National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 9, leave out “, or ought reasonably to know,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to tighten the scope of the offence in Clause 1.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed. Before speaking to them, I make a general observation which is applicable to nearly all the amendments we have put down for debate today.

Broadly, Part 1 of the Bill is aimed at updating and clarifying the law against espionage, sabotage and subversive behaviour which threatens the safety, security or defence of the United Kingdom. We and the whole House support that aim, which is clearly described in the Long Title: to

“Make provision about threats to national security from espionage, sabotage and persons acting for foreign powers.”


However, as I said at Second Reading, we on these Benches wish to ensure that the Bill sticks to that remit and is not so wide as to damage individual liberties which our security and defence services are there to protect.

The amendments in this group would ensure that guilt of the relevant offences could be established only on the basis of actual knowledge of essential facts, and not merely what is often called imputed knowledge. The Bill talks of what a person ought reasonably to know rather than what they might be deemed to know. However, we object to the addition of

“or ought reasonably to know”

after “know”.

I shall remind your Lordships briefly of the offences covered by these amendments and the sentences proposed for them. The offences in Clause 1, “Obtaining or disclosing protected information”, and Clause 12, “Sabotage”, both attract a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. All four offences in Clause 2, “Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets”, Clause 3, “Assisting a foreign intelligence service”, Clause 4, “Entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK”, and Clause 15, “Obtaining etc material benefits from a foreign intelligence service”, attract a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. The offence in Clause 5, “Unauthorised entry etc to a prohibited place”, is in a different category because it is a summary offence, but, apart from that Clause 5 offence, all these offences are treated very seriously indeed.

Yet in order to be guilty of the offences, the defendant does not actually have to know essential facts. It is enough if they “ought” to know them. In Clause 1, the offence is committed if the person

“obtains, copies, records or retains protected information, or … discloses or provides access to protected information”.

Clause 1(b) provides that the person’s conduct has to be

“for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

In the next group, I will make the point that the interests of the United Kingdom concerned ought to be the “security or defence interests”, not just interests in general. But in this group, our point is that, in order to be guilty under this clause, the person should actually have to know that their conduct was for a purpose that was prejudicial to the UK. It should not be sufficient to constitute guilt that they merely “ought to have known” that, even if they did not. That is the point of our Amendment 1.

Another unsatisfactory feature of this and other clauses is that the clause presupposes an actual purpose—that purpose, presumably, being the reason for the defendant’s actions. It would be very odd if, the prosecution having established the purpose, the additional requirement of knowledge could be met not by showing that the defendant knew that that purpose, which was his or her own, was prejudicial to the national interest but merely that they “ought” to have known that.

Under Clause 2, which is the trade secrets offence, the defendant’s conduct, under the Bill, has to be “unauthorised”. However, as drafted, the defendant does not have to know that the conduct is unauthorised; it is enough if the defendant “ought” to have known that. Our Amendment 7 would change that.

Under Clause 3, “Assisting a foreign intelligence service”, it should be required, we say, that to convict a person of this offence, they actually knew—the Bill says that they ought to have known that it was “reasonably possible”—that

“their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,

not merely that they should have realised that the possibility existed. Amendment 14 would address this. We also say that the word “likely” would be more effective than the words “reasonably possible”, but that is addressed in a later group.

In Clause 4, the offence of entering a prohibited place suffers from the same inherent problem as the Clause 1 offence. The purpose has to be proved, but the defendant does not actually have to know that the purpose was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom; it is enough that they “ought reasonably” to have known. The clause heading, “Entering etc a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK”, highlights the illogicality. How can you have that purpose if you do not actually know that the purpose is prejudicial at all? Yet the clause as drafted says that you can; that should go, and our Amendment 17 would remove it.

Clause 5 is the summary offence of unauthorised entry to a prohibited place. Under the Bill, proof of actual knowledge of the lack of authorisation is unnecessary; again, merely the defendant “ought” to have known that. Our Amendment 22 addresses that.

Regarding Clause 12, the very serious sabotage offence, the same point applies to the purpose as in Clauses 1 and 4. Again, we say that guilt ought, crucially, to depend on actual knowledge that the purpose was prejudicial. Amendment 36 addresses that.

Amendments 46 and 48 make similar points about the defendant’s knowledge of the source of benefits provided by a foreign intelligence service. Amendment 65 would amend the application of the foreign power condition in Clause 29, which states that

“the person knows, or ought reasonably to know,”

that the conduct is carried out

“on behalf of a foreign power.”

The foreign power condition in the Bill is a very important condition for liability for a number of these offences. How can it possibly be just for the law to provide that the condition can be met if a person does not know that their conduct is carried out on behalf of a foreign power and naively does not catch on, just because it is later decided that even if they did not know at the time, they should have realised? Juries can, and frequently are asked to, come to a conclusion about what defendants know or knew or even what they believe or believed. Juries are good at determining actual states of mind, drawing conclusions from the evidence they hear and see.

To take a simple example, the Theft Act defines receiving stolen goods as:

“A person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of the stealing) knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods”.


But here we are concerned with the proposal that juries should decide cases not on the basis of conclusions they reach about an actual state of knowledge or belief but on views they may take about what the defendant did not know but should have done. These are value judgments, not true decisions of fact.

We are not suggesting that imputed knowledge is never used in the criminal context, but where it is the context is very different. It is used, for example, for insider trading in Canada, where professional insiders receiving tips are able to be found guilty on conclusions that they ought to have drawn. It is used in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in respect of defendants who should have known their own conduct would amount to harassment. In the Official Secrets Act 1989 the reference is broadly to unlawful disclosures by Crown servants and contractors or others to whom confidential information was entrusted. They have a defence to unlawful disclosures if they show they did not know and had no reason to believe that the disclosures were unlawful. The burden of proof is reversed, I accept, but I suggest that is because of the positions the defendants hold or held. However, lack of knowledge or of the reason to believe in a state of fact amounts to a defence even then, so that liability is a long way from these cases because these provisions may catch anyone with no special relationship to the Government on an assessment that the defendant did not know the relevant facts but ought to have done so. Our position is that that is unjust. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I venture a few thoughts on this phraseology. The crucial question is: how much would the prosecutor have to prove about the state of knowledge of the defendant? In some contexts, when phraseology of this kind is used, it is necessary to show what the individual knew was the state of the law and what information that individual had at the relevant time from which a conclusion should be drawn.

The problem with the phraseology here is that it is so general that it is not clear whether the knowledge the individual had is to be the actual knowledge which that person had, which is one thing, or, as has been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, imputed knowledge. If we are dealing with imputed knowledge, the situation becomes much more serious, particularly having regard to the fact that one is concerned with not just the safety of the United Kingdom but the interests of the United Kingdom, which itself is an unfortunately vague expression. I think it would help the Committee if the Minister would explain exactly what a prosecutor would be expected to have to prove in order to establish the offence.

Putting myself into my former position of prosecutor, I would find it quite troublesome to have to face up to proving not only what the individual knew about the law but what the individual knew about the facts. But it would be quite reasonable for me as a prosecutor to have to do that. To impute knowledge of facts to an individual with an offence as serious as this is to take the matter a long way from a reasonable punishment with the extreme penalties mentioned in this clause. It would be helpful if the Minister would explain exactly what would need to be proved in order to establish the offence so that the noble Lord and those supporting know exactly where they are.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand where the noble Lord is coming from. I commit to making sure that we explain that in considerable detail at the appropriate time, if that is acceptable.

For the reasons I have given, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I shall certainly withdraw the amendment at this stage at the end of what I have to say, and will then consider it and my other amendments with the Minister and others between now and Report.

I am grateful for the incisive consideration of imputed knowledge by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, supported, as I understood it, by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who clearly articulated the difference between the basic knowledge that you must have and the conditions for imputing knowledge. That is what the Government’s drafting of all these clauses in the Bill simply does not address.

My noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed pointed out the very difficult coexistence of the Bill with the Official Secrets Act 1989, which I think the Minister accepted and said that we are going to come back to. It is difficult precisely because it is not simply a competition between offences that involve serving or former intelligence officers and those involving any person; it is also that there is a carefully defined defence under the Official Secrets Act that does not apply here, and the offences can be made out on the basis of imputed knowledge.

The point made by the Minister, that the requirement for actual knowledge might hinder prosecutions, would be a good one were it not for the fact that juries are very good at determining whether or not people who deny knowledge actually have it, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out. With the exception of the Clause 5 offence, these are all indictable-only offences, as you would expect, carrying very serious penalties. A defendant who denies knowledge will have that denial very carefully considered, and the underlying facts that he knew, or can be shown to have known, will be considered to enable a jury to decide whether he actually knew.

On that basis, I suspect that, at the end of the deliberations on the Bill, the House may well want to ensure that, for a conviction to stand, it is a question not of hindering prosecutions but of whether a conviction on reasonable evidence is a likely outcome. When that is considered, I believe that actual knowledge should be required, although I of course wish to consider this over the intervening stages of the Bill. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, after “or” insert “security or defence”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to clarify the definition of “interests of the UK”.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group would all tighten the definition of the

“interests of the United Kingdom”

that are to be protected under the provisions of the Bill. They would make it clear that the interests to be protected from damage or prejudice by this National Security Bill should be the “security or defence” interests of the United Kingdom.

In opening group 1, I made the point that the aim of Part 1 was set out in the Long Title: the Bill is about “threats to national security”, not general concerns about the interests of the United Kingdom. This reflects a point, made by me and others at Second Reading, that the interests of the UK in the Bill as drafted are not restricted to the defence or security interests of the UK at all but that any interests of the United Kingdom are to receive protection.

For example, under Clause 1, obtaining records or disclosing “protected information” is to be criminalised. “Protected information” includes any information that is “restricted in any way”, or may be reasonably expected to be so restricted, for the purpose of protecting any interests of the United Kingdom, not just security or defence interests. There is no requirement that a genuine threat to the UK be shown, and there is no restriction on which areas the interests of the UK might be held to cover.

As the Minister said in responding to the Second Reading debate, the phrase “interests of the United Kingdom” has been interpreted by the courts as meaning

“the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers”.

He also said:

“This is notably different from protecting the particular interests of those in office.”—[Official Report, 6/12/22; col. 152.]


In a personal sense, that may be so, but the interpretation that he recited, which I accept is correct in law, means effectively that the interests of the UK are synonymous with government policy at a particular time. So if the Government of the day are pursuing a particular policy on environmental protection, for example—I mentioned fracking at Second Reading but it could just as easily be immigration or any commercial interest covering transport, planning, housing, safety standards, employment rights or whatever—then investigation and disclosure would be at risk of being criminal.

Under Clause 4, photographing, recording or even looking at any prohibited place for a purpose contrary to any interests seen as those of the UK—these interests are effectively determined by the policy of the Government of the day—would all be criminal. Worse still, the photography or the recording could all be from outside the prohibited place.

Under Clause 8, the Secretary of State may designate anywhere in the United Kingdom—or for that matter any vehicle—as a prohibited place if they consider it necessary to protect the unlimited and undefined interests of the UK. That would hand an unscrupulous Government the power to choke off much of the investigative journalism and broadcasting that is fundamental to our democracy. Consequently, informed discussion of what the national interest requires would be similarly choked off. The dissemination of information about government policy on almost any topic that the Government could claim bore on the national interest could be stifled by the imposition of government restriction at will.

As drawn, many of these provisions have nothing whatever to do with national security. All of our amendments in this group are designed to restrict the interests to be protected by the Bill to “security or defence” interests. That is sufficiently wide, and it is the aim of the Bill, as demonstrated by the Long Title. We therefore hope that the Government will accept these amendments, because we find it hard to believe that they would wish to arrogate to themselves such wide-ranging protection of all possible interests that could be designated as interests of the United Kingdom in a Bill that is rightly concerned with the protection of national security. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will make some simple arguments, because there are other noble Lords who can make much more complex arguments. I say very clearly that the Bill we are debating is the National Security Bill and, therefore, it ought to be about national security. The offences should not be able to be translated to other areas. The offences are drawn so badly and broadly that they will criminalise a huge range of conduct which might only vaguely affect the interests of the UK. The wording should be changed to “security or defence”, as the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, have suggested in their amendment. It is a dangerous piece of legislation, because it is so broad that the police and security services will be able to turn it into something they can use against far too many people.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If noble Lords will bear with me, I am going to address that point.

I was saying what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using the legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that someone is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact. Each offence under this legislation includes tests that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit the Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is “protected” for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and the activity must be conducted for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. The limits to the type of conduct that is capable of being caught under this offence, in particular the foreign power condition, ensure that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.

Additionally, Attorney-General consent must also be obtained before prosecution can be pursued for the majority of offences under Part 1—in the case of Northern Ireland that is the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland—and the Crown Prosecution Service must apply the public interest test.

I understand the intention of these amendments. I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that obviously individuals and groups might not agree with government policies, and the noble Baroness makes it very clear that she falls into that category on a regular basis, but they nevertheless represent the policy of the Government who have been elected to act for the country, and disclosing information to a foreign power can never be the right response to that.

As I say, I understand the intention of these amendments, but the Government cannot support them and respectfully ask for them not to be pressed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely understand the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, but, with respect, the fallacy that he falls into, and the fallacy into which the Government fall—the Minister has articulated it—is that, in the interests of being able to prosecute a wide range of activities, they threaten to lower the threshold for such prosecutions to a point where the responsibility for the decision on guilt lies not with a jury considering guilt or innocence but with those who decide to prosecute because they perceive a threat to the interests of the United Kingdom, and the interests of the United Kingdom are very wide.

I agreed with almost everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said; the one thing he did which I did not agree with was that he misquoted the Bill. The Bill is not about prejudice to the safety “and” interests of the United Kingdom. Everywhere that the phrase occurs, it says the safety “or” interests of the United Kingdom”.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Lord is quite right; I should have said that, and I meant to. I apologise to the Committee; that is what I meant to say. I thank the noble Lord for clarifying that.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am quite sure that no apology was needed for what was plainly a slip in a detailed speech made without reference to lots of notes. But the point is an important one, because the protection of the interests of the United Kingdom is free-standing, and the point that almost every noble Lord who has spoken has made is that, because they are defined, there is no clarity at all.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked about opacity. It is not just opacity; it is that no one can know what is criminal. The prosecutors are there to decide what they will charge—certainly with the consent of the Attorney-General where that is required. However, where they make that decision, the jury is left with an impossible position. The judge is bound to direct the jury properly, under the terms of Chandler—that the interests of the United Kingdom are effectively what the Government of the day determine those interests to be—and the offense is left effectively without any clarity at all. That is our objection. I take it a little further, but it is an objection that illuminates the danger of going down that path. It is unjust not to have clarity about what behaviour is criminal, particularly where the sentences are so serious. It is also damaging to public confidence in the criminal law itself if prosecutors and defenders cannot know what is criminal and what is not.

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the debate on Amendment 4 flows fairly naturally from the previous debate. The amendment flows from the report by the JCHR, which I am a member of, and is designed to

“confine the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information to information that has been classified as secret or top secret (rather than to all information access to which is restricted in any way).”

