Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Pannick

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I also have an amendment in this group. It may be convenient if I say what I have to say now. In many ways, Clause 4, which we are now dealing with, is the oddest of these three clauses. As drafted, it was strongly criticised by the Fire Brigades Union, St John Ambulance and the Red Cross, among others. To take the instance of the Fire Brigades Union, the clause goes directly contrary to advice that it has given for many years to people involved in a fire: to get out of the way of the fire as quickly as they can and to stay out. If they intervene to try to rescue somebody, then they are only likely to put in greater danger the firemen, who will have to come to their rescue as well.

This was pointed out as a difficulty—indeed, as a serious objection—in the other place, but no notice was taken of that criticism until at a very late stage in this House, when the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, gave notice of his amendment to leave out the last 11 words of the clause. Leaving out the last 11 words of this clause is undoubtedly a great improvement, but leaving out half a clause to save the rest of a clause is an unusual thing to do. It only demonstrates that the clause, like the rest of the Bill, was never properly thought out in the first place. In Committee I suggested that it looked like a clause drafted on the back of an envelope. I now think that that may be going too far in its favour. It must surely have occurred to someone at some stage that a clause that protects someone who takes no thought for his own safety, but does not protect someone who takes some thought for his own safety—that, as it was put elegantly, as always, by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick,

“protects the instinctive hero but not the thoughtful hero”—[Official Report, 18/11/14; col. 416.]

—is surely inherently ridiculous. Be that as it may, the objection to Clause 4 is essentially the same as that to Clause 2. The substance of Clause 4, as it will stand if the noble Lord’s amendment is accepted, is already covered by Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006.

It is difficult to imagine a,

“person … acting heroically … to assist an individual in danger”,

who is not by that very act engaged in a “desirable activity” as envisaged by Section 1 of the Compensation Act. If so, this clause adds literally nothing to the existing law. If the noble Lord in his reply can think of a single example where the point I have made is not valid because something would be covered by this clause and not by Section 1 of the Compensation Act, I hope he will tell us. In the mean time, I submit that it adds nothing and should be rejected on that ground. In due course I will move my amendment too.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, there is a further reason why Clause 4 is pointless and that is, of course, because it adds nothing to Clause 2. It is very difficult to understand in what circumstances a person is acting heroically in an emergency when they are not also,

“acting for the benefit of society or any of its members”.

Perhaps the Minister can tell the House of a theoretical case that would not fall within Clause 2 that falls within Clause 4. There is no doubt that the removal of the final words of Clause 4 is a distinct improvement. We must be grateful for small mercies.

I have a further concern that when courts have to apply Clause 4 there is ample room for no doubt lengthy debate as to what is meant by “heroically” and “emergency”, neither of which is defined in the Bill.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Pannick

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support everything that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill. I add simply one point. Amendment 7 would enact what was the practice prior to 1997, except of course that the review prior to that date was conducted by the Secretary of State and not by the independent Parole Board.

I am concerned that there is one reason and one reason only why this Government, and indeed their predecessor, removed the right to a review after 25 years and refuse to reinstate it. The reason is that, as a matter of law, such a review could not lawfully be undertaken by a Minister. The Strasbourg court has repeatedly stated that an independent person must make decisions on release. I would welcome the Minister’s comments on this, but I anticipate that the Secretary of State would be quite content for there to be a review by her or by her successors after 25 years but what she cannot accept is a review by an independent Parole Board. However, as the Strasbourg court has repeatedly stated—and it is surely right—decisions on release should be made by an independent person or body and not by a politician, however wise or experienced she may be.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons that have already been given, I support the amendment and I do so all the more willingly because it is very similar to an amendment which I tabled two years ago when we were debating the LASPO Bill. A very significant difference between the two amendments is that I thought that the review should take place after 30 years rather than 25 years. My reason was that 30 years is one of the starting points for determining tariffs under Schedule 21. A defendant with a 30-year starting point and no mitigating or aggravating features would look forward to a review after 30 years but not before. It would not particularly make sense that a whole life prisoner should have a right of review after 25 years when one with a 30-year starting point would have to wait for 30 years, but that is a small detail.

