Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Baroness Mallalieu

Thursday 9th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I say at once that Clause 114 seems to be wholly pointless. The only explanation for it that I can imagine is that it was a quid pro quo for the abolition of the indefinite sentence for public protection in Clause 113, in case somebody should say that the Government were getting soft on crime. Since the official position of the Opposition is not to oppose Clause 113—I am very glad about that—I suggest that the Government might now look again at dropping Clause 114.

In brief, the clause states that if a person commits an offence for which he serves 10 years in prison, and then commits another offence for which he might expect 10 years in prison, the judge must give him a life sentence unless this would be unjust. It has been called a mandatory life sentence, but of course it is nothing of the sort. The clause explains that the judge has discretion to do what is just, so there is no “must” about it. So what on earth is the point of Clause 114?

Considering the sort of facts that might give rise to a life sentence under Clause 114, the judge would almost certainly have a life sentence in mind anyway. If he does impose a life sentence, Clause 114 serves no purpose. If he does not, because it would be unjust to do so, Clause 114 adds nothing. Have the Government made any estimate of the number of people who will get a life sentence under Clause 114 who would not be given a life sentence anyway under the existing law? There is no point in replicating existing law with ever more offences.

Is Clause 114 perhaps meant to be a deterrent? Let us consider that for a moment and imagine a man coming to the end of his 10-year sentence in prison. How will he hear about Clause 114? Will he be warned by his solicitor, or will he hear about it from a fellow prisoner who is something of a barrack-room lawyer? The idea that this would ever act as a deterrent is ludicrous.

In debating a previous amendment, I warned of the dangers of Parliament becoming too closely involved in the sentencing process. At one extreme, it results in the sort of sentencing complexity of which we have plenty of evidence in the Bill. At the other, one finds clauses such as Clause 114 which, as far as I can see, serve no purpose at all and simply clutter up the statute book.

[Baroness Mallalieu]

My Lords, I support the noble and learned Lord. “Pointless” is a very good description of Clause 114. It is pure political posturing. That is the trouble in the area of criminal law; there has been too much of this going on in recent years, and to little effect. Why on earth can we not leave the detailed business of sentencing in cases such as this, with the guidelines that already exist, to the people who hear the evidence and see the cases: namely, the judges?

We have seen far too much interference with the criminal law. As a practitioner, I go along to courts and am asked by people in the robing room, “How on earth did you let this happen? Didn’t you speak up and point out that it’s a waste of time or has consequences that are totally adverse to the interests of justice?”. Well, I am speaking up, but without a great deal of hope that my words will fall other than on stony ground. Surely we can avoid, at the very least, complicating the statute book with clauses such as this which do not do anything.