European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 6th September 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

Given what the Prime Minister has said, it is not going to happen. But the prerogative of the Prime Minister is retained under this provision—as it is in the other Bill.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

This simply keeps free from constraint the prerogative of the Prime Minister, notwithstanding this Bill. This Bill simply deals with requiring the Prime Minister to apply for an extension; if he manages to get one anyway, it does not matter. That is what is preserved. There is no question at that stage—if we accept the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, about the nature of extensions—about conditions, except temporal conditions. Therefore, what the Prime Minister is allowed to do here is what, apart from this Bill, he would be able to do. This Bill is an additional requirement on him when it is activated.

Brexit

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goldsmith

Monday 25th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

It is to change the club’s rules. In this case, Parliament is the club. I was just trying to explain how I see the situation. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, rising to his feet and gladly give way to him.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I think that there has been some discussion about this. The situation is that the EU is in charge of the treaty. Therefore, if we are not out of the treaty, we remain members as a result of the treaty of the European Union. However, the treaty by itself was not the whole story, because we had to pass an Act of Parliament to make the treaty work in the United Kingdom. If, as has happened, the EU has extended the date so far as the treaty is concerned, in order to make our law conform with the way the treaty works, the statutory instrument is required. Otherwise, there would be a discontinuity between the treaty on the one hand and the initial law on the other.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord has said. I see that the noble and learned Lord, the Advocate-General, has come to sit next to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, to put him straight on all of this.

Let us move on quickly to the things that matter more than that. The issue is what the country is now faced with. In that debate we are now really a spectator, as has been said. At this stage, we are watching as the House of Commons considers what to do. We may well find that, through the mechanism of indicative votes—personally, it is what I hope we will see—it will now consider all the possible alternative routes for this country. As has been said by a number of your Lordships, we are reaching that point at a very late stage and, as has also been said, that is as a result of the obduracy of the Prime Minister. One has to respect her stamina and perseverance but, as already raised in this debate, the fact remains that there are people whose voices have not been heard by the Prime Minister. It was remarkable to watch on the television yesterday who was turning up at Chequers. I admire their motorcars, and there were two exceptional ones that I envied, but it was surprising for the people of this country to see that this is how their future is being decided—by private discussions with just a small group of people.

Now, I hope that that will not happen and that the House of Commons will take charge of the situation. I have no doubt that it will take into account many of the points that your Lordships have discussed today. I am glad that there was a reference during our debate to the position of young people. I have seen the benefits of Erasmus in my own family, and I saw the young people during the march protesting about their lack of voice.

I think that only the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to the contribution that the European Union has made to peace and security in Europe. I was struck by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, at Saturday’s march and I am sorry that he is not in his place. This was powerful stuff. He has said it before in this House, although perhaps not in those words. As I recall, he said that being alone was not Churchill’s wish or hope; it was his fear. Peace and security is a very important matter which no doubt the House of Commons will take into account when it considers where we go from here.

Inevitably, your Lordships have talked about the legitimacy of a referendum. Again, it is for the House of Commons to consider in its indicative votes whether that is a way forward. I myself have never understood the objections to a further referendum on democratic grounds. I appreciate that people who thought they had achieved a particular result the first time round do not want to see it rerun. However, regarding legitimacy, in an earlier debate in this House—I do not which one it was; it might have been the first debate but perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Newby, can tell me—the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, used the colourful if slightly whimsical example of his maiden aunts being invited to make a choice on the basis of inadequate information. I therefore agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who asked why this would be undemocratic.

As a result of what the European Council said, there has also been much discussion about the need to hold further European elections. If that is the case, it will be, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, said, inconvenient—one could perhaps put it more strongly than that—but I find it difficult to describe it as undemocratic to ask people to vote in an election. That is perhaps why the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, referred to the need to give people the final say. However, that is not for us to decide today. Looking at the annunciator, I see that there is a Division in the Commons. Maybe I should sit down before we find out what is going to happen over the next few days. Arguments were powerfully put by my noble friend Lord Adonis. I am not sure that I agree with the sequencing that he has in mind but that was not the fullness of his observation.