The debate on my amendment took place on 9 February 2012, at col. 390. There were 12 speakers on that occasion. All, except the noble Lord, Lord McNally, supported the amendment. The only reason which the noble Lord gave for not supporting the amendment was that the public was not yet ready for it and, for that reason, the other place would not accept it and there was no point in it passing through this House. During my reply, he said that it would be easier to reach unanimity if we could arrange a joint meeting of both Houses. That is exactly what has now happened in the sense that we have the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which includes Members from the House of Commons and the House of Lords. So far as I know, there was no dissentient voice from any Member of the Commons. Perhaps we may put that objection on one side.

Until 2003, there was no doubt that exceptional progress in prison qualified a lifer serving a whole life tariff for a review after 25 years. Somehow, that right was overlooked when the 2003 Act was being pushed through Parliament. There was no evidence that I know of that the right of review after 25 years was causing resentment or was in any way unpopular with the public. Certainly, those serving these sentences had done nothing that I know of to forfeit the right which they then had. For my part, I cannot believe that anyone in government made a conscious decision to remove this right. It seems almost inconceivable that they would have done, but there we are. All we seek to do in this amendment is to restore to these prisoners a right which they have lost, so far as I am concerned, for no apparent reason.

There are other equally strong arguments to support the amendment. Prisoners serving tariffs of 20 or 30 years are entitled to a review after they have completed their tariffs. It gives them light at the end of the tunnel and provides them with a reason for making progress if they can. In those cases, the review is justified both on practical grounds and on humanitarian grounds. Will the Minister say why those reasons precisely do not apply to those serving whole life sentences? One might think that it should apply all the more so. It cannot be that they are being deprived of this right for some symbolic reason, but if that is the case I would be very glad to hear about it.

I could understand if the Minister said, like the noble Lord, Lord McNally, that this amendment would never be accepted at the other end of the corridor, but I would have no sympathy with him at all if he said that we should wait until the Supreme Court has decided the appeal in McLoughlin. The decision in Vinter is clear: a life prisoner is entitled to know at the start of his sentence what he has to do to qualify for a review after 25 years. It is equally clear that exceptional progress in prison would be a qualifying ground. But Section 30 of the 1997 Act provides that a prisoner can be released only on “compassionate grounds”. A prisoner who has earned his review by making exceptional progress is not being released on compassionate grounds in any ordinary sense of that term. Whatever the Supreme Court may say, we will need primary legislation to change the word “compassionate” or make clear what the word “compassionate” means. I would have thought that we would need a different word or an additional word. That will require primary legislation. I see no reason to wait until the Supreme Court has expressed a view. Indeed, if we had the primary legislation now, maybe there would be no need for a hearing at all. We should, in my view, grasp the nettle now. That is why I support the amendment.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Pannick

Monday 10th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I remember well when the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 was going through this House that I was much concerned by Section 76. I have always thought that the piecemeal amendment of the common law by legislation was a mistake unless such amendment was preceded by a report from, in the old days, the Criminal Law Revision Committee or, nowadays, the Law Commission. I suggest that there are two grave disadvantages in the sort of piecemeal amendment we are now asked to perform. First, it deprives the development in the common law of the flexibility that the common law provides as circumstances change. Once you put it in statute it is in statute, and if it is to be changed at all it has to be changed by statute. Secondly, it may often be initiated as the result of a particular campaign—this may be an example of that—without regard to the wider context.

