International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill

Debate between Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Friday 6th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market]

My Lords, there are two themes to all our amendments: hypothecation is one and the other is value for money et cetera. This is not the most important amendment to deal with hypothecation but it happens to be the first. That is the point. A lot of the other amendments—which I hope we can deal with much more swiftly because we will have dealt with the general arguments—are more designed to ease the target so as to deal with problems such as, for example, having in one given year to go on spending to meet the target when it might have been better to spread that over a few years. We have other amendments on those themes to deal with that problem. This is not the most important amendment but it happens to be the one where we can make the general case.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, with some trepidation I rise to speak to this amendment. Perhaps I should make it absolutely clear that I am not against the Government spending 0.7%, 0.8% or 1% of gross national income on aid. I am not opposed to aid; indeed, I have raised quite a lot of money for women in India. For me, the central argument is what we are trying to do here. I hope that I can avoid the noble Countess calling me to order in speaking to this amendment.

By the way, I do not know why there is confusion about which “the” it is. The amendment says:

“Page 1, line 2, leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’”.

We are talking about “a” duty of the Secretary of State rather than “the” duty.

The Economic Implications for the United Kingdom of Scottish Independence

Debate between Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market]

I cannot speak for my committee as a whole—although I suspect I am doing so—but that exact point occurred to us as we went through all the evidence. Many of the responses that we were getting, or not getting, did not deal with the points that I am raising now. I put my emphasis on the UK Government’s position today because we are in the UK Government’s Parliament, but I hope that many of the issues that we have raised—and, incidentally, that have been raised by Scottish business and some Scottish local authorities, such as the Glasgow City Council—will get a better answer than we have had so far.

As I was saying, we have spelt out many of the consequences of Scottish independence in our report. On defence in particular, there are potentially huge cost implications. Also included are such major issues as the division of assets and liabilities, negotiations on sterling and monetary policy, and so on. That is all very well. On the other hand, so much hinges on the subsequent negotiations. It is not enough, it seems to us, to leave it to those advocating independence to make the case, as the Chief Secretary to the Treasury has argued. He argued the case on our questions on the need to have the negotiations clarified as follows:

“The UK Government believes that people in Scotland will vote to remain part of the United Kingdom and therefore is not making plans for Scottish separation from the UK. This is not complacency but rather based on a strong belief that the UK works, and works well. Scotland contributes to, and benefits from being part of the UK”.

He goes on to say:

“It is for those advocating independence to set out a clear and well evidenced case to people in Scotland about what the implications of leaving the UK would mean for them—including some of the unavoidable choices that will have to be made”.

We do not think that that is a sufficient response because, in fact, the implications for the rest of the UK are very substantial as well. That is why we have argued the particular point that I stress now. We have argued in our report that:

“Scotland needs and deserves a fully informed debate, based on fact and free from rancour, well before the referendum vote”.

It continues with the following key point:

“To help bring it about the Scottish and British Governments should be more open about how they see the outcome of negotiations after a ‘Yes’ vote; each should indicate the ‘red lines’ of its negotiating stance on such crucial issues as currency, defence, division of assets and debts and negotiations with the EU before the referendum so that voters can make an informed choice”.

I regard this as a critical point. The debate is becoming much clearer and better informed, particularly since we took evidence and completed our report. The UK Government have produced very helpful and detailed analyses of some key issues and we look forward to more. However, there is still this issue about not discussing the negotiations in advance of the referendum. One argument has been that that should wait until after the negotiations, but one problem is that could make it very easy for many of the people intending to vote in the referendum to vote “yes”, on the assumption that all the negotiations would take place afterwards and that there would then be a second vote afterwards, once they were completed. That is not satisfactory and it is not the way it should operate. That is why we have urged—

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

I am most grateful to my noble friend. Does he not think that the Government are facing two ways on these issues of referenda? On the one hand, on Scotland they say that we should have the referendum and then look at the detail afterwards, whereas on Europe the argument is that we must have the negotiations first so people know what they are voting for.

[Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market]

Well, yes. That is exactly why we must be much clearer about the negotiations before the vote takes place. I have explained the UK Government’s position on this and we do not think that that is sufficient. That is why we made the recommendation for the red lines to be clearly established beforehand so that no one is in any doubt as to where both Governments, but particularly the UK Government, would stand firm on some key issues.

To conclude, since we took evidence and completed our report, the UK Government have produced very helpful and detailed analyses of some key issues and we look forward to more. But it is critical that they also address this issue of the red lines and they should undertake to do so well before the referendum. That is the upshot of our report. There is some very helpful analysis in it and it will continue to stand the test of time as we get towards the end of the negotiations. It is on the point of the red lines, which the Government in their response to our report have so far sidestepped, that I would particularly welcome the views of the noble and learned Lord on the Front Bench in the wind-up. I commend the report to the House.