As the offence relates to the sharing of information, freedom of information—which is of course protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights—is engaged, including the potential that it could catch journalism, political expression or whistleblowing activity. This could potentially capture a wide range of information, not least given the uncertainty we have just been discussing as to how the words

“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”

might be applied in a given case.

The requirement that the information be “restricted in any way”, or even that it might be “reasonable to expect”—that also harks back to the preceding debate—that information be restricted in any way, lacks clarity and legal certainty. As your Lordships can see, common themes are emerging. It would of course catch information that was not protected but it was reasonable to expect that it would be. The Government’s Explanatory Notes set out that it would cover non-classified information accessible in a building with restricted access, such as a government building.

I recall the severity of the offence; with a potential punishment of life imprisonment, it might be reasonable in the light of that to expect that it would attach to a clear type of information such as that categorised as “Secret” or “Top Secret”. It seems unreasonable and disproportionate that the offence should attach to information simply categorised as “protected”, or indeed official information that is not restricted at all.

The offence as currently drafted in Clause 1 does not make it sufficiently clear what information is considered to be protected for the purpose of this offence. It creates an unacceptable level of legal uncertainty, raising concerns about compliance with rights to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression, as protected by Articles 5, 6 and 10 of the ECHR.

As proposed by the JCHR report, in the interests of improving legal certainty and proportionality, this amendment proposes that the clause be amended to say that it applies only to information at a certain level of categorisation and therefore sensitivity, such as “secret” or “top secret”. The report suggests that the details of what could be included could be contained in a non-exhaustive indicative list or specified in a statutory instrument, but this amendment is designed to tighten up the offence so that it does not spread too far or impact too much on freedom of expression, journalism and other lawful activities. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, our Amendment 6 would omit Clause 1(2)(b). Your Lordships will know by now that Clause 1(2)(a) deals with protected information as being when

“access to the information, document or other article is restricted in any way”,

as my noble friend Lady Ludford has explained. However, Clause 1(2)(b) goes on to say that

“it is reasonable to expect that access to the information, document or other article would be restricted in any way”—

that way being entirely unspecified.

It is our position that the inclusion of Clause 1(2)(b) takes the clause far too wide. There is no answer to who would be doing the restricting, or what the determinant would be of when and how it would be reasonable to expect restriction. It might be completely reasonable to expect a mad authoritarian Government to restrict the most innocuous but possibly controversial informational document for the purpose of saving public or national embarrassment. Yet that would not make the entirely unjustified restriction on the information or document any less unreasonable; nor would it make the removal of the document from the public domain more justifiable.

This is a misplaced provision, and it should go. We agree with my noble friend Lady Ludford on the JCHR’s Amendment 4, that the restriction of prohibited information ought to be limited to “secret” and “top secret” categories as a matter of definition.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being present at Second Reading. I cannot even claim, like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, that I was broadcasting the benefits of line-by-line scrutiny to a foreign power. I was performing a long-arranged judicial function in the Channel Islands.

I am well disposed in principle to Clause 1, and I entirely understand why the concept of protected information is not limited to “secret” or “top secret”, as the JCHR recommended. However, in the interests of obtaining a little more clarity, perhaps I might press the Minister on this point. Paragraph 63 of the Explanatory Notes states:

“Protected information includes, but is not limited to, classified material.”


Three examples are given. One is about information on the identity of police officers working with security and intelligence services. One is about information on intelligence officers operating in a foreign state. I suspect that they do not get much more classified than that. One is classified information on a defence system.

Bearing in mind that those examples appear to relate to classified information, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain, first, what circumstances he can envisage in which it should be an offence to obtain or disclose information that is not classified, or that could not reasonably be expected to be classified, applying Clause 1(2)(b). Secondly, how is one supposed to know that non-classified information is protected, given that the only controlling factor, other than the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—which, as the Committee has just heard, is very broadly framed—is that access should be restricted in some way? On one view, “restricted” could apply to anything, however innocent, that is not actually published. I assume that such a broad meaning is not intended, but could the Minister give us more of a clue as to where the line is drawn?

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It would be the case only if those three tests that I have just described are met for the purposes of the offence in the Bill. So it would have to be that the information was protected, that the person ought reasonably to know that, and that its disclosure was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. I imagine that will be the topic of some debate in the context of the hypothetical example that the noble Lord mentioned. It also has to be done with the intention to benefit a foreign power. I cannot see that, in the hypothetical situation the noble Lord mentioned, that issue realistically would arise because the combination of these tests means not only is the proposed offence proportionate but an appropriately high bar has to be met to bring a prosecution under this clause. The Government therefore consider that the definition of protected information is justified and cannot accept the proposed amendments. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Following up on my noble friend Lord Purvis’s question, would it not probably be in the interests of Canada in the example he gave to expose wrongdoing on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom? The Government of the United Kingdom might define the interests of the United Kingdom in accordance with government policy in a way which was inimical to the interests of Canada and the offence would still be committed.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I find the hypothetical example that the noble Lord postulates hard to follow, because it seems difficult to envisage a situation where a prosecutor could conclude in those circumstances that there was a prejudice to the Government of the United Kingdom and a benefit to the Government of Canada, and that the other elements were present. It seems a most unlikely scenario.

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[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I had two points to make, the first of which, about foreign power, has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, so I will not repeat it. The second is more of a question. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked, “Why not charge theft?” I have no doubt that I will be advised by the Minister, but is there not a requirement that you have to deprive somebody permanently of something to constitute the offence of theft? I can see some potential argument that somebody charged under that offence would say that they had no intention to deprive that person permanently of that information.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not yet spoken to Amendments 9 and 10, which I was proposing to do before my noble friend spoke for us. Before doing so, I join my noble friend Lady Ludford in opposing the protection of all trade secrets without any requirement for there to be prejudice to the interests of the United Kingdom. That amendment, which has been proposed on behalf of the JCHR, seems to me to be sensible. I also share her bemusement, and that of others, that trade secrets are included in the Bill, because the way in which they are included is extremely wide.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out that Clause 2(2)(b)—he read it aloud, but I will not repeat doing so—is so wide that it effectively covers any information which has any commercial value of any significance. Of course, that information is important, and, to that extent, I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, state actors may also steal, or act nefariously in respect of, trade secrets—as may others, be they state actors or not. They may be from the United Kingdom or abroad. They may be connected to national security, but if the Bill will deal with trade secrets, they need to be defined in such a way that it is confined to trade secrets that present a threat to national security. The Bill goes far too wide if we include wide threats to trade secrets in the criminal proceedings—which, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, carry very heavy sentences—without the need to prove the threat to national security as an element of the criminal offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, threats to trade secrets are normally dealt with in the civil courts, where the protection to intellectual property is customarily and very frequently dealt with every day.

It is absolutely right, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, pointed out, that there is a requirement that the foreign power condition must be met. However, the foreign power condition in Clause 29 is not a very difficult hurdle to surmount. The present drafting does not require any prejudice to the security, defence or other interests of the United Kingdom. It is met if conduct is carried out not by a state Government but by any entity controlled or financially assisted by a foreign power—so that could be a commercial organisation that happened to be state-controlled. For “foreign power”, we have to read that as any power or any other state, including any friendly Government from anywhere in the world.

Our Amendments 9 and 10 tighten up the wording on trade secrets in Clause 2, but only in a limited way: by requiring that a trade secret must be subject to measures to prevent it becoming generally known or available to rival experts in the field. We suggest that it is simply not satisfactory—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I have been listening very carefully to the noble Lord, whom I always listen to with great respect. Can I take it that he or his party will put down an amendment to the Long Title of the Bill in due course? Perhaps he has not read the Long Title in full, because, as far as I can see, it covers all these amendments in the exact way in which they are intended. We are in danger of over-sophisticating a non-existent definition of national security.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am bound to say that I discussed that before the noble Lord came in. Since, in my opening speech on the first group of amendments, I quoted specifically from the Long Title of the Bill dealing with Part 1 offences, I do not accept the criticism that I have not read it. Nor do I accept the criticism that it is apposite to threats that have nothing to do with national security, because the Long Title—which starts by dealing with Part 1, as far as the first semi-colon—is about making provision about threats to national security. My point is that, if you protect trade secrets in these very wide terms, it may include threats to national security, but it is not limited to threats to national security and it may go far wider.

It is not satisfactory for trade secrets to qualify for protection just because the information in those secrets might be reasonably expected to be subject to measures to prevent them becoming known generally. What would the measures be? Would they be imposed by a court, by government or by regulation? That is undefined. Perhaps the Minister, in replying, would explain what those measures might be. How does it help to protect trade secrets that are not subject to any protective measures, as the Bill specifically envisages? The clause raises far more questions than it answers.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will very briefly follow my noble friends to agree with that proposition. There has been reference to the foreign power condition, and I will refer to that too.

First, I take the opportunity to say that I am grateful to the Minister for what he said to me earlier by highlighting Clause 29(5). Yes, it does include that the foreign power condition can be met,

“if the person intends the conduct in question to benefit a foreign power”,

without necessarily identifying that foreign power. However, that is not an exclusive meeting of the test, as my noble friend Lord Marks has indicated. The test can be met, for example, if one of two business partners who has some intellectual property or something of commercial value is in negotiations with, say, a sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf and then there is a dispute between the two business partners. While one wants to sell that to the sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf, the other says, “You can’t do that, because that is now in breach of the National Security Bill, because I believe that this is a trade secret.” That is because a foreign power, under Clause 30(1)(c), is

“an agency or authority of a foreign government”,

so a sovereign wealth fund seeking investment could be within that definition. Therefore, I have sympathy for the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but a counterpoint has been raised by asking whether the Bill is the most appropriate way for national security to cover those aspects—and, on balance, I do not think that it is.

However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret is unlawful where the acquisition, use or disclosure constitutes a breach of confidence in respect of confidential information. As I understand it, that was the thrust of his argument. That is also the law: we have transposed the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2018 into UK law, so we have that intellectual property legislation—including a nine-page trade secrets regulation. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord said, and all of it, I think, is covered within existing legislation. The question then arises as to what the intent would be if one is either selling a trade secret or giving a trade secret to a foreign power to advance that foreign power.

That could absolutely be included in the Bill. The concern is that, given the way the Bill is drafted, so many other aspects could also be. That is the point we are trying to tease out: whether the Government intend that trade secrets are, as the noble Baroness indicated, some form of economic warfare, espionage or tactic. That is where the interest of the Bill should lie. It should not be the mechanism whereby trade disputes, commercial disputes or intellectual property disputes are resolved. Ultimately, that is where the Bill could be used. I do not think there are any in this Committee, but I am certain there are creative lawyers who might look for the most appropriate vehicle for the less appropriate cause. I am worried that the Bill would become one of those.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

12: Clause 3, page 3, line 23, at end insert—
“(c) intends that the conduct will prejudice the safety or security or defence interests of the United Kingdom.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds a further intentional element to the offence in Clause 3.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group would add a mental element of intention to prejudice the safety and security or defence interests of the UK to a number of offences in the Bill—those in Clause 3, assisting a foreign intelligence service; in Clause 4, entering a prohibited place; Clause 5, unauthorised entry to a prohibited place; and Clause 16, preparatory conduct to any of the offences in Clauses 1, 2, 4 or 12. The amendments also add, importantly, a similar mental element of intention to prejudice to the foreign power condition that we discussed in the last group, in Clause 29.

The Clause 3 offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service would require intent to prejudice the safety, security or defence interests of the United Kingdom to be proved. That would answer my criticism at Second Reading that the Bill would criminalise a private citizen who helped Mossad to trace possessions looted by the Nazis from their victims, or criminalise the private citizen who helped the CIA to trace war criminals and bring them to justice from whatever theatre. Noble Lords may remember that the only answer that the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, gave to my example of a citizen working for Mossad was that

“we would expect that the UK would have been made aware of such activity and it is possible that the UK would have made an arrangement with Israel. As such, the activity would have a defence in Clause 3(7)(c)(i)”.—[Official Report, 6/12/22; col. 156.]

On analysis, that is no answer at all. There is no legitimate reason why a British citizen should not assist the intelligence service of a friendly nation to achieve ends which are not remotely inconsistent with the interests of the United Kingdom. It is entirely wrong, not to mention high-handed and often either impractical or impossible, to suggest that the citizen should have to go through one of the hoops set out in Clause 7 of demonstrating a legal obligation, carrying out a UK public function, or being in accordance with an agreement with the UK or a proxy of the UK to make his or her conduct lawful.

The proper way out of this difficulty is to criminalise assistance to a foreign intelligence service only if it is intended to prejudice the safety or security or defence interests of the United Kingdom—although, as I pointed out in an earlier group, I am not wedded to those words. But it must be clearly defined, and that is the point of the proposal in Amendments 12 and 15. That is consistent with the aim of the Bill, which the clause as drafted, with its breadth, is not.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has Amendment 16 from the JCHR in this group, which we support, but we stress the need for the interests of the United Kingdom to be defined by reference to national security; the disjunctive safety or interests of the United Kingdom generally is not enough.

Amendment 19 adds a similar requirement to the Clause 4 offence of entering a prohibited place. That clause is less offensive as it stands, because it already requires knowledge or imputed knowledge that the conduct in question is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. If our amendments in groups 1 and 2 were accepted, as they have not been as yet, all Amendment 19 would add is a positive intention requirement, which we say is justifiable and needed but which would not cause great problems by its omission if those amendments were accepted.

Amendment 20 to Clause 5, the summary offence, is more in need of change, even if our amendments in groups 1 and 2 were accepted. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has Amendment 21 in this group, with a similar change to Amendment 16 of requiring the intention to prejudice, which we support, subject to the same proviso regarding the definition of UK interests.

Amendment 47 adds an intentional prejudice element to the Clause 15 offence of obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. Again, as drafted, this is far too wide and ill defined. If a journalist is paid to investigate or write a story for the intelligence service of a friendly nation, entirely compatibly with the national interests of the United Kingdom, he should not be guilty of a criminal offence unless the benefit derived was, in the words of the Bill,

“reasonable consideration for the provision of goods or services”,

and so was within the so-called excluded benefits in Clause 15(4).

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I note the noble Lord’s remarks. I am not entirely sure that I follow the logic, but I will study Hansard carefully and take it back to the department.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has given no quarter. I suppose that is to be expected on the first day of a Committee on a Bill, with the Government defending their position as thoroughly as he has done. I hope that when he does read Hansard, as he has just promised to do, he will realise that there are a great many areas in which flaws in the Bill have been exposed—and exposed in particular by this group of amendments—where it is quite plain that conduct that ought not be criminal runs the risk of being criminalised. The question asked by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed just a moment ago exposed the danger for people working for a foreign intelligence service if they are British citizens; they are plainly caught. There are a number of areas where assisting a foreign intelligence service, for instance, gives rise to particular difficulties.

Before I go on to any detail, let me say that it is a dangerous path for a Government to say that they do not believe that there would be many unjustified prosecutions because the public interest test for a prosecution would not be met. Let us remind ourselves that the prosecution services have to consider two things: first, whether there is a reasonable chance of a conviction on the evidence, and, secondly, whether it would be—

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

Realistic.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

“Realistic” is better than “reasonable”; the noble Lord knows far better than I what the test is.