I did not in fact oppose Section 76 when it went through the House because it at least did not in any way seek to change the law on self-defence. That is made amply clear by Section 9 itself. Section 76 was in some ways an odd provision because it refers both in subsection (1) to the test being one of reasonableness and in subsection (6) to the test being one of disproportion—although those two things might be thought to be opposite sides of exactly the same coin. That will not be so from now on because of the addition of the word “grossly” before the word “disproportionate”. For that reason Section 9, which made it clear that the common law was not going to be changed, has now itself been amended to show that, in this respect, the common law is being changed. We are thus now doing exactly what I feared would be the result if we stratified the law as we did in 2008.

What is being done is defended on the basis that it is very difficult for the householder, in the agony of the moment, to make a nice judgment as to what is reasonable or is not. That has always been the law, as my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf has made clear. Speaking from my own experience, I have always stressed that very point. In that respect, this will not change the law but it will, in fact, change the law in the way that I have described. Just as judges have got used to directing juries in accordance with Section 76, they will now have to change tack, which they should not be required to do.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the Minister said that householders should not be subjected to criminal liability because of the use of force which may appear disproportionate in the cold light of day, and that the amendment is designed to redress the balance. It is very important to identify precisely what the balance is at the moment and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, have said, the law is very clear on this subject. The official specimen directions to a jury—what judges up and down the land actually tell jurors on this subject—are contained in the Crown Court Bench book which says:

“When considering whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable do bear in mind that the person who is defending himself cannot be expected in the heat of the moment to weigh precisely the exact amount of defensive action which is necessary; and in this regard, the more serious the attack (or threatened attack) upon him, the more difficult his situation will be. If, in your judgment, the defendant was or may have been in a situation in which he found it necessary to defend himself and he did no more than what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary to defend himself, that would be very strong evidence that the amount of force used by him was reasonable”.

This provides all the protection that the householder needs or, indeed, deserves. The Minister did not refer to any cases of unjust convictions, or even unjust prosecutions that should not have been brought. The highest that the Minister put it in his opening remarks is that such cases “might conceivably” occur in the future. This is surely the weakest basis for proposing law reform that your Lordships will have heard for some time. Furthermore, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, that these amendments are inconsistent with our obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights to protect the right to life. It is one thing to allow the householder to use proportionate force and to assess that on the basis of what they honestly and reasonably understand the facts to be at the time they act in circumstances of shock and distress. It surely is a very different matter for Parliament to authorise the use of disproportionate force.

With great respect, I cannot understand why the Opposition Front Bench is not opposing this amendment in the Division Lobby today, despite the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, eloquently explaining that the amendment would cause confusion and nothing positive. It is all very well to treat this as a Second Reading debate but it is the only opportunity that this House will have to oppose the amendment. I hope that the Opposition will reconsider their position. I am sure that many noble Lords would join them in the Lobby if a Division were called.

This amendment is unnecessary, unprincipled and inconsistent with our international obligations. I hope that the Government will think again.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 4th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

I am sure it is true that all Supreme Court justices—particularly the 11 men, if it is those to whom the noble and learned Lord is referring—have family care commitments. However, the same point can be made about all senior men in all other professions. We all have family care commitments. The difficulty, as the noble and learned Lord knows, is that the family care commitments that address the needs of children and, perhaps more relevantly at the senior levels of the judiciary, aged parents, tend in our society to fall on women rather than men. That is a social fact.

I say to those who support the amendment that I entirely understand the points they make about practical difficulties but it is important not to exaggerate the problems. Judges regularly take time off from judging to do other things. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, mentioned that judges are regularly appointed to head inquiries. Supreme Court justices sometimes take four to six weeks off to sit on the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong. One could give many other examples. The idea that the system cannot—

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Is that not the perfect example of what one means by flexible working as opposed to part-time working? They are not currently appointed part-time, but that is possible because of flexibility. That is what we should be aiming for.

