All 1 Debates between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Elton

House of Lords: Reform

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Elton
Wednesday 22nd June 2011

(13 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Lloyd of Berwick Portrait Lord Lloyd of Berwick
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My Lords, it is very difficult to follow a speech such as we have just heard. I say at once that I am against a wholly elected House. Apart from anything else, it would mean losing the Cross Benches, a point made very powerfully this morning by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames. I think most of us would agree that the Cross Benches are, in the immortal words of 1066 and All That, “a good thing”, not because we are in any way better than any other Members—of course not—but because we are independent not only of party but of each other, as we have seen very often during the last few weeks; indeed, we will see it shortly when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, follows me. He and I share a room and I know that he strongly disagrees with everything that I am about to say.

I am not only against a wholly elected House; I am against a wholly appointed House, for two main reasons. First, it would give too much power to the seven members of the Appointments Commission just as the present system of appointing Peers gives much too much power to the Prime Minister.

Lord Elton Portrait Lord Elton
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Is the noble and learned Lord aware of the fascinating fact that this House was more than 50 per cent appointed in the regime of Tony Blair, when the Government suffered the greatest reverse of any time in their history since the Second World War?

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Portrait Lord Lloyd of Berwick
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I am not sure that that answers the point that I am against appointment by the Prime Minister. I would also be against appointment by so small a body as the seven eminent men who are apparently proposed. To have seven people appoint the whole of one Chamber of a bicameral Parliament seems to me to be wrong in principle.

Secondly, it would mean that the voice of the people had not been heard in choosing any of the Members of this House. The noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, argued yesterday that the voice of people is heard, and often heard, in this Chamber. That is true and I entirely agree with her. However, it is not heard in choosing the Members of this Chamber, which is a very different thing. That was the great point made yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown. Perhaps even more relevant, it was the great point made by the royal commission under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham.

The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, in his measured speech this morning, was not against reform but he said that we should take it slowly and even think of appointing a royal commission to take the matter forward. Surely he was forgetting that we have already had a royal commission. Its membership could hardly have been more distinguished—eight were Members of this House out of a total of 12, I believe. They took a mass of evidence, both expert and non-expert. May I say in passing that I am really surprised that so little has been said so far in any of the speeches that I have heard about the work that that royal commission undertook? I think that the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, himself was the only person who has mentioned it, and he was far too modest about the merit of the proposals in that royal commission. It reached very clear conclusions, one of which was that a significant number of Members should be elected to represent the regions—the north-east, the north-west, Scotland, Wales and so on. There are 12 regions in all. That seems a very good idea. The commission went on to consider various models of how it might be achieved; under model B, there were to be 87 elected Members to represent the regions, or 15 per cent of the total, while under model C it was somewhat more. A majority of the royal commission favoured model B, and so would I.

I am in favour of a partially elected House. There are two main arguments against having any elected Members at all. First, it might lead to friction between elected and non-elected Members; secondly, it might lead to friction between this House and the other place—and perhaps even call in question the conventions that we all know. The royal commission dealt with each of those objections at considerable length and rejected them both, and so would I. Of course, a wholly elected House would challenge the primacy of the other place. That almost goes without saying. That of course is what is proposed, but it is not what the royal commission proposed and not what I favour.

Since in a debate of this kind, one should always come down and say what one does actually want, perhaps I can say what I would like to see and to have considered by the hardworking committee that will consider all these matters. I would like to see a House of 400 Members—rather more than the 300 proposed in the Bill. There is more than enough work for 400 Members to do. Of those 400, 320 would be appointed by the new Appointments Commission, of whom 100 would be Cross-Benchers. The remaining 80 would be elected by proportional representation to represent the 12 regions, as recommended by the Wakeham commission. I am easy as to the form of proportional representation, as long as independent Members are not discouraged from standing. They would serve for two terms, renewable; they would not be eligible for election thereafter to the House of Commons, so the House would not become a stepping stone for ambitious politicians. All Members, whether appointed or elected, would be paid the same salary, which would be taxable.

I accept that of course what I am in favour of is a compromise between what is proposed in the Bill, which I do not like, and the wholly appointed House favoured by very many. But a compromise may yet become necessary if we are to reach a consensus with the views held in the other place, whatever they may turn out to be. I would not expect such a compromise to be popular in either place, but then compromises are never popular until they become inevitable, and often not then.