In an earlier debate, I drew an analogy with the play “Waiting for Godot”. At that stage, we thought that there would be a further opinion or a further amendment to the legal position that would cause us to reconsider what we had been saying about that. I quoted the Irish critic who had referred to “Waiting for Godot” as,

“a play in which nothing happens, twice”.

I hope that we are not going to see nothing happening three or four times.

We have to move on for the sake of the country, and it is now to the other place that we must look to get the guidance and establish the direction in which the country will be going. That is what I look forward to seeing at the end of this evening when the House of Commons decides about the procedure, and during the rest of this week, when it makes its decisions on the votes.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the existence of these powers in the Bill has created an apprehension in a lot of people that the Government are proposing to use the powers in some way to undermine something that is valuable to them. It is therefore important—apart altogether from the argument that examines the detail—that we examine this carefully. The noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton—with his background of great success as a civil servant, no doubt contributed to by his early experience as a lawyer—has moved the amendment in a way that has made it extremely clear. It is quite clear to me that necessity is a better test on which to leave these powers than the discretionary test of “appropriate”. It is not absolutely right that discretion is not subject to judicial review, but at least an objective test is certainly more likely to lead to successful judicial review if it is transgressed.

We have to remember the huge task involved in trying to put these two systems together; the European system, which has been here for 45 years, has been working alongside our system and kept separate from it over all that time. That is by no means an easy task. Indeed, what we already discussed with regard to Clauses 2 and 3 illustrate that. It is difficult and time consuming, and we must ensure that the solutions we suggest to the Government are practical and will enable this to be done in a reasonable time so that the statute book can be right on Brexit day.

I anticipate that the test of necessity will be an easier one to apply for those entrusted with the power than the test of what is appropriate. The latter involves an element of judgment, which is not always easy to exercise; whereas if it is obvious that these two bits do not fit together, it is necessary to do something about it. As the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, said, it is not necessary to circumscribe the solution. The argument that necessity suggests not only that the amendment is required but also what particular amendment is required stretches the matter a little far. So long as it is necessary to do it, that is a sufficient test for our purpose, and then it is for the Minister to do his best to sew these two pieces together.

I am somewhat alarmed at the survey by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, of the people entitled to use this power, and the Minister may well have something to say about that. However, there is a lot of work to do, and we do not want to overwork the Ministers with necessary adjustments when they ought to be doing something else. There is certainly plenty to do between now and Brexit.

In addition, it has been said that this is surrendering the power of Parliament to the Executive. To an extent that is true, but Parliament retains a veto in respect of every single regulation, either by a negative or an affirmative resolution. It is true that we do not want to have thousands of these if we can possibly avoid it, apart from anything else. But there is an element of control there. How practical that would be is, I think, doubtful. There is an urgent need now to circumscribe these powers so that they work properly and effectively but not excessively. As I said, a lot of people have worries about human rights, equality rights and a whole lot of other rights. Sometimes people have spoken in conversation or in observations to the press or whatever, which does not represent the Government’s policy. This helps to inflame the idea that the Government are using these powers to take away all that has been so dearly won. I do not think that is true, but we should try to remove the possibility that this idea can be represented.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, these are hugely important amendments. The Minister will have noted that not a single Member of the Committee has spoken in favour of the present position in the Bill. From all sides of the Committee, it has been stated that the Bill, as it stands, is not acceptable. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, is not present today, for reasons that we all entirely understand. Noble Lords will recall what he said at Second Reading, when he talked about this as the biggest transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive in peacetime. I entirely agree. I agree with what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Wilson of Dinton, Lord Cormack and Lord Lang of Monkton—with whom, or rather under whom, I was privileged to serve on the Constitution Committee, when he chaired it. I agree also with the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. Everybody has taken the same position in relation to that.

Let us look at the key amendment, Amendment 71, to which I am privileged to have added my name, just to note the importance of what it does. It would replace the statement that “the Minister considers it appropriate” with “it is necessary”. As a former Minister, as a former adviser to Ministers and as a practising lawyer, I fully see the significance of that change. I know as a lawyer that if I am able to say to the judge, “All that is required is that the Minister considers it appropriate—how can you say that he did not? How can you second guess that?”, I am home and dry. If, on the other hand, I have to show that it is necessary—not just in the Minister’s decision, not just on reasonable grounds, but that it is in fact necessary—then that is the test that the court has to undertake in order to satisfy itself. The point behind these amendments is that nothing less than that will do to enable this huge transfer of power to the Executive from this House.

