Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill
Debate between Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lord Flight(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I hope that the Committee will allow me to come in after the Minister has spoken—I wanted to hear what she had to say. I declare of course my interests as on the register. Despite the accolades and praise I received in this place recently for my advisory abilities, sad to say they do not apply to my investment abilities. I have seen administrators and liquidators up front at the wrong end, so I have some personal experience—if not professional experience—of what happens when things go wrong. Of course, I very much welcome the Government’s work in controlling legal expenses and pay tribute to the work of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, on related matters. In this particular part of business life, however, there is a role for contingent and after-the-event funding. I rise simply to suggest that there may be a happy medium of a temporary exemption to allow time to see how things pan out during the Bill’s passage, if Amendment 61AJ cannot be accepted as a whole.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her helpful and constructive response. I am particularly pleased that she is happy to look at the new clause proposed in Amendment 61AJ and to meet with R3 to go through these issues.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I think there is a consensus that pre-packs need to be cleaned up, as it were. However, it would be a great mistake to get rid of them and I will cite some figures in that respect in due course. I am less than comfortable with Clause 126 as it stands, which enables the Secretary of State to make regulations where approval is required for the sale of an asset to the connected parties, although it does not appear that that is the case now. I would be concerned if onerous obligations were put on an insolvency practitioner to obtain, say, creditor consent, which is likely to take significant time and could impact the deliverability of a transaction, and which would be in the interests of the creditors. Insolvency practitioners are meant to have the expertise and experience to make sound commercial decisions. My concern is that regulation is being put ahead of commercial needs.
In reference to what the noble Baroness has just said, the Graham review made some very sensible pre-pack pool proposals for reviewing and giving either the thumbs-up or the thumbs-down to pre-pack arrangements. I think that these are starting to be adopted and that is a very useful route to go down. As has been said, the current drafting of the clause goes beyond pre-packs and captures all connected party sales in all types of administration. For example, a business could end up going into liquidation instead of administration as a result of the clause. This would lead to job losses and the UK business rescue culture would be undermined.
The Government’s aim is to provide great confidence to unsecured creditors and other affected stakeholders, and a pre-pack represents the best outcome to them. The clause provides the Government with a reserve power to prohibit not only pre-pack administration sales but sales to connected parties, as has been mentioned. The concerns about the clause as it stands relate to the unintended consequences of the wide manner in which it is drafted. The Government have confirmed that the clause is aimed at pre-packs, yet it captures all types of trading administrations, which could include a straightforward business sale. For example, there may be a case in which a company could be put into trading administration and no pre-pack deal is on the table; the administrator conducts open and wide marketing, and there are a number of bids to buy the company. The administrator could be prevented by the clause from selling the business to any of the workforce of the company, because they would be considered to be a connected party. This could mean that the good and best offers cannot be accepted by the administrator, and the creditors would lose out. Jobs would also be lost and the UK’s business rescue culture undermined.
I am certainly opposed to the risk of pre-packs being prohibited. The benefits of pre-packs were identified in the Graham review and previous research. Given the proposed areas of reform to pre-packs to boost transparency and confidence, the clause to ban pre-packs—that is the intention—is greatly mistaken.
The extent of pre-packs is often overstated. There are around 20,000 corporate insolvencies in the UK a year, about 3% of which—between 600 and 700—are pre-pack sales. Yet only a small percentage of all corporate insolvency pre-packs attract public scrutiny over a perceived lack of transparency, but this has obviously affected policymakers.
Pre-packs preserve jobs. In 92% of pre-pack cases, all the employees were transferred to the new company; whereas that happened in only 65% of business sales. Average returns to secure the creditors in pre-packs were 35%, compared with 33% in straightforward business sales. In addition, the Graham review found that pre-packs certainly have a place in the UK’s insolvency landscape, preserve jobs, bring benefits to the UK, and reform would be worth while. I am therefore uncomfortable with Clause 126, which goes too far, and there ought to be a less draconian way in which to tidy up the scope for abuse of pre-packs.
Lord Leigh of Hurley
My Lords, if we cast our minds back some five or six years, all the professions at that time forecast that we would be faced with an unprecedented level of receiverships, administrations and insolvencies. It is worth reflecting—I am sure we would all agree—on the success of the coalition’s long-term economic plan and that the number of administrations has been dramatically less than anticipated by every forecaster, in particular the insolvency profession, which geared itself up for many more administrations than proved to be the case. As my noble friend Lord Flight has said, pre-packs in fact make up around 3% of the total number, which is a small number in itself.
