Fisheries Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Lansley and Baroness Young of Old Scone

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, as I did on Monday, I draw attention today to my interest in a company that essentially operates in Brussels but is in partnership with another agency, which, in turn, has UK Fisheries Ltd as a client. It is not our client but the client of the other agency.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for adding his name to Amendment 51. Its purpose is to provide that where the Secretary of State, although for these purposes it says:

“The Secretary of State and Ministers of the Crown”


to make it clear that it encompasses all members of the Government, is engaged in international agreements that could be “relevant to fisheries policy”, they should have regard to the fisheries objectives. Clause 10 makes it clear that if the fisheries policy authorities are exercising functions relevant to fisheries, fishing and aquaculture, they must do so by reference to the joint fisheries statement, the Secretary of State’s fisheries statement or the fisheries management plan. To that extent, in exercising any function—including, presumably, annual negotiations on fisheries, for example—the Secretary of State would do so by reference to and with regard to the fisheries objectives. That is not the issue.

The issue in my mind, which is why my amendment is here, is that there are agreements which would not necessarily be confined to fisheries but would be relevant to them and have impacts on fisheries negotiations. For example, if one were to look at the subsequent Clause 23, the power to determine fishing opportunities derives from international obligations. Those may be in international law but, more particularly, they may be derived from negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union—or, for that matter, between the United Kingdom and other states such as Norway or Iceland, the Faroe Islands or Greenland. My contention is that those international agreements would not necessarily be confined to fisheries.

While I might like to agree with the Government’s proposition in this respect, I have to say that it is unrealistic. The Government’s assertion is that fisheries, trade and market access must be kept separate. If that were indeed true, the problem that I perceive would not eventuate. But it is not true—there is a connection between the two.

I pray in aid the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who, on 19 May in the other place—I believe he was physically in the other place, although it was a Hybrid Proceeding—made a Statement on the state of EU-UK fishing negotiations. He said of the EU’s approach:

“The EU … wants the same access to our fishing grounds as it currently enjoys while restricting our access to its markets.”—[Official Report, Commons, 19/5/20; col. 503.]


So I have it on the strength of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster that trade, market access and fisheries quota are linked—and they are linked in these negotiations. The Government have to acknowledge that their hope is wrong; they are not wrong to hope, but wrong to think that it will actually happen.

The Government’s position is very interesting. They say that they want to keep fisheries and trade issues separate. They also say that they want us, as an independent coastal state, to be like Norway. These are two perfectly reasonable propositions, but the trouble is that Norway does not keep trade and fisheries issues separate. So, the Government’s two propositions do not work. Why do I believe this to be the case? The House of Commons Library briefing from only some six weeks ago, in reference to Norway’s entry into the European Economic Area, said—I apologise that it is a longer quote—that

“at an early stage in the European Economic Area agreement negotiations, the European Community”—

as it then was—

“made it clear that the quid pro quo for any trade concessions it was prepared to make in respect of imports of fishery products from EFTA states would be increased access for EC fishing vessels to the fishery resources found in the waters of EFTA states.”

So market access and fishing quota are linked, and they have been linked even by the Norwegians.

Of course, the truth is that Norway and other states like it, including even Iceland, are surprised that we have not linked the two. As far as they are concerned, there is leverage on the UK’s part in that we are a very substantial market for the fishery products of the fishing fleets of Norway and other such states. They are expecting that leverage to be used to secure continuity arrangements for the United Kingdom fishing fleets in relation to the quota that we presently enjoy, not in Icelandic waters but certainly in Norwegian waters. More to the point, they are expecting us to seek additional access, and they are expecting these two things to be linked. I think they are surprised that the United Kingdom has not already proceeded down this path; perhaps the Government do not have the bandwidth to think beyond the EU negotiations to realise that it is perfectly possible to have these negotiations in a substantive way—with Norway, for example, or even with Iceland—before the point at which we have concluded our EU negotiations.

My contention is that there are negotiations that are not strictly fisheries negotiations—the EU-UK negotiation on a free trade agreement is a present and substantial example—being conducted by a Minister other than the Secretary of State and where this Bill, were it an Act, would not bear upon those negotiations. So, I am looking for the fisheries policy objectives—as stated, not least by the Secretary of State in the Secretary of State fisheries statement—to be reflected in the objectives of the Government in international negotiations. That is the message that I want to hear from my noble friend on the Front Bench.

I understand that putting into an Act of Parliament a duty for Ministers to have regard to specifics in international agreements is somewhat prejudicial to the prerogative power of Ministers in those negotiations. It happens sometimes, but it is generally avoided by Governments because, down that path, we arrive at the point where Ministers are mandated in international negotiations and are unable to reach the conclusions and comprises that they have to reach.

What does that compromise look like in the EU negotiations? It is interesting. It bears directly on the implementation of this Bill when it becomes an Act. I may be wrong but, in my view, what were originally apparently incompatible positions—those of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government—have moved, in the sense that the European Union has said that it is willing to accept the principle of annual negotiations. As I understand it, it has even accepted that zonal attachment may have a role to play in future, but its starting point, of course, is that there must be maintenance of the relative stability mechanism and adherence to historic catch levels.