I do not need to repeat the remarks made by other noble Lords about how taking back control should not mean taking back control by the Executive—that is not what anybody had in mind. I do not need to repeat the remarks about the number of Ministers that this gives power to. I am not even sure that the figure of 109 is right. I recall, in government—no doubt the Minister will tell me that it does not apply here—that all Ministers can act, and often do act, by their officials. The Carltona principle means they can sign the instruments, so it may mean that the 109 is multiplied manifold. I have no doubts about their good intentions, but this is not what our system requires, and we should not be giving it up in these circumstances.

Other noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Dykes, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, have also spoken powerfully in favour of these amendments.

I have a couple of other points to make, as most of what I wanted to say has already been powerfully and clearly expressed by noble Lords. The most important point is the one I started with, which is that the Minister must see the unanimity of view, as it appears at the moment, around the Committee about the change that needs to be made. We can debate whether it is essential or necessary. I rather agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that “necessary” has become a term well understood by the courts and so it is probably the better one to have, but the end aim is the same. That it is not a decision for the subjective view of the Ministers is the other key point on which we agree.

One point that I want to deal with, which has not had much discussion so far—although the noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised it—is Amendment 244A. It proposes that there should be a statement by a Minister as to the need for the change, and it is not simply a policy change. There is merit in that proposal, I would suggest, though not as a substitute for the amendments we are proposing. I draw attention to the similarity with Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, an excellent provision which requires that a Minister has to certify that a piece of legislation is compatible with the convention rights. We see it on the very front of this Bill itself. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, is not in his place. He had a lot of involvement in making sure that that worked, by insisting that when it came to certifying that legislation was compatible, it was not just on a wing and a prayer.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goldsmith

Tuesday 26th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has made that point twice. Does he recognise that although, as he said at the outset, there have been procedures in which material has been seen, but not by one party, those are not procedures in which that material is then relied upon by the judge to determine the rights and wrongs applicable to that party? This is in order to exclude that material and not to allow it in. Is that not the novelty of this procedure?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Absolutely, that is the procedure with excluded material. Of course, excluding the material can sometimes be extremely damaging to the interests of the other party to the litigation. The noble Baroness referred to Matrix Churchill. That was exactly the sort of case that Matrix Churchill would have been if the judge had excluded it because the material that was sought to be excluded as sensitive material was, on further examination, of great use to the claimant, as we all know. The idea that a public interest immunity certificate is so superior to this procedure strikes me as being without great foundation.

I assume that the only material in question is material that has been subject to all the processes that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has suggested for removing its sensitivity, because if you can do that the party is not required to produce sensitive material because it has been neutralised and the difficulty has been removed. Therefore, when you have that in mind, it is very hard to see how you can find out whether there is any other way in which the case can be dealt with. One of the problems about that is that at the beginning of a case things may look different from how they look as the case proceeds.

One of the great benefits of the amendments that the other place has put in here is that this matter can be reviewed at any stage of the procedure. Therefore, it seems to me that this system, in a very small minority of cases, will be the best way of securing the fair and effective administration of justice in that case. It is not a question of excluding material, which is an appropriate test for the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald; it is nothing to do with that. It is to see that the material that is being used is used in a way that does not damage the security of this nation. The Government have as one of their primary responsibilities securing the national security, as evidenced by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said about control orders, which control people’s liberties, in which this sort of procedure was introduced. I believe that this procedure is the best way in which to secure national security.

I endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said in his letter. Our judges are as familiar with the desirability of open justice as any Peer who has spoken. They know the value of open justice; they were brought up to it. There is no question of a judge going for a closed material procedure if he thought it could be done in open court. I believe that giving this discretion to the judiciary in very limited circumstances with two very important conditions is the right way to deal with it. It is not the Executive who are deciding, but the judge. Judges have taken an oath to,

“do right to all manner of people … without fear or favour, affection or ill will”.

That oath will apply in the decision that the judge has to make, and it seems to me that the best possible test has been evolved by the House of Commons in its consideration of our Bill, and the test is the fair and effective administration of justice in that case.