The other great improvement in that recession—to the extent that it was a recession—compared with the previous one has been the role of the banks and accountants. Last time around, banks appointed investigative accountants to look into businesses, but those accountancy firms were the same firms that were appointed as the administrators—and stayed as administrators for many months. In some instances, that lasted years and enormous fees were taken out of companies by the same firm that had been appointed by the bank to investigate whether a business was viable. So it is pleasing to see that the role of the administrator has changed.
The beauty of the pre-pack is that it is extremely quick. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, that it is wholly unacceptable where Smith and Jones turns into Jones and Smith and everyone loses out, except perhaps Smith and Jones or Jones and Smith. I also agree that one needs to focus on the bad pre-packs where it all seems to be a bit cosy and there is no form of review. I welcome the Graham report. Teresa Graham served with me on the council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and I have spoken to her about her recommendations. I am apprehensive about some of them. I am not convinced that the pooling idea will work, and finding six people at short notice in certain difficult parts of the country to convene and form an opinion would be tricky. I would welcome a speedy assessment of whether her proposals need to be fine-tuned or amended.
I want particularly to say that I have seen pre-packs that have in practice been extremely helpful. I am thinking of where a retailer has ended up with a very large number of branches in areas that have changed, but because of the way UK property law is run, it is impossible to get out of onerous leases by doing it any way other than through a pre-pack. The pre-pack has led to a business being trimmed down and subsequently able to run successfully. In those instances, the only loss has been for the landlord who has a tenant with an inappropriate lease. I definitely would not want to throw out the good with the bad, but I agree that we need to focus on the bad and address how the Graham report recommendations will pan out much more quickly than perhaps is envisaged.
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill
Debate between Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lord Flight(9 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Lord Flight
My Lords, on the specific point, I just add the following. First, it would be perfectly possible to operate a non-UK shell company as the Bill stands so the Bill is completely avoidable for those intent on doing evil. Secondly, with regard to UK companies, it might be possible to include a definition. The point of a shell company is that it does not have a business. I am very clearly talking here about small companies that have an active business. Finally, anyone with evil intent will not register a small company, even if it is a UK company, for the reasons the noble Lord just pointed out: the chances of being discovered are very small.
Therefore, I beg to suggest that the Bill is ineffective in this area as it stands. What would be effective is a significant burden on the innocent—the runners of small family businesses. As my noble friend Lord Leigh pointed out, the issue of who has control is sometimes quite debateable because there may be more than one person holding 25% and the way family affairs are organised may be complicated.
For some reason, my Amendments 48 and 49 are also included within this group. I did not really want to combine them with Amendment 36A, which is very different in nature, but nor did I want them not to be aired by default. These two amendments, together with Amendment 51, are practical proposals which emanated essentially from the BVCA, which I believe has had some practical discussions with government about possible ways of handling the points raised.
Amendments 48 and 49 extend the provision in the Bill applying to English limited partnerships to include other limited partnerships without a legal personality which are comparable to an English limited partnership. Many overseas limited partnerships invest in UK companies and, unless there are arrangements along the lines of Amendments 48 and 49, the effect would be to require information on all limited partnership investors to be put into the register. This would create confusion about who was the controller of the English company the partnership was investing in as well as creating unnecessary and costly administration. The main relevant overseas companies to which this applies are Channel Islands limited partnerships which are frequently used by private equity firms to invest in UK companies. This is a practical issue which it is necessary to deal with, or where there are non-UK limited partnerships investing in UK companies we could end up with a wealth of unnecessary and quite confusing information.
Lord Leigh of Hurley
I, too, shall speak to Amendments 48 and 49, as they are grouped together, and express the same reservations as my noble friend Lord Flight about not wishing to have the two connected. The reason for my amendment is principally to ensure that the policy objectives of the Bill are met. I seek to manage and mitigate unintended consequences as much as possible, in this case by making sure that only individuals who meet the criteria set out are disclosed and not many others by dint of legislative accident.
It is worth noting here that the Bill has already been improved in this regard. The original draft would have missed out partnerships entirely, because they have no legal personality, and forced the disclosure of hundreds of investors, none of whom owned 25% of the business, but all of whom would have been deemed to have owned that amount through their investment vehicle.
