Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Report stage
Monday 29th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I am in the rather unusual position of having brought the judicial retirement age down, all those years ago, to 70 from 75. Your Lordships will remember that 75 was a fairly recent innovation because, originally, judges were appointed for life, and if they did not care for resignation, that sometimes meant fairly long periods in office.

I am very given to wishing for diversity on the Bench, and I realise what the authorities responsible for appointments have done over the past few years. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, can be sure that if they get 72 instead of 75 there will be an increase in diversity on the Bench. I had a great deal of experience—it is a long time ago—of trying to work with the ethnic minorities to improve their chances of getting to the top. Indeed, the death of one of those appointments—Mr Kadri, the first Muslim Silk who originated from Pakistan—was reported just the other day. During my time in office, I struggled to bring up the standards of ethnic minorities at the Bar because I felt that was the way to build up a chance of diversity. One of the difficulties in doing that was getting the arrangements needed for that purpose. I was of the view, and am still, that the best chance for ethnic minorities is not Chambers that are entirely of an ethnic minority but diverse Chambers with people from different backgrounds. That has happened to a considerable extent in recent times. It has produced some ethnic-minority members on the Bench, although nothing like as many as I would have liked.

I am convinced that the situation is very different now from what it was 27 years ago, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said. Just after the Supreme Court was set up, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, and I wrote to the then Lord Chancellor suggesting that the age limit for Supreme Court judges should be raised to 75 from 70 to accommodate for a reasonable length of time some of those who were there and had the potential to be very good examples of service in the Supreme Court. I am not sure that diversity has necessarily increased very much since then. It is perhaps worth my commenting that the President of the Supreme Court and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court are from Scotland. That is a very important move, although it is not in the way of diversity. It shows that those making the appointments are doing their best to secure the best quality they can at this time. However, it is important to do everything we can to raise the quality of those who are thinking of going to the Bench.

I do not know on what basis the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, whose experience and position is a matter of great importance so far as I am concerned, know that if this is left at 72 there will be greater diversity than now. The people making appointments are as keen on diversity as we are, but they find it difficult in the context in which they are working to bring it forward. I do not believe that it is at all likely that 72 will be more fruitful in that respect than 75. There is no doubt in my mind that going to 75 will increase the possibility of people in senior positions at the Bar taking the appointment. That is one of the things that I realised. The reason is simply that, as has been pointed out, the pension is important in these situations. People who are at the top of the profession are rather unwilling to take a judicial appointment unless they have a pension that encourages them to leave the Bar, with what they are making. I support this move to 75 very strongly, although I know it reverses what I did all those years ago.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, it is an enormous privilege and pleasure to be able to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, because when he was Lord Chancellor he swore me in as a judge of the High Court. At that time, the retirement age had been reduced to 70. Before turning to this particular amendment, because it is of particular relevance, I say how much I welcome and appreciate what the Government have done in bringing forward this Bill and clearing the terrible problem related to judicial pensions. Of all the research that was done during the time that I was the senior judge, it was clear that the biggest impediment to recruitment was what had happened on pensions, so I thank the Government with all my heart for putting this matter right.

I could not possibly begin to say that a retirement age of 75 was in ordinary circumstances the right age. It would be a difficult proposition to make to this House in any event, but I will be of that age next year and I still sit in a judicial capacity. However, that is not the issue. The issue is, starkly, diversity. I do not think that this House can run away from that, for reasons that I will endeavour to explain. The senior leadership judges whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has described all support moving only to 72 because of the imperative of diversity.

When I was Lord Chief Justice, I was under a statutory duty to promote diversity. Working hard with Lady Justice Hallett, as she then was—she is now the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hallett—we did it not because we were under a statutory duty but because we believed it was imperative for the judiciary to increase its diversity. The figures are telling. In 2005, there were two female members of the Court of Appeal. By 2015, there were eight, but—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, gave the figures—there are only 10 now. In the Supreme Court, there was one, then there were three, and now there are two, so the battle for diversity has yet to be won, particularly as regards our ethnic communities.

Why do I have this belief in diversity? There are three reasons. First, it is critical to public confidence in the judiciary—without which, the whole of society suffers. Secondly, diversity represents the fundamental principles of justice: equality of opportunity and fairness. Thirdly, unless we fully embrace the principles of diversity, for the whole of our society, we will not recruit and bring into the judiciary the broad background that we need—possibly not to decide the most intellectually important cases but to bring justice that is appreciated to everyone.

Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I find difficulty with these amendments, and I will look carefully at the detail to understand exactly what is involved. As a Scottish lawyer, I was brought up in the Scottish system, where Newton decisions are utterly unknown. Since training in the law of Scotland, I have acquired a certain amount of familiarity with the law of England and Wales, and I have come across these Newton hearings, and indeed the judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in the case which has been cited, and the explanation he gives for having them.

It may be wise just to look a little bit further into the detail which is required or which requires a Newton hearing. In the law of Scotland, the indictment of a serious offence requires the detail of the offence to be set out. If the accused wishes to plead guilty, he has the option to plead guilty to the indictment as served, or to plead guilty with items in the indictment which are matters of detail deleted. The prosecutor then has the option either to accept that plea, which will be of the offence with the details as agreed by the accused, or to proceed to trial. However, there is no room then for difference of opinion at the sentencing hearing about what the detail of the offence was, so there is no need for anything resembling a Newton hearing.