The second point is whether it would be in the public interest to prosecute. That is a decision made by prosecuting authorities. What we are concerned about in this Committee is what conduct is criminal and merits a conviction in a criminal court. That carries with it the question of how a judge will be constrained to direct a jury as to what criminal conduct is. We have to get that right. Nowhere is that better shown than in this group of amendments.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, was referred to jocularly in an earlier group by the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, who said that she often does not agree with government policy and the interests of the United Kingdom as defined by government policy. Of course, he is right that she often does not agree with government policy, but she is right to point out the danger of ill-thought-out laws that go too wide, criminalising behaviour that is no more than the democratic expression of dissenting views. That is one of the evils at which this whole suite of amendments that we have tabled is directed.

An example of how the Bill goes too far was highlighted by the response of the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, to my Mossad example. She said that, of course, Mossad operating in the United Kingdom would be—I forget the phrase she used—notifiable activity, or it would notify of the activity. That is not the concern I was expressing. The concern that I and others were expressing is that a private citizen helping a foreign intelligence agency in the interests of the United Kingdom or compatible with them, without a government sanction and without working for the Government, would be criminalised. I suggest that it is wrong for that private citizen to be dependent on the Government, prosecuting authorities or the Attorney-General taking the view that the public interest test was not met.

In connection with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, we simply heard no answer to his question about the tendering of legal advice. I know the Minister said that consideration would be given to that, but that calls into question the whole gamut of queries raised in this House, in this Committee and elsewhere about where the Bill goes too far. I suggest that where a Bill is too wide because it offends against human rights so that human rights are infringed and obviously infringed, the law can become positively dangerous—that is why the JCHR position taken on a number of these amendments is so important; I agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on this. We do not just have to consider a benign and friendly Government steeped in the traditions of British democracy. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is not here today, often says, you have to consider the possibility arising of a Government who are wholly against the traditional freedoms that are protected by our law on human rights. I suggest that that is the danger that we are concerned to defeat.

I therefore invite the Minister and his colleagues to go away and think very carefully about the breadth of these clauses and about the strength of the amendments that we have suggested to them, and to discuss with those people who have proposed amendments—we will all be willing to discuss these amendments and any refinements there should be; we are not wedded to the wording as it is the principles that are involved. Thus, by the time the Bill comes back on Report, they can be far more clearly defined, and the intent to prejudice national security—the subject of the Bill—should be clearly made out before anyone is subjected to serious criminal consequences as a result of misguided prosecutions and convictions that will inevitably flow from the misguided wording of the Bill. Having said that we will discuss it, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

13: Clause 3, page 3, line 25, leave out “it is reasonably possible may materially” and insert “is likely materially to”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for a higher threshold to be met for the offence in Clause 3.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this group contains only Amendment 13. That said, there ought to be two amendments, because a further amendment in exactly the same terms is required to Clause 3(2)(b).

Clause 3 deals with assisting a foreign intelligence service, and Clause 3(2)(a) provides that a person commits an offence if they engage in conduct

“that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.”

For some reason that I cannot explain, we did not propose that Clause 3(2)(b), which provides that the person

“knows, or ought reasonably to know, that it is reasonably possible their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities”

should be similarly amended. If this goes further, there will be such an amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my reading of it is not the same as the noble Lord’s, but I will seek clarification and happily write to him on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised a hypothetical about assisting foreign intelligence services. I am happy to provide a few more which may clarify the scope of this clause. Hypothetical examples of a person assisting a foreign intelligence service in carrying out its activities could include aiding intelligence-gathering operations or providing a financial benefit to a foreign intelligence service, or someone working for a foreign intelligence service to entice an individual into working for them. I hope that clarifies it to some extent.

It is important to note that the threat posed by espionage, as we have said in previous groupings, is constantly evolving. It is important that our legislative provisions withstand the test of time. We must safeguard against a rapidly changing and complex threat landscape in which foreign powers and their intelligence services use a whole-of-society approach to conduct hostile activity against the UK. That is why Clause 3 is such an important part of the Bill. We therefore reject this amendment and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I was going to ask the Minister something before he sat down, but he sat down so fast.

My concern with the Government’s approach, and the Minister’s approach in his response, is that it describes activities without reference to the legal definition of the activities concerned. Clause 3(1) involves the person committing the offence if the person

“engages in contact of any kind”.

Under Clause 3(4):

“‘UK-related activities’ means … activities taking place in the United Kingdom”.

It is not necessary to identify the service. As my noble friend pointed out, Clause 3(7) does not cover the private sector.

My amendments are very simple and very short, but even that raising of the threshold the Government resist. We are at a loss to understand why the Government are not prepared to bring a more forensic approach to the definitions in our criminal law. I quite appreciate and agree that the offence, in principle, of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the prejudice of the interests of the United Kingdom—which we say should be clearly defined—is a very important part of the Bill. But it is wrong to draft the law in such a way as to catch any conduct that attracts the displeasure of our intelligence services, our prosecuting authorities or government policy. It is important to define criminal conduct in such a way that it criminalises only conduct that ought properly to be a criminal offence when committed not only by United Kingdom citizens but by others who have absolutely no intention of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the detriment or prejudice of the United Kingdom. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

Public Order Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not been present for earlier proceedings on this Bill because of other commitments, for which I apologise. For that reason, I will say only a very few words. With everyone else who has spoken, I completely oppose Clauses 19 and 20 and support the amendments in this group restricting their ambit and the ambit of SDPOs, for all the reasons considered and voiced by my noble friend Lord Paddick in opening and all other noble Lords who have spoken.

The so-called serious disruption prevention orders amount to punishment that does indeed involve serious disruption: serious disruption of individual citizens’ liberties, imposed without a criminal conviction and on proof to the civil and not the criminal standard, and which can last indefinitely. These proposals are entirely inimical to principles deeply embedded in our law and to notions of crime and justice that we all hold so dear. They are an insidious attack on civil liberties. They threaten a gradual, incremental encroachment on civil liberties—the very type of encroachment that can ultimately lead to the destruction of those liberties themselves.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare a historical if not a current interest as a Home Office lawyer from January 1996 until the autumn of 2001. I was occasionally and habitually a happy and unhappy inhabitant of the Box.

I agree with—I think—every speech so far in this significant debate. I would go further than some in saying that I was always against this blurring of civil and criminal process from the beginning when, I am sorry to say, Labour did it. I was against ASBOs, CRASBOs, control orders, TPIMs, football banning orders and all the rest, because they were always about lessening criminal due process. That is always the intention when you blur civil and criminal process by way of these quasi-injunctive orders. Whether it is minor nuisance or suspicion of being associated with terrorists, whatever the gravity of the threat, you will catch behaviour without proper criminal due process and then prosecute people for the breach.

Although we do not always agree, I must commend the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in particular on a devastating critique of this use of copy and paste in my former department. Computers are wonderful things—until they are not. I will not labour the point, save to quote the right honourable Member for Haltemprice and Howden, who has done his best on this Bill in the other place along with Sir Charles Walker, from the Times this morning:

“Serious disruption prevention orders, or SDPOs”—


protest banning orders—

“can be given to anyone who has on two previous occasions ‘carried out activities related to a protest’ that ‘resulted in or were likely to result in serious disruption’”—

which is not defined—

“or even ‘caused or contributed to the carrying out by any other person’ of such activities. This is drafted so broadly so as to potentially include sharing a post on social media or handing out a leaflet encouraging people to go to a protest—even if you did not go on to attend that protest. Those issued with an SDPO can face harsh restrictions on their liberty, including … GPS tracking and being banned from going on demonstrations, associating with certain people”,

et cetera—and the orders are renewable indefinitely, as we have heard.

I am sorry if I have made noble friends feel uncomfortable. Do not think about these measures as they would be employed today. Think about how they could be used on the statute book by another Government, not of your friends and not of your choosing, in 20 years’ time. That is why, in a terrible Bill, Clauses 19 and 20 should not stand part.

National Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in general we support the aims of this Bill. We agree that our national security law needs updating, and we agree that many of the threats posed by foreign actors to our national security are new and require fresh and targeted solutions. The Bill attempts to achieve all that and in many ways, which the Minister ably explained, it does so. I add our thanks to those of the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to the security services for all the brave, efficient and crucial work they do to protect our national security. However, we have a number of concerns. I shall concentrate largely on the criminal offences proposed in Part 1 of the Bill.

Our first concern is one of principle, because restrictions proposed in the Bill threaten important rights and liberties, but we are also concerned that the Government have missed serious adverse and almost certainly unintended and unforeseen consequences which follow from this proposed transformation of our national security law. These concerns overlap, where there are restrictions of our rights and liberties which were almost certainly unforeseen, and I shall deal with them together.

Our first objection in principle is that the breadth of many of the definitions in the Bill would substantially and unacceptably broaden the scope of the protections ostensibly afforded to national security. Let us consider protected information. The definition within Clause 1 is unduly wide. It covers any information where

“it is reasonable to expect that access to the information … would be restricted in any way”.

So the information does not need actually to be restricted to classify as protected information, disclosure of which is to be criminalised by the Bill.

Then there is the foreign power condition—the foundation of a major expansion of the reach of the national security provisions, and applicable to a number of the new proposed offences. I quite understand the need to replace the concept of a national enemy with the concept of a foreign power, in the attempt to update our legislation and rid it of old-fashioned distinctions between friend and foe and to make it “actor-agnostic”, as the Minister described it. But the attempt is not trouble-free.

In particular, the foreign power condition must be met for an offence under Clause 1 of obtaining or disclosing protected information to be made out. The condition is defined by Clause 29 and relates, broadly, to conduct that is carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, which may be any friendly non-UK Government. Conduct qualifies as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if it is carried out with financial or other assistance provided by a foreign power, so a state-backed broadcasting organisation or state-run company funded by a friendly Government would have such financial assistance. It follows that anyone who obtains or discloses information which they “ought to know” is prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom, however defined—and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that there is no definition available; it is a desperately controversial test—on behalf of a foreign nationally owned broadcaster is at risk of prosecution and conviction of this very serious national security offence.

The freedom of journalists working for foreign broadcasters might be substantially restricted if, for instance, they came by and used leaked information which the UK Government might prefer that they did not have and thereby found themselves at risk of being prosecuted for a Clause 1 offence. The relationship between the conduct and the foreign power may be indirect, so any such conduct meets the foreign power condition wherever it appears in the Bill. For example, it also appears in the definition of the new offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets under Clause 2, which carries a maximum term of 14 years. Clause 2 again is very widely drawn; it covers unauthorised obtaining, recording or retention of a trade secret, for whatever purpose, on behalf of any body deriving financial assistance of any sort from a friendly overseas government body. This presents a significant threat to a wide range of investigative journalism on matters of importance and public interest, which ought to be aired in public even if the owners of such information might regard such airing as highly unwelcome.

In the unforeseen consequences category, the Clause 3 offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service presents a serious difficulty. Under this Bill, the foreign intelligence service can be that of any friendly foreign country; an offence under the clause, again carrying a 14-year term, penalises all conduct to assist any foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities—that is, any activities, of whatever nature, taking place in the UK. So, a UK citizen who assisted Mossad within the UK to recover goods looted by the Nazis, or who helped the CIA find and arrest war criminals, would be guilty of an offence, unless they could show that they were acting under a UK legal obligation or effectively on the direction of the British Government. If they could not show that, I can see no defence under the clause as drafted. How can that be right?

The unauthorised entry to a prohibited place offence under Clause 4 is also far too wide, penalising even inspection of a photograph of a prohibited place, even for journalism, if the accused should have known that the purpose was prejudicial to the interests of the UK. And that is not just UK defence or security interests, but any interests at all. So, photographs of any environmentally damaging activity carried on by government as a matter of policy—fracking, for example, if it were ever again authorised—would count. That is not the defence of national security; that is the suppression of legitimate investigation and dissent.

The Home Secretary told the House of Commons in a Statement on national security and this Bill in particular on 1 November, a week after her reappointment:

“Now, as our markets integrate, we need to think about the future of our industry and innovation. Our economic security guarantees our economic sovereignty just as our democratic security guarantees our freedom … Britain has been on the frontline of the defence of liberty for generations”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/22; col. 790.]


The Bill fails to ensure that the steps we take to defend our liberty are targeted and limited to what is necessary for that defence of liberty. So, the first task for this House at the later stages in the Bill will be to cut down the scope of conduct that is unnecessarily and wrongly caught by the Bill as drafted.

However, much of the discussion on the Bill has been as to whether there should be a public interest defence to the new offences. We regard such a defence as essential. It offers the prospect of avoiding convicting journalists, investigators, campaigners, whistleblowers and many others who should not be targeted by the criminal law at all. Such a defence must be broad enough to protect the free flow of information on which democratic political discourse depends, and it must protect from criminal sanction activities that may infringe private rights of physical or intellectual property where such infringement is justified in the public interest. As the NUJ briefing, which many of us will have received, put it succinctly:

“There should be no situation in which journalists risk being classed as spies or traitors … A free press is one of the conditions of a pluralistic democracy and the UK government should not close down scrutiny of its activities.”


I do not believe that the public interest defence should be available only in Clause 1 cases of obtaining or disclosing protected information. It should be no less applicable in cases under Clauses 2 to 5 and Clause 16, and possibly Clauses 13 and 15 as well.

The possible conditions of a public interest defence have been widely discussed, but I suggest they should include, in some form, each of the following. First, it should be for the defendants to raise the defence. I leave open the question of whether the burden of proof should be on the defence to prove the defence, or whether, once that defence is raised, it should be for the prosecution to rebut it. However, if the burden is to be imposed on the defendant to prove the defence, that should be on the balance of probabilities, and it should also be specifically incumbent on prosecuting authorities to consider the prospect of such a defence succeeding before a decision to prosecute is made. Unnecessary and unmeritorious prosecutions cause untold heartache and substantial loss. The prospect of being prosecuted has a serious chilling effect on conduct in the public interest, and the risk of such prosecutions should be carefully weighed before they are ever brought.

Secondly, the manner in which the defendant has acted should always be a factor to be considered. Thirdly, so too should the good faith of the defendant be considered, and whether or not the defendant reasonably believed that their conduct was in the public interest. Fourthly, proportionality should always be a factor, whether or not the conduct was no more than was necessary to protect the public interest asserted by the defendant. Fifthly, whether or not the conduct was for personal gain should be considered, but the fact that a defendant stood to gain from their conduct should not be enough to rebut the defence; after all, journalists stand to gain from scoops. Finally, a jury should always be left to consider the overall reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in the light of a balancing of possible harms risked against possible benefits to be derived by the public.

In an interconnected world, many of us work in a number of professional fields, collaborating with agencies of foreign Governments. Particularly sensitive is the work of journalists, academics, researchers in commercial fields, and many working directly for friendly foreign Governments and international organisations. My noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire will elaborate our concerns about the foreign influence registration scheme, or FIRS, and the degree to which academics will be snowed under by a bureaucratic avalanche in working out what they need to do to comply with this law’s requirements, and then in undertaking the necessary registrations to comply with an unnecessary and overcomplicated registration system which threatens to stifle and deter international academic co-operation. Journalists, broadcasters and researchers in the commercial world, as well as the media, are equally under threat.

