(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Minister waxed lyrical about the scