Health and Social Care Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Lester of Herne Hill
Main Page: Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Lester of Herne Hill's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in my view, the Human Rights Act applies already to the matters raised in this amendment. The reason for that is fairly straightforward. As your Lordships know, when the Human Rights Act was passed, many functions previously exercised by public authorities were by that time exercised by private individuals and companies. Therefore, the Human Rights Act contained the provision that public authorities should include those in respect of whom certain of their functions are functions of a public nature. That was deliberately adopted to deal with the situation where the public service was in fact given by a private individual or a private company that was not itself a public authority. For the purpose of enforcing the Human Rights Act, bodies that had as any of their functions a public function were responsible in respect of it as if they were a public body.
The case of YL has been referred to. That was not a health case but a case under the National Assistance Act where the local authority had put the lady into a private home. A majority of the House of Lords held that that was not a public function in respect of the private home. It was of course a public function in respect of the local authority, Birmingham City Council, but not in respect of the private home. The Government of the day decided to reverse that decision, not because they thought that the principles of the Human Rights Act should be altered but because they believed that the outcome in that case was wrong. That is what has happened in relation to that type of case, leaving untouched the general principles settled in the Human Rights Act itself.
At the time, the then Government decided to have a consultation on whether the Human Rights Act needed to be amended in some way to deal with these situations. The result of that consultation, so far as I understand, was that nothing needed to be done. The Government put forward an amendment in respect of the YL decision, whose introduction in this House was, I think, in the hands of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. In accordance with what the Government thought about the matter she said:
“Therefore, it remains the Government’s view that, in general, the provision of publicly arranged health and social care should be considered a function of a public nature. The Government will therefore continue to treat those exercising such functions as being subject to the Human Rights Act”—
and ever since that has been the position. She went on:
“I reiterate one important point from the letters. It remains the Government’s firm view that independent providers of NHS care under the National Health Service Act are, as the law currently stands, exercising a function of a public nature”.—[Official Report, 22/05/08; col. GC 632.]
That is to say that independent providers operating under the health service were carrying out a function of a public nature, and therefore the protection of the Human Rights Act applied.
In YL, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, who was one of the minority, expressed the matter in this way: he thought the answer to the question in that case was clear. Unfortunately, not everybody sitting in the case thought the same, but that was his answer. He said:
“When the 1998 Act was passed, it was very well known that a number of functions formerly carried out by public authorities were now carried out by private bodies. Section 6(3)(b) of the 1998 Act was clearly drafted with this well-known fact in mind. The performance by private body A by arrangement with public body B, and perhaps at the expense of B, of what would undoubtedly be a public function if carried out by B is, in my opinion, precisely the case”,
which here is covered,
“by Section 6(3)(b)”.
In his opinion, that was the case in YL. Parliament has gone along with that in the amendment and has said that the minority in the YL case were correct. In particular, it has been affirmed that this applies to the Public Health Act.
Some of the situations that have been mentioned by those who support the amendment have occurred in private residential homes. That does not mean that the Act does not apply; it means that for some reason the Act was not observed in these homes. Sadly, that can happen anywhere in relation to the Human Rights Act. It does not mean that it does not apply; it just means that it has not been carried out.
This amendment is supposed to clarify the law. Your Lordships will notice that its heading states that it applies to certain parts of the health service: it is not in any way a universal provision. The heading states:
“Human Rights Act 1998: provision of certain personal care and health care services to be public function”.
It refers to certain services, not all. I submit that that applies to all in the light of the statute as I have explained it.
As I say, the amendment seeks to clarify the law and close a loophole. Unfortunately, when you start to investigate particular cases of this kind, you are apt to get into areas of risk. What happens if a lady who is getting personal care is staying with her daughter and is not in her own private home? This amendment would not apply to that situation. This is a very difficult area. Those who originally framed the Human Rights Act bore that in mind, and the Act was very carefully framed by the Labour Government of that day. My noble and learned friend Lord Irvine of Lairg was extremely careful in selecting the language that was used. As I said, in 2008, when the amendment was made in respect of the National Assistance Act, the position in relation to the health service was very clearly restated. I submit that this amendment is unnecessary, undesirable and risks not covering the whole of the National Health Service provision, as, indeed, it does not attempt to do.
My Lords, it is a privilege to act as junior counsel to a leader as distinguished as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. His speech makes it unnecessary for me to speak for long. I respectfully agree with everything that he has said but wish to add a few further points. I am very sorry to disappoint so many of my friends from civil society and their representatives whose eloquent speeches we have heard today. However, I do not think that there is a loophole and, if there were, I do not think that this amendment would remove uncertainty; it would, in fact, increase it.
