Queen’s Speech

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I shall concentrate in winding up primarily on justice issues. As an example, I welcome the Government’s commitment to addressing violent crime. Increasing violent crime, particularly knife crime, threatens public safety and confidence, but changes in the criminal justice system can only ever be part of the answer. Youth services in particular have been severely cut over recent years, when they needed to be increased and improved.

The promises in the Queen’s Speech include commitments to locking people up for longer. I am afraid this populist approach reflects the Prime Minister’s tone, yet it is more directed to the readership of the Daily Mail than to responding to serious evidence. Many of us, along with noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, remember the debate of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on 3 October. Members there demonstrated to a very high standard that long prison sentences do not reduce crime. They stressed our need for better, more humane and more effective prisons with better physical conditions; prisons that are less overcrowded and better staffed, with more opportunity for education, training, sport and employment; and in which violence is brought back under control and health issues and drug and alcohol addiction are addressed.

Rehabilitation must be the central purpose of imprisonment: during custodial sentences, in preparation for release and during supervision following release. These points were well made in the debate by my noble friend Lord Dholakia, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Woolf, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lords, Lord Hastings, Lord Carlile, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Farmer. My noble friend Lord Beith added that prison is not only ineffective but extremely expensive.

The proposed Sentencing Bill will commit to strengthening community orders, addressing offenders’ behaviour, mental health and alcohol or drug misuse needs, but achieving this will require better and properly resourced community sentences when the contracts of the disastrous “community rehabilitation companies” are replaced. It is right that victims should receive more support, but the Government should start with the proposals in my noble friend Lady Brinton’s Bill to improve and strengthen the rights in the victims’ code.

The proposals for no-fault divorce are important. The time has long gone when a precondition for divorce should be the attribution of blame to the other party. Divorce should be a conciliatory process managed for the benefit of the parties, but still more for their innocent children.

We welcome back the Domestic Abuse Bill, initially a casualty of the unlawful Prorogation attempt. It will strengthen support for victims and define domestic abuse more broadly. It benefited greatly from pre-legislative scrutiny, and it is important that the changes proposed by the committee should not be watered down and be properly resourced.

The proposed new points-based immigration system was considered by my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lady Smith and the noble Lords, Lord Horam and Lord Green. I would add two warnings. First, a points system can be sclerotic in failing to respond to rapid changes in the labour market’s need for different skills. Secondly, a system that relates the right to come and work here to earnings risks excluding many of those on lower earnings whom we really need.

Had my noble friend Lady Hamwee been able to be here, she would have raised the issue of rendition. The chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee has said that the UK,

“tolerated actions, and took others, that we regard as inexcusable”.

There remains a cohort of individuals subjected to rendition and torture in which the UK Government were complicit. They have suffered reputational damage, immigration problems and stops at international ports, with no means of defending themselves or their families, who are of course also affected. Will the Government implement a durable solution to their immigration status and direct a new judge-led inquiry into the UK’s actions?

We note that the police are to be,

“awarded the power to arrest individuals who are wanted by trusted international partners”,

in an extradition and provisional arrest Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, pointed out, it is ironic that this coincides with our possible loss of the very successful European arrest warrant. It is principally directed to mitigating its loss.

I regard the measures to,

“improve the justice system’s response to foreign national offenders”,

as largely a red herring. Deportation is already available in respect of serious offenders, but the Home Office’s record of deporting offenders is abysmal. It is far more important to implement existing deportation orders effectively than to rely on new measures to deter the return of those who have been deported.

We are promised a new regulator to scrutinise environmental policy and law, investigate complaints and take enforcement action. That would ring less hollow if the Government had not been repeatedly found in breach of the Aarhus convention for failing to comply with our commitments on environmental justice.

Strangely, we are offered a Bill on the implementation of agreements in private international law, to produce an agreed international mechanism for co-operation in justice matters. The Government hope to retain or replicate the advantages we currently enjoy in the civil justice system from a network of regulations and conventions between EU countries, at present monitored and overseen by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

However, it is pie in the sky to suggest that this can be achieved by domestic legislation, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, hinted at. These are international agreements: the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction, registration and enforcement of judgments; Brussels II, on family law issues; Rome I, on governing law in contract; Rome II, on conflicts of law in non-contractual obligations; and the Hague conventions, including on child abduction. They are additional to the benefits of European co-operation in criminal justice matters, which were discussed by my noble friend Lord Paddick and go far beyond the benefits achieved from the European arrest warrant, substantial as those are. We have Europol, which is a massive improvement over Interpol in terms of efficient co-operation and speed; Eurojust, which allows co-operation between judges and courts; and access to the Schengen database of information to protect national security, border control and law enforcement.

The answer the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, gave to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on these points was wholly inadequate. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, amplified the point in his speech, but even he did not meet the point that all these benefits depend on multilateral agreement between nations. They are a major benefit of EU membership—a binding system monitored by the CJEU. It was an absurd red line that we should lose so much in international co-operation in order to reject the involvement of a court to which no one can identify a single, solid, practical objection; to which United Kingdom judges have contributed so much; and in which we could negotiate continued involvement in areas of continuing co-operation.

We should all remember the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, on the operation of the constitution and his warning that,

“if you mess about with the constitution it will bite back”.

The House heard impressive speeches on devolution to the nations and regions of the United Kingdom. My noble friends Lady Humphreys and Lord Scriven, the noble Lords, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth and Lord Heseltine, and many others contributed to that debate. There is, however, a hollowness that positively rattles in the Government’s protestation:

“The integrity and prosperity of the union that binds the four nations of the United Kingdom is of the utmost importance”,


to the Government. Brexit poses a massive threat to the union, yet the Government ignore the threat of Scottish independence and the fact that the form of Brexit that might be implemented could be the most inimical possible to Scotland’s economic interests.

The Government seem prepared to threaten the union with Northern Ireland in their desperation to get Brexit done against an artificial and politically imposed deadline, seeking to reconcile the clearly conflicting goals of leaving the customs union, honouring the Good Friday agreement with no border between the Republic and Northern Ireland, and treating Northern Ireland as an intrinsic part of the UK. Yet the benefits of leaving the customs union are illusory, largely based on a view of President Trump that is unrealistic to the point of being fantastical.

Finally, I support my noble friend Lord Tyler’s call for transparency and reform of election and referendum expenditure, and for greater accuracy and completeness of our electoral registers, and the call from the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, for protection from interference and abuse. Our democracy is under real threat from injustices, anomalies—including the one raised by the noble Lord, Lord Low, in the gap—inefficiencies and the risks inherent in our present electoral arrangements. We on these Benches will seek to uphold the integrity of our democracy, whatever the outcome of present conflicts.