If I understand the United Kingdom Government’s position and the EU’s position, there is clearly room somewhere for a compromise. That compromise is that, starting from our position now and in a process of annual negotiations with some movement beginning in the first year, we move away from historic catch levels and the RSM and moving toward zonal attachment. The question is: at what pace? Finding that compromise and the pace of movement will be key because neither side will be happy. Of course, that is often the essence of comprise: nobody is entirely happy but, equally, nobody is entirely disappointed.

I use that as an instance. These are important negotiations. They will have significant impacts on the fisheries industry, clearly. They are being conducted not by the Secretary of State but by the Government and led by a Minister other than the Secretary of State who is not a fisheries policy authority. I therefore want to know from my noble friend that the Government will —in these negotiations and in those that they conduct internationally, such as with Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and others—have regard in future to the statements made about how they and the devolved Administrations propose to implement and achieve the fisheries objectives. I beg to move.

[Baroness Young of Old Scone [V]]

My Lords, this feels a bit like Groundhog Day because I jumped the gun yesterday and set off in support of Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, only to discover that it had been degrouped. Nevertheless, what was worth saying yesterday is worth saying today. I commend the noble Lord on a rather neat amendment. As he eloquently outlined, it aims to make sure that important elements that we are trying to deliver through this Bill are not traded away as a result of negotiations being run by people other than Fisheries Ministers.

Yesterday, I said that I remember vividly successive occasions when the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was Secretary of State—first for agriculture and then for the environment—and he used to come back and tell me and other NGOs in a rather crest-fallen voice that he had not been able to get what he wanted because a side deal had been done on something totally unconnected to the agricultural or environmental issue that he was trying to pursue. It could be as strange as an automotive deal, a backdoor pact on an immigration issue or whatever.

I support the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley: there is absolutely no point in having a Fisheries Bill that talks about fisheries and sustainability objectives if in fact they can be traded away in other negotiations elsewhere. I very much support this amendment.

Fisheries Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Lansley and Baroness Young of Old Scone

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 22nd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, Amendment 11 relates to the question of whether, if there is an inconsistency between the fisheries policy authorities in the preparation of a joint fisheries statement, there should be what has been described as a dispute resolution mechanism—some means by which that dispute between the authorities can be resolved so that the joint fisheries statement presents a consistent view across the United Kingdom. When we debated this in Committee, there were some deficiencies in the drafting of my amendment at that point, so I have come back with something that remedies at least those points, but it does not, of course, meet the Government’s objective. They believe that the existing mechanisms are sufficient, including the scrutiny of this Parliament and the other Parliaments and Assemblies in other parts of the United Kingdom, as well as the consultations leading to a joint fisheries statement.

However, I remind noble Lords that I tabled the amendment because of a briefing from the National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations, which said that, under the existing concordat, which we are seeing a development from, the apparent nature of the agreements sometimes obscures the fact that there are differences and inconsistencies in the approaches taken between, in particular, Scotland and England. It cites two examples. It sees the transfer of fixed quota allocation units out of Scotland as a one-way valve: it is possible for fixed allocation units to be transferred into Scotland, but the Scottish administration makes it difficult for them to go to England. Likewise, it says that the transfer of vessels and licences out of Scotland has been made more difficult by obstacles presented by the interpretation of the rules in Scotland. I do not want to debate those details—they are matters for the National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations—but it wants to be clear that, if the joint fisheries statement betrays a lack of consistency in the application of the rules, it wants there to be a mechanism by which an independent reviewer could be brought in to provide some means of resolution.

I am asking for an assurance from my noble friend about the vigilance that will be given to the process of achieving consistency, because the joint fisheries statements will begin to fall down if people believe that they are a cover for inconsistency under the surface. On something such as, for example, the equal access objective, it is stated in the fisheries objective that it must not be narrowly construed and that what we must be looking for is something that ensures that there is literally equal treatment, if I can put it like that, not just equal access, of English-based vessels and English-based owners in relation to Scottish waters and Scottish opportunities in the same way that there are opportunities for those based in Scotland in relation to English quota and the like. So, in moving Amendment 11, I am looking for that kind of assurance from my noble friend in response to this short—I hope—debate. I beg to move.

[Baroness Young of Old Scone [V]]

When I originally read this amendment, I thought I supported the proposal made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for an independent review if there was disagreement among the fisheries policy authorities. However, the more I thought about it, the less I liked it. The problem with independent reviewers is that the selection of them does not always do the business, especially when environmental, economic and social considerations need to be balanced within a requirement for sustainability. Independent reviewers are often identified as having come from one or other of the sectors involved, and their background is deeply suspected by people from the other sectors.

We have just had a perfect example of that in the recent so-called independent review of HS2 costs and benefits, with the result that ancient woodlands are being comprehensively trashed along the length of England. So I hope that the Minister will meet the request made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and come up with some other good idea for working through disagreements between the fisheries policy authorities that does not involve independent review.