Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown and Jacob Rees-Mogg

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

That is a very helpful intervention, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for it. I think the House of Lords would almost certainly follow the Salisbury convention in that respect, and it would be wrong of it to go against the clearly expressed will, in a manifesto, of the lower House. The point of this measure is as a protection and a safeguard, not as a die-in-the-ditch stalling method to prevent any reform in future. It may be that, had I been around in 1911, I would have been all in favour of dying in a ditch to prevent reform, but I was not, and that is not the purpose of the new clause.

It is worth noting that the Bill is not subject to the Parliament Act 1911. The reason for that is that it extends the life of Parliament, potentially. It gives the Prime Minister the discretion—the ability—to extend the life of a Parliament from five years to a maximum of five years and two months. As we all know, the Parliament Act requires that that can be done only with the consent of the House of Lords, and cannot be pushed through if that consent were refused.

That leads me on to the reason why that was in the Parliament Act. Why was it thought sensible in 1911, when the Liberals were last in independent government—although they had some Irish help—to put in a clause that safeguarded the length of time that a Parliament could sit? It was done to prevent a tyranny of the lower House—to prevent a lower House from extending its life or changing its ability to serve for a particular time whenever it felt like it.

The relevant section is section 2, which states:

“If any Public Bill (other than a Money Bill or a Bill containing any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years) is passed by the House of Commons…”

So any Bill which extends the life of Parliament beyond five years is excluded from the functioning of the Parliament Act. That is relevant to this Bill, because it changes the basis on which the lifetime of a Parliament is calculated. It would therefore be logical to say that the safeguard in the 1911 Act should be extended to it too, so that it is clear that a new Government cannot come in and play fast and loose with the new Act. It would also give clarity to the Government’s purpose.

Many of us want to know whether the Act—or Bill, as it currently is—is about coalition and about two parties which, over a weekend in early May, were deeply distrustful of each other, or whether it is about major constitutional reform that it is thought will improve the settlement and the democracy of our nation.

The reason why I mention the weekend in May when the parties may have distrusted each other is that I have a feeling that that distrust has broadly evaporated. I think there is now great fellow feeling, at least in the hierarchies of the two parties, between the two sides that they work well together and are committed to some major reforms. The Liberal Democrats have made some admirable and brave decisions, particularly in relation to tuition fees, that have shown that their heart is in the right place in terms of the coalition, and how they have been willing to sacrifice part of their manifesto for it.

[Dr William McCrea (South Antrim) (DUP)]

Did the hon. Gentleman hear the severe criticism expressed by the Deputy Prime Minister at Deputy Prime Minister’s questions concerning the activities of the other House last night?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

The hon. Gentleman is right to raise that issue. I did hear what the Deputy Prime Minister said about the upper House. Most unusually—because in the spirit of coalition I usually find that I hang on every word of the Deputy Prime Minister in almost entire agreement with it—I had to divert from him on that occasion. I have always thought that Governments make a mistake when they think that they will always be in government, and therefore that it ought always to be easy to pass legislation.

I think it ought to be difficult to pass legislation, because we will not always be in power, yet we represent 40% of the electorate. Labour will not always be in power either, yet it represents 40% of the electorate. Those large minorities ought always to be taken into account—and the one power that they have is the power to delay. It was a great mistake of the previous Government to allow our proceedings to be so truncated. That means that now the present Government are, regrettably, doing the same on constitutional issues. That is the inevitable consequence of what happened between 1997 and 2010.

I would like to see the House of Lords maintain its ability to delay. “Filibuster” may be a good word. I am hoping that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) will give us a definition of “filibuster”. He has given us regular definitions of the word “gerrymander”, and it is rather an expertise of his. I hope that “filibuster” may be defined later on.

I think it important that that right to delay be preserved, and that the House of Lords should have it. As I have said, that House has the crucial constitutional function of protecting our constitution from what Lord Hailsham referred to as elective dictatorship. I do not think that we have elective dictatorship, but I do not think that it would be impossible to get to it, and that means that we must preserve some elements of the constitution on which the House of Lords will have the final say, as if on an Act prior to 1911.