Communications Data and Interception
Debate between Lord King of Bridgwater and Lord Taylor of Holbeach(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am not in a position to answer that particular question. It may be beyond the gift of anyone to answer it at this stage. The noble and learned Lord makes a very interesting point which I am sure will be considered, but it is not part and parcel of this legislation, which is very narrow in what it is seeking to achieve. We are not looking to extend the powers that we currently have available.
Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)
My Lords, to save the Minister embarrassment I do not expect him to reply to this point; I fully agree with the previous comment of the noble Lord, Lord West, about the failure to move forward with the previous Bill. Having said that, my noble friend will be aware that both Houses of Parliament are very leery indeed about emergency legislation, and are rightly suspicious of it. It is not just the cynics who say that they are not totally reassured when all parties are in agreement on emergency legislation, which has not always had a happy history.
Having said that, nobody could underestimate the importance of the matters that the Minister has discussed and of what the data have meant to the defence of this country. If ever there was a time not to reduce our defences, this must be it. Can the Minister confirm again that this represents no change in the present situation—that there is no advance in the intrusions on the citizen; it is a matter of data, not the content of messages? It is the “who, when and where” that are so vital in the pursuit of this.
The most important thing is that the provisions also contain the surprisingly short sunset clause, as I understand it, of May 2015—
Lord King of Bridgwater
That is still, for the matters which must be discussed, a short sunset clause. It is absolutely right that that is there, and I welcome it.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am most grateful to my noble friend. As a former chairman of the Intelligence and Security Select Committee, I know that he—like the noble Lord, Lord West, from his ministerial role—can see inside this problem. I expect and want the House to scrutinise this legislation, because it is right and proper that we do so.
My noble friend is right also to point to the fact that the sunset clause allows an incoming Government only 18 months to put a new communications data Bill on the table if they choose to do so. If I were part of any such Government I would be exhorting prompt action in that area. Clearly, without the legislation that we are now hoping to bring forward, we place ourselves in an extraordinarily difficult position.
Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord King of Bridgwater and Lord Taylor of Holbeach(12 years ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for presenting his amendments in such a typically articulate way. He draws to our attention the challenge that faces us in achieving confidence—the word that was used by many noble Lords and spoken of by my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater. In a nutshell, this is about the scrutiny of Parliament and the responsibility of government, and how those two can be reconciled. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, talked about not wishing to create a special committee, this is a special committee because it deals with matters that are self-evidently outside normal public scrutiny.
This group of amendments, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and others for bringing to the House, concern the status of the ISC and, although we have not talked about it much, the remit of the Intelligence Services Commissioner. As my noble friend Lord Henley previously noted, the Bill proposes a number of important changes to the ISC’s status. Members of the ISC would be appointed by Parliament, rather than as at present by the Prime Minister, and those members would be free to choose their own chair. The ISC is created by statute to ensure that there are safeguards in place to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information and therefore the Government do not consider it appropriate for the ISC to be a full Joint Committee established under the Standing Orders of each House, as other Joint Committees are. I hope that noble Lords will find it useful for me to expand on this reasoning.
It is essential that the ISC operates within a framework that protects the highly sensitive material to which it has access. In particular, the Government must be able to prevent the publication of sensitive material by the ISC. They must be able to withhold the most sensitive material from the committee—albeit that those powers are rarely used currently and can be expected to be rarely used in future—and must have some role in the appointment of members of the ISC. Without guarantees in those three areas, the risk of disclosure of information that might damage national security would be increased. That might, in turn, lead to a situation where agency heads found it hard to reconcile their statutory duties to protect information with their duty to facilitate oversight. That could therefore lead to the sharing of less sensitive information and a corresponding reduction in the effectiveness and credibility of oversight.
The Bill provides the necessary guarantees in each of those three areas. The Prime Minister would be able to require matters be excluded from the ISC’s reports if the matter would be prejudicial to the discharge of the functions of the agencies or the wider intelligence community. Ministers would be able to withhold information from the ISC in the limited circumstances provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 1. A Member of this House or of another place would not be eligible to become a member of the ISC unless they had first been nominated for membership by the Prime Minister.
Although it may be possible to replicate those safeguards in Standing Orders of this House and another place, Standing Orders can be amended at any time, as noble Lords will know, and can be suspended for a specific period, or dispensed with for a specific purpose, by a Motion in the relevant House. Standing Orders do not therefore have the same permanence, or provide the same level of protection to sensitive information, as statutory provisions to the same effect.
It seems to me that we can divide the noble Lord’s amendments into two sets. Both are concerned with the same aim—that the new ISC should be a Select Committee—but they get there by different routes and with different consequences. It is not absolutely clear what the effect of the noble Lord’s first two amendments would be. If we were to accept them and the amendment that he proposes to Schedule 2, the ISC would still be created by statute in the Bill and safeguards would still exist to protect national security in the three areas that I have listed. My noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater drew attention to the inconsistency of the amendments, but we accept the noble Lord’s wish to draw the issue to the attention of the House in the way that he has by tabling Amendment 1.