I am particularly glad to say this in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Wills. He will remember that he was Minister when I was trying, as a GOAT in the Brown Government—noble Lords will know what that means—to persuade his colleagues that we should do something about the YL problem by way of further legislation. Unfortunately, the previous Government were unable to muster support for that and the present coalition Government have given that general problem to the Commission on a Bill of Rights, on which I serve, as one of the issues to consider in the context of whether there should be a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom. Therefore, the general problem is on the agenda of that commission. When it reports by the end of this year, the Government can then take stock of what to do about it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Low, indicated in his completely accurate account of some of the background, the origin of the problem lies in the majority decision of the Law Lords in the YL case. I believe that the majority in that case asked themselves the wrong question. Instead of asking how to apply the test in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act to cover private care homes, they said to themselves—and made clear—that it was somehow unfair to place greater obligations upon public sector bodies than private sector bodies. I think that was completely the wrong question and they were very bold in deciding not to follow Lord Bingham and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, whose speeches I found completely convincing in logic but also, more importantly, completely in harmony with the intentions of the legislation when it was enacted in 1998.
My Lords, in supporting the amendment, I hope that it might be helpful to your Lordships’ House if I were to provide more background from the previous Government, for whom I shared ministerial responsibility in this area, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, alluded to. I am privileged to follow him on this, because I have found so often in our past relationships that we share many common objectives but do not always agree on the best way of getting to them.
As we have heard, the problem that the amendment seeks to address arose unexpectedly from a decision in the House of Lords, narrowly decided by a majority of three to two, which removed from vulnerable people basic protections that until then had been widely assumed to be entrenched. The arguments for addressing this problem have been compellingly outlined by other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. These arguments were clear to the previous Government. As the Minister responsible for human rights, I felt that the YL decision did not reflect what Parliament had intended. I will not go into that because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has set out cogently exactly why that is the case. I felt that it would be necessary to legislate to put that beyond dispute.
However, as always, it was necessary within government to agree on the scope of any change and to find an appropriate legislative vehicle. As your Lordships well know, this can often take some considerable time. In 2008, the Health and Social Care Bill, as it then was, was the first opportunity that the previous Government could find to make some progress in putting right the consequences of the YL case. I will come back to this, but here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that this was only a start and did not address the more fundamental problem that the case had thrown up. The change in the 2008 Act was narrow in scope. As we have heard, the changes were limited to residential care services. They did not address the status of health services or home care services that were contracted out by the NHS or local authorities, and contracting out is only likely to increase under the legislation being brought in by this Government. The previous Government ran out of time in making a settled decision on how best to go further. Sadly the noble Lord, Lord Lester, had decided to stop being a GOAT, even before that process was concluded.
Therefore, in the light of all this and the YL judgment, I am not sure why the noble Earl seems to believe that all care from all providers is now covered beyond dispute by the Human Rights Act. I should be grateful if the Minister could set out in detail why he believes that advice to the opposite effect—including, as I understand it, from counsel to the HRC—is wrong. Why is that advice wrong?
The Government also appear to be concerned that accepting the amendment might cause legal uncertainty in other areas outside health and social care. I understand these arguments. I heard them many times when I was in government, but such bureaucratic caution could be extended to arguing against ever legislating for anything. However, in this particular case, if the Government are seriously worried, I suggest to the noble Earl that they may be too late. The 2008 Act has already opened that door. The Government’s suggestion that all these services are already covered, whatever the legal status of that commitment by the Government, has opened the door still wider. The Minister would therefore be unwise to rely on their line of argument, if that is what he is tempted to do in resisting the amendment.
Can the noble Lord explain what is meant by “certain personal care”, which is unclear, and what is meant by a “health care service”, which is not defined in the Bill? He is saying that we need it clarified. I do not understand how that can be done.
I am very sorry; the microphone was not working for the beginning of that. If the noble Lord was asking a specific question that he actually wants me to answer, I would be very grateful if he could repeat it.
I am asking whether the noble Lord has any answer to my point and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about how the references to certain personal care and a healthcare service, which is not defined anywhere in the Bill, will resolve uncertainty rather than create greater uncertainty.