[Lord Pannick]

My answer to the noble and learned Lord is that if the legal system is able to accommodate this type of problem—that judges regularly take time off to carry out other activities—then, like all other professions, it ought to be able to accommodate a female judge taking time off on a regular basis for domestic reasons. It remains to be seen whether allowing part-time judges to sit will result in more women judges at high levels. These powers are permissive, not obligatory, and no woman or man—although one anticipates that it is likely to be women who are so appointed—will be appointed unless it is practical.

My primary objection to these amendments is based on the factor to which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, referred—which is the message that is sent out—although I arrive at a different conclusion. I suggest that it would be a very unfortunate message indeed for the law to confer an exemption for the senior judiciary from one of the most important means of enabling talented women to rise to senior positions in all professions. Watering down the part-time provisions in this Bill would wrongly suggest, wrongly, that the senior judiciary is not serious about doing all that it reasonably can to assist talented women to be appointed at senior levels. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Pannick

Tuesday 8th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Experience shows that where two or three lawyers are gathered together one is sure to disagree. I entirely agree with every word that has fallen from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I am afraid inevitably means that, with great respect, I venture to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. He suggested that the advantage of his proposals was flexibility. I suggest that the disadvantage is an absence of simplicity. I can see no possible advantage in having a double decision process in a matter such as this. On the face of it, one would think it must increase the likelihood of an application for judicial review. In any event, the question should not be decided simply by that—it was a strong argument at one stage. But now we have before us not the original amendment proposed by the Convenor, the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, which in its way was a very good amendment, but an amendment from the Government containing everything that was in that amendment, which, to my mind, is essential. A public inquiry as such is not essential. A public hearing is, and that is what is promised.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I share the Government’s objective here, which is to make this process more efficient. At the moment it is not efficient. It is too slow, too cumbersome and there are too many lawyers involved. I therefore share the Government’s objective. However, I also share the concerns so eloquently expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The Government will abolish any effective inquiry and will introduce a procedure which will ensure that the decision-maker—and here I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, that there is only one decision-maker on the opposition amendment: the Boundary Commission—does not hear the oral representations that have been made. The person who does hear those oral representations has no role in communicating to the decision-maker any advice on what he or she thinks of what he or she has just heard. It is absolutely inevitable that the introduction of such a procedure will exacerbate rather than diminish the sense of grievance that has led people to make representations in the first place.

Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 6th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Perhaps I may be permitted to start the ball rolling before my noble friend Lord Pannick speaks. I am sure that your Lordships are waiting to hear his views, but as I did not have an opportunity to take part in the Second Reading debate, perhaps I may express my views on the amendments first.

The government amendments were published only on Monday, so I saw them only yesterday. We have not had long to reflect on them, but one thing that is clear is that the Government have listened to what was said on Second Reading, they have studied carefully what was said in the excellent report of the Constitution Committee and they may even have had a preview of what the Home Office review will say on the subject. On any view, the Government have kept an open mind on the matter up till now, which should surely be a subject for congratulation. If I may say so from the safety of the Cross-Benches, that makes a welcome change.

The amendments now proposed are so fundamental that at this stage we need another Second Reading debate, particularly in relation to what is proposed in the appeal to the High Court on fact as well as on law. That is a fundamental change of huge importance, and we will come to that later.

On the matters covered by this group of amendments, I start with the new interim designation order. That seems to be the logical starting point, although of course it will come later chronologically as we go through the Bill. There may be those in the Committee who will object to “reasonable suspicion” in relation to the interim designation order. Some may prefer “reasonable belief” in that context, as well as in the context of the final designation order. I do not share that view. Reading the new clause took me back to what I wrote in 1996 on page 86 of my report. I have many spare copies of that report at home if anyone would like to see one. That was of course long before 9/11 and long before Resolution 1373. I said then that there should, exceptionally, be a power to freeze assets before the suspect is arrested or charged. It should be open to the police to go before a judge ex parte—that is, without notice to the defendant—and satisfy him that they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the defendant is about to commit a terrorist offence. I recognised then that that would be a radical step to take but I said that it was justified because of the paramount need to neutralise terrorist funding before the terrorist offence is committed.