The noble Lord’s amendment would not create a full Joint Committee, because that can be done only by the Standing Orders of each House. It would create an entirely novel body—a Select Committee established by statute. To what extent would such a body share the characteristics of other Select Committees? The Bill makes clear, even were it amended in other respects according to the noble Lord’s wishes, that the ISC is quite different from other Select Committees in fundamental respects—for instance, in relation to appointments and reporting. That being so, it is unclear whether or to what extent changing the ISC in this way would give it the other characteristics of a Select Committee. Indeed, the risk is that describing the ISC as a Select Committee when it has characteristics that are not shared by such committees could mislead as to the ISC’s true character. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw his amendment and that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, will reconsider her position on it.
The noble Lord’s next four amendments would, together, remove the first four clauses, which deal with the ISC. It is to be assumed that the noble Lord’s intention with those amendments is that a new ISC should be created solely by the Standing Orders of each House. Indeed, the noble Lord said so in his speech introducing his amendment. I have already listed the vital safeguards relating to appointments, reporting and provision of information contained in the Bill. Without these safeguards, we will increase the risk of unauthorised disclosure of the sensitive information to which the committee has access. As I have already said, Standing Orders cannot adequately replicate the safeguards against disclosure of information that might damage national security contained in the Bill. It is only by enshrining these safeguards in statute that we can ensure that they are sufficiently robust and enduring.
Lord King of Bridgwater
My noble friend has put much more clearly what I tried to allude to. The only correct position that would seem to emerge from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and the noble Baroness who speaks for the Opposition is that nobody should vote in favour of Amendment 1. If they vote for it and do not carry Amendment 6, we will have a complete muddle. What is involved here is actually not voting on Amendment 1; the issue about the Select Committee should properly be addressed under Amendment 6.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The noble Lord is persistent but he is more persistent than the committee has been long standing. The committee in its present form has not yet been set up. The new committee will establish its own traditions and it is not for me standing here at the Dispatch Box as a member of the Government to say how the committee should conduct its affairs when I, and the Government, have said that the committee will elect its own chairman. It is a matter for the committee to decide.
Lord King of Bridgwater
My noble friend will recognise that this is a long-standing issue that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert. I happen to strongly support what he said and believe that it would be in the interests of the reputation and credibility of the ISC—which is of great advantage to the Government and the nation—if it is seen to be a committee that is in no sense government-led, or led by a member or supporter of the Government, but is chaired by a member of the Opposition.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am not at all doubting the value, for example, of the Public Accounts Committee, to which the noble Lord referred. However, it is up to this committee to decide whether to establish its own tradition. To predetermine its traditions, as suggested by the noble Lord, gives a false description of what “tradition” really represents.
I hope that the noble Lord will allow me to move on, because I was going to suggest another scenario: of course, there is no reason why the chairman of this committee should be a member of another place. It is a Joint Committee of both Houses, and although noble Lords may consider it unlikely that a Member of this House would be elected its chairman, that may indeed happen, and it probably would not be appropriate for the salary to be determined by IPSA in that respect. It would be a question of us seeking to resolve the issue should the occasion arise.
I understand what noble Lords and the noble Baroness are trying to achieve; that is, some sort of established practice within existing committee procedure. I have some sympathy with the argument. The ISC is an important committee, carrying out a very valuable oversight function, and the chairman of that committee has a critical role in that respect. However, deciding on the appropriate level of financial support for the chair of the ISC is very much a matter for existing mechanisms within the two Houses and would be best resolved in that way. It is for Members of the House of Commons and, for Peers, the House Committee to resolve this issue, not the Government. I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention but, as I have explained, the reality is that these posts are special and important. They are exactly as a Permanent Secretary’s post is in terms of the continuity of Government over changes of Government. There is nothing bureaucratic about this. This is the way in which public servants are appointed. I hope that what I am describing is clarifying the Government’s argument—namely, that these posts, important though they are, are Civil Service posts occupied by servants of the Crown performing the duties of particular posts. Procedures are in place for making sure that those appointments are made on merit. They are not political appointments subject to political scrutiny. I hope noble Lords will accept that argument.
Lord King of Bridgwater
My noble friend has set out admirably and very clearly what the position is as seen from the Civil Service point of view. However, there is a serious point here. I think that a number of newly appointed heads of the agencies would have welcomed the opportunity to have this sort of a hearing, possibly even in public, given the importance of credibility for the Intelligence and Security Committee, as we discussed earlier. Given the importance of gaining public credibility and confidence for those who have been appointed to lead these critical national security agencies, this would be a very important opportunity. Therefore, although there may be technical reasons why such a procedure does not square with the Civil Service code, or whatever, I hope that my noble friend, who has manfully explained the current position, will consider whether there is an argument for establishing such a permissive arrangement in this area.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I note my noble friend’s guidance and assistance. However, I do not flinch from presenting the Government’s position in this respect. These are not conventional public appointments. They are Civil Service appointments which provide for political impartiality and, indeed, are outside the scope of Parliament. Once we start to argue for public scrutiny of an appointment, we argue for a political process. However, we have always sought to avoid such a political process in Civil Service appointments.
Government Efficiency
Debate between Lord King of Bridgwater and Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I cannot assure the noble Lord that it will be published on Monday. The subject and the content of the review to be published are matters for Sir Philip Green himself. The review will of course be subject to proper scrutiny by both the Government and Parliament. The report will go to the Cabinet Office, where the Minister for that office deals with efficiencies across government. It will also go to the Treasury, where Danny Alexander is responsible for the framework of the spending review. I think all noble Lords appreciate the need for efficiency in government and I hope this review has their support.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I do not follow such things closely but I think it is quite probable that he was.