(1 year, 9 months ago)
Other BusinessI tabled a Motion to facilitate a short debate on this clause, in the spirit of what we just discussed, to show not only that we have been assured about the structure of the Bill but that we can demonstrate to those who care to read our proceedings that we have done so and gone through a process; it is a bit like doing arithmetic and showing one’s workings.
In this particular respect, regarding Clause 2, I want to look at the relationship between the Bill and the UNCITRAL model law on electronic trade records. The Bill enables the possession of electronic trade documents in the same way as paper trade documents. The MLETR is based on the principles of technological neutrality and functional equivalence between a transferable document or instrument—as defined in each legal jurisdiction, as they say—and the resulting electronic trade document, based on a reliable system. The MLETR is clear that functional equivalence standards can be achieved using different approaches in different jurisdictions.
The Bill achieves that required effect, taking advantage of the existing legal concept of possession in English and Welsh law and placing the exclusive control of a paper trade document as the functional equivalent of possession. A particular example I raised was the question of time and place indications. Article 13 of the model law provides for indications of time and place, but the Explanatory Notes state that this is to the extent that these are required in the equivalent transferable document.
Clause 2 sets out what is required to constitute an electronic trade document; it is, in effect, about exclusive control of such a document. Clause 2(1) provides that the information required to establish a paper trade document is to be the same as for the equivalent electronic trade document. The following subsection then sets out what is needed for control and for the singularity of the document, so that one should not have multiple requests for performance of the same obligation. Time and place indications are not always required in a paper trade document; if required, they would be covered by both the equivalence provision in the first subsection I referred to and the operation of the reliable system as provided for in subsection (5).
I am not sure that we discussed Clause 2(1). I think it is really useful. It sets out very well how our structure in the Bill meets the standards set in the MLETR. I support the clause standing part as we have it before us.
My Lords, I have declared my interests previously in relation to various bodies that deal with maritime law, insurance law and various other aspects of the law.
I thank the Minister for his letter, which was very helpful and clear in summarising all the answers to the various points that have been raised. It has been a pleasure to work in this committee. I think I first saw a bill of lading as a young pupil over 50 years ago. Other members of the committee did not suffer from that disadvantage, so it has been a great pleasure to work with them. I thank them very much for the hard work to which they have been put and for their generosity in the thanks I have received this morning.
I will make one point in the debate on this clause. It is clear that the agreement on UNCITRAL’s model law on electronic trading records marked a significant turning point in the move towards the use of electronic trading documents in shipping and finance. It did so by establishing a common legal regime that will take the place of the common legal regime for paper documents that has evolved through traders, originating in Italy or maybe before then in the Middle Ages. We need to make an immediate change now.
The Bill adopts the MLETR common legal regime for electronic trading documents by adapting the law in the UK so that it is entirely consistent and interoperable with the MLETR regime. Indeed, there would have been no point in bringing forward this Bill if it was not completely consistent and interoperable with the MLETR. Those engaged in international trade will not move to the use of electronic documents unless there is a common legal regime grounded on the MLETR.
In hindsight, it is unfortunate that this was not made clear in the Bill. I hope this point will be noted for future Bills directed to law derived from international bodies that must operate across the world. I hope the Minister can confirm that the sole purpose of the Bill is to make the law in the UK consistent and interoperable with the MLETR.
The evidence that we received was almost unanimous in its strong support for the technical way in which the Bill adapts the law in the United Kingdom. I say that, because we have also looked carefully at Scots law; a project of this kind in future must include the other parts of the United Kingdom. In addition to being entirely consistent with the MLETR, the legal technique employed provides the benefit of building on the existing law developed in international trade largely through the judgments of the English courts, and on this occasion I do mean English. I will say a little more about this when we discuss the issue of possession in the debate on Clause 3.
My Lords, my Motion on this clause is similarly to facilitate a short debate. In particular, I was interested in our discussions about why we did not define exclusive control as equivalent in law to possession.
As I understand it, the effect of the Bill is that the control of an electronic trade document may lead to possession of that document in the same way as for a paper trade document. We do not treat the control of paper trade documents as equivalent to possession, but they are capable of possession. Therefore, removing the legal block on the possession of an electronic trade document in statute simply retains in practice the equivalence of paper and electronic trade documents. Defining exclusive control of an electronic document as possession would, as I have now understood, create a legal difference between paper and electronic trade documents, which is contrary to the intention of the model law and, indeed, confusing and unhelpful to those who are using electronic trade documents.
We had interesting discussions about the intention to possess, but the conclusion that certainly I have reached is that although the intention to possess an electronic document may very rarely be an issue, there is case law on possession that would be helpful in the context of the electronic equivalent of a document being forced into a person’s control or their having control unknowingly or unintentionally.
As the Bill stands, and as my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond rightly said, we benefit from the existing law on possession, and the Bill as it stands introduces no confusing difference in the legal treatment of trade documents in different forms. With that explanation, I continue to support this clause standing part.
I, too, will add a short word in relation to this point. First, I thank the Minister for making so clear that the purpose of the Bill is consistency and interoperability with the MLETR, and I hope that the message to the Law Commission and to draftsmen in the future is to put that in the Bill.
During our evidence sessions, we spent some time, as the noble lord, Lord Lansley, has so eloquently explained, looking at legal techniques, particularly those employed in Clause 3(1). The technique employed in the Bill enables electronic documents to be possessed, in contradistinction to the legal technique of using exclusive control as the equivalent of possession, as was done in Singapore. It is essential to stress that, for all practical purposes, the result will be the same. Both techniques ensure interoperability under the common legal regime to be established by the MLETR.
We were lucky in both the oral and the written evidence that we received, particularly from the judge in charge of the Commercial Court, Mr Justice Foxton; from Mr Andrew Taylor in his submissions on behalf of the UK branch of the Comité Maritime International, which has done so much to ensure uniformity of maritime law; and from a large body of distinguished academics, including Professor Sir Roy Goode, Professor Louise Gullifer, Professor Miriam Goldby, Professor Alex Mills, Professor David Fox and Professor Andrew Steven, who effectively gave evidence to the same effect: that there was an advantage in the continued use of the concept of possession for electronic trade documents, in contradistinction to simply adopting exclusive control in its place.
Here, trade documents are in a different category from other forms of control over electronic documents and digital assets. The two advantages can be summarised as follows. First, retaining the concept of possession more easily enables the law relating to electronic trade documents to be developed by building on the established law relating to paper documents so carefully developed over the centuries and with worldwide applicability.
Secondly, although in my view this is likely to be of only minimal practical significance, and I certainly hope that it is, there could be an exceptionally rare case in which the requirement of an intention to possess—I would prefer to stick to the English rather than to “animus possidendi”—arising from the continued use of the concept of possession might permit a court to deal in a just way with a case in which something unanticipated has unfortunately gone wrong.
There are those two advantages, but I stress again that the fact that Singapore has chosen a slightly different route to that adopted in the Bill is, for all practical purposes, immaterial to interoperability.