In England and Wales, the situation is somewhat different in that an indictment requires a description of the offence which does not, or may not, involve the same degree of detail. Therefore, the Crown may accept a plea of guilty from the accused when there is in fact quite a difference between them as to the detail of the offence, and that difference may make all the difference in the world to the seriousness of the offence. Therefore, when the question comes up for sentence, the exact amount of detail and what the details were becomes utterly relevant, but there is no way of resolving that, because there is no jury trial. Accordingly, the judge has to have a hearing when he determines what in his or her view actually happened. The result of that is that the accused has come to accept in effect a plea which has the effect not of being what he wanted but of something that the judge decided he should have wanted.

This is the reason for the Newton hearings. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, to make the matter just, you have to know what happened. That is because the plea has not been sufficiently detailed to determine that. That is why these hearings have to be held. I once thought that it might be possible to get to a better solution by making it a requirement of an indictment to have more detail in it, but that has not so far happened. Who knows what may happen yet?

That is the situation of the Newton hearings. I understand the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford —with his great experience of both English and Welsh law on this subject—to suggest that if there is a dispute between the accused and the Crown about whether the accused has, justifiably or otherwise, refused to disclose what has happened to the body, the matter would be subject to a Newton hearing. I think that, if that happens, a Newton hearing is inevitable. Fortunately, I think that the noble and learned Lord who will follow me explained that that circumstance is usually taken into account at the conclusion of a hearing, including of course the jury trial, if the matter has become an issue between the parties at that stage. On the whole, it seems likely that this kind of question would be resolved without difficulty. It must be pretty much a matter of clear fact at the time of the trial and, therefore, the judge would usually take account of the situation agreed between the parties as to whether the accused has disclosed where the body went. This is on the assumption that the accused accepts that he committed the murder. I believe that the consequence of all that is that the number of Newton hearings with this subject matter will be relatively small.

I have to say that I speak on this matter subject to the observations of those learned in the law of England who will follow me. This is a matter of course only for the Crown Court, and therefore does not involve the magistrates’ court in which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is so experienced. In my view, accordingly, there are a very limited number of circumstances in which this arises at all but, if it does arise, it is obvious that the decision of the judge in the Newton hearing will take place before he commits sentence. Therefore, Rule 5 of the Parole Board Rules requires that if the observations of the judge at trial before sentence are available, they are to be considered. The rules already take account of the exceptional cases, if any, in which a Newton hearing has taken place in relation to this matter. I therefore cannot see that it is at all right to modify the Bill by such an exceptional circumstance, which in any case illustrates a possible need for improvement in the law of England and Wales.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd [V]]

It is a pleasure and privilege to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in this debate. It is important to observe at the outset that I consider this amendment the kind of amendment that shows the danger of trying to make piecemeal amendments to a very limited-purpose Bill.

If I may be permitted, I will first say a little about the law of England and Wales in relation to the role of the judge and of the parties in determining the facts for sentencing. The least common form of determining the facts is a Newton hearing. More commonly, the facts—if there is to be a plea of guilty—are determined on the basis of plea. Both procedures are set out in cases to which reference has been made, but they are now codified in division VII B of the Criminal Practice Directions. By far the most common method of determining the facts is the determination made by the trial judge for the purposes of sentencing. Although a jury determines guilt or innocence, save in a most exceptional circumstance, it is for the judge who has heard all the evidence to determine the facts on which he or she will sentence. If the judge follows the correct approach to this, there can be no dispute before the Court of Appeal in relation to the findings made, as set out in the 2018 judgment of Mr Justice Sweeney in the Queen v King.

Thus, what this amendment seeks to do, on the face of it, is to refer to the least common means of determining facts for the purposes of sentence, leaving out a slightly more common means, but not so common in murder or the other cases covered by the Bill where a life sentence will be involved—that is, a basis of plea agreed with the prosecution—and leaving out of account entirely what would normally happen, which is that the trial judge would have made findings. In the case of murder, this is particularly important because, as I mentioned in Committee, if the body has not been found or has been dismembered so that it cannot be found, this is provided as an aggravating factor under Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the judge must make findings about it—and, in my experience, they invariably make findings about it—and it would be essential for the Parole Board to take that into account to avoid any risk of double punishment.

I therefore regret to say that, on its face, the amendment, if it seeks to deal with the narrow issue of what the Parole Board should do, is not a good amendment, because it leaves out the most common form of the determination of facts. However, if the wider purpose, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is to encourage the taking place of Newton hearings after a trial, I venture to suggest that this is a most undesirable process. The trial judge will have heard the evidence; it is plain that, if a body has not been discovered, its whereabouts have not been discovered or the identity of the victim is unknown—as happens often in indecent image cases—this is bound to have been debated at the trial, and the trial judge will, as the law stands, have made the necessary findings. It is to those that the Parole Board should have regard.

If, however, it is thought that there should be a different procedure and that we should look at this matter again, I respectfully suggest that this is not the Bill in which to do it, and that this provision does not achieve what is intended. It illustrates that, if there is a problem with the way in which facts are determined—I believe there is no such problem—this is a matter that should be part of a wider investigation and not undertaken in this limited-purpose Bill.

I therefore propose to vote against this amendment on various completely different grounds. First, it has the potential to impair the discretion of the Parole Board by expressing reference to a particular means of determining the basis of sentencing and leaves out the more important. Secondly, it is unnecessary for the way in which the Parole Board approaches cases for the reasons I gave last time. Thirdly, the Parole Board is under a duty to look at what the judge has found. Fourthly, if there is a wider purpose, this is something that should be examined separately. This amendment achieves none of these purposes and I urge the House to reject it, if the House is divided.