A particular concern is private equity, as my noble friend Lord Flight said. Funds raise money from many investors of different types and different geographies, but normally none of their investments as individuals would be anywhere near 25% of the fund. The private equity fund, typically known as the general partner, takes responsibility for investing that fund in a portfolio of businesses and managing those businesses. It is the fund run by the general partner and not any individual investor who exercises significant control. It is right that the public and, indeed, Governments know who that is. It is not necessary for them to know who the individual investors are behind it.
The merits of this point were accepted in the other place and there is an exemption for English limited partnerships. This amendment seeks to apply that to other limited partnerships that are similar to English limited partnerships in structure but are governed by other laws. I am thinking in particular of partnerships structured in the Crown dependencies. It is very important that we offer a level playing field in this context. Funds structured particularly in the Channel Islands and elsewhere are direct drivers of inward investment into the UK. To be clear, we are not talking about tax avoidance or tax evasion. It is simply a mechanism for investment. It is typically used by pension funds, which would not pay tax in any circumstances. My amendment would allow any partnership deemed similar in structure to an English limited partnership to be treated the same as one and not have to disclose the hundreds of investors underneath it.
In his excellent Budget in 2013, the Chancellor commendably launched a new initiative to make our asset management industry as competitive as possible. It was about encouraging our financial services industry to be drivers and attractors of inward investment in the real economy. These partnerships are great channels for such investment and must be encouraged. That is why they should be treated the same as English limited partnerships. If the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Flight is accepted, investors in partnerships, which are of huge benefit to the UK economy, will be treated as if they had invested in an English limited partnership or one that is similar in spirit.
Lord Flight
My Lords, Amendment 51 seeks to address the issue of the duties of shadow directors and to limit the extension of their duties to what is fair, reasonable and appropriate. The current wording in the Bill goes too far in making the condition that the duties apply,
“where … they are capable of so applying”,
whatever that actually means. The territory relates to the doctrine of avoiding conflicts of interest and, in particular, the situation for full directors, but unfortunately the ground rules there do not apply to shadow directors who sometimes may not even be aware, subjectively, that they are shadow directors. This amendment seeks to tie the conditionality of the duties of shadow directors to what is reasonable, just and equitable. I understand that the Government are sympathetic to these issues but may prefer to address the territory via regulations. As the Bill stands, I suggest that the position of shadow directors is not reasonable. I beg to move.
Lord Leigh of Hurley
My Lords, Amendment 51, which is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Flight, is to Clause 86 and concerns shadow directors. Shadow directors are individuals who influence a company without actually being a director. I do not think I have to declare an interest as being a shadow director of any company, as far as I am aware, but—
Lord Leigh of Hurley
That is the point. Shadow directors can be significant shareholders who have chosen not to sit on the board—in particular, a lender who has become active in the affairs of a business—or simply someone in whose interests and according to whose instructions the directors act, without the person actually being a director. The Bill seeks to clarify the rules governing shadow directors so that people do not deliberately assume that status in order to avoid a lighter touch corporate governance regime. Indeed, the definition of shadow director is not changed by the Bill, only the extent to which they should enjoy the same duties as directors.
At present, the duties of directors apply to shadow directors to the extent permitted by common law rules and equitable principles. These are set out in Section 170 to 177 of the Companies Act and offer up a code of conduct. Clause 86(3) would enable the Secretary of State to make regulations to apply any duties of directors to such shadow directors. The Bill makes provision for the duties of directors to apply to shadow directors,
“where … they are capable of so applying”,
as my noble friend said. This wording, quite apart from adding certainty, will do the opposite and leave the courts little discretion to allow them to apply said duties in a proportionate manner. This wording, “capable of so applying”, amounts to some sort of blanket application of duties from one to the other since it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the duty would be incapable of applying.
Of particular interest is the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. It is not often possible to prevent a conflict from arising, and therefore the prima facie duty to avoid conflicts is typically addressed by having some mechanics: for example, one frequently sees a director excusing himself from any meetings considering such matters which might present a conflict and thus being prevented from voting. The Companies Act specifically considers these mechanisms but, of course, it will not be possible to apply them to shadow directors, who may not seek to be shadow directors and may not even be aware that they are. This could result in an automatic breach of the duty by entirely innocent shadow directors, so I would argue that more flexibility is required.
This is why the amendment offers up an alternative wording, which says that duties will apply,
“to the extent it is reasonable, just and equitable for any such general duty to apply”—
it certainly sounds reasonable to me—and caters for examples such as conflicts of interest. It still allows for the Secretary of State to make an intervention, as well as giving the courts the requisite discretion, but it will prevent the inherent unfairness in the situation that I have just described.