Therefore, I have no difficulty at all with “reasonable suspicion” in relation to the interim designation order. The problem as I see it is somewhat different. If the designee, if I can call him that, is able to go before the judge as soon as he has notice of the order, as is now intended, would it not be altogether more sensible for the judge to make the order in the first place? That is how it is done in other branches of the criminal law, so why not here? What is the reason for the Treasury making the order itself rather than applying in the ordinary way, with which we are all familiar, to the judge? So much for interim designation orders.

I turn to the final designation order. Of course I welcome the change from “suspect” to “believe”, although in practice there may not be quite as much difference between those two things as is sometimes supposed. The real problem here, as indeed in the case of interim designation orders, is that, a fortiori, if we are to impose a permanent designation on the individual, we surely need something much more solid than either suspicion or belief. We need fact. Before we impose a final designation order or final freezing order on all his assets, the defendant must surely have been arrested or charged with some criminal offence. That was certainly my view in 1996 and it is certainly Liberty’s view today in its, as always, excellent briefing paper. However, more important than either of those, it was the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, in Ahmed. In that case, he referred to paragraph 1(c) of Resolution 1373 and then went on as follows:

“Thus what the Resolution requires is the freezing of the assets of criminals. The natural way of giving effect to this requirement would be by freezing the assets of those convicted of or charged with the offences in question. This would permit the freezing of assets pending trial on a criminal charge, but would make the long-term freezing of assets dependent upon conviction of the relevant criminal offence to the criminal standard of proof”.

As I understood the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, he does not accept that, and he does not accept that that is the view formed by the Supreme Court. But with great respect, it seems to me that that was its view. It comes to this. The noble Lord has gone a very long way to meeting all the problems that we raised on Second Reading and that have been raised elsewhere. But I ask him to go one step further. Can he agree between now and Report that the final orders should be made by a judge on the application of the Treasury? If so, he will have my complete support on that occasion. And more importantly, it will be in line with what I believe was the intention of the Supreme Court in Ahmed.

[Lord Pannick]

The reasonable suspicion criterion was a feature of the Bill that caused concern both in your Lordships’ House and elsewhere. Concern was expressed during passage of the temporary provisions Bill earlier this year; expressed by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee; and expressed by a number of your Lordships in Committee. The concern, quite simply, was that the Government should not enjoy the power to freeze a person’s assets, with all the damage and inconvenience that that involves, unless they have at least a reasonable belief that the person concerned is involved or associated with terrorist activity. That is why I tabled Amendment 3, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has added her name. It would substitute reasonable belief for reasonable suspicion.

I am very pleased that the Minister has listened to the arguments. He has accepted that, other than for a temporary period of 30 days, assets should be frozen only when the Government believe, on reasonable grounds, that the individual is involved with terrorist activity. I am sure that all noble Lords will be grateful to the Minister and his team for their response to the expressions of concern, and for the care with which they have drafted and presented these amendments. For my part, I accept that it is appropriate for the Government to have an interim power to freeze assets for a period of 30 days simply on the basis of reasonable suspicion. I accept that because there may be cases when they have only limited information and reasonably wish to act to prevent dissipation of the assets while investigations are concluded. A period of 30 days seems a reasonable time for that interim exercise. Of course an interim order, although undoubtedly very inconvenient for the person concerned, will not have the same draconian effect as a freezing order that continues for a lengthy period. I welcome the government amendments.

There are three points of detail in relation to the amendments in this group. First, it would be desirable for Amendment 29—the new clause which confers power on the Treasury—to make an interim designation to specify the purposes for which the power may be exercised. I am concerned that the drafting does not identify the specific mischief that the interim designation for 30 days is designed to meet. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause simply repeats the substantive criteria for a final designation save that the criterion for the interim designation is reasonable suspicion rather than reasonable belief.