Sibling Couples

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 21st March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My noble friend makes a persuasive case. I appreciate the meeting we had in December, to which he also brought Catherine Utley. It persuaded me that this needed to be looked at again, and I therefore went to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury and asked him to do so. He looked at it again, and pointed out in his letter to my noble friend on 6 February, along with the Answer I gave to my noble friend’s Question, that if siblings order their affairs such that they jointly hold the asset, the charge would effectively become liable only on properties exceeding £650,000 in value. If they had difficulty in making that payment, inheritance tax could be made payable over 10 years. That was set against the fact that the average property price in the UK is £225,000. Those were the arguments put forward for retaining the position.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has a strong point and he has long campaigned on it with great energy and skill. He highlights much unfairness to siblings and other blood relatives who share households. It is not only inheritance tax; there are fiscal disadvantages in a number of areas, and disadvantages in landlord and tenant intestacy. Do the Government agree that while there is not a case—and we agree with this—for equating siblings and other blood relatives with civil partners, there is nevertheless a strong case for a number of reforms? Will the Government agree to establish a cross-departmental working party to look at these issues and consider what specific measures are necessary to address these disadvantages?

[Lord Bates]

I am happy to do that. The standard response of all Treasury Ministers is to say that government policy in this area of tax is constantly under review. That has a particular meaning at the moment, because the Office of Tax Simplification is undertaking a review of inheritance tax. The issue of siblings will be within the scope of that. It is due to report in the spring, and we will take its findings seriously, but our position is clear—that this reflects an impact on a very small number of estates for which, with careful tax planning, much of the liability can be mitigated.

Anonymity (Arrested Persons) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 1st March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I start by congratulating my noble friend Lord Paddick on the excellent way he opened the debate on the Bill so lucidly and eloquently. He has, of course, campaigned for this change for some time. Indeed, we tabled an amendment to the Policing and Crime Bill in 2016, seeking pre-charge anonymity. On that occasion we withdrew it, but I am very pleased to see that my noble friend is taking it forward to legislation.

I am supposed to be winding up this debate on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. Since my noble friend Lord Paddick was to be the only one speaking before me, I was pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, spoke in the gap, so that I would have some winding-up to do, as well as supporting my noble friend.

I welcome the Bill. It is right that it does not stop with sexual offences but talks about criminal offences in general, because a wide injustice occurs as a result of unfair exposure to publicity of people who are innocent. We all know the high-profile cases—my noble friend mentioned Lord Brittan, Paul Gambaccini and Sir Cliff Richard—and we know of many others. Some are not exactly high-profile and are just pursuing anonymous lives, but there are many who are half way up the system, who cannot afford to take proceedings, who do not have the influence to complain, but who are exposed, if they are arrested falsely then released, to damage to their reputation in their communities that can be long-lasting.

My noble friend, and the briefing, reminded us of the couple who were arrested for flying drones at Gatwick. They were, I suggest, mercilessly and falsely hounded by the press in a, frankly, unforgivable way, but the press thought it made a good story and there was the background that many people had lost their holidays and been caused severe disruption by what had happened. The result, when they were photographed, their names and pictures were published, their house was searched and they were held in custody for some time, was that they felt completely violated. It is also possible they were exposed to danger from the less scrupulous of those who had been seriously affected. The problem for their reputation is that people do not follow the details as closely as they might. They will be forever known by the question: “Oh, weren’t they the ones who had the drones at Gatwick?”. That kind of innuendo and misinformed spread of rumour trashes reputations unjustly.

My noble friend rightly talked about balance, and it is a question of balance. It is balancing the right of the public to be informed—the so-called right to know—against the right to personal and family privacy. He was also fundamentally right to mention the presumption of innocence. That is a presumption in our law that is at the root of our liberties, and yet the exposure to our reputations being trashed by the media strikes at the heart of the value of the presumption of innocence. Too many are convicted and have their lives ruined not by processes of law but by gross and intrusive publicity, often to be released without charge or simply not charged, but to find that they are nevertheless convicted at the bar of public opinion.

The internet and social media make the position far worse. It has been a few years now, but many of your Lordships will remember the film “Notting Hill”, and Hugh Grant tries to reassure Julia Roberts when his house is surrounded by press photographers and television cameramen. He says to her, “Don’t worry: today’s newspapers are tomorrow’s fish-and-chip wrappings”, and she says, “No, everything I do, every time I am seen in public in future, the pictures they’ve taken today will be taken out, hauled out, and put in the newspapers”. That effect may be dramatic for film stars, and her character was a successful film star, but it is also dramatic for anybody who takes any part in public life. I suggest there is a danger that people are avoiding public life because of the danger of too much publicity. The Bill is a small step on the way to combating that evil.

I echo the point made by my noble friend that this is about arrest rather than charge. Anonymity is to be extended by the Bill not to those who have been charged but to those who have been arrested. He made the very valid point about the difference between the test that the police have to apply when they arrest somebody, which is no real proof of guilt, nothing that gives rise to major suspicion, and the test that the Crown Prosecution Service or the police have to meet before somebody is charged.

What are the arguments against? They are twofold. First, there is the argument that people will not come forward. My noble friend mentioned the Warboys case, but it is often used in cases of domestic and sexual violence, in particular. I wonder whether that is true. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, perhaps, I believe that the exceptions to reporting restrictions contained in Clause 2 provide that balance. I do not see difficulty about the interests of justice or the public interest: those are the general principles that would be applied by a judge in the Crown Court hearing such an application. Reasons given for lifting restrictions include that,

“it may lead to additional complainants coming forward … it may lead to information that assists the investigation of the offence … it may lead to information that assists the arrested person; or … the conduct of the arrested person’s defence at trial is likely to be substantially prejudiced if the direction is not given”.

Those are reasons that may well, in particular cases, justify the lifting of the anonymity restriction.

We have to trust the judges. They know the principles they are supposed to apply and they are given a key, in what is not an exhaustive list, to the circumstances that might justify this. In my view, those factors strike a reasonable balance between the interests of publicity and of justice.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I am sorry to press the noble Lord, who is an eminent lawyer, but I go back to,

“it may lead to additional complainants coming forward”.

Is that not the case in almost all rape cases?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

No, I think it is not. I do think that there are many cases involving defendants or suspects in cases of sexual abuse, grooming and so forth, where the publicity may well lead to other complainants coming forward. Where there is a reasonable prospect of that, it seems to me right that a judge should have the power to raise the issue of anonymity. That is the point. I also believe that people who might not otherwise come forward, because they are frightened and deterred by what has happened to them from raising something publicly, gain courage from the fact that there is publicity about particular defendants or suspects. If they realise that a suspect is under suspicion for offences against 20, 30 or 40 other people, they are encouraged, in the public interest and the interest of their community, to come forward and make a complaint where otherwise they might not have done so. It seems to me that a judge is entitled to weigh up those features of the case and to come to a just conclusion.

It is also important that subsection (3) is well-balanced, because it allows the person arrested to say, “No, I do not want anonymity” for any reason. It allows both the chief constable, on behalf of the police force, and the prosecuting authority to make an application. Of course, the “any other person who has an interest” provision might be subject to financial constraints, because it is a big step to go to the Crown Court and people have to be able to do it—but the police and the person arrested may well decide to make that application if they think that it is important.

I also draw attention to subsection (4), which allows for consent applications. If there is a consent application and the arrested person and the chief constable or the prosecuting authority agrees, the direction shall be made—the judges say, “If they all agree, you can do it”. That, it seems to me, preserves the right to choose of people arrested, in a way that is quite important. So I believe that the Bill does strike that important balance.

