Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Hain

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, following the excellent speeches we have just listened to, beginning with my noble friend Lord Stevenson, I support this group of amendments and appeal to the Minister seriously to consider reversing the ERG amendments, not just for the detail and well-founded points and reasons that have already been made, but because the Government did not choose to accept them. They were foisted upon them, because of the arithmetic and politics of the situation, and wanting bigger fish to fry. As a result, we have a defective Bill, even by the Government’s own objectives. I ask the Minister seriously to consider on Report, rather than facing a possible vote and even defeat given the cross-party support that exists, getting the Bill back to where it was before the ERG plundered it.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, what connects this group of amendments is that they are European Research Group’s amendments in the Commons that were accepted by the Government. I do not think they should be treated by my noble friends on the Front Bench as if they all had the same merit or otherwise.

The single UK customs territory, which is now Section 55 in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, specifies that there should not be a separate customs territory between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Frankly, I cannot see the circumstances in which this House or the other place would find this acceptable. That being the case, I cannot see any merit in this House seeking to ask the other place to think again about that issue. I do not think anybody in the other place is proposing to revisit it, so my suggestion is that we do not go down the path of thinking that Amendment 79 has merit.

I do not disagree about Amendment 80. I listened with care, but I would not like to try to explain it to somebody else and I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, is right about that.

I support Amendment 77 because I cannot see any good grounds for why legislation should require the Government to seek new primary legislation to have a customs union of any character with the European Union in the future. If, for example, we want to have a customs union with the United States of America, it could be done by an Order in Council. There is no basis for a distinction of that kind, other than the politics of the moment, and legislation should not be governed by the politics of the moment. If there is a proper process for the scrutiny and approval of a customs union, it should be set out in legislation and apply to any other country with which we establish a customs union and not discriminate and impose additional requirements specifically in relation to the European Union.

That just leaves Amendment 78. I confess I saw this being slightly of the moment, in that it was intended to entrench into statute the provisions in the Chequers White Paper relating to reciprocity in the collection of import duties on behalf of the European Union by the United Kingdom. But as I understood the White Paper, it did not necessarily mean that the European Union would collect import duties on our behalf. There was some suspicion on the part of our colleagues in another place that the negotiations might lead to such an eventuality, and that we would collect duties for the European Union but they would not collect duties for us, so they put this into the legislation. Frankly, that is not where the negotiations are now. We are either in a customs union or we are not; I do not think we are going to be in some sort of asymmetric customs arrangement of that kind. Nobody is debating that presently.

Amendments 77 and 80 have merit. I hope they are not going to be pressed at this point, but my noble friends should certainly think carefully about amending them when we come to Report to enable the other place to think again.

We discussed the customs union last Wednesday. That was the day before an interesting report was produced, principally by German economists at the Ifo Institute. I was encouraged by it, not least because I agree with it. It basically said that, to break the deadlock, both sides have to move from their red lines. In the United Kingdom’s case, that means no longer excluding the possibility of being in a customs union with the EU. In the European Union’s case, it means not treating such an arrangement necessarily to mean that the United Kingdom has to remain a member of the existing customs union or the Customs Union Code. They therefore propose the establishment of a European customs association, in which both the United Kingdom and the member states of the European Union would have voting rights. As a consequence, in the event that the European Commission operated as the representative of the European customs association, it would do so based on a mandate in which the United Kingdom continued to exercise the same kind of authority it presently exercises on the European Union’s customs arrangements.

This customs union would extend only as far as the present custom union applies inside the European Union. The document Hard Brexit Ahead: Breaking the Deadlock contains precisely the kind of discussion we have been having. It is not about whether we are in the customs union; it is what a customs union between the United Kingdom and the European Union might look like in the future.

It is doubly encouraging to see that not only put forward but put forward by prominent German economists. I hope that Ministers will continue to look at that in the time available before they have to come back and talk once more to the other place about what the next meaningful vote should be on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, I am speaking on behalf of my noble friend Lady Altmann, who is unable to be here and asked me to extend her apologies. I think she would have shared the view of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that Amendment 98 would not prevent our exit without an agreement, which is the default situation under the statute law as it remains, but it would certainly enable one to put into the equation consideration of the damage and chaos that would result if one were to leave by default without an agreement and without the statute book and continuity agreements being in place. Both Houses would have to think hard about that. It is a contest between different visions of what kind of chaos might ensue. Unfortunately, that is essentially where we are.

My noble friends on the Front Bench have done a grand job, not least in keeping us on track, wherever possible, in understanding the importance of getting this legislation into the right structure rather than being distracted too often and too far into discussion of Brexit. I think we agreed at Second Reading that the Bill is occasioned by Brexit but is not really about it; nor, technically, is it about the future processes and structures of free trade agreements. Their approach has enabled us to have what I think will be some interesting, positive and constructive discussions on Report, arising out of this Committee, when we can really focus on one or two specifics. My noble friends will have been given an indication of what kinds of considerations will be important to the House in thinking about free trade agreements as they come along.

[Lord Hain]

My Lords, I realise that the hour is late, but I rise to support Amendment 98, which would make it much more difficult for the Government to preside over a default no-deal Brexit, and to encourage the development of alternative strategies.

Due to the failure of the Government to develop a credible Brexit strategy, there is now a grave danger of the UK crashing out of the European Union on 29 March—in just over 50 days’ time—as the default option. This would have truly devastating consequences. However, because of the Brexit-related legislation already on the statute book defining exit day as 29 March 2019, it is possible that Parliament will not have the powers to stop it happening.

