United Kingdom: Global Position Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Leong
Main Page: Lord Leong (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Leong's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(1 day, 17 hours ago)
Lords ChamberI welcome the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and I follow in every sense what the noble Lords, Lord Howard and Lord Waldegrave, have just said.
In this crisis we need to hope for the best, prepare for the worst and learn from the past. I hope that Putin buys the ceasefire compromise and comes to accept Ukraine as the legitimate sovereign state it is, but we need to prepare for a future in which his appetite for territorial gain has only been whetted. The analogy, I think, is Munich in 1938: Hitler settled for one-third and nine months later came back for the other two-thirds.
We need to contemplate a future in which America, perhaps in the hope of pulling apart the Beijing-Moscow relationship, finds itself closer to the autocrat in the Kremlin than to the democrats in western Europe. At Munich last month, Vance told us that the real threat to Europe was not Russia but the enemy within—our corrosive liberalism. Musk says that America should quit NATO and America has left planning for some NATO exercises. So far, Trump has said only that America will not defend NATO’s free riders, and for America to follow Musk’s advice would be remarkably quixotic. America is right to resent the free riders, but it is America that drives the bus.
The NATO supreme commanders have always been serving US officers reporting to their commander-in-chief, and Congress accepted the Washington treaty only when that was spelled out to it. The alliance has been, from the start, a very effective means of projecting US power—too effective for de Gaulle’s taste. The American military and the American arms industry would be horrified if Musk got his way, and we should work to see that he does not. We should work to strengthen Europe’s contribution to the alliance, as Peter Carrington and Helmut Schmidt did with their Eurogroup and European defence improvement programme when Congress first got stroppy about the free-rider problem. But we also need to prepare for the worst, as the noble Lords, Lord Howard and Lord Waldegrave, have been saying.
European security is our security and we need a new structure that we should be defining now—but not in a way which might precipitate the very eventuality that concerns us, so not too much of the performative strategic autonomy talk that we hear from Paris. The best analogy may be 1948 and Ernest Bevin’s Western Union treaty. What would Bevin do now? I will make three guesses. First, obviously, we rearm. Obviously, 2.5% of GDP will not be nearly enough; in the 1970s, we were at 5.5%. Secondly, we demonstrate commitment. In the 1970s, we were still honouring Bevin’s WU commitment to keep 55,000 troops forward-based in continental Europe. The Baltic states must feel now rather as the West Germans did then—and they were very glad to have our forces on the ground. Thirdly, we need to strike a security deal with the EU in May. With the continuing cold wind from the east and new blustery winds from the west, we Europeans need to huddle together.
May I remind noble Lords that this is a timed debate and we have to finish it by 3.19 pm? I am gently reminding noble Lords that the advisory speaking time it is four minutes.
My Lords, I too welcome the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley, and hope that he enjoys his time here. We are in rather difficult times, so we look forward to further contributions.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howell, for making possible this important debate. It is more than important. It is an extraordinary debate. It would have been inconceivable, months or even weeks ago, for the House to be united in saying the things that it has said about our position in the world, and particularly the position of the United States. Matters are changing fast—as we speak, even. These are unprecedented times, in which America has joined the autocracies and dictatorships of the world in a belief that might is right, abandoning the rule of law, abandoning international free trade, abandoning liberal democracies, attacking its own allies and clearly adopting the same expansionism as that of Xi and Putin. It is as if the America First movement in the 1930s had seized power just when the Americans in practice came behind us to defeat Hitler when those America First politicians had argued for them to abandon Europe to Hitler. The wrong side has taken control. It is unimaginable that this Chamber would be united in these concerns, yet that is obviously so.
I will touch on the two big issues. The first is trade. It is absolutely evident that there is nothing about what Trump has said—and he is saying it more today—that suggests that this country can expect a genuinely good trade agreement with the United States. If he has one, it will be based entirely on self-interest and on us surrendering any measure of our interests to do a deal. We have to recognise that we need to work with all countries that believe in the rule of law, free trade and international institutions to build an alliance around trade. We cannot compromise our position by thinking that we can somehow sit on both sides of the Atlantic—that is just not an opportunity now available to us.
My second point is on defence. People have often misunderstood what NATO is about. The most important element that NATO provided was, effectively, an anti-proliferation treaty that said a member state could rely on America to defend it and therefore did not need the bomb. France has a few bombs—independently. Britain has a smaller few, which are not independent of America in any event; we cannot in practice use them without it.
The truth is that the offer to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Poland, the Baltics, Britain, Germany and France—all of those other democracies—was, “We will defend you and therefore you don’t need the bomb”. Even more importantly, not only do we need a defence alliance across Europe and other likeminded countries that has a nuclear deterrent—we are going to have to think about that now—but behind the nuclear deterrent was the promise that, if Russia or China used nuclear weapons at any point, the first response would be a non-nuclear one: an overwhelming shock and awe attack.
This was said to Russia when it threatened a nuclear attack at the start of the Ukraine war. Russia was told, “You will be taken out by a non-nuclear response”. But the only country in the world capable of providing that is America, and it is quite apparent that we cannot rely on it to do so; indeed, it is very unlikely that it would do so. Therefore, our defence now needs to work with our likeminded allies around the world to build a non-nuclear capability to respond to and stop these “might is right” countries, of which America now is one.
My Lords, I remind all noble Lords that they must stick to their advisory speaking time of four minutes, because we have to finish the debate by 3.19 pm.