I understand that fundamental point. That does not argue against the Minister rejecting this amendment in principle. If he believes that that point in itself will create uncertainty, it is very open to the Government to redraft the amendment and specify it more precisely. I would be very content to support this amendment if the Minister said precisely that—that he would accept the amendment, subject to revising and clarifying that particular point. There will always be some areas of ambiguity in any legislation. That is why the courts exist and that is how the noble and learned Lords in this place have made their careers. That does not concern me very much. I would be perfectly content if the Minister stood up and said he was content to accept an amendment along these lines, subject to clarifying what the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord have already identified as an issue.
I also understand that the Government are worried that they may be pre-empting the role of the Care Quality Commission and that this amendment may be unnecessary because of the protections that have been offered by that. Of course it has a role to play but that role should never substitute for the fundamental protections offered to the individual by human rights legislation.
As we have already heard, there is a serious problem of flagrant human rights abuses of older people. They need the protections offered by the Human Rights Act, but it is not just a question of the sort of brutal abuses that we have already heard described today. There are protections against those anyway, but I ask the Minister to consider this: the protection of the Human Rights Act offers fundamental dignity and respect to elderly and often very vulnerable people. I think here of the case of an elderly couple who had been together for 60 years or so but were about to be separated by a local authority. From memory, one of them had dementia and the local authority wanted to provide care for that partner in a specialist facility for dementia care, while the other partner went into more mainstream residential care. They had no protection against that. They were not being refused care. They certainly were not being abused in any of the ways that we have heard about already, but they wanted to spend their remaining years together. The Human Rights Act was the only protection that they had. The case was taken to court. They won and were able to spend their last years together. That is the sort of dignity and respect that elderly, vulnerable people are owed. That is the protection that the Human Rights Act offers them, and that is what this amendment seeks to extend.
Even then, there is a further benefit from extending the protection of the Human Rights Act in the way that this amendment wants to do. Important work that was carried out for the EHRC two or three years ago by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and Professor Klug at the EHRC showed how basic human rights principles of dignity and respect can help transform the culture of public service delivery. The Government could signal the importance that they attach to this by accepting this amendment today.
Throughout the long passage of this Bill, the Minister has been notable for his willingness to listen to and engage with argument and, where he has felt able, to change course. I hope that he will not now seek refuge by pushing this off to the forthcoming White Paper on social care. If media whispers are to be believed, No. 10 does not want that to see the light of day any time soon. Even if it appears, there is no guarantee that this issue will be satisfactorily addressed. Even if it is, it could then be years and years before any appropriate legislative vehicle could be found to make the necessary changes.
I simply say to the noble Lord that he should not believe everything he reads in newspapers.
Believe me, I try extremely hard not to do so, but I noticed that the noble Lord did not deny the account given in the Daily Telegraph. I hope that it is wrong.
For the record, I deny the account given in the Mail, in the Telegraph, by Dr Pinto-Duschinsky on the BBC, and anywhere else.
I am extremely glad to hear that. I hope that the journalists concerned have noted that important denial, which I am grateful to hear from the noble Lord.
If this issue is delayed, we could be looking at years and years when vulnerable elderly people will be denied that fundamental protection. When I was Human Rights Minister, I was certain that we needed to go further than the Health and Social Care Act 2008 in tackling this problem. We ran out of time. The Government now have the time and the vehicle to do what I wish that the previous Government had been able to do. I hope that the Government will seize this opportunity and accept the amendment.
Can the Minister clarify one point? Is his objection to the amendment a drafting one—in other words, in an ideal world, were there more time, could a draft be found that would meet the various objections that he has just outlined—or is it one of principle, and is he saying that no such amendment to cover this loophole could conceivably ever be drafted?
Perhaps I may take just a little more advantage of the Minister’s time. He mentioned earlier that, in the Government’s judgment, were a case along the lines described ever to come along, the court would find in favour of the Government’s judgment. If that were not to be the case, can the Minister say whether in those circumstances the Government would be prepared to consider an amendment along the lines of that put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross?
Before my noble friend replies, perhaps I may have a go as well. The problem is that the more specific the amendment, the more the Latin maxim applies that says that, by expressing something, you are deemed to exclude something else. Therefore there is a great danger in ambiguous specificity.
My noble friend expresses the position exactly. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Wills, if a court in the future were to arrive at a judgment that all of us here would consider adverse, of course the Government would intervene. However, in our view, it is now highly unwise at this point to try to frame an amendment to put these matters beyond doubt in the way that the noble Baroness seeks to do because any attempt to do so is almost certain to lead to ambiguity and doubt about the applicability of the Act in other areas. That is the point. Of course I can pick holes in the drafting of this amendment, but that is not the central issue. The issue is the wider one to which I alluded earlier.