The second argument deployed against this Bill is the idea that it will end open justice. In a sense, it is of course a restriction on the public’s right to know who has been arrested—but it is not a restriction on the right to know that somebody has been arrested. The restriction is limited to the revelation of that person’s identity, or information that would lead that person to be identified. Again, I believe that this is a balanced approach.

It is only a question of open justice before anybody is charged. When you balance justice to the uncharged suspect against justice to the public—often in this case the public as purchasers of prurient newspapers or listeners to television programmes that are trying to improve their ratings, which we have seen so many times—it is important to have regard to both sides.

My noble friend pointed out that the police are bound by the guidance of the College of Policing, which protects innocent suspects in the vast majority of cases: their identity is to be released only if there are exceptional reasons for doing so. He mentioned sex cases, where victims get lifetime anonymity. That is a question for another day; sometimes one thinks that it may need consideration, but on balance I agree with him that lifelong anonymity for victims of sexual offences is better than excessive and unwarranted exposure.

These are difficult questions; they always are. In my judgment they are questions that need addressing with statute because society as a whole has got the balance wrong. The Henriques paper talked about the balance and the need for statute in the light of his investigation of particularly serious cases. These cases are far more widespread. At the moment there is excessive and unwarranted exposure of people who are arrested but not charged, which leads to cases of very serious injustice. I fully support the Bill and invite the House to give it a Second Reading.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, with his Private Member’s Bill the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, brings before the House a very important issue that has in recent years come much more to the forefront of public debate.

The experiences of those accused but not charged of sexual offences, or charged but subsequently acquitted, has exposed the intensity of media scrutiny for alleged sexual offences. That leads to damage to private lives, reputations and the very important right to be presumed innocent, which we should all cherish. Complainants in sexual offence cases are, as we have heard, assured of lifetime anonymity. There is no protection available to defendants. As noble Lords will know, the principle of anonymity in sexual offences was introduced in the Heilbron report of 1975, which proposed lifetime anonymity for complainants.

We have talked in this debate about the many cases of public figures, from various different walks of life, being under intense public scrutiny. The damage and devastation that can be caused to private life by media scrutiny has been starkly set out. We have heard of prominent cases, including those of Sir Cliff Richard and Paul Gambaccini, but, as we have also heard, this is an issue for those not in the public eye—ordinary citizens who find themselves accused of certain matters. We should all be concerned that, if people are accused, they should be thought of as innocent until proven guilty. However, I very much accept the point that unfortunately, weeks, months and years later, people will say, “That’s the person who did this”. People see it in the media and they just believe it.

I also recognise, however, that publishing a defendant’s identity, and the response to it, has encouraged victims to come forward in some cases. I think I am right to suggest that people came forward in the cases of Stuart Hall and Rolf Harris, which, in the end, enabled those two men to be brought to justice for their crimes.

Noble Lords may not remember but there was also the SNP MSP Bill Walker, who was convicted of domestic abuse. He was elected to the Scottish Parliament in 2011, convicted in 2013, went to prison and had to resign his seat. Again, as a result of the initial publicity, many other people came forward. I think his first wife told the court that she had to wear concealer to cover a black eye on their wedding day. It was appalling. When one person came forward in that case, so did a number of other women with whom he had been involved, so it was important.

If these cases did not receive a lot of publicity, that would not happen. Publicity causes other victims to come forward. Noble Lords have mentioned the Worboys case. I think 85 victims came forward when his identity became known. Again, that was very important—the scale of the man’s crimes was brought into perspective.

Even when someone is not officially publicly identified, there is now the whole issue of the internet. It is a kind of Wild West, and we have often debated how we will control it. I know that the Government’s White Paper on internet safety is coming out shortly, but it is a huge issue. Even when things cannot be reported, stories fly around the internet, and how we will deal with that is an issue.

I have concerns, however, about how information is released. I mentioned Cliff Richard previously. I think I am right in recalling that there was a BBC helicopter flying outside his house. That is totally outrageous. Somebody somewhere—I assume from the police—told the BBC, “We’re going to raid this celebrity’s house and you might want to come along”, and the BBC said, “This is so big that we’ll get a helicopter up there”. That is totally unacceptable.

There are issues that we need to reflect on further, including how this should be handled in the future. Some publicity is useful, as I outlined earlier, but these matters need to be handled properly. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned the College of Policing guidelines. He will know them much better than I do, but it is a question of the police—these are operational matters—and the media acting responsibly. Clearly that has not always been the case, so these things should be properly codified and agreed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

The noble Lord talked about the Cliff Richard case and he is right: it was a BBC helicopter. As we have heard, Cliff Richard was able to bring a case, at great expense, and he secured an award. However, even with that course of action, does one not feel that many people now have at the back of their minds the idea that there is something wrong about Cliff Richard? His reputation has suffered even though he was able to bring proceedings. The vast majority of people do not have the opportunity to bring proceedings. It is all very well to say that the press should behave responsibly—of course the media should behave responsibly. But does the noble Lord not agree that there is no way of codifying that without us in Parliament doing it for them?

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I was going to come on to that point. Essentially, my next point is that I agree entirely that unfortunately, in the court of public opinion, people’s reputations are often trashed and damaged. That is one reason why it is so regrettable that we will not move on to the second phase of the Leveson inquiry, which was going to look at some of the issues here. The Government have decided that they do not want to do that. I accept the point that people can be damaged very much by these issues.

In conclusion, I assume that because of where we are in the parliamentary cycle, the Bill will not make much more progress. However, it has highlighted an important issue: the situation is not right at the present time. I cannot see the Bill progressing much further, but I hope the Minister will be able to respond to the general points raised in the debate.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on introducing the Bill, which is on an important topic. I thank him for congratulating me on this being my third Bill this week but of course the noble Lord, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, are also on every Bill I am on. We have had a bit of a marathon week but we are all still smiling, which is the important thing.

The nub of the debate today has been about the balance between press freedom and personal privacy, which is important. The Government are committed to protecting the freedom of the press and recognise that a vibrant and free press plays such a valuable role in our cultural and democratic life. How lucky we are to have our free press. We want to make sure that it continues, with high journalistic standards and with work absolutely in the public interest.

Of course, the right to freedom of expression is not absolute and must be appropriately balanced against the right to privacy. As enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, everyone has the right to respect for their private and family life, their home and their correspondence. Any interference with this right must be in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society and, as such, must be adequately protected. The courts have had to develop privacy law in accordance with Article 8, resulting in the development of the tort of misuse of private information. Information will be considered private where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to it, which is a fact-sensitive assessment. Article 10 of the convention, which covers freedom of expression, is often relied on in defence of a privacy claim, resulting in the need for the balancing of Article 8 rights against the Article 10 rights.

The Data Protection Act 2018 puts in place a framework for the protection of data that either identifies or is capable of identifying living people. Within this framework, the privacy rights of individuals are balanced against the legitimate needs of public and private sector organisations to make use of such data, including publishing it. The Act provides the rules by which the processing of personal data for legitimate purposes can take place, and “processing” includes the disclosure or sharing of personal data. To be compatible with the Act’s requirements it must be shown, among other things, that the living individual to whom the disclosure relates has consented to the disclosure, or alternatively, that there is a lawful basis that it is necessary to disclose the data for. The Act and the GDPR set out what those lawful bases are, including the public interest.