On a happier note, it is a relief to note that the Government have excluded giving and taking legal advice from the scope of this part of the Bill; a completely justified protection of legal professional privilege and the right of all to secure legal advice in confidence. However, the Bill contains a pernicious attack on the right to equality before the law. Clauses 82 to 84 give a court power to reduce damages payable by the Crown to any claimant bringing national security proceedings against the Government. But national security proceedings include any case where any of the claimant’s evidence or submissions, of whatever nature, relate to the activities of any security service, here or overseas. So if a claimant sues the UK Government—any department—and adduces evidence of wrongdoing by, for instance, the Saudi or Rwandan intelligence services, the Crown is entitled to seek an order that the damages will be reduced, and to seek that order at any stage in advance of final judgment. Granted that one of the factors the court must take into account is whether the claimant has been guilty of terrorist wrongdoing, but the lack of that factor does not avoid a reduction in damages. That is inequality before the law. It hands the Government a tool to stifle legal claims against them. It is inimical to liberty.

So too is the proposed ban of up to 30 years on the grant of civil legal aid for anyone convicted of any terrorist offence or an offence having a terrorism connection. The ban is not just for the most heinous terrorist offences but minor accomplice offences, which may have been committed by a family member and which, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Law Society point out, may not be of a very serious nature. Further, the legal aid ban is not just for proceedings connected with terrorism but any civil legal aid to which they might be entitled for any purpose, thus largely putting them outside the protection of the law.

Although the general tenor of the Bill and its purpose are understood and accepted, at the later stages of this Bill we will be trying to make sure that it properly reflects the concerns that we have.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 12th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this was a depressing Queen’s Speech, and nothing in it more so than the Bill of Rights proposal. The Government’s briefing promises to

“end the abuse of the human rights framework and restore some common sense to our justice system”.

The assumptions that our human rights framework is being abused and that our justice system lacks common sense rely on banal, populist assertions, unsupported by any evidence.

The so-called “main elements of the Bill” include

“restricting the scope for judicial legislation”

and

“guaranteeing spurious cases do not undermine public confidence in human rights”.

These are vindictive and populist attacks on the Human Rights Act and on judicial review, unjustified, unfair to the judges and unworthy of serious politicians. As to what will be in the Bill, we are left to guess. Neither the briefing nor the Queen’s Speech even mention the Human Rights Act. The Minister enlightened us no further. The Government claim to be committed to the ECHR, yet they say they will

“establish the primacy of UK case law, clarifying that there is no requirement to follow Strasbourg case law”.

Can the Minister explain how that sits with Article 46 of the convention, which provides that:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties”?


If the UK is bound by decisions in cases to which it is party, how can our courts ignore Strasbourg decisions in other cases?

The truth is that the Human Rights Act has worked well for more than 21 years and still does, with great respect to eloquent points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. It is true that Governments may sometimes resent the Act, a point powerfully made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, but then it often suits Governments to override human rights. That is precisely what the Act and the convention are there to prevent.

The Act amply fulfilled its promise to “bring rights home”, enabling litigants here to enforce their convention rights in domestic courts. Can the Minister tell us the Government’s true intention? Is it to repeal the Human Rights Act and replace it with this new Bill of Rights? Will UK residents be entitled to enforce convention rights here or must they travel to Strasbourg once again?

Nor does the Act undermine parliamentary sovereignty. If a court finds a statute incompatible with the convention, it cannot strike it down. It makes a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4. Parliament then usually legislates to remove the incompatibility. Certainly, by Section 3(1) courts must try to read legislation in a way that is compatible with the convention. So they should—we have an international obligation to respect convention rights. The section is sparingly and wisely applied; there is no evidence to the contrary.

We used to have a reputation for respecting our international obligations. This Government have cast that to the winds; witness their disrespect for the Northern Ireland protocol and the refugee convention. Such carelessness betrays a long Conservative history of honouring international obligations.

This Government established the Independent Human Rights Act Review in December 2020, with Sir Peter Gross as chair and a distinguished and varied panel. It was briefed to consider both the relationship between Strasbourg and our domestic courts and the Act’s impact on the constitutional balance between government and judiciary, which is not the one that needs rebalancing, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighhead. The review’s report made some detailed recommendations to make the Act work better—unsurprising after 21 years—but by and large the Act received a clean bill of health. The Government now threaten to ditch the review’s findings. In so doing, they appear to ascribe to the British public an ill-informed and frankly bigoted approach to human rights, which I believe seriously misreads the fair-mindedness of the people of this country.

For Liberal Democrats, belief in human rights is at our core. We will defend the Human Rights Act in full and the right of all in the UK to enforce convention rights here. We will do so for everyone, without discrimination or prejudice, because the Act has shown that human rights are for everyone, in matters of education, housing, health, social care and freedom of expression as well, not just undeserving foreigners trying to stay unlawfully in the UK, as the Government seem to imply. I have faith that we will be supported in that campaign, across the House and among the wider public.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Strongly though I support it and absurd though I too think it is to allow for some possibility of a jury trial with the jury sitting otherwise than in the actual courtroom, I had no intention of speaking tonight until I learned that my noble and learned friend Lord Judge could not. As I seem to be the last judge standing this evening and feel so strongly about this, it seems that I should say a word. But I urge all of your Lordships to recognise that if my noble and learned friend had been speaking, he would have said the little I propose to say so much more tellingly and convincingly that the House really ought to add enormous weight to it.

All I say is that the whole value of a jury, sacrosanct in our law of course, is that they are there and part of the atmosphere. They watch the whole thing unfolding, see the witnesses and sense the entire development of the arguments as they emerge. My noble friend Lord Carlile made a number of these points, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, has just done. The whole aura of the process and the fact that the jury recognise in the courtroom that they are, for the first time, having to apply themselves to this critical question—is this man or woman guilty or not guilty?—is lost and dissipated if they are not there. I urge your Lordships not to provide for this suggested possibility, for who knows in what circumstances it would be? They can be only circumstances that do not justify having a separate jury.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on the amendments he moved or spoke to on proceedings involving children and health screening, and with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. We support those amendments, but I will speak to Amendment 97CA from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the use of live links in jury trials, to which I have put my name.

This amendment raises two important questions about the nature of juries and of jury trial. First, how important is it to the trial process that juries see and hear witnesses give their evidence live? Secondly, how important is it to the trial process that the relationship and balance between judge and jury is live rather than remote? On the first issue, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made the point that jury trials depend, more than anything else, upon the ability of jurors to weigh up the evidence of witnesses. They have to assess two things: veracity, or whether the witness is trying to tell the truth, and accuracy, or whether he or she has got it right.

As others, including the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile, have said, after nearly two years of the pandemic we have all become completely familiar with the process of remote discussion and meetings. None of us, I feel, would now argue that remoteness makes no difference. In this vital area of our national life, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, pointed out, we entrust decisions about the guilt or innocence of those charged with serious crimes to juries of 12 who listen to and weigh up the evidence of witnesses, and make decisions about truth or falsehood, reliability or inaccuracy, honesty or dishonesty, and intent, accident or misadventure. Those jurors will certainly consider objective evidence that has the same effect when seen or heard remotely as it has when seen or heard directly. But much of the evidence they will hear, and usually the most critical evidence in jury trial cases, has to be subjectively judged, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said. That is done by references to the witnesses’ demeanour, body language, response to cross-examination and emotional responses.

These are matters on which juries might initially and quite legitimately disagree. Their assessment—the different assessments of all 12 of them—will be the subject of detailed discussion during their deliberations and depend upon impressions. We would be undermining our jury system by depriving jurors of the opportunity, in the case that they decide, to share their experiences of the witnesses and the experiences that they have had live. I do not believe that undermining the jury trial in this way can possibly be justified.

On the second point about the presence of the judge, counsel and jury in the same place, the role of the judge and jury and the relationship between them is a delicate one. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the judge’s position is to ensure that trials are conducted in a responsible and serious way. I also think there is considerable importance in that relationship that the independence of juries is maintained. A stock sentence that judges quite properly use when summing up is when they tell the jury, “It is a matter for you, members of the jury,” and it is.

However, for juries to make the decisions they are charged with making, they must not feel to be, seem to be or, still less, actually be at a disadvantage compared to the judge who has seen and heard and assessed the witnesses live. When the judge recounts a particular piece of evidence in summing up, juries must not be cowed or persuaded into accepting what they may perceive to be the judge’s view of the evidence. They must be able to say to each other: “He or she may have said that, but I did not believe that witness—did you see how scared they looked?” That is what jury independence means. Jury independence is fundamental to our system and why it is so important. For that reason, I completely support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, this group contains amendments covering the application of live links to children and vulnerable people as well as to remote juries. I will come to the remote juries point separately later.

First, to make sure that we are all on the same page, I remind the House that Clauses 168 and 169 do not mandate remote or video hearings. How a hearing is to be conducted is a matter for judicial decision on a case-by-case basis. These clauses ensure that, if appropriate, observers can watch a hearing taking place to ensure that the principle of open justice can be maintained.

Amendments 97A and 97B seek to prohibit remote observers from being present in all cases in which a child is among the parties. Amendment 97C similarly seeks to remove children from the application of Clause 170. I suggest both these amendments are unnecessary and would inhibit both the principle of open justice—which is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction—and the principle of judicial discretion. It would inhibit the ability of courts to use audio and video technology where the court sees fit and when it is in the interests of justice to do so.

I turn first to Amendments 97A and 97B. The effect of these amendments would be that all such remote hearings would effectively have to be held in private, including, for example, any multiparty litigation in our civil courts or tribunals in which a single claimant—perhaps one of a number of claimants—is under 18. That would unnecessarily constrain the transparency of our justice system and impede the principle of open justice.

While I accept the sentiment that underpins the amendments, they are unnecessary because we have sufficient tried-and-tested legislation in place to safeguard the privacy of children in these proceedings. That is set out in Section 47(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. We also have existing procedure rules under which the court can hold any hearing in private in order

“to protect the interests of any child or protected party”.

Therefore, I suggest to the House that that statutory provision and the procedure rules provide sufficient protection to safeguard the privacy and well-being of young people in the justice system, whether the hearing takes place in-person or remotely.

Amendment 97C would prevent the court making a direction to enable any participant in a hearing to attend by live link where a child is party to proceedings. Again, it is important to protect the interests of children, but we have clear support and guidance in place which mandates the court to consider and have regard to the welfare of the child, to make sure that each child is fairly assessed and represented, is sufficiently supported, can understand what is happening, and is able to engage and participate in proceedings and be kept safe. That is set out in the Criminal Procedure Rules and criminal practice directions.

I recognise, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said, that, in the majority of cases, it may well be more appropriate for children to attend a hearing in person, and the Criminal Procedure Rules recognise this. But one must recognise that there may be situations where it is more beneficial for a child, whether as a witness or a defendant, to participate by live link; for example, to protect a child witness from having to be in court with the defendant. Clause 170, as drafted, gives the court that inherent flexibility.

I will come to Amendment 97D in a moment but let me first turn to Amendment 97CA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which seeks to exclude juries from the provisions in Clause 170 that would otherwise allow a jury assembled together to take part in a trial through a live video link, where appropriate and where the court has decided that it would be in the interests of justice to do so. I will come to the detail of the amendment in a moment, but let us not lose sight of one important point. This amendment is designed to strengthen and support the jury system. It is designed to ensure that we can continue to hold jury trials in circumstances where it might otherwise be impossible, as we experienced for a certain time in this jurisdiction during the pandemic. I am pleased that we were one of the first jurisdictions in the world to get jury trials back up and running, but we could not do as many as we would normally because of the social distancing constraints.

Why are we so keen to maintain jury trials? The answer is simple and perhaps a little topical. The jury is a fundamental part of our criminal justice system. To adopt the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it is a cornerstone of our liberty. True it is that the cornerstone gets a little defaced with some graffiti from time to time, but it is, none the less, a cornerstone of which we should be proud.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, threw something of a gauntlet down to me. I am very happy to pick it up, briefly. Juries sometimes return verdicts that raise an eyebrow, but I know from bitter experience that it is not unknown for judicial decisions to trouble the eyebrows too. In a proper case, there is a procedure, once the jury has brought in its verdict, to ask the Court of Appeal to consider and determine specific points of law to assist in future cases without disturbing the actual jury verdict in the instant case.

If the noble Baroness wants to have a crack at my right honourable friend the Attorney-General, she can, but she cannot, I am afraid, stand up and have a crack at her while betraying fundamental ignorance of the underlying legal principles. Counsel in the case himself said that his arguments were “new and complex”. Those are precisely the points which would be suitable for reference under Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972, a provision with which I am sure the noble Baroness is very familiar. I am also sure that she has read the recent case in the ECHR of Handzhiyski v Bulgaria, decided on 6 April 2021, which discussed in terms whether the provisions of Article 10 of the ECHR did or did not apply to a charge of criminal damage.

