Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and Lord Lloyd of Berwick

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I support the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It covers the same ground as my amendment, which would have amended Clause 6 by substituting civil standards of proof for “obviously flawed”. I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said.

The great advantage of the balance of probabilities as a test is that it is flexible. At the more serious end, it approaches the criminal standard. There could hardly be a more serious finding to make against an individual, as has been said often today, than that he has been engaged in terrorist activity. Therefore, the burden of proof in these cases ought to approach the criminal standard. There is not the slightest justification for a burden of proof which is less than the civil standard.

With one exception there is no precedent that I can find in English law for a serious finding, such as is involved here, being made on the basis of reasonable belief. In the earlier debate I referred to many instances of prevention orders being made by the civil courts, some in serious cases such as sexual harm and so on, and in every case the burden of proof has been the balance of probabilities, and so it should be here.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, Clause 4 of the Bill indicates that the finding which will be made in relation to a TPIM is that an individual has been involved in,

“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”;

or in,

“conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in”,

such conduct.

This is a very grave finding. As I suggested earlier, it is a finding which justifies a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities rather than reasonable belief. I support the amendment for the reasons that have already been set out.