Publishing the names of suspects and others who stand accused of wrongdoing is not of itself unlawful unless found to be in contempt of court. Private law actions, however, can be brought against those who disclose such information, based on the right to privacy.

In considering the balance we are trying to achieve, we must remember that there are times when, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, in a comment almost identical to that made today by the noble Lord, Lord Marks,

“publicity can lead others to come forward with supporting evidence that helps to make the case against the person who is rightly accused. Sometimes this is evidence that the person accused has treated them in the same way. They have not previously come forward because they are fearful that no one would take them seriously. It is only hearing that an allegation is being taken seriously that gives them the confidence to come forward”.—[Official Report, 16/11/16; col. 1454.]

That is an important comment, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, reflected today. More recently, the #MeToo movement has been a living testament to this.

I see that the Bill in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would not necessarily prevent disclosure in these circumstances. It is focused on a specific period—that between arrest and charge—and it allows for restrictions to be lifted in exceptional circumstances.

In this way, it mirrors the framework within which the police operate. The circumstances in which suspects’ names may be released to the media by the police are set out in the authorised professional practice guidance on media relations issued by the College of Policing, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. It makes clear that the police will not name those arrested or suspected of a crime save in exceptional circumstances where there is a legitimate policing purpose to do so. A legitimate policing purpose may include circumstances such as threat to life.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. She mentioned exceptional circumstances, which is of course right about the police guidance, but this exception is not an exceptional circumstance. This is when the Crown Court judge thinks it is appropriate to make the order in the interests of justice and for other reasons. There is no bar of exceptional circumstances. It is for the judge to weigh up the consideration either way and make a decision.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I completely acknowledge that point. I am just trying to give the context of everything that has been discussed in the debate.

The rationale for naming an arrested person before charge should be authorised by a chief officer and the Crown Prosecution Service should be consulted. Noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will know that in May 2018, the College of Policing updated this guidance to make clear that it also applies where allegations are made against deceased persons.

The Bill would replace this administrative system with a requirement for the chief constable to apply to a Crown Court judge for a direction that reporting restrictions be lifted. This risks adding potentially dangerous delay in fast-moving investigations as well as placing additional burdens on our courts.

It is not clear that this is necessary. On the contrary, the existing arrangements for the police seem to strike a sensible balance. To test whether these changes have had the desired effect, the previous Home Secretary asked Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to carry out a short, targeted review of police adherence to the guidance on media relations, looking in particular at pre-charge anonymity. The inspectorate is undertaking a scoping study this financial year to consider where inspection activity might best be focused.

I recognise, of course, that the guidance on the police releasing suspects’ names does not address the separate concern about the media publishing suspects’ names, which the media may find from other sources, but the media has its own framework for guiding its behaviour. Ofcom’s broadcasting code places detailed requirements on broadcasters to ensure that news, in whatever form, is reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality. Robust powers are available to enforce adherence to the code. Statutory sanctions include levelling a fine and, in serious cases, revoking a broadcaster’s licence to broadcast.

For the press, there now exists a strengthened, independent, self-regulatory system. The majority of traditional publishers—including 95% of national newspapers by circulation—are members of IPSO. A small number of publishers have joined Impress, while others, including the Financial Times and the Guardian, have chosen to stay outside either self-regulator with their own detailed self-regulatory arrangements.

IPSO’s editors’ code puts in place robust requirements of accuracy and privacy.

Trade Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

37: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Bilateral system of civil judicial cooperation
(1) It shall be the objective of an appropriate authority to take all necessary steps to implement an international trade agreement which enables the United Kingdom, after exit day, to fully participate in a bilateral system of civil judicial co-operation for the purposes of facilitating trade between the United Kingdom and the European Union. (2) A bilateral system of civil judicial co-operation under subsection (1) shall include agreed conditions on—(a) jurisdiction, including applicable law and choice of jurisdiction; and(b) bilateral enforcement and recognition of judgments.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 37 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord McNicol of West Kilbride, would make it the objective of an appropriate authority to secure a bilateral system of civil judicial co-operation between the UK and the European Union, to include arrangements for the choice of jurisdiction, the choice of law and the bilateral enforcement and recognition of judgments.

The amendment is relevant to the Bill in at least three ways: first, to new free trade agreements with third countries that currently enjoy FTAs with the EU, and therefore with us through the EU; secondly, to bilateral FTAs with third countries that might enter such agreements with us in the expectation of further trade through the UK with the EU member states; and, thirdly, in the event of no deal, when, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, pointed out earlier, the Bill—which will then be an Act—after exit day will be the only legislation bearing upon the arrangement of future FTAs.

In moving the amendment, we have every reason to believe that we are pushing at an open door. In debate after debate since the 2016 referendum, mine has been just one of many voices arguing that if we leave the EU we must maintain the whole gamut of the arrangements for cross-border judicial co-operation that we presently enjoy as a member of the EU. Every time, the Government have responded that they recognise and will maintain the benefits of these arrangements for the United Kingdom. Only yesterday we considered SIs laid by the Government on this topic. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was very clear that the SIs were laid only against the undesirable possibility of a no-deal Brexit, and accepted that should that occur we would be losing a significant benefit; I refer to columns GC 231 and GC 233 in yesterday’s Hansard. We would be forced to fall back on less effective, more costly, extremely inconvenient and altogether inferior alternative arrangements.

Whatever outcome emerges from the current impasse, we should do all we can to replicate all the arrangements for civil and commercial cases that we currently enjoy. These stem largely from the Brussels regime and its provision for the determination of jurisdiction and for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments. The Brussels regime principally comprises the Brussels Ia EU regulation and is supplemented by the 2007 Lugano Convention, which provides similar arrangements for Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Denmark. Choice of law in contract cases, which make up the vast bulk of commercial litigation, is governed largely by the Rome I regulation, and Rome I applies throughout the EU except in Denmark, which has an opt-out for judicial co-operation.

If we failed to replicate the arrangements of the Brussels regime, what we would lose is well summed up in two bullet points in the Explanatory Memorandum to yesterday’s SI on civil jurisdiction and judgments. The first refers to,

“a system of uniform jurisdictional rules to identify the appropriate court in which to bring a civil or commercial claim”.

The second refers to,

“a simplified mechanism to recognise and enforce the judgments of EU Member State/EFTA state courts in civil and commercial cases, with a view to reducing costs for litigants and increasing efficiency. The possibility for such simplified and almost automatic treatment of the judgment of one such state in another is based on the ‘mutual trust’ that each state will have applied the uniform rules of jurisdiction”.

These arrangements have been built up over decades and British lawyers, jurists and judges have played a major part in their development. The European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters, established in 2001 by the European Council, is an important forum for cross-border co-operation between courts across the EU. It seems to me that there is no significant reason why we should not be able to negotiate some continued access to the European Judicial Network after we leave the EU.