I am very happy to respond on the glories of the jury system, but I respectfully suggest that, if the noble Baroness is going to make a point about the conduct of the Attorney-General, she looks at the underlying legal position first. There are certainly points in the Colston case which an Attorney-General might properly decide to, or not to, refer to the Court of Appeal. That is a matter for the Attorney-General.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

97: After Clause 164, insert the following new Clause—
“Women’s Justice Board
(1) There is to be a body corporate known as the Women’s Justice Board for England and Wales.(2) The Board is not to be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown or as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown; and the Board’s property is not to be regarded as property of, or held on behalf of, the Crown.(3) The Board must consist of 10, 11 or 12 members appointed by the Secretary of State.(4) The members of the Board must include persons who appear to the Secretary of State to have extensive recent experience with women in the criminal justice system.(5) The Board has the following functions, namely—(a) to meet the particular needs of women in the criminal justice system;(b) to monitor the provision of services for women in the criminal justice system;(c) to advise the Secretary of State on—(i) how the aim in subsection (5)(a) might most effectively be pursued;(ii) the provision of services for women in the criminal justice system;(iii) the content of any national standards the Secretary of State may see fit to set with respect to the provision of such services, or the accommodation in which women are kept in custody; and(iv) the steps that might be taken to prevent offending by women;(d) to monitor the extent to which the aim in subsection (5)(a) is being achieved and any standards met;(e) for the purposes of paragraphs (a) to (d) above, to obtain information from relevant authorities;(f) to publish information so obtained;(g) to identify, make known and promote good practice in— (i) meeting the particular needs of women in the criminal justice system;(ii) the provision of services for women in the criminal justice system;(iii) the prevention of offending by women;(iv) working with women who are, or are at risk of becoming, offenders;(h) to commission research in connection with such practice;(i) with the approval of the Secretary of State, to make grants to local authorities and other persons for the purposes of meeting the aim in subsection (5)(a) and the provision of services to women in the criminal justice system, subject to such conditions as the Board considers appropriate, incl uding conditions as to repayment;(j) to provide assistance to local authorities and other persons in connection with information technology systems and equipment used or to be used for the purposes of the aim in subsection (5)(a) and the provision of services to women in the criminal justice system;(k) to enter into agreements for the provision of accommodation for women in the criminal justice system, but no agreement may be made under this paragraph in relation to accommodation for women in the criminal justice system unless it appears to the Board that it is expedient to enter into such an agreement for the purposes of subsection (5)(a);(l) to facilitate agreements between the Secretary of State and any persons providing accommodation for women in the criminal justice system;(m) at the request of the Secretary of State, to assist in carrying out the Secretary of State’s functions in relation to the release of offenders detained in accommodation for women in the criminal justice system; and(n) annually—(i) to assess future demand for accommodation for women in the criminal justice system;(ii) to prepare a plan setting out how they intend to exercise, in the following three years, the functions described in paragraphs (k) to (m) above, and any function for the time being exercisable by the Board concurrently with the Secretary of State by virtue of subsection (6)(b) below which relates to securing the provision of such accommodation, and(iii) to submit the plan to the Secretary of State for approval.(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument—(a) amend subsection (5) above so as to add to, subtract from or alter any of the functions of the Board for the time being specified in that subsection; or(b) provide that any function of the Secretary of State which is exercisable in relation to women in the criminal justice system is exercisable concurrently with the Board.(7) The power of the Secretary of State under subsection (6)(b) includes power—(a) to provide that, in relation to any function that is exercisable by the Secretary of State in respect of particular cases, the function is exercisable by the Board only—(i) where it proposes to exercise the function in a particular manner, or(ii) in respect of a class of case specified in the order, and (b) to make any supplementary, incidental or consequential provision (including provision for any enactment to apply subject to modifications).(8) No regulations under subsection (6) may be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(9) In carrying out their functions, the Board must comply with any directions given by the Secretary of State and act in accordance with any guidance given by the Secretary of State.(10) A relevant authority—(a) must furnish the Board with any information required for the purposes of subsection (5)(b), (c) or (d) above; and(b) whenever so required by the Board, must submit to the Board a report on such matters connected with the discharge of their duties as may be specified in the requirement.A requirement under paragraph (b) above may specify the form in which a report is to be given.(11) The Board may arrange, or require the relevant authority to arrange, for a report under subsection (10)(b) above to be published in such a manner as appears to the Board to be appropriate.(12) In this section “relevant authority” means a local authority, a chief officer of police, a local policing body, a local probation board, a provider of probation services, a clinical commissioning group and a local health board.(13) Schedule (Women’s Justice Board: further provisions) has effect.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause makes provision for the establishment of a “Women’s Justice Board”, along the lines of the Youth Justice Board. The drafting closely follows the form of the provisions establishing the YJB in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group propose the establishment of a women’s justice board, along the lines of the Youth Justice Board. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for adding their names.

The drafting of the two amendments remains as it was in Committee, and closely reflects the wording of the provisions in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 establishing the Youth Justice Board. When we debated these amendments in Committee, on 17 November, they enjoyed widespread support from everyone, except the Minister. The diversity and unanimity of the support we received, I suggest, speaks volumes. Indeed, the support from the Labour Party was unqualified. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said:

“We on this side of the Committee strongly support these excellent amendments”.—[Official Report, 17/11/21; col. 327.]


He spoke of the need to give real drive to the movement to further the needs of women within the criminal justice system.

No one disputes that the Youth Justice Board has been a resounding success. It has concentrated effort on recognising and addressing the special needs of young people within the criminal justice system. It has diverted many away from involvement with the system, and offered help and support to those who have been convicted and sentenced, both with community sentences and in custodial settings. The figures speak for themselves: in the last 15 years, the number of under-18s in custody in this jurisdiction fell by about three-quarters, to well under 800 now.

The establishment of a women’s justice board could, we believe, achieve similar success for women, by concentrating effort and resources on helping women who come into contact with the criminal justice system, diverting them from custody, improving the effectiveness of community sentences for women, increasing their use in consequence, and building ways of offering women offenders specialist support with the special issues and difficulties that they face. In Committee we debated those at length.

We also considered the appalling effect of custody on women and their children. The harsh truth is that 19 out of 20 children whose mothers are imprisoned are forced to leave their homes. All the evidence is that those children are themselves more likely to become involved in crime, more likely to suffer from mental ill health and to fail at school, and less likely to find stable employment as young adults—all to the detriment of society at large. The Minister, replying in Committee, disagreed with the proposition that there is a crisis of confidence in women’s justice. That is not the view of the overwhelming majority of experts and those working in this area, who are all deeply troubled by the lack of specialist support and consideration for women in the system.

It is true that, as the Minister said, we have the female offenders strategy, which started in 2018, and the Advisory Board on Female Offenders. The Ministry of Justice is doing work in this area, but it was working in the area of youth justice before 1998, and that did not obviate the need for the Youth Justice Board.

The Minister said in Committee, and repeated when we met the other day—I am grateful to him for the time and care that he has taken, as he always does, to consider the arguments on this issue—that the key point, from the Government’s point of view, was that we do not have a separate criminal justice system for women and girls, as we do for young offenders. As he put it, there is no separate legal framework; women are dealt with as part of the adult offender population. He drew a distinction, for that reason, between women’s position in the criminal justice system and that of young offenders, whom the law treats differently from adults.

I am afraid I do not follow that logic. It seems to me that it contains a non sequitur. The Government accept that women, like young offenders, have special needs in the criminal justice system. The Minister himself spoke of women having particular needs which we needed to identify. I say we need to do more than to identify them; we need to address them. He spoke of the prevalence of mental health issues, of the number of women survivors of abuse—I took it that he was referring to both sexual and physical abuse—and of the closer link among women offenders between drug and alcohol abuse and reoffending than exists for male offenders.

The Minister did not speak in Committee about the particular family issues faced by women in the system—but the effects of custody on the children and families of women offenders are devastating. We have heard about them, in particular, in the debates on the amendments proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester on primary carers. It is no answer to the need for special attention to women’s needs in the criminal justice system to say that women are subject to the same criminal law as men. That fact, of itself, does nothing to address those special needs.

The Minister raised in Committee the issue of the time needed to establish a women’s justice board, but if we could achieve, in 23 years, anything like the same improvements as the Youth Justice Board has achieved in that time, that would be swift progress indeed. He also spoke of the cost implications of establishing a women’s justice board. That does not allow for the substantial savings that would follow from keeping even a few women out of custody, with the knock-on social costs of taking children into care, and the social costs that follow from women’s involvement in the criminal justice system, particularly when they receive custodial sentences.

There is simply no genuine and convincing answer to this proposal. I urge the Government simply to accept that establishing a women’s justice board would be the most effective, and the most promising, way to achieve all that they themselves say that they wish to do for women who find themselves entangled in a system that lamentably fails to address their particular difficulties. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment, because there is a real problem at the heart of criminal justice, which leads to the dissatisfaction that women feel about the justice system. We have created our system around a notion of gender equality that followed on from many years of using the male pronoun, “he”, with the person at the heart of the criminal justice system being a male agent. We then decided that we could not have that any longer, and that the way forward was gender neutrality. But of course gender neutrality is to a large extent a fiction. We know that that neutrality—creating some sort of supposed equality in criminal justice—actually creates further inequality. To treat as equal those who are not yet equal creates only further inequality. I want to emphasise that: it creates further inequality to pretend that we now have equality between the sexes. That is why I feel—although I know it is never comfortable for Governments to take ideas from elsewhere—that having such a board is a necessary part of addressing the great public discontent about the system and the way it deals with women.

I support the idea of a board that looks specifically at women in prison. We know that the majority of them have mental health issues and that their dependency on drugs and drink often derives from backgrounds of abuse: having been brought up in families where abuse was prevalent, or having themselves been at the receiving end of abuse. Understanding women in prison, how they themselves almost invariably have been victims of crime, is one of the ways in which we will progress the system. The Government should adopt this idea.

We need to concentrate on addressing what happens when women go to prison, because often they lose their accommodation and their children are taken into care. The disruption of everything that matters to them is so great that it is very difficult to repair. I therefore support the amendment. It is worthy of this House’s consideration and it is regrettable that it has been dismissed out of hand. There is a problem at the heart of this: you cannot move from inequality to equality simply by saying that there is equality now.

--- Later in debate ---

The underlying point is that we have a single adult criminal justice system. We should not, therefore, have a separate women’s justice board. The Youth Justice Board is for a separate justice system. Essentially, for that reason, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I am reassured by the fact that he says that he understands the case, of course, but I am not reassured by the logic that drives him still to oppose these amendments.

I did not hear in what he said anything that answers the unanimous speeches around the House, which made two important points. The first is that women’s needs are different and special. As I said in my opening speech, that does not seem to me to be answered by the fact that there are different justice systems applicable to youths and to women. The second point is that this is about delivery. It is not just about a philosophy that says that we recognise those needs, or even that we identify them; it is about addressing those needs and bringing some drive to that effort. Those points were made powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and many others. The question put to the Minister by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as to what it is that the Government do not want delivered, was not answered by the Minister saying that the Government want to see this delivered, unless they are prepared to do something to achieve that delivery.

I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, whose speech can perhaps be summarised by her question: so far, has it been done? The answer is no. Delivery has not been achieved. We believe—the speeches from around the House show that noble Lords also believe this—that a women’s justice board is needed to achieve that delivery. For that reason, and in the hope that sufficient Members from the noble Baroness’s party will support her and us on this issue, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Monday 13th December 2021 Lords Chamber

It seems to me that a pragmatic approach to this problem is to accept the wording of the clause, but for the Government to indicate as strongly as they can that it is not their intention that prison sentences should be the norm, even when the injury tends towards the upper end of the scale. Ultimately, the way of dealing with the various gradations of injury and carelessness would be a matter for the Sentencing Council to set out, as it has already done for this kind of offence in various grades. However, all of that will take time, which is why an indication from the Minister would be very important as we encounter this offence coming before magistrates and sheriffs soon after the Bill takes effect. I hope the Minister will be able to assure your Lordships that he has taken on board my concerns about the possibility of prison sentences for this offence by placing that possibility into its proper context. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I support the opposition of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lady Randerson to this clause. The clause as it stands is simply wrong in principle and I agree with the noble and learned Lord that this is not a case where you can simply tinker with the language. The problem is that the clause threatens to penalise the outcome of the offence—that is, serious injury—with imprisonment, yet the mental element of the offence of careless driving is no more than negligence. Careless driving involves no more than a driver falling below the standard of care of a prudent driver. All negligence is careless; a simple mistake or inadvertence will suffice. To make such an offence imprisonable because it results in serious injury is not a step that we have taken before. It offends against the principle that the seriousness of the offence should depend not just upon the act done, but on the state of mind of the offender. That is what distinguishes careless driving from dangerous driving, because dangerous driving involves a very serious departure from the normal standard of a careful and sensible driver.

I make one further point. In the absence of mechanical failure or an unexpected event, almost every accident is the result of negligence on the part of at least one of the drivers involved. Sadly, a large number of accidents involve serious injury. A broken limb is a serious injury for this purpose, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out.

The vast majority of accidents arising from negligence —whether they cause serious injury or not—do not currently lead to prosecution. I should be grateful to hear whether the Minister regards the establishment of this new offence as likely to lead to more prosecutions. This clause would leave it to the police and prosecuting authorities to pick out the few accidents which they decided should lead to prosecution. This would expose drivers to the risk of imprisonment for a simple mistake. Leaving this decision to the police and prosecuting authorities to implement in a very few selected cases would be arbitrary and unfair. It would introduce an unwelcome element of lottery into our justice system.

It may well be that the noble and learned Lord does not press this to a vote. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, we will get a very clear statement from the Minister as to how prosecuting decisions will be taken in these cases and as to what he regards as the likely approach to sentencing. I suggest that imprisonment for inadvertence is a retrograde step.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I was pleased to have the opportunity to join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on Amendment 60A—whether Clause 67 should stand part of the Bill. I thank the Minister for his time and willingness to try to assist us. I shall listen carefully to what he has to say.

The crux of this is when careless becomes dangerous. My experience in 20 years as a magistrate is that, basically, people are charged with both in the hope that the prosecution manages to make one or the other stick, as they say. I share the concern expressed by my noble friend of exactly what careless means. What should it mean? It should mean exactly what comes into our minds when we use the word. It should not be regarded as just a slightly milder form of dangerous. The thought processes behind it should be significantly different. Careless usually implies without specific intent—often a momentary lack of attention. Most of us sitting here will have suffered from this at some point in our driving careers. Most of us will have been lucky enough not to have caused an accident during that momentary lack of attention. Or, if we did cause an accident, hopefully it did not cause injury. Even the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has struggled with the definition and hence opted to try to remove the clause.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, because he has assured us that he will be able to elucidate sufficiently for us to feel that there will be a clear distinction. We do not want to face a situation in which, for example, a harassed mother with a child or two in the back who backs out of a parking space and inadvertently hits a pedestrian might go to prison, when she was backing out carefully in terms of her own concentration at that moment, was not going fast and was looking in her mirrors, but there were too many things happening at the same time for her to be able to concentrate fully and she made a terrible mistake.

I think we have all been guilty of that sort of momentary inattention or error of judgment and people should not find themselves being sent to prison for something such as that. It is therefore very important that the Minister is able to reassure us that that is not the kind of thing the Government have in mind.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of Cradley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendments 292A and 292B. In doing so, I declare my interest as director of Generation Rent.

In my view, men advertising free rent for sex are not landlords, they are predators; they prey on vulnerable women and men with limited financial options. The fact that they use Covid as a marketing technique is abhorrent. They do not provide, or even attempt to provide, a safe, secure home; they deliberately take advantage of people. Although the law and CPS guidance in this area were updated a few years ago, they are still flawed and inadequate. Action against these predators needs to be enforced, investigated and prosecuted. The web platforms such as Craigslist, which is reportedly worth £7.5 billion, that facilitate this exploitation need to have action taken against them. They host these ads, yet they are ignored by law enforcement. Some of these predators may not be aware that they are breaking the law; however, I am sure that many are laughing at the law. They post their ads, which are open and explicit, and their criminal actions pass by unhindered because they know that they can post these ads without consequence.

Despite it being a criminal offence, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton said, there has only ever been one charge for sex for rent. That was in January this year, and it was because of the good work of journalists who passed their evidence to the police. Thanks to that and an investigation by ITV researchers in 2009, this then resulted in further criminal inquiries.

Of course, as director of Generation Rent, I would say that dealing with the criminal justice aspects of this issue is only one side of the problem. Hand in hand with these criminal justice changes there needs to be action to address the insecure housing situation and financial vulnerabilities of thousands of people in this country. We need a dramatic increase in social housing. It was reported last week that fewer than 6,000 social homes were built last year. We need more interventions to support renters in arrears. Rent arrears have tripled during the pandemic, and more renters than ever are now on universal credit. We need a proper and permanent end to private renters being able to be evicted for no reason with just two months’ notice. Hundreds of thousands of people are financially vulnerable and live at risk of homelessness and exploitation.

No one should ever be forced by coercion or circumstance to exchange sex for a home. The law needs to better protect renters from these predators, who seek to exploit them in return for a roof over their head. I very much support the amendments tabled by my noble friend and look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely support the motivation behind all the amendments in the group, comprehensively spoken to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. I am, however, hesitant about the detail of the new offences proposed, and that goes further than the drafting—I fully accept that the noble and learned Lord suggested that there could be changes to the drafting. All five of the new offences have problems of breadth. That prevents me giving unqualified support to creating these new offences without considerable further research being undertaken.

