Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord McCluskey and Lord Stephen

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord McCluskey]

My Lords, I need not repeat the arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has put forward again so clearly. We need say nothing more about “normally” except that we were anxious to help to improve the Bill. This was not anti the Government or anti the Scottish Administration.

My second point relates to Amendment 12 in this group, which is to do with the question of justiciability. For the reasons that have been advanced at some length, so I need not repeat them, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and I are agreed that this word is justiciable. It would be very foolish of the Minister to reject the advice of a man as distinguished in the law as the noble and learned Lord. The word “normally” is bound to appear before a court. If the UK Government decide to legislate on a matter that is devolved and say, “This is not a normal situation”, and some person, whether in the Scottish Government or affected by the legislation, says, “No, it is not”, and it goes to court, the court cannot say, “We’re not going to resolve this matter”—it must answer the question. So to say that it is justiciable is exactly right, and it is wrong for the Minister to ignore that. The Minister kindly suggested that he and I should meet, and we did, but I am afraid that we simply agreed to differ on the issue of justiciability.

I should mention one other point that does not arise out of these two amendments precisely, which is that this is to do with the Sewel convention. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, will permit me to quote what he said in Committee on 8 December. In response to the argument that the Smith commission stated that:

“The Sewel Convention will be put on a statutory footing”,

he said, referring to the noble and learned Lord speaking from the Front Bench:

“Surely on his own argument the Government will have to withdraw Clause 2, not only on the grounds of what constitutes a statutory footing but because it embodies the words of Lord Sewel, which he spoke when the Scotland Bill was before Parliament, and not the convention as understood at the time the commission produced its report”.

The noble and learned Lord rejected that, saying:

“I do not accept that, because it appears that what is understood by the Sewel convention is the expression of that convention by Lord Sewel during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998 through Parliament”.—[Official Report, 8/12/15; cols. 1506-07.]

I must confess that it astonished me to hear that. Can the Minister make it clear whether the Government stick by that statement at col. 1507, which was repeated in response to the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose? In due course I hope to move Amendment 12.

[Lord Stephen (LD)]

My Lords, I make it clear at the outset that we support the wording provided in his amendment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. Indeed, we agree very much with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that the word “normally” seems at best unhelpful in legislation.

Our first two amendments, Amendments 9 and 10, provide for the consent of the Scottish Parliament to be required when UK legislation makes or attempts to make any alteration to the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament or the executive competence of the Scottish Government—Scottish Ministers. The amendments would ensure that the current convention is fully reflected in the way it has been understood and applied in practice.

The part of the convention currently covered by Clause 2 is effectively only half of the convention. It is to apply when UK legislation makes provision for issues which are within the legislative of the Scottish Parliament. As has been stated, Clause 2 reflects almost exactly the words used by Lord Sewel in the House of Lords during the passage of the Scotland Act on 21 July 1998, when he said that,

“we would expect a convention to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish parliament”.—[Official Report, 21/7/1998; col. 791.]

These comments in this Chamber effectively recommended the establishment of a convention but it has operated more widely than he indicated or anticipated. We should not blindly follow his words in 1998 rather than the convention as it works now. The constitutional practice of putting forward a legislative consent Motion where the legislative competence is being affected, amended or altered was applied, for example, to the Scotland Act 2012, and there are good constitutional reasons for both elements of the convention to be safeguarded. That should be the correct constitutional approach to the Scottish Parliament. Legislation which without consent reduced the scope of the Scottish Parliament’s legislative competence, would be just as controversial, and perhaps more so, than UK legislation which encroached on matters within its competence.

How long has the convention operated in this way? Since 1999, the convention has been understood to require the consent of the Scottish Parliament when UK legislation will alter the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament or the executive competence of Scottish Ministers. This was exactly how it was expressed in the memorandum of understanding that was agreed between the UK Government and Scottish Ministers back in 1999. It is also reflected in Devolution Guidance Note 10, which was issued by the Department of Constitutional Affairs back in 1999 and gives information as to how the UK Government operate the convention in practice—and that is how it has been operated.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord McCluskey and Lord Stephen

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stephen]

At this late hour, I am happy to confirm almost anything to the noble Lord.

[Lord McCluskey]

My Lords, in view of the terms of Amendment 33, I shall not be moving Amendment 32.