(11 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I cannot begin to emulate the eloquence of the speech that we have just heard. I too regret that I was not present when this matter was discussed in Committee on 9 January but, after reading Hansard, it is clear to me that the debate was of an exceptionally high standard, particularly the contributions of my noble friends Lady Campbell of Surbiton and Lord Low of Dalston. Unfortunately, my noble friend Lord Low cannot be here today; I cannot begin to take his place, but I agree with everything he said in that debate.
There is another person who cannot be here today for a different reason. He was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, as one of those who led the way in this area of the law in the 1990s and long before that. I refer, of course, to the late Lord Morris of Manchester. It is not difficult for me—or I suspect, anybody else in the House today—to imagine what Lord Morris’s reaction to the proposed repeal of Section 3 would have been. I do not doubt for one moment that he would have regarded it as a serious backwards step, and he would have said so in his usual trenchant terms.
I want to deal first with the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, as a lawyer—I am sure that his heart was not really in it—that if we leave out Section 3 we are losing nothing. Secondly, I want to comment on the reasons given by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, at the end of her reply for the Government’s decision to repeal Section 3. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, gave two reasons for his view. The first was that Section 3 was purely aspirational, so it would make no difference if it were repealed. It contained nothing, he said, that could be enforced in a court of law.
However, if that argument were correct, it surely proves too much. If Section 3 is purely aspirational, so, surely, are Sections 8 and 9. How would the noble Lord enforce in a court of law the duty under Section 8 to promote understanding of the importance of equality and diversity? How would he enforce in a court of law the commission’s duty under Section 9 to promote understanding of the importance of human rights? If the legal argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, were correct, it would surely mean that we should repeal not only Section 3 but Sections 8 and 9, which would leave us with absolutely nothing. Of course, the truth is that the argument is misconceived. Recent legislation is littered with examples of duties which cannot be enforced in a court of law but serve, nevertheless, a very useful purpose. For example, Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides that:
“This Act does not … affect … the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law”.
How is that to be enforced in a court of law? However, it serves an extremely useful purpose.
Another example that occurred to me is Section 1 of the Climate Change Act, which provides that:
“It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline”.
How—perhaps I should say, when—is that duty, clearly stated by Parliament, to become enforceable: in 2048, 2049, or when? Therefore, with respect, that argument carries very little weight. For all those reasons, I suggest, with the utmost delicacy, that the legal argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, should not deter us in any way from supporting this amendment.
However, the noble Lord had a second argument. He said that there is nothing in Section 3 which is not also contained in Sections 8 and 9, so Section 3 is in effect otiose. I suggest that he is wrong, but suppose for a moment that he is right: if Section 3 adds nothing to Sections 8 and 9, how is that consistent with the Government’s argument all along that Section 3 is too broad? As the noble Lord, Lord Low, pointed out, the Government simply cannot have it both ways. I suggest that he was right. In truth, Section 3 does indeed add something which is not in Sections 8 or 9, and something of the very greatest importance. It provides for the first time in legislation the unifying link between equality and other fundamental human rights. This was the point made by Sir Bob Hepple in his memorandum, which I hope the noble Baroness has read, and which has already been referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. That deserves an answer and I hope that it will get one. Indeed, the assertion of a unifying principle in Section 3 was surely one of the main objectives of the 2006 Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, himself pointed out when he was promoting the Bill. Therefore, I again suggest, as delicately as I can, that the noble Lord might in this instance have done better to follow his heart than his head.
My Lords, I was not intending to speak and it is a misfortune for the House that I now do so, with extraordinary brevity. When I joined this House almost 20 years ago, Lord Alexander of Weedon said to me, “Remember, Anthony, that the House of Lords is not a court of appeal, it is a jury. Try, if you can, to speak to a jury”. I totally disagree with almost everything that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, has said today, and would do so in a court of appeal. However, when we are dealing with a jury whose sentiment has already been powerfully expressed, I do not think that it would do the slightest good if I were to explain exactly why I continue to hold the view that I did previously.
By the way, I did not promote the 2006 Act, but I certainly took part in debates on it and I did not oppose Section 3. However, being a practical person—I am no philosopher—I shall concentrate in these debates on three practical things: one is caste discrimination, the second is the abolition of the questionnaire procedure, and the third is the relationship between the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the commission. I hope that I shall not speak on anything else.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeCould the noble Lord just inform me, although I am sure I ought to know this: is Fox’s Libel Act still on the statute book?