I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, that there is some danger to having a review of the spiking offence, but, in general, as distinct from the specific new offences, I am entirely unqualified in my support for the two amendments calling for urgent reviews of the law on exposure and on spiking. We need to consider carefully how the law in these two areas is working, the extent to which it needs reform and exactly what reform is needed. The review mechanism proposed in the amendments is comprehensive and sensible, and the amendments have the potential, if accepted, to lead to measured and evidence-based reform which will work well. It is that type of reform that we should all want.

The amendments creating each of the five new offences in this group respond to entirely justifiable views that something must be done, but I am not sure that the conditions on which criminal liability is imposed have been sufficiently reviewed and considered. The response I would like to see in each case from the Government is a promise to consider the new offences carefully and, with expert help, to see whether they can come up with offences that would be clearly defined, thoroughly drafted and delineated, and limited to behaviour that should properly be criminal, with all the pitfalls considered.

I fully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, that we have suffered in this Bill from trying to do everything in a rush. These amendments, while well intentioned and in the right spirit, fall into that danger.

We could take the creation of the new offence of non-fatal strangulation in the Domestic Abuse Act as a useful template. The proceedings on that provision in that Act also proved that there does not need to be undue delay in ensuring that a well-drafted provision reaches the statute book. Indeed, it might be possible to include new offences in all these areas, if only the Government would give a sensible allocation of more time for their consideration.

Perhaps I may give several examples of my concerns—they include those expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but go further. On street harassment, in Amendment 284, I am concerned about the breadth of the proposed offence. The noble and learned Lord saw it as a virtue that it was not confined to sexual harassment. I do not agree with that, because “harassment” as defined is so broad that it criminalises behaviour that many people would not believe ought to be criminal.

I am also concerned about the use of the words “ought to know” in the context of harassment. When a defendant does not know that conduct amounts to harassment but is charged on the basis that he ought to have known it, is that properly a criminal offence? These are not drafting points; they reflect a concern about criminalising behaviour with a particular target—generally sexual harassment, as has been said—while included in the target are far more offenders than could properly have been envisaged.

On kerb-crawling, I am concerned that the definition in subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 285 is far wider than anything that would normally be understood as kerb-crawling, which usually has to do with soliciting prostitution. This would cover any conduct amounting to harassment, after getting out of the vehicle, that is

“likely to cause annoyance, alarm, distress or nuisance”.

It seems to me that any incident of road rage could therefore be covered. The proposed offence is completely two-sided. The suggested penalty is revocation of a licence, or a fine. Why revocation of a licence? Incidents of road rage may be two-way—there may be blame on both sides. Why not a shorter ban, if the removal of a licence is indeed appropriate?

Amendment 292A concerns the offence of sex for rent and Amendment 292B concerns facilitating it. These amendments are directed at unscrupulous landlords and owners or providers of accommodation. Appalling behaviour, such as that outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, would be covered by the proposed offence, but is that behaviour all that the proposed offence would cover? The definition includes the words “requiring or accepting” sexual relations. Is the provider of the accommodation always the only guilty party? Should such behaviour always be criminal? What about the landlady of the bed and breakfast who seduces the potential paying guest and offers him or her a free room in return? Is that always to be criminal? Even if it is, is that offence always triable on indictment only? Is that proportionate? I suggest not—it needs further thought. The business of sex for rent is disgraceful, in exactly the way expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, but we need to be very careful about what we introduce in response to the outrage that is felt as a result.

On Amendment 292T and sexually motivated homicide, of course one understands the motivation behind creating that new offence, but my concern is that, as drafted, the offence would criminalise behaviour where the perpetrator intended no harm at all to the person who died. It covers a person who kills another

“in the course of … sexual gratification”

and intends the act—in other words, has the intention to do whatever sexual act it is that led to the death of the person who dies. Would this not cover consensual acts desired or intended by both parties which, whether by accident or misfortune, led to the death of one of them? The noble and learned Lord said that this was there to outlaw the defence of rough sex. I understand that it is there for that purpose, but people have sex that gives them heart attacks—that is an extreme and, in a sense, absurd example, but there are a lot of sexual acts that lead to harm. You cannot criminalise them all just to deal with the defence of rough sex. Some of those acts would be unintentional and innocent.

My point is not to resist any change in the criminal law; it is simply to point out how careful we need to be in passing new legislation before we introduce new rafts of offences that go far too wide. That would be a restriction on freedom, not an improvement in the freedom of the citizen from new offences. I hope that the Government will respond to these amendments in a positive way, but with great care and in the spirit of compromise between the need for care and the need to criminalise behaviour that truly ought to be criminal.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Then there might be a point where that becomes harassment.

I found the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, to be terrible. He sounded like a Government Minister in relation to this, thinking of excuses why not to do something about harassment, not just against women—against other people as well—but particularly against women. I was very struck by the fact that the Minister at least acknowledged that there is a real problem in relation to this. Her speech accepted that something had to be done about it, which that of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, did not.

There was a difference between the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which was broadly to accept the proposals that I am making in Amendment 284, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who raised two particular points in relation to street harassment. One was about the breadth of the offence, which is not limited to sexual matters. I do not think it should be limited to sexual matters. If somebody who is disabled is chased down the street by a group of people taunting them for being disabled, that should be harassment. The second point the noble Lord was worrying about was “ought to know”. The sort of conduct that we are seeking to criminalise here is where people behave in a way that is wholly unacceptable. If you say, “I did not know that it was criminal to wolf-whistle and chase somebody down the street,” the fact that you did not know that should not be any defence. Those were the only two points he made in relation to it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way and I am sorry that he found my speech terrible. I think he missed the point. I am not suggesting that there should be no criminalisation of the sexual offences. It may well be that the behaviour about disability that he mentions is already criminal. The point I am making is that you have to be very careful to delineate offences so that they are criminalising only conduct that ought to be criminal.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, with whom I do not always agree, made the distinction very well. In my understanding of the Minister’s speech, she and I were on exactly the same page. We both believe that violence against women and girls has to be treated extremely seriously. We both believe—and if I sound like a Government Minister, the noble and learned Lord knows that I am not and never have been one—that the Government have a responsibility to ensure that the ambit of the criminal law is kept within the ambit of the law that people can trust and have confidence in. They cannot do that if you randomly criminalise behaviour that ought to be without the criminal law.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I do not know where to start in relation to that intervention. I agree with the noble Lord that we need a clear delineation. We need to come forward with something. We have come forward with something that, interestingly enough, the former Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland found completely acceptable but the noble Lord, Lord Marks, does not, for the two reasons that he has given that seem to me to be ill founded. We need to make progress in relation to it. We are not going to have an opportunity to do it. What I take the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as saying is that he will co-operate with us in trying to delineate an offence for the purposes of this Bill because something needs to be done now.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

The noble and learned Lord invites a response. I can certainly say that we will co-operate with that and I completely agree with him that the degree to which we are forced to rush this legislation inhibits progress on the kinds of proposals he is making. The difficulty is that one has to look at these offences in detail.

The noble and learned Lord suggested—rather unfairly, I think—that the two points I made against the street harassment offence he was particularly concerned with were the only two points I had. I made it absolutely clear in my speech that these were just examples. I agree with the Minister that you have to look very carefully at the whole area of new offences. That is why the reviews are important in relation to the spiking and exposure offences. You simply cannot legislate in a hurry to create new offences, as his amendment seeks to do.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I have no idea whether that was a yes or a no to my question. I assume the two points the noble Lord made were his two best points and the other two were no better than that, so I do not know where the Liberal Democrats stand in relation to that now.

In relation to the sex-for-rent offence, various points were made about whether the case of the landlady who seduces the male tenant and then does not charge rent should be an offence. I am more than happy to work out whether there should be certain defences available. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, made clear, it is something that urgently needs criminalisation—and criminalisation that does not require the victim to be either characterised as engaged in prostitution or incited to commit prostitution. The implication of the law, even if it gives the victim anonymity, is that by succumbing to the sex-for-rent proposal the person is forced to become engaged in prostitution. That is not the way the law should be. There should just be a straightforward criminalisation of it.

Of course, I am sure that the offence can be made better in terms of its drafting but it is a drafting issue, not an issue of substance between us. If we do not do it in this Bill, when will we do it? The point that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, makes is almost unanswerable: there has been one prosecution. I could not work out whether there is maybe another one coming, from what she said. That would make it two, over years, and it is wholly unacceptable that that is the position.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I will most certainly do that. So this is offences where the knife is not actually deployed and the person with the individual with a knife in their pocket would not have known that the knife was in their pocket. Without getting myself into further trouble, I would say that the courts would take those facts into consideration—but I will elect to write to noble Lords with as many permutations and combinations as I can possibly think of before Report.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I have no wish to get the noble Baroness into more difficulties, but the problem arises because she said that the court would have to consider the relevance of the carriage of the knife to the offence, and that is quite simply wrong. I would be very grateful if the noble Baroness, before any examples are produced, would concede that, and then discuss whether these amendments are not very important in light of the answer. There is the weakness—the lack of the nexus between the carriage of the knife and any offence that is proved.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I think I need to reflect further on what noble Lords have said. I will try to answer the noble Lord’s question in a letter before we start talking about examples. We are, after all, in Committee, and I am learning, like other noble Lords, as we go along.

Amendments 226, 226A and 226B would remove the provisions that enable a court to issue the SVRO if two or more people commit an offence but not all of them used or were in possession of the weapon—that is slightly going back on what we were discussing. When a knife offence or offensive weapon-related offence is committed, it is not always the case that all the offenders had the weapon in their hands—as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out—during the commission of the offence. But if the court is satisfied that a person knew or ought to have known that another person committing the offence had a knife or an offensive weapon during the commission of the offence, and this person committed an offence arising out of the same facts, we think it would be appropriate for an SVRO to be available. Again, I will put the various permutations and combinations to noble Lords in a theoretical way. This would allow SVROs to be made in relation to all the individuals who were involved and were convicted of such an offence, should the court consider an SVRO to be necessary in respect of those individuals.

This provision intends to cover situations such as a robbery or a fight where a weapon was used by one individual, but where other individuals convicted of offences related to the same facts knew, or ought to have known, that a weapon was being used or carried by another person involved in the offence, even if they themselves were not carrying the weapon. This is very similar to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, except that that individual was brandishing the weapon.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I propose to deal with just one amendment, Amendment 233, which is concerned with the defence of reasonable excuse. I concentrate on that because my noble friend Lord Paddick has covered the ground in this group. But it seems to me—and I agree with what my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, have said—that this group offends against principles of our criminal law and rides roughshod over them, because the overall purpose of the Bill seems to have taken precedence over any degree of thought being given to the detail of what is actually being done.

Amendment 233 in the names of my noble friend Lord Paddick, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, would permit a reasonable excuse defence to an offence committed where an offender subject to an SVRO tells a constable that they are not subject to such an order. The Liberty briefing, for which we are all very grateful, points out that an offender may have committed the proposed offence of telling the police constable falsely that they are not subject to an order even where they honestly and even reasonably believe that the order—the SVRO—is no longer in force, or where they do not understand the question because English is not their first language, or for any other reason.

Looking at the proposed offences under new Section 342G(1), the reasonable excuse defence is presently available only in respect of offences under (a) or (b) of that subsection. The first is if the offender

“fails without reasonable excuse to do anything the offender is required to do by the order.”

The second is where the offender

“does anything the offender is prohibited from doing by the order.”

But there is no reasonable excuse defence available for any of the other three offences. Under (c), I think “notifies the police” means providing to the police,

“in purported compliance with the order, any information which the offender knows to be false”,

while (d) covers denying the order which is the subject of Amendment 233m which I have addressed, and (e) is where the offender

“intentionally obstructs a constable in the exercise of any power conferred by”

the legislation. None of the last three has a reasonable excuse defence available.

In thinking about this proposed section, one is reminded that reasonable excuses may arise in odd and unpredictable ways. Legislation ought to avoid criminalising any behaviour for which the citizen has a reasonable excuse, because criminalising behaviour in these circumstances brings the law into disrepute. If there is no reasonable excuse, the offence is committed and conviction will follow—but if there is a reasonable excuse, there ought to be no conviction.

We have only to remind ourselves that there may be a reasonable excuse for disobeying police officers’ requirements. Tragically, Sarah Everard was persuaded to enter Wayne Couzens’s car, with awful results, because he purported to have the right to require her to do so. We should be open to the view that automatic obedience to the requirements of a police officer is not always sensible, and that offenders, even though subject to SVROs, might well have reasonable excuses for non-compliance with police officers’ requirements.

I suggest that the Minister and her colleagues ought to think about whether reasonable excuse should not be a defence to all these offences. Initially, they might consider that there would not be many cases where a citizen would have a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. But they might also wish to reflect that that does not mean that, in those cases where citizens do have a reasonable excuse, they should be found guilty of a criminal offence. This is an important lacuna in the proposals made here—that reasonable excuse will be no answer to conviction.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has explained, this group of amendments deals with further aspects of the new serious violence reduction order. Amendments 231A and 231B would remove the requirement for an offender subject to an SVRO to notify the police of their home address; any changes to their home address; the address of any other premises at which the offender regularly resides or stays; or the address of any place they decide to live in for a period of one month or more.

We included notification requirements in the legislation in order to help officers to identify those subject to an order in their area. It is a common feature of other offender management regimes, including in relation to sex and terrorism offenders, so we are not breaking any new ground here. We stated in the draft statutory guidance that the police should use the notification stage to engage with the offender and clarify the effects of an SVRO: that is, to explain to the offender in ordinary language the requirements and effects of an SVRO and what offences may be committed if they breach the order. This, along with an up-to-date description, could be used to assist with future identification when conducting a stop and search. It is therefore important that we keep the notification requirement as currently drafted to ensure that officers are able properly to identify those subject to an order.

Amendment 233 would create a defence so that an offender can tell an officer that they are not subject to an SVRO if they have a reasonable excuse to do so. I do not see any circumstances where it would be reasonable for an offender not to tell an officer that they are subject to an SVRO if they are asked. It may be that the noble Lord wants to cover circumstances where an offender subject to an SVRO has a reasonable excuse for carrying a knife. In such circumstances, it would be for the police, and ultimately the courts, to decide whether the reasonable excuse defence was made out in the event that the offender was arrested and then charged with an offence in relation to the possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon.

