(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is inevitable that this bit of our proceedings will be dominated by an argument not so much about a referendum but about fiscal autonomy and fiscal responsibility. I follow my noble friend only in the sense that I speak after him, not in the sense of following his arguments. He is a great and genuine supporter and exponent of fiscal autonomy. I am afraid that I am a total opponent of fiscal autonomy. A unitary system like ours has the great benefit of being able to move resources—public expenditure—around from richer areas to poorer areas. It so happens that that is a political objective, a political process that I am more than happy with. That is what we ought to be about: reducing inequalities.
The difficulty with fiscal autonomy is, in fact, that you lose that ability. It is not so much that you freeze inequalities; you are most likely going to make them worse. The rich areas will have a strong tax base, a relatively high tax take and very few deep-seated problems to deal with. The reverse will be the case for poorer areas. Their tax base will be fragile and they will have a low tax take, but they are faced with enormous social and economic problems. Only through a unitary system does—let us say it—the state have the power to move resources around to enable those inequalities to be lessened. That is an agenda that I wish to support. Fiscal autonomy leads us in completely the opposite direction.
My Lords, I thought that I was going to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, but I find that I take a third and different position from those advocated by the two noble Lords who preceded me. Like the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, I am a federalist and I do not believe that federalism is to be identified with the unitary model that the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, recommended. However, we should look at different levels of taxation and at giving greater fiscal responsibility for the matters that have been devolved.
I hope, however, that we will not confuse the issue at this stage, before the federal option has been properly explored and ways of dividing tax-raising powers between the different levels of government adequately set out, so that people not only in Scotland but in Wales, Northern Ireland and England can grasp what this is about. We should include in our explanation details of the provision for the redistribution of the wealth of the United Kingdom to its constituent parts—not only to the four nations but to some of the regions of England, which seem to be doing rather badly out of the Barnett formula.
The timing of the referendum seems inappropriate. It turns not only on whether the earlier referendum gave the mandate to Parliament that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has come round to thinking that it did. It seems to me that at the time—and I am basing my remarks entirely on memory—we were thinking about varying the rates of income tax and not about extending taxation. I was interested to listen to what the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, said on that, and I dare say that he has done more historical research on the point than I have. It will be interesting to hear from the Minister, who I am sure will answer these questions, whether the noble Lord, Lord Browne, was right, and I hope that we can accept that there are more than two ways of imparting the responsibility for fiscal tax-raising. There is also a federal way. We should explore that, because it operates more fairly throughout the United Kingdom and will take care of the other countries, whose needs also need to be thought of in this context.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI, alas, disagree with the noble Lord on that. As he said, I served on the Scottish Constitutional Convention but I am bound to say that it was a device to fill a gap in time when it was not possible to extract from Parliament the decisions that reformers such as the noble Lord were in favour of. It was a method of trying to cover up political delay. I am sorry but I do not think that it was ideal. I think it was he who suggested that all parties had participated. That is not the case. The Conservative Party did not participate.
I also sat on another convention which was attempting to draw up a constitution for Europe and, again, was filled with representatives of national Parliaments from all around Europe. I am bound to say that it came to nothing. What has come to something has been the treaty of Lisbon, which came about as a result of executive government in a number of different countries plucking from that convention the best that they could to give us a framework for our European constitution.
I am sorry, but I profoundly disagree with the thread of argument that has been built upon the amendment that we heard eloquently defended and advocated at the beginning of this debate. We have seen this process of setting up commissions. We had a commission—a royal commission—set up on the reform of this place, sitting under the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham. How many of its recommendations, consensual as they were, have been implemented here? Virtually nothing has happened.
The most notable reforms of the Government which preceded the present one did not all come about as a result of commissions of inquiry or looking for consensus. One of the most remarkable reforms was that which resulted in the appointment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to the Cabinet and concerned taking out of this Chamber active judges—active Members of the House of Lords, sitting in its judicial capacity—and the creation of a Supreme Court. That was done by the decision of the Prime Minister, backed by some influential members of his Cabinet. It was certainly not accepted generally or widely. There was no consensus about it. It was torn apart in this House and was considered for months in a committee of this House, but it was certainly not produced as a result of seeking consensus. After the event, it seems to have been a very wise move, which was backed by the then great Lord Bingham, who was the senior Law Lord.
I wonder whether the noble Lord will now try and square the argument he is putting forward with the argument for participatory democracy that his party advocates?
Yes, I will. We have a very imperfect system of participatory democracy, because we have a rotten electoral system. The first past the post system does not reflect in Parliament anything like the aspirational end of participatory democracy, and although I do not regard the alternative vote as the ideal system—again I speak for myself and not the coalition—it is none the less a step towards a better representation and a more participative end point in our constitution. It will, I believe, make people feel in their constituencies generally that their vote does count.
In that case, is the noble Lord saying that the individual citizen is limited to being just the individual elector and not an active citizen in the legislative process?
There are many ways in which one can be an active citizen, and I enumerated some of them when introducing a debate on that very subject in this House shortly before Christmas.
I do not wish to detain the House, and I am conscious that the hour is late and that many will wish to reach a decision on this. However, I want to say that I am distressed by the fact that so many noble Lords for whom I have a high regard should imply that this deliberative process would bring about a better end point than the deliberations of our Parliament, which the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, referred to as the mother of Parliaments. It is so highly regarded largely because it is thought to act, usually, in a deliberate and wise way. On this occasion, the silence on these Benches indicates consent to what the Bill is putting forward, and an awareness that those opposing it are seeking to stop it from making progress and to stymie the efforts to achieve the constitutional reform that is long overdue.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI briefly follow my noble friend Lord Howarth on the substantive issue of the Commons reason. This is a sensitive issue and there are clear conventions that we should not in this House criticise the proceedings of another place—and I would not dream of doing so. However, I wonder whether I can take Members of this House back to another period of Conservative government. I recognise that a declining number of Members of this House were in here at the time of the last Conservative Government. Those of us who were used to delight in the tussles between my noble friend Lady Hollis and my friend but, alas, noble opponent at the time, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, on pensions legislation. Frequently, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish had to make concessions and was sometimes defeated. The effect of those concessions and defeats was that this House increased government expenditure. That Conservative Government never cried financial privilege.
My Lords, before the House reaches a judgment on the Commons reason, there ought to be absolute clarity about the intention of the House of Commons. It is far from clear in the reasons that have been provided that it is the intention of the House of Commons to claim financial privilege. A single reason is given and that is that the amendment that we are considering, which was carried in this place, would impose a charge on the public revenue. In opening the debate, my noble friend explained that as the Government giving priority consideration to the taxpayer over those who have paid for their identity cards. That does not sound like the invocation of the right of the House of Commons in respect of financial privilege. Without some greater authority indicating that that was the Government’s intention, there seems no bar to this House paying serious consideration to the law officers’ views on the legality of what is proposed under the terms of the human rights convention. I hope that the House will not be forced to take a decision without those views being made abundantly clear and without absolute clarity about the intentions of the Commons in bringing forward this sole reason for their disagreement. To my mind it is far from clear. We will establish a bad precedent if we determine that claims can be made lightly, not by the Commons themselves, that their privilege in this respect has been breached.