The amendment would therefore put a limitation on the commencement of the Trade Bill and provide that Clause 2(1), which gives the Government powers to implement international free trade agreements, can be implemented only on the condition that either: Parliament has approved a negotiated deal; the Government have requested an extension of Article 50; Parliament has approved a no-deal departure; or Parliament has voted for a second referendum. It would also offer your Lordships’ House a chance firmly to reject the possibility of the UK crashing out of the EU in a no-deal scenario.

The hard Brexiteers of the European Research Group, who assert that no deal would be an acceptable option, argue that Britain’s trade outside the EU is increasing at a much faster rate than trade with EU countries. However, this ignores the fact that measuring growth starting from a much lower base is always higher in percentage terms. They also fail to mention that trade with non-EU countries is not a binary choice and has been boosted by the EU’s own trade agreements with those countries, from which the UK benefits as an EU member—witness Germany’s spectacular trade increases with China, for instance. If noble Lords have any doubt about this, they should look at the website of the Department for International Trade. In the case of the recent trade agreement between the European Union and Canada, we read:

“UK trade with Canada up 14% since new free trade agreement introduced”.


This is a reference to CETA, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, which was signed in 2017 after seven years of negotiations. EU free trade agreements with non-EU countries such as Canada, South Korea and Japan were negotiated with the leverage and weight of the 500 million-strong market of the whole EU, which the UK will lose after Brexit. Brexiteer fantasies about WTO rules ignore the complexity of the necessary reallocation of the UK’s share of EU tariffs and quota schedules, which will require difficult negotiations. They also disregard the application of rules of origin to UK goods trying to enter the EU market, which the Government have previously estimated could cost firms between 4% and 15%.

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Hain

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansarad): House of Lords
Monday 21st January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for coming into the Chamber just a couple of minutes into my noble friend Lord Stevenson’s speech. I hope that it is in order to continue to make a brief contribution.

I follow the speeches of my noble friend Lord Wigley and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as well as that of my noble friend Lord Stevenson, in saying that it is vital that, particularly in respect of the devolved Administrations— I speak as a former Secretary of State for Wales and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—we do not see an action replay of what we saw earlier in this whole fiasco. I am talking about a power grab by the Government that repatriated to Westminster powers that had already been devolved but were under the European Union’s aegis. That showed a cast of mind in the Whitehall machine of the Government that I encountered as a Secretary of State, whereby the natural instinct of other departments—particularly Defra and the Home Office, although it went more widely—is to centralise, grasp and keep power, not to devolve it. It is essential that, as the amendment seeks, there is a recognition by Ministers that the natural instinct will be to consult the devolved Governments—and in the case of Northern Ireland, whatever is there; maybe senior civil servants, as now. That should be the immediate instinct of every Minister and every senior official in every government department as they process all this.

My second point relates to paragraph (e) in the amendment, which refers to “appropriate consumer groups” and so on. Will the Government consult the CBI, the FSB, the IoD, the TUC and consumer groups, let alone all the other NGOs that might have an interest? Will that be a natural reflex, as in consulting the devolved Administrations, or will they have to come back in right at the end? I hope that the Minister will be able to give us some reassurance on the record about all that.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, perhaps I may start with Amendment 3 in this group. I am not sure that I understand why it is necessary to do this, as Parliament is approving our membership of the government procurement agreement by virtue of this legislation. It seems to me that we are going through that process now, and the amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Again, I am not sure that I understand why Amendment 2 is needed. Section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act makes provision for how legislation can be modified by subordinate legislation. I do not see anything in the Bill that disapplies Section 7 of the withdrawal Act, and therefore it applies. We do not need to say it in order for it to apply.

I think that there is a point in Amendment 1, although the drafting is not quite right. In so far as the regulations would relate to changes to government entities for the purpose of the rules on public procurement or the annexes to the GPA, surely it should particularly draw attention to consultation with those government entities or specifically focus on the business organisations or others that would be affected by that public procurement issue. There is a drafting issue about who is likely to be affected. I know that the amendment states that they should be consulted but we need to focus on the entities concerned and how they are changed by virtue of these regulations.

Parliamentary Standards

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Hain

Tuesday 8th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lansley]

My hon. Friend is quite right to draw the House’s attention to paragraph 156, in which, contrary to the impression that might have been received, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards said that the Committee might not reach the same view as her on what she described as a “finely balanced” issue. I encourage Members, the press and others more widely to read the whole report. Only by reading the Commissioner’s report, the appendices and the Committee’s report does one gain a balanced view.

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

As a former Leader of the House of Commons, I yield to no one in wanting to protect parliamentary privilege and the independence of the House from external interference, but the truth is that the public think there is one rule for them and another for us. That is an intolerable position for us to find ourselves in, and we have to do something about it. There must be a solution that protects parliamentary privilege and the continuing integrity of the work of the Standards Committee while allowing external regulation of this sort of complaint. Otherwise, frankly, we are not going to be in a credible position.

[Mr Lansley]

The right hon. Gentleman will understand that, while it is clear from past court cases that the expenses system does not constitute parliamentary proceedings, and that parliamentary privilege does not extend to them, other aspects of the regulation of Members’ conduct clearly do. An important practical consideration is that, if the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards did not report to the Standards Committee as a Select Committee of the House and was instead established as an entirely separate and independent entity, parliamentary privilege would not extend to her investigations. That would make it much more difficult to proceed with those investigations and to get them completed, because they would be subject to legal and procedural challenge. The Commissioner has the power to undertake all the investigations required.