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Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

240A: After Clause 163, insert the following new Clause—
“Women’s Justice Board
(1) There is to be a body corporate known as the Women’s Justice Board for England and Wales.(2) The Board is not to be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown or as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown; and the Board’s property is not to be regarded as property of, or held on behalf of, the Crown.(3) The Board must consist of 10, 11 or 12 members appointed by the Secretary of State.(4) The members of the Board must include persons who appear to the Secretary of State to have extensive recent experience with women in the criminal justice system.(5) The Board has the following functions, namely—(a) to meet the particular needs of women in the criminal justice system;(b) to monitor the provision of services for women in the criminal justice system;(c) to advise the Secretary of State on—(i) how the aim in subsection (5)(a) might most effectively be pursued;(ii) the provision of services for women in the criminal justice system;(iii) the content of any national standards the Secretary of State may see fit to set with respect to the provision of such services, or the accommodation in which women are kept in custody; and(iv) the steps that might be taken to prevent offending by women;(d) to monitor the extent to which the aim in subsection (5)(a) is being achieved and any standards met; (e) for the purposes of paragraphs (a) to (d) above, to obtain information from relevant authorities;(f) to publish information so obtained;(g) to identify, make known and promote good practice in—(i) meeting the particular needs of women in the criminal justice system;(ii) the provision of services for women in the criminal justice system;(iii) the prevention of offending by women;(iv) working with women who are, or are at risk of becoming, offenders;(h) to commission research in connection with such practice;(i) with the approval of the Secretary of State, to make grants to local authorities and other persons for the purposes of meeting the aim in subsection (5)(a) and the provision of services to women in the criminal justice system, subject to such conditions as the Board considers appropriate, including conditions as to repayment;(j) to provide assistance to local authorities and other persons in connection with information technology systems and equipment used or to be used for the purposes of the aim in subsection (5)(a) and the provision of services to women in the criminal justice system;(k) to enter into agreements for the provision of accommodation for women in the criminal justice system, but no agreement may be made under this paragraph in relation to accommodation for women in the criminal justice system unless it appears to the Board that it is expedient to enter into such an agreement for the purposes of subsection (5)(a);(l) to facilitate agreements between the Secretary of State and any persons providing accommodation for women in the criminal justice system;(m) at the request of the Secretary of State, to assist in carrying out the Secretary of State’s functions in relation to the release of offenders detained in accommodation for women in the criminal justice system; and(n) annually—(i) to assess future demand for accommodation for women in the criminal justice system;(ii) to prepare a plan setting out how they intend to exercise, in the following three years, the functions described in paragraphs (k) to (m) above, and any function for the time being exercisable by the Board concurrently with the Secretary of State by virtue of subsection (6)(b) below which relates to securing the provision of such accommodation, and(iii) to submit the plan to the Secretary of State for approval.(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument—(a) amend subsection (5) above so as to add to, subtract from or alter any of the functions of the Board for the time being specified in that subsection; or(b) provide that any function of the Secretary of State which is exercisable in relation to women in the criminal justice system is exercisable concurrently with the Board.(7) The power of the Secretary of State under subsection (6)(b) includes power—(a) to provide that, in relation to any function that is exercisable by the Secretary of State in respect of particular cases, the function is exercisable by the Board only— (i) where it proposes to exercise the function in a particular manner, or(ii) in respect of a class of case specified in the order, and(b) to make any supplementary, incidental or consequential provision (including provision for any enactment to apply subject to modifications).(8) No regulations under subsection (6) may be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(9) In carrying out their functions, the Board must comply with any directions given by the Secretary of State and act in accordance with any guidance given by the Secretary of State.(10) A relevant authority—(a) must furnish the Board with any information required for the purposes of subsection (5)(b), (c) or (d) above; and(b) whenever so required by the Board, must submit to the Board a report on such matters connected with the discharge of their duties as may be specified in the requirement.A requirement under paragraph (b) above may specify the form in which a report is to be given.(11) The Board may arrange, or require the relevant authority to arrange, for a report under subsection (10)(b) above to be published in such a manner as appears to the Board to be appropriate.(12) In this section “relevant authority” means a local authority, a chief officer of police, a local policing body, a local probation board, a provider of probation services, a clinical commissioning group and a local health board.(13) Schedule (Women’s Justice Board: further provisions) has effect.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause makes provision for the establishment of a “Women’s Justice Board”, along the lines of the Youth Justice Board. The drafting closely follows the form of the provisions establishing the YJB in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Amendments 240A and 259C in my name and that of my noble friend Lord German, who has had to leave, call for the establishment of a women’s justice board. It has been pointed out in Committee that these are very long amendments. I understood from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that the second of them may be the longest in what is still, on day 9, an extremely full Marshalled List, but the drafting is modelled on the drafting of the legislation establishing the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. I do not propose to spend any time considering its detail.

However, it is widely acknowledged that the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales has been a great success. It has benefited from the effect of concentrating effort, research, learning and resources on youth justice. It has focused on recognising and addressing the difficulties of young offenders in the criminal justice system and on helping children to achieve their potential while aiming to minimise the harms that follow from young people’s contact with the system.

Perhaps most significantly, it has had the outcome of the number of children entering the youth justice system reducing year on year. Between March 2006 and 2020, the population of under-18s in custody in England and Wales fell from 2,832 to an average of 780 in the year 2019-20. Of course, the remaining cohort represent the most intractable cases and present the most difficulties. Nevertheless, that success in reducing youth offending has been remarkable. It is the aim of these amendments to establish a women’s justice board that can produce similar successes.

Much has been attributable to the success of the Youth Justice Board in attracting extremely effective and committed leadership. On these Benches, we are very proud of the work that has been undertaken by my noble friend Lord McNally, but the leadership of successive chairs, such as Frances Done and Charlie Taylor, as well as the current chair, Keith Fraser, has been a major factor in the board’s success. Establishing a women’s justice board on similar lines would also be likely to attract effective leaders, who would bring immeasurable benefit to women in the criminal justice system.

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I will add two further points. First, I am concerned about, and conscious of, the time it would take for a new body to be set up and establish relationships with the relevant organisations that would make a real difference. As we have the advisory board up and running, I would rather work with—and improve if need be—the organisations that we currently have. Secondly, there is a cost implication. As a point of comparison, if we are going to look across to the Youth Justice Board, its staff costs alone in the 2019-20 accounts were £5.5 million. I really do not want to divert any money from our primary task of fully delivering the female offender strategy. For those reasons, therefore, which I think are a blend of principle and practicality, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the support of noble Lords from around the House for the proposal to establish a women’s justice board. I pick on two points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, arguing that women have very special needs. Those are sufficient justification for considering the establishment of a women’s justice board.

I then move to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said about the establishment of the Youth Justice Board. He talked about how it gave “drive” to the consideration of the needs of young offenders and the assistance and help given to them; I should have mentioned the work of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, as the board’s first chair because it was extremely important. It provides some answer to the point made by the Minister, who picked up on the issue of time. The Youth Justice Board was established in 1998. Under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, it started work in that year. It is 23 years since then, and every one of those years has been a success. That is extremely important. In the view of those who spoke in favour of this amendment, we could get equivalent drive and movement in catering for the special needs of women through the establishment of a women’s justice board. It is entirely artificial to draw a distinction between youth justice, where there is certainly a separate structure, and women’s justice, where there is no separate structure and women offenders are treated as part of the adult population.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lady Brinton drew attention to the family needs of women and the devastation produced for women and their children by contact with the criminal justice system. When it is acknowledged that women in the system have very particular needs, as the Minister did fairly, it is enough for me to say that the distinction he drew is artificial. I also accept my noble friend Lady Brinton’s point that the women’s justice board would deal with family court issues as well as criminal court issues. Although I have talked about the criminal justice system, the wider justice system and its help for women are also seriously in need of the extra drive of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, spoke.

Saying that, I detected some flexibility in the Minister’s speech. I hope that, in discussions with him between now and Report, we may find some room for movement. On that basis, even if he does not admit that flexibility now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 240A withdrawn.

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[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may respond to what noble Lords have said. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, mentioned young offender institutions. When I was getting educated by Frances Crook, I asked her, “How often do inmates at a YOI get taken out on camp?” She said to me, “John, you should ask how often they are taken out of their cells.”

In response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, I am not proposing conscription or a national service-type solution. However, the points that he makes are absolutely what is informing my thinking. He made a valid point about the need for instructors and I am not proposing the use of the military to provide that function. Prison officers ought to be taking up that role and I envisage, among other things, youngsters who trained as Outward Bound instructors who cannot necessarily get particularly well-paid employment then training as prison officers and being double-hatted. There are a lot of things that we could do if we wanted to do them.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will not address the detail of the noble Earl’s amendment, but I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, that there is a great deal of merit in the call for more and better training within the penal system. We have long taken the view that training within prisons in particular is inadequate, poorly arranged and often unavailable. We therefore commend the noble Earl for the thrust of his amendment and certainly commend him for the care and dedication that he has given to setting it out in detail and in the briefing that he circulated.

We are not convinced of the need for a new sentence of detention for training at Her Majesty’s pleasure but we agree with the heart of the amendment, which is the focus on skills to train for future employment, for which there is a great need. The classroom-style of training does not always work. What is needed is training for skills on the job and for soft skills because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, pointed out, not everyone is suitable for the basic training that perhaps the noble Earl has in mind. There should be a combination of practical, soft and technological skills. We are all for better training. However, we seek the Government’s work to be directed towards the provision of that sort of training—better training and more of it—within the criminal justice system and overcoming the barriers to prisoners being work-ready by the time they finish their terms of imprisonment because, at the moment, there is a serious deficiency in that area.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I join noble Lords in commending the noble Earl for the effort and work that he has put into this and the fact that he has thought it through. I also commend what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said. It was obviously not a detention for training centre that he was passed to, but his experience was successful in diverting him from the criminal justice system. That is an indication that it worked, even if he ended up in the criminal justice system as the Lord President of the Court of Session and a member of the Supreme Court.

I very much agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said. There are parts of this that we would all agree with. However, we on this side would not support this as a separate sentence. If one looks at the detail, it requires the setting up of a number of rural detention centres. The right thing is for the Government to look at the elements aimed at trying to rehabilitate those in the criminal justice system and use them in the existing system, rather than setting up a whole new network. We admire the noble Earl’s work but think that this is not the appropriate way forward.

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I can see where the Minister is coming from, but one has to ask whether there is a realistic prospect of any judge applying his or her mind to the interests of justice ever giving sanction for this to take place—in which case, it may be that this clause is simply not worth the paper it is written on.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this is a very difficult issue and one on which I would normally expect to find myself on the side of assisting persons with a disability, for precisely the reasons given just now by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, but also by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, at the beginning of his speech. That would be assisting persons with a disability such as deafness to take a full part in jury trials, even as members of a jury, so I completely share the reluctance of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in finding myself opposing the Government’s proposals and wishing to restrict the assistance proposed for people with the disability of deafness.

One has every respect for the fact that similar proposals were considered in Scotland in 2018, as explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but I have come to the conclusion that it is simply incompatible with a fair trial by jury for one or more of the jurors to be assisted by one or more sign language interpreter—it is an important point that it may take more than one to give coverage throughout a trial. It seems to me that the presence of an interpreter in the jury room would raise a number of questions that are simply impossible to answer in a way that is compatible with this new proposal. The questions may reflect some of the concerns that noble Lords and noble and learned Lords have expressed in this debate.

The first is: would the interpreter be bringing a personal view of the evidence and the discussions to bear on the juror concerned, for whom he or she was interpreting? The associated question is: how would we know that the interpreter was bringing that personal view to bear on the juror concerned? The next question is, in one sense, the converse of that: would the contribution of the juror concerned to the deliberations of the jury as a whole genuinely reflect the contribution which that juror would have made had the interpreter not been present? That, of course, affects not just the juror concerned but all the other members of the jury as well.

Then there is a third and very obvious point, made as a result of the speed with which jury deliberations necessarily take place and which reflects the points made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford: how accurate is the interpretation that is achieved in any particular case? Again, the second point that arises from that is: how is that accuracy to be monitored? How do we know how accurate the interpretation is? Of course, it is not just the interpretation of the contributions to the deliberations that that particular juror has to make, but also the interpretation to that juror of what all the other jurors who might agree or disagree with that juror’s point of view may be saying.

Also, how far would the contributions of other jurors be affected by any actual or perceived views of the interpreter? We come back to the questions raised by both the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, of the dynamics of the jury room. We all know from experience that people gathered together carry different degrees of forcefulness, persuasiveness and believability. It is almost impossible, it seems to me, to rule out forcefulness or persuasiveness on the part of the interpreter, as distinct from the part of the juror concerned.

So I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on the principle and with other noble Lords who have spoken on the dynamics of the jury room. I also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, on the point he made about the centrality of privacy in the jury room. We have always believed and held to be cardinal that jury deliberations are private and nobody else should be involved. The noble and learned Lord took the Kafkaesque point that maybe the Government would ultimately want a representative in the jury room. Even if we do not go that far, the principle is there to protect the privacy of jurors. The presence of third parties—or 13th and 14th parties—weakens that. I also take the point that many potential jurors who are deaf may not wish to serve on a jury and may see the effect of their disability as something that cannot be overcome by recourse to an interpreter.

These difficult questions are recognised in Clause 165 by the proposed new Sections 9C(4) and 20I of the Juries Act 1974, which create a new offence of an interpreter intentionally interfering with or influencing the deliberation of the jury. For my part, I cannot see that those proposed provisions could ever provide a satisfactory answer to the problems. The difficulties come not from the risk of intentional interference or influence but from the actual effect of unintentional and unintended interference or influence by a forceful interpreter, or a jury that did not follow what the interpretation was affecting.

Our system depends on the interaction between the views of 12 independent jurors, who have all listened to and considered the same evidence in the same way during the course of the trial. Each and every one of those jurors will have weighed up the truthfulness and accuracy of the evidence given by witnesses giving oral testimony and will have been influenced, partly at least, by the way in which that testimony was delivered. They will have formed their own views of that before they ever get to the jury room.

In this context, Section 10 of the Juries Act requires the discharge of potential jurors with insufficient understanding of English to enable them to act effectively as jurors. They need that understanding in order to interact with and understand the meaning, force, style and believability of the evidence, as they must. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, no foreign language interpreters are permitted, for obvious and good reasons, and I am entirely unpersuaded that the interests of justice would be best served by permitting interpreters of any language, including sign language, to accompany jurors into the jury room.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, there have been some very strong speeches from some very eminent lawyers, talking about the underlying principles of the jury room. Set against that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there are very strong equality arguments in favour of the proposal by the Government.

I served on a jury many years ago, but I want to talk about my experience as a magistrate. Magistrates are both judge and jury. About two years ago, the Greater London Family Panel of magistrates recruited a deaf magistrate. As far as I know, she has been sitting successfully for the last two years. I am in a position to know because I am currently chairman of the Greater London Family Panel and would be told if there were any complaints or observations related to the way she was performing. I have not heard any and, as far as I know, it is absolutely fine. She sits with a regular interpreter, who is familiar to her, and with the other magistrates when they are determining these very sensitive issues.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, there are a number of amendments in this group to which I would like to speak. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made the overarching point that he is suspicious of broad powers being taken in legislation. It seems to me that those amendments which are not the Government’s address the broad powers which the Government are seeking to take in this group.

Amendments 245A and 245B, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would remove children from the application of Clause 167, providing that remote observation and recording of court proceedings may not occur in cases where a party to the proceedings is a child under the age of 18.

Under Amendment 259A, also in the name of my noble and learned friend, a court may not give directions for live links in criminal proceedings where a party to them is a child under the age of 18. The amendment in my name, Amendment 259BA, would require that all defendants who might appear on a video or audio link from a location outside the court should be subject to a health needs screening. Screening information must be made available to the judge responsible for listing before the listing is finalised.

