlier year. Because of the timing of the outturn data, that would mean that we could not set out this information except in respect of the two previous years, which might make it a little out of date. However, we will consider that and talk to the LGA about it. I hope that, having heard those comments, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
The noble Baroness dealt with the question of whether the list in sub-paragraph (5) is complete, and the answer was that it is not. If it were, however, what other bodies would be on there? Would it be a vast range? Can she give us a clue as to which others might have sat on that list?
I think I have said all I can say. The list is not complete and others can be substituted or interposed if necessary. Those will arise at other times but I do not know what they are. If we have information on or a sort of idea of which others we might be talking about, I will let the noble Lord know, but at the moment it is simply left that other bodies may be included.