Throughout the European Union, citizens and businesses now know where cross-border disputes are to be determined. They know what law is to be applied. Crucially, they can be confident that court orders obtained in one member state will be recognised and enforced without fuss, delay or extra proceedings throughout the Union. This system has been of incalculable benefit not just to those who use our legal system but to our economy as a whole, because it is widely understood that all member states respect the arrangements and decisions of courts in other member states.

It often seems to me—I hope I can say this as a lawyer without special pleading—to be largely overlooked that our legal system has contributed significantly to Britain’s commercial success during the decades of our EU membership. One reason the United Kingdom has been so successful in attracting both inward investment from outside the EU and trade from elsewhere within the EU has been the fact we have not just excellent financial services and a sophisticated financial architecture—another plus is sometimes said to be political stability but I somehow doubt that at the moment—to add to the benefits of the English language and a convenient time zone, but a well-respected commercial legal system, one that functions without undue delays and at cost levels that are reasonably competitive in the international market, and which produces outcomes that are relatively predictable and generally accepted.

A very important component of that success is that our legal system functions internationally in supporting cross-border trade and international commerce. If we lose that, however frictionless we may make our trading arrangements, we will have compromised our future both as a destination for international investment, attracted to the United Kingdom as a gateway to the European Union, and as a trading partner for member states of the EU and the EEA. Put shortly, at a time of major upheaval, we will have needlessly thrown away a significant competitive advantage. That is something we cannot afford to do and it would be folly indeed. I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Department for International Development (Lord Bates) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for moving this amendment and raising this very important issue. He is right to highlight the contribution which UK law has made to the commercial contract area and the success of trade and financial services.

We have long made clear our intention to negotiate a new relationship with the EU which covers civil judicial co-operation. The political declaration provides a positive means for discussion on this. It makes it clear that the UK and EU have agreed to explore a bilateral arrangement on matrimonial and parental responsibility and other related matters. This goes further than the arrangements that the EU currently has with any other third country to date.

The UK also remains committed to future co-operation on civil and commercial matters with the EU—recognising that this is in both our interests, for the reasons the noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out—and to similar co-operation with other international partners. In this area, the UK will, as a minimum, continue to prioritise joining Hague 2005 in our own right and seek also to accede to the Lugano Convention. The UK will engage with EU partners to ensure that these important issues, which provide vital protections for citizens, are the focus of detailed negotiations with the EU.

On the specific issues which the noble Lord referred to, co-operation in this area makes clear that the UK and EU have agreed to explore a bilateral arrangement on aspects of law. This goes further than any arrangements that the EU currently has with a third country. The UK also remains committed to international co-operation in future.

The noble Lord asked what would happen in the event of no deal. As a responsible Government, we are preparing for all outcomes, hence the statutory instruments debated in Grand Committee yesterday. We have published a dedicated technical notice for civil judicial co-operation, detailing how the rules would change in the event that we cannot reach a deal. This is not our preferred outcome—we remain focused on getting a deal that works for the UK and the EU. The rules on civil judicial co-operation rely on reciprocity. After exit, even if the UK were to apply these rules unilaterally, there would be no requirement on EU member states to apply the same rules in the UK. Without the guarantee of reciprocity, our broad approach is to repeal existing EU instruments and revert to applying the rules which the UK currently applies in relation to non-EU matters.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this important matter, and I hope that I have provided as much reassurance as I am able to at this stage.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response, and I will be withdrawing the amendment, with your Lordships’ leave. The plain fact is that the arrangements the Government have in mind in the event of no deal are what I described yesterday as “thin gruel indeed” compared with what we have. They are inferior, bitty and involve a great deal of scope for satellite litigation where parties are having to litigate on issues such as enforcement and jurisdiction in different jurisdictions. This is so important because it highlights an area which has had far too little attention in the event of no deal. It is a significant danger for us—no deal will deprive us of the competitive advantage we enjoy as a member of the EU.

I share the Minister’s confidence that, in the event that we secure an agreement, we will also secure an agreement on judicial co-operation during a transitional period, because it is in the EU’s interests as well as ours. The danger is that people float into no deal by accident, and cost us everything involved in losing judicial co-operation. It is a significant feature that ought to weigh heavily in the minds of all the policymakers involved. With that warning, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

63: After Clause 21, insert the following new Clause—
“Access to a solicitor
(1) Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 7(1) leave out “paragraphs 8 and 9” and insert “paragraph 8”.(3) In paragraph 7A—(a) leave out sub-paragraph (3);(b) in sub-paragraph (6) leave out from second “would” to the end and insert “create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person”;(c) in sub-paragraph (7) at the end insert “provided the consultation is in private”;(d) leave out sub-paragraph (8).(4) Leave out paragraph 9.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment is also in the name of my noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark. It would amend Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act to protect the right of a person detained or questioned under Section 41—on suspicion of being a terrorist—or Schedule 7 of that Act, which is concerned with questioning at ports and borders, to consult a solicitor and to do so without delay and in private.

The first and third parts of our amendment, in proposed new subsections (2) and (4), would amend paragraph 7(1) and omit paragraph 9 of Schedule 8. Paragraph 7(1) presently provides, subject to two exceptions to which I will turn in a moment, that a person so detained,

“shall be entitled, if he so requests, to consult a solicitor as soon as is reasonably practicable, privately and at any time”.

The two exceptions to the entitlement under paragraph 7(1) are, first, the power to delay a consultation with a solicitor. Under paragraph 8, an officer of the rank of superintendent or higher may authorise a delay in permitting the detained person to consult a solicitor in certain prescribed circumstances; the second is a restriction on the right to consult in private, which we suggest is central to the right to confidential advice. Under paragraph 9(1), a direction by a police officer of the rank of commander or assistant chief constable or above may in certain circumstances provide that a detained person who wishes to consult a solicitor may only do so,

“in the sight and hearing of a qualified officer”.

The specified circumstances for the application of both exceptions are—I paraphrase—where the lack of such a direction may lead to any of a number of risks. They include damage to evidence of a serious offence, interference with or physical injury to any person, alerting other suspects, hindering the recovery of property obtained as a result of a serious offence, hindering information gathering or investigation, alerting someone to an investigation so as to make it more difficult to prevent an act of terrorism, and alerting someone so as to make it more difficult to apprehend, prosecute or convict a person of the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.

Our amendment would, significantly, leave the exception under paragraph 8 relating to the power to delay a consultation in the specified circumstances but would remove the exception under paragraph 9—that is, the denial of the right to a consultation in private. We are clear in our view that it is fundamental to the right to consult a solicitor that the consultation should indeed be in private. The Joint Committee on Human Rights considered this question in its second report. It said in the section on access to a lawyer, in respect of Schedule 3 to this Bill, at paragraph 55 and 56:

“In some cases, the detainee may only consult a solicitor in the sight and hearing of a ‘qualified officer’. The Government explains that this restriction exists to disrupt and deter a detainee who seeks to use their legal privilege to pass on instructions to a third party, either through intimidating their solicitor or passing on a coded message … We recognise these concerns, but consider that there are more proportionate ways of mitigating these risks, such as pre-approval of vetted panels of lawyers. We suggest further consideration be given to alternative options so that timely and confidential legal advice can be given to all persons stopped and detained under these powers”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I was going to use the word “shove”, but I will give them a push instead, which is probably more in keeping with your Lordships’ House.

Perhaps I may move on finally to Amendments 83 and 87. I draw the attention of the Committee to the draft Schedule 3 code of practice, which I have already circulated to noble Lords. Like its equivalent for Schedule 7, the draft code is clear that a person detained under either power must be provided with a notice of detention that clarifies their rights and obligations. The examining officer must also explain these rights and obligations to the detainee before continuing with the examination. In addition, at each periodic review of the detention, the examining officer must remind the detainee of any rights that they have not yet exercised.

The Government are in complete agreement that any person detained under Schedule 3 should be informed of their rights before any further questioning takes place. It has always been the case through the exercise of Schedule 7 powers and it is why we have made it explicit in the equivalent draft code of practice for Schedule 3. While the Government are clear that the intention behind these amendments has already been satisfied through the provision of the draft code, I am now ready to consider further the merits of writing such a requirement into Schedule 3 and Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act.

With those remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am grateful to the Minister for the points that she has said she will consider. We will wait to hear the results of that consideration. I also thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. Although I do not necessarily come from the same position as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on these amendments, he made an important point about the recording of incidents when the right of consultation with a solicitor is either delayed or restricted. Whether it is a push or a shove that is needed, it would be helpful if that could be clearly achieved.

I also make the point that while it is helpful that, in the vast majority of cases, the Government intend to ensure that the right to consult a solicitor in private in a timely and confidential manner is preserved, they should not underestimate the importance of the confidentiality of advice—a point made eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. That is of course particularly relevant in circumstances where answering questions under these powers is compulsory. I therefore invite the Government to consider carefully, over and above the matters that the Minister has said she will consider, how far more proportionate ways of ensuring that detainees do not disrupt the purposes of their examination can be achieved without compromising confidentiality or the fundamental right to consult a solicitor. If we have that assurance—I note that the Minister is nodding in assent—I am happy to withdraw my amendment. However, it is a matter that we may well return to on Report.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, in my view it is very important that photographs which may have a dramatic effect on the opinion of those who view them should be dealt with in the way described in this clause. They may, for example, include photographs derived from execution scenes which are both disturbing and, unfortunately, very influential.

In general terms I support this clause. I have a reservation about the Northern Ireland situation, and ask the Minister to reflect on this before Report and possibly consult more widely. I have travelled extensively in Northern Ireland, both when I was Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and subsequently. I have been taken to scenes where there is imagery which is now internationally regarded as works of art. I have been taken to scenes where there is imagery which may on the face of it be very distasteful, but plays an extremely important part in the history of the community concerned and in the extraordinary settlement that has taken place in Northern Ireland as a result of the Good Friday agreement, and I would not wish anything to be done that might disrupt that. It seems that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland should be consulted to determine the issues raised in those amendments, before we become too dogmatic about them.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and I oppose this clause standing part of this Bill. I agree with my noble friend Lady Hamwee that it goes well beyond what is necessary for the protection of the public against terrorism. While I quite understand the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that imagery is in many circumstances unacceptable, I disagree with him that this provision meets that problem. We have seen no evidence from the Government that persuades me that the terms of this proposed new section would reduce terrorism or make terrorists easier to catch. I believe that it departs from the sensitive balance between the protection and the security of the public, and the public’s civil liberties, in a way that is irredeemably bad.

The Government seek to define an objective—deterrence of displays encouraging terrorist groups—but offer no evidence as to why the new offence in these terms is needed. That is the first reason why it should be opposed. In other words, if we apply the first test I suggested at Second Reading for considering these measures—what is the purpose of this provision, which is a measure criminalising publication only; and what is the mischief it seeks to address—the Government leave both questions unanswered. Because the purpose is left undefined, it is not possible even to move to the second test of whether the measure is necessary to achieve that purpose.

The second reason why this clause should be opposed is that a person might be convicted of an offence under proposed new Section 1A, even if no mens rea of any kind is proved. To introduce a new offence criminalising behaviour where the prosecution is not required to establish any mental state on the part of the alleged offender is a very serious matter, and needs compelling justification. No such justification has been advanced in support of this clause. This is an absolute offence of publication, the only indicator of a guilty mind being that publication takes place,

“in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.

No requirement is proposed that the person charged should have deliberately, or even recklessly, given rise to such suspicion; no requirement that that person should be a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation; or even that the person should in fact have done anything to make anybody think that he or she was such a member or supporter. There is not even a requirement that the publication itself should be deliberate. A person who accidentally captures an offending image and unwittingly publishes it might be committing the offence merely because other reasonable people might regard the publication as casting suspicion on the person who publishes it. As for the images published that may be caught by this clause, the range is very wide. It follows, applying the test of proportionate response, that this measure is disproportionate, and it is no surprise that this term was used frequently in the first report on the Bill by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I was going to explain it in my own words, but I think the notes agree with me. On the innocent selfie with the ISIS flag in the background, the offence is clear: it is committed only where all the circumstances in which an image is published give rise to reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or a supporter of a terrorist organisation. The picture in and of itself is not the offence. I hope I have explained that clearly to the noble Lord.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I invite the Minister to consider that with her department, particularly in view of her concession that she does not wish to criminalise anyone who would be excused by the two amendments we have been discussing. The difficulty is that the drafting of the clause at the moment introduces an objective test of reasonable suspicion in the viewer of the image without any regard to the purpose in the mind of the person publishing the image. The offence is one of publication. The suspicion does not have to be in the mind of the publisher; the suspicion is in the mind of the observer. That is the difficulty that the Minister’s position does not grapple with.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the clear and helpful way in which she opened the debate on this very difficult subject—and indeed I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, and I join with him and the noble Baroness in paying tribute to the work of the police and security services in combating terrorism. I also look forward to the maiden speeches of my long-standing friend the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and of the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie.

On these Benches we agree with the Government in acknowledging the need for strong legislation to counter terrorism and to protect the public, so we accept the principles underlying many of the measures in the Bill. However, the approach we take to this legislation, as to all counterterrorist legislation, is that we must balance the security imperatives to protect the public and to combat terrorism against the liberal imperative to safeguard our freedoms as citizens in a democratic society. We assess each of the measures proposed with the following questions in mind. First, what is the purpose of the measure and what is the mischief it seeks to address? Secondly, is the measure necessary to achieve that purpose? Thirdly, is the measure a proportionate response to the mischief, having regard to the restrictions on liberty that it entails, and in particular would a more limited response achieve the purpose in a more proportionate way? Fourthly, will the measure be effective in achieving its purpose?

I also suggest that we should approach these new powers having in mind that we may in the future have not a Government with genuine respect for liberty and democratic values but a Government who are prepared to ride roughshod over our freedoms as citizens. If the tests I set out are not met in the context of such a Government, the powers proposed should be opposed or limited by Parliament. In a number of areas we believe that these tests are not met in this Bill. Some measures may be capable of amendment while others, we believe, are irredeemably bad.

Clause 1, creating a broad offence of expressing support for terrorist organisations, is drawn in very wide terms. We share the concerns of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the offence must be restricted so as not to criminalise legitimate freedom of expression. As presently drafted the clause is demonstrably not proportionate or sufficiently limited. I would add at this stage that Parliament has every reason to be extremely grateful to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its careful work on this Bill. Its existence and thoroughness help us to ensure that human rights are respected when we consider legislation and its reports deserve our closest attention.

Clause 2 would criminalise the publication of images of clothing or articles arousing reasonable suspicion of membership of a proscribed organisation. Again, this is insufficiently restricted and disproportionate. It could catch honest and fair reporting, cultural work and international and political study, and stifle genuine discussion. Clause 3, relating to use of the internet, is targeted at the legitimate objective of preventing the internet being used for terrorist purposes. But again, it is insufficiently limited. In spite of the reasonable excuse defence, there is a risk that the clause will operate to restrict innocent and harmless research and journalism.

As was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, Clause 4 was added late by an amendment in the House of Commons. It gives the Government power to designate areas outside the UK and prohibit travel to such areas by UK citizens—a radical restriction of individual liberty. Outside wartime, such a curtailment of citizens’ rights is very difficult to justify. I do not believe that the availability of a reasonable excuse defence adequately mitigates the violence that the creation of this offence would do to our liberties.

The provisions in Clause 6 on extraterritorial jurisdiction seem to risk injustice to both UK citizens returning to this country and foreign nationals travelling here. Much more thought needs to be given to the proper limits on the ability to prosecute here for offences committed abroad.

I turn next to the sentencing provisions, starting with Clause 7. I and many others in this House, in the senior judiciary and throughout the criminal justice system have pointed out many times the dangers of sentence inflation, yet elements of the populist press still urge their readers and politicians to push for longer sentences. No one would argue that prison is not the proper punishment for terrorist offences, but longer and longer sentences are not the answer. Our prisons are overcrowded, understaffed and violent. They do not function as places of reform and rehabilitation. Educational facilities are limited or non-existent. It is a fact that our prisons tend to radicalise their inmates. Sending those guilty of terrorist offences there for ever-longer terms is more likely to encourage others to commit such offences than to reduce the threat to the public. The Government will need to produce a stronger case before I will be prepared to support these provisions. We will look at the numerous other powers and requirements proposed in the Bill in the same spirit, seeking to ensure that any new powers meet the tests I outlined earlier. Where they do not, we will oppose or seek to amend them.

Finally, it is one of the ultimate contradictions of this extremely difficult period that while our Government struggle to improve domestic counterterrorist legislation, they nevertheless risk through Brexit abandoning most of the UK’s international work in this area over decades. With our active participation, the EU has painstakingly constructed the most comprehensive and effective international network ever devised, certainly in a democratic context, to combat terrorism and safeguard public security. It has achieved this with great sensitivity to protecting democratic freedoms, supported by the requirements that EU legislation have regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and that its implementation be monitored by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The Government prepared Part 2 of the Bill in response to the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, as the Minister pointed out. We should remember the co-operation of our friends and neighbours across Europe in resisting Russian aggression in the wake of the Salisbury poisoning. Is it not ironic that on 5 September the Prime Minister pointed out in the House of Commons that although Russia resisted any extradition, we obtained a European arrest warrant to ensure that, if the two suspects ever travelled to Europe, we would be able to secure their arrest and bring them swiftly to justice in the United Kingdom?

We hope that the Government will get a deal to retain the European arrest warrant system, but they are also planning for no deal. In those circumstances, it is not just the European arrest warrant system that is at risk. Access to the Prüm database, which was secured in 2016 just before the referendum, would also be at risk. An Interpol DNA search takes 143 days on average. Through Prüm, it takes 15 minutes, a fingerprint match comes back within 24 hours and car registration numbers are searched in just 10 seconds.

Europol, the European law enforcement agency, which was led until May by an energetic and effective British director, Rob Wainwright, and into which we opted back in December 2016, is also at risk. So is Eurojust, the network for co-operation between judges and prosecutors across the EU to combat serious cross-border crime. Then there is the Schengen Information System, which enables enforcement agencies to exchange information about risks presented by serious criminals and suspected terrorists. Although the UK is not part of the Schengen agreement, under the treaty of Amsterdam it has access to the Schengen Information System for law enforcement purposes.

By this Bill the Government seek to introduce new measures to protect the security of the UK public. Yet by risking our co-operation with the EU on terrorism and cross-border security through the imposition of arbitrary and indefensible red lines—for example, on the role of the European Court of Justice—the Government threaten to undermine the very security they seek to protect.

Violence Against Women

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 20th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover]

Across government, we are determined to make sure that we do everything we can to protect the victims of domestic abuse. I know that colleagues across government have looked at this issue. If the noble Baroness has more specific information, I would welcome receiving it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, there is a clear link between domestic violence and sexual abuse and women’s offending, with between 50% and 80% of the women in our prisons being victims. Is this not a sound reason for devoting more government resources, as this report demands, to education and to campaigning in the community to help to bring an end to this dreadful scourge?

[Baroness Northover]

We recognise the challenge posed by female offenders and the fact that they themselves are often at risk of violence and have specific rehabilitation needs, as well as often having high levels of mental health problems. Many of them have indeed suffered domestic violence. The Ministry of Justice has just set up a cross-departmental advisory board on women offenders, chaired by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. This group will be looking at more provision in the community, more rehabilitation, a review of the prison estate to raise the profile of women offenders and the factors associated with offending that my noble friend has just pointed to.

Health and Social Care Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 5th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Warner]

My Lords, I support the thrust of most of the amendments in this group and have added my name to Amendments 226, 259 and 339. As others have said, it is essential to have in the Bill a clear commitment from the Government, and indeed from Parliament, that three things are very clear when it comes to directors of public health. First, we have to make sure that they should be registered public health specialists, with appropriate qualifications and expertise. That seems to me a given if these people are to have standing in the local communities and, perhaps, even in a wider area. Secondly, the director should be accountable to the local authority’s head of paid service and be able to report directly to the local authority itself, particularly when there is an area of great concern in that local community. One does not want people intervening between the director and local authorities’ main committees when a serious incident is taking place locally.

Thirdly, for the reasons that everybody else has mentioned, we have to ensure that a director of public health cannot simply be fired on a whim because they are doing something which is uncomfortable or unpopular, or has brassed off a local interest of one kind or another. That is particularly critical when we see the difference of approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, put very well: between the evidence-based approach of a director of public health and the commitments that local authority members, quite reasonably, have to seek re-election from time to time. That is how the system works, but a different approach is likely to run through some local areas when something is uncomfortable for the local authority but is backed up by the evidence that the director of public health can put in the public arena.

Directors of public health need to be seen to be capable of doing the job and to be able to deliver bad news—as well they may have to. They should be able to expect to be supported and protected locally when they have to deliver uncomfortable news. Amendment 226 is part of that package of armour that we need to wrap around directors of public health. There may be better ways to do that in these amendments than in Amendment 226, but its purpose certainly ought to be in the Bill.

Amendment 259 is an important part of the protective armour that I have mentioned for directors of public health, in that it aims to ensure that they simply do not lose ground financially over time in their pay and conditions of service with NHS medical equivalents. I am not a supporter of creating situations where there are bidding wars between local authorities and the NHS. We have seen that with occupational therapists over the years, where one side decides that it can secure some advantage by upping the ante a bit for a specialist group when there is a degree of local competition for a sometimes scarce resource, so I am not in favour of doing that.



However, my experience—and I have worked six years in local government—is that where there are these bidding wars, usually the NHS specialist is further up the greasy pole in terms of pay and conditions of service, and the specialist at the local level is trying to catch up with what has happened. That is why Amendment 259 is important, in that it ensures that there is a catching-up process. Much more importantly, it tries to ensure that it is not necessary to have a catching-up process, because there is an agreed alignment between the pay of those specialists who are employed by the NHS and those who are employed by local authorities.

In speaking to Amendment 339, to which I have put my name, I should declare an interest, in that my daughter is a non-medical public health specialist, although I hasten to add that I have in no way discussed this with her, so she should not be held responsible for the views I am about to express. It is vital that public health specialists are brought within the purview of the Health Professions Council and that there is a separate register for non-medical public health specialists which comes under the purview of that council.

Increasingly, the behavioural aspects of successful public health policies and their implementation are absolutely critical. This is not an area where we should be relying only on personnel with medical or dental qualifications. If we are to have successful public health policies, it is vital that we have people with the kind of background where they can communicate, understand, and do research on the emerging areas of the behavioural sciences. I hope, therefore, that we can have a register which has public standing and is supervised by the Health Professions Council.

Before I sit down I would like to start this session with a mild chastisement of the Minister. I said at Second Reading that I had a benchmark for the Minister’s flexibility in accepting amendments to this Bill. However, he has been uncharacteristically inflexible in responding to many of the noble Lords’ concerns in their amendments. Of course, he has always been very polite; but we have not seen much evidence of the Government being willing to take away some of these issues and come back with amendments at a later stage. I would say to him that this set of amendments gives him a good chance to turn over a new leaf. They do not affect the Government’s policies in this Bill. However, they strengthen the ability of the Government to deliver those policies in the way that they have strengthened the arrangements around the appointment, the pay and the safeguarding of the independence of the directors of public health. I do hope, therefore, that we will see a different type of Earl Howe appearing in relation to these particular amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I, too, support this suite of amendments. I shall speak only briefly, not in favour of a reinvigorated Earl Howe but in support of Amendments 234 and 234A, which are to the same effect and concern the termination of the appointment of directors of public health.

The Bill provides for joint appointment of the directors of public health, by the local authority and the Secretary of State, and it is right that it does so. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Patel, that it is therefore essential that the Secretary of State should also have a crucial vetoing part to play in the termination of such an appointment. It is not only that it is logical and sensible that he should do so. It is also that it is more important upon termination that the Secretary of State has that power of intervention. It is important because the director of public health has to have a sense of independence and security. As my noble friend Lady Cumberlege and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, have pointed out, there is considerable potential for disagreement between the local authority and the director of public health. It is therefore crucial that, in the event of friction, the director of public health can act with confidence to disagree.

This is exactly the kind of decision in which it is the Secretary of State, having ultimate responsibility for the health service, who should have that role. The Secretary of State’s role is therefore the best guarantee of the independence and the freedom of action that directors of public health ought to have.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, my name is to Amendment 339. The other amendments have been spoken to most eloquently, having been introduced fully by my noble friend Lord Patel. One additional point, and the reason for having these directors of public health on a register, is that the person appointed may be fit to do the job today but they need to be fit to do the job tomorrow as well. By having them on a register, issues of revalidation, continuing professional development and so on would be maintained, and a level playing field would be maintained in an upward direction.

We have heard today about infection, but the greatest threat to public health may well come not from infection but from issues such as cyberterrorism around our major utilities and the havoc that that could cause. These directors of public health will have an enormous amount on their shoulders, and they need to be linked into the national and international disaster planning groups. Some of those aspects of their work will be ill understood by those in local authorities, who may feel that such things are remote and unlikely to happen. In the event of a disaster, those skills will have to be drawn on immediately, and the directors of public health have to be prepared and able to take the leadership role.

I urge the Government to consider carefully any good reason why not to register directors of public health. I cannot see any reason not to register these people who are trained specialists. You have to have a really good reason not to, in the face of all the evidence that they should be registered.

Health and Social Care Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 5th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford. The Minister will know well that one of the many attractions of the Health and Social Care Bill for me is the lengths that it goes to in order to try to achieve some degree of integration between healthcare and social care, and indeed integration of various other kinds. For the most vulnerable of all patients, not only physically but mentally and socially, who are at serious risk, such integration of healthcare and social care is of enormous importance—something that I know well from my own experience.

It is surprising to me that in this clause it is as though we are going in the opposite direction. Instead of healthcare and social care being integrated, they are being separated out. I rather suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Adebowale, is right: while in previous clauses the criticism from the other Benches has been that too much complexity is being introduced into the system, on this occasion the attempt to simplify things may actually be the problem. It may have seemed that it would be good to get clarity and give the responsibility to one side or the other, but the care of those who are mentally disturbed to the degree that they are a risk to themselves or someone else and therefore have to be detained cannot be accomplished by either one side or the other, either healthcare or social care; they need to be working together.

I appeal to the Minister to look at this question again. I do not think anyone suspects there is any malice aforethought in this. The clause is rather complex, referring to lots of other pieces of legislation, and it may merit being looked at again in order to ensure that those who have been cared for up until now by a more integrated approach will not in any way lose out from the change that is proposed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 237, a probing amendment concerning independent mental health advocates, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Williams. It concerns Clause 40 of the Bill. The scheme for independent mental health advocates was introduced into the Mental Health Act 1983 by the 2007 Act, and came into force in 2009. Under the legislation, the responsibility was that of the Secretary of State, and, under the regulations, commissioning was to be job of PCTs.

Mental health advocates fulfil an important function. They act as independent advocates experienced in mental health matters to provide qualifying patients with help and advice. Qualifying patients are those who are liable to be detained, who are subject to guardianship and who are community patients, and patients can qualify in some other circumstances. The help involved can include help and advice on: the provisions of the legislation; the conditions and restrictions to which such patients can be subject; importantly, the mental treatment that they are receiving or are likely to receive; why it is being given; and their rights in connection with it. The right also involves a right to help and advice on visits and, importantly, a right for the advocate to inspect the medical records of the patient.

The point to which the amendment is directed is that, under Section 130A of the 1983 Act, subsection (7) introduces an element of discretion because regulations may make different provisions for different circumstances and cases. That may be unexceptionable as it stands, but the difficulty is that there is a concern when the Secretary of State’s function is transferred to local social services authorities. The amendment raises particular concern about the position of minors, and seeks to ensure that independent mental health advocates must be made available to minors who are qualifying patients. Minors who are also mentally ill are in the worst possible position to speak for themselves and to seek help independently. Therefore, we invite the Government to respond with an indication of how, after the transfer of functions to local social service authorities under Clause 40, they intend to monitor the working of the independent mental health advocate provisions; and to ensure their provision, particularly to this very vulnerable class.