We have all had a variety of experiences of dealing with remote links. I have done it many times over the last 18 months and in a number of jurisdictions. I was pleased that the Minister referred to Sir Andrew McFarlane’s report about trying to increase the transparency of family courts. I have read that report and it is interesting. There is the idea there of permitting journalists to observe family courts remotely. However, there is another side to this coin. Yes, we pat ourselves on the back for getting through a difficult situation—I have done it myself—and we have all managed to make the various parts of our lives work, including this House, but I do not think that anyone would say that the manner of getting through things within the court system or within this House or this Committee is as good as doing it in person.

The amendments I have spoken to look at arguably the most vulnerable people who potentially proceed through the criminal system and at whether there should be a form of review around whether that is indeed suitable. The amendments I have referred to talk about people under the age of 18, but there is a wider point, because there has been criticism of the way in which we in the family court system have proceeded remotely. I have literally taken away a child from a mother remotely, by telephone. It was the best thing to do in the circumstances, but nobody would argue that that was the best way to proceed when the court system and other forms of support should be in place and available.

There are overarching and broad powers being sought through this group of amendments. The amendments in my name and those in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, are basically looking for exceptions to this, where the situation is so sensitive that these overarching powers should not be taken and there should be further research and assessment of their appropriateness. The amendments in my name deal with young people under the age of 18. I have had a number of hearings with such young people. Sometimes they go okay; sometimes they simply switch off and do not have a clue what is proceeding within the court system.

I hope that, when the noble Lord comes to sum up, he will be able to say something about ongoing reviews of particular appraisals of young people being able to participate in these types of hearings, and that there will not be a blanket approach, as is proposed in his group of amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. I wanted to hear what he had to say about his amendments and those in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

I speak first to the amendment to which I have put my name, Amendment 259B—on which I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said—about excluding jurors from the operation of the provision permitting participation in criminal proceedings by remote live links.

The proposal in the Bill is that the problem of jurors taking part in criminal proceedings by live link should be dealt with by a requirement that all members of a jury taking part through a live link should be present at the same place. So the suggestion is that, by being present at the same place, the jurors would be able to decide a case whether or not they were physically present at the trial. I do not believe that suggestion is accurate or that it responds adequately to the difficulties posed by the proposal that jurors should be able to attend remotely.

In the last group we considered how important it is for jurors to be able to see and hear witnesses giving their oral testimony live, with a view to assessing the truthfulness of those witnesses and the accuracy of the evidence they give. That involves a very personal judgment about credibility and reliability. Reliance upon that judgment—the independent judgment of 12 citizens, as distinct from the individual judgment of a professional judge—is what marks out the jury system. I believe it is what has given the public confidence in the system that we all have. I do not believe that that judgment is capable of being reliably made by live link.

Post Covid, we can all see the attractions of remote hearings. As a barrister, I have appeared in many such hearings over this period, as I dare say others have—certainly the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has. For hearings before judges alone, or before arbitral tribunals, they generally work well. Indeed, for many civil hearings, I suspect we will not go back to the system of all-oral hearings for a significant percentage of our work. That will be a matter for individual judges, arbitrators and lawyers, depending upon the particular circumstances of the cases before them.

However—this was the case that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made—even during the pandemic and despite the pressures of increasing trial backlogs, we have not gone down the road of holding jury trials without jurors being physically present to hear the evidence and being in the same place as the judge. In my view, that is for good reason, so I invite the Government to think again and to accept Amendment 259B.

On the other amendments, having heard the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, explain his amendment about the need for health-needs screening, I agree with the noble Lord and invite the Government to accept that, too. As for the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thornton, I fully accept the argument that it would be unusual for the use of live links to be directed by a judge in a sensitive case involving children, but I can see an argument that some such cases might justify a direction. I see no reason not to leave it to the judge in any particular case to determine whether the use of live links would further or impede the interests of justice. In this regard, we need to remember that refusing a live-links direction may in many cases cause delay in the determination of those cases, and that such delay may lead to particular injustice in cases involving children, for whom an early determination of the issues surrounding their care is often of great importance. So, although I see the point of this amendment, I suggest that it is better to leave it to judicial discretion in cases involving children.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, the Committee will know that, as a non-lawyer, I very often attend these debates because I do not trust lawyers to make decisions about themselves. I therefore intervene here because, on this occasion, lawyers have brought to the surface a most important issue.

I am interested in whether people believe that justice has been done, and it seems to me that extending, in these circumstances, the use of technology to overcome the presence of people in court has a fundamental issue for the generality of the public believing that justice has been done. I am a great believer in Zoom and Teams. They have made my life a great deal better and I have spent more time in the beautiful countryside of Suffolk than I had been able to do before, but I am very conscious of the fact that there are many things that you can do perfectly well—indeed, better—through these techniques and there are some things that you cannot. One of the things you cannot do is replicate the public’s confidence in the concept of a jury. The point, which was made by the previous speaker so adequately, is that it is different, and our system is different because we have this element.

I cannot believe that there are circumstances when it would be sensible for the jury to be in one place and the judge in another. Therefore, I wish to say to my noble friend, whose explanations throughout today and previous days have been remarkable—he has been able to defend some very peculiar things more effectively than most people have managed to do, certainly in the other House—simply this: we have here a position in which it is hugely important that the public should feel that justice is done. I do not believe they will if we do it this way.

As somebody who was a Minister for 16 years, I warn him that I see the civil servant here, who said to some Minister somewhere, “Better do this in case”. Some of the cases proposed are frankly incomprehensible, unlikely and totally beyond any sense—but it is the duty of civil servants to say, “Better not leave this out, Minister, lest it should happen and then we’d be in trouble”. I suggest to my noble friend that he would be in less trouble by not doing some of these things than he would be in the extreme possibility that he might need this power.

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[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

Restorative justice is a very wide issue, and one should not think that because it does not work for road traffic accidents it does not work. Furthermore, it is done only with the agreement of the parties involved.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we welcome this amendment and the opportunity to discuss restorative justice. We are very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for relaying the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who has a long-held commitment to restorative justice that is well known.

We fully support the amendment and are concerned that the Government should take in how important restorative justice is felt to be in this House. This debate has given us the opportunity to make that clear. We were privileged to have the explanation of the reasons for restorative justice and the comprehensive account of its birth and development from my noble friend Lady Harris, who set out, from her experience of police work and as a magistrate, how restorative justice has developed and its value.

The amendment is important because we—some of us, anyway—have concerns that, although there is this commitment around the House, there may be a danger of progress stalling. That is why it is so important that there should be a call for the preparation of an action plan, that it should be laid before Parliament and that there should be a report on the progress on restorative justice.

Members of the House will have been interested to hear the account of the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, on how restorative justice developed in Northern Ireland from a state of great hostility, where real potential enemies were confronting each other, and how restorative justice became reflective of community justice as perpetrators and victims came into contact. He made the point that this was very much not a soft option but was victim based, and that analysis from the circumstances in Northern Ireland was, I felt, reflected by the analysis of my noble friend Lord Paddick, who gave the history of restorative justice in London and dealt with the achievement of victim satisfaction and, interestingly, a greater feeling of safety on the part of victims. He also talked of the benefit for perpetrators in the contact between the victim and the perpetrator; that was a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who was one of the signatories to the amendment.

I will be very interested—we will be very interested—to hear the Government’s response, which we hope will give us an indication that the Government take restorative justice as seriously as the speakers this evening do and that their commitment to it will be increasing and continuing.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for proposing the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who is unable to be with us this evening. She spoke eloquently at Second Reading about the benefits of restorative justice, and I am very sorry that she is not in her place this evening. I am sure that I speak for the whole Committee in wishing her well. She did, however, have a meeting with me on this topic, and I record my thanks to her for her time and for the discussion. She expressed concern that the Bill did not include provision for restorative justice. The amendment is trying to fill that perceived gap by requiring the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary to publish an action plan for restorative justice every three years.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, for her support for restorative justice. I agree that, in the right circumstances, it can have far-reaching benefits. I have heard and felt the mood of the Committee on this point, but the truth is that I did not really need any persuading as to the importance of restorative justice. It can bring those harmed by a crime and those responsible for that harm into communication, and it can help everyone affected by the crime to play a part in repairing the harm; that is commendable. The Government support restorative justice where it can be suitably used.

However, with respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, I would draw a distinction between civil cases and criminal cases. We have to remember that in a civil dispute—this is part of the answer to the road traffic point, but I will write to my noble friend as well—there are two parties before the court. I can settle my case on whatever terms I want if the other person agrees. When it comes to crime, there is a public interest; we prosecute in the name of the public. We do not allow victims to determine always whether the offender serves a punishment or not. I am not saying that restorative justice is not applicable, but we have to remember that there is a different set of criteria and principled underpinnings to our civil justice system and our criminal justice system.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, on his excellent maiden speech. I have known the noble Lord for very many years, and it is a pleasure to be with him in this House. I look forward to working with him, particularly on access to justice.

The noble and learned Lords, Lord Falconer, Lord Judge and Lord Garnier, my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lord Beith and many others have attacked the size of the Bill. The Constitution Committee’s report was damning. Paragraph 5 stated:

“Bills of this size and complexity impede proper legislative scrutiny in Parliament. This is not the first time the House has encountered this problem. It should not be repeated.”


The fact that we are spending seven hours at Second Reading, with 66-odd speakers, time limited, debating such a raft of disparate measures makes the point. Each of the first 12 parts of the Bill would have justified a Bill of its own.

My noble friend Lord Paddick pointed out that the Long Title brings within scope amendments to cover the whole gamut of criminal justice topics, and so we can expect many. We will need a great deal of time in Committee and on Report to do this justice. This Bill arrogates power to the Executive, effectively sidelining Parliament. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, laid bare the way this Bill usurps the role of Parliament with wide and unacceptable regulation-making powers.

There is, of course, much that we welcome: the earlier rehabilitation of offenders, long worked for by my noble friend Lord Dholakia, and the police covenant, on which my noble friend Lady Harris spoke so knowledgably, to make sure officers and retired officers get the support they deserve. In principle, we welcome the regulation of the intrusion of extraction of information from mobile phones, but innocent victims of offences must be protected and not deterred from pursuing prosecutions by the fear of losing their devices and having their private information trawled through by strangers. The noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, highlighted the difficulties.

However, this Bill seriously threatens fundamental liberties. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, denied any such threat. We disagree. The right to peaceful assembly and protest is fundamental in a democracy and it is axiomatic, as so many have said, that protests are noisy and often unruly. Yes, they may cause disruption, inconvenience and nuisance, but that is all part of dissent being permissible and being heard. My noble friend Lord Oates and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, passionately argued this case in relation to climate change. Certainly, Greta Thunberg’s original solo school demonstrations were not noisy, but Extinction Rebellion, and no doubt the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, are squarely in the Government’s sights.

The “Today” programme this morning reported on the anxiety of young people about climate change—on the reluctance to have children, on the feeling that the world is doomed. This is not our world now, but theirs. Are the under-35s represented in Parliament? No. Do we, the over-50s, understand their concerns? At an intellectual level, yes. But as a personal threat? Bluntly, no. As one summed it up, “For us, it is personal.” How are they to be heard? Through protests. Will they be noisy? Yes. Offensive? Probably. May they

“result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation”,

using the words of the Bill? What about demonstrations outside company meetings or political meetings? The Constitution Committee rightly concluded that the noise trigger provisions offend against Article 10 convention rights to freedom of assembly. And who makes the regulations to define “serious disruption”? Why, the Secretary of State, of course—no matter their age, nor how authoritarian or illiberal their attitudes. The noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Chakrabarti, my noble friend Lady Miller, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and others made these points graphically.

The sentencing provisions in the Bill are overwhelmingly retrograde, pandering to the tabloid view that longer sentences reduce crime. But all the evidence is to the contrary, as my noble friend Lord Beith pointed out—granted that locking up people for longer affords the public the temporary protection of keeping some offenders in custody. But the price of that protection far outweighs any benefit. We pay the cost of imprisoning more people than any other nation in western Europe, but we also institutionalise offenders; we break up families; we make offenders less employable and therefore more dependent on the state; we overcrowd our prisons, which have become violent academies of crime; and so we increase reoffending and the human, social and financial cost of divided and criminalised communities. Yet the Bill establishes more minimum sentences; restricts the discretion to depart from some in cases where there are exceptional circumstances; increases many terms to be served from half to two-thirds of notionally determinate sentences; and ends automatic release at the halfway point for many sentences.

On community sentences, we see increased curfew hours and periods, but nothing about increasing help for offenders to turn their lives around. There is provision for recall to custody for breach of community orders, with short custodial penalties, in the face of all the evidence that these do not work and have a disproportionate effect on women and minorities and an adverse effect on families—points persuasively made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester.

We need fewer offenders in prison and more looked after in the community. We must address the personal issues that caused their offending: mental ill-health; histories of physical and sexual abuse; drug and alcohol addiction, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said; homelessness; and missed educational opportunities. None of this is new. But it is desperately sad that a Bill said to be directed at overhauling our criminal justice system is misguidedly focused on imprisoning more people for longer, on reducing judicial discretion and on abandoning important principles that have long underpinned our justice system. We will support the attempt of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to increase the use of restorative justice, for all the reasons she gave.

We agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that we must now end the utter scandal of detaining IPP prisoners indefinitely, way beyond their tariff term. We will support the Children’s Society-backed amendments to ensure that serious violence reduction strategies prioritise protecting children and young people. We will oppose groundless stop and search for persons who have been once convicted of any offensive weapons offence, even on a joint enterprise basis. That is an unjust and racially divisive proposal.

On encampments, we see no reason for criminalising trespass with intent to reside, for the reasons explained by my noble friends Lady Bakewell and Lady Brinton, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. The proposal is unnecessary; there is already a wide range of eviction powers in existence. The proposed new powers rely far too much on the subjective judgment of the police. This proposal is discriminatory; it is also one-sided. If encampments are to be restricted, we need adequate local authority provision of safe and approved sites for the Traveller community.

On sentencing for assaults on emergency workers, we agree—but why not include retail workers, transport workers and public service staff? This provision needs rethinking to extend it to protect those providing a public service.

On remote hearings, we agree with the proposals for more—and more efficient—such hearings in appropriate cases beyond the pandemic. But we also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that such cases do not include jury trials. Jury trials depend, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, on working relationships between judges and juries; but they also depend, crucially, on discussion and debate among jurors, which cannot be properly achieved on Zoom or Teams. For my part, I have long said that I would like to see more public broadcasting of proceedings—at the discretion of judges, certainly—for the purpose of improving open justice, but that is a different matter.

Finally, noble Lords have spoken of the missed opportunity to add more protections for women and girls. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, argued for an amendment to be moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, which we will support, extending the upskirting legislation to cover photography without consent of women while breastfeeding. We agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, and others that serious violence should explicitly include domestic and sexual abuse. We also agree with my noble friend Lady Brinton, the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and others who will propose amendments to increase the surveillance of offenders and introduce further measures on domestic violence.

There is much to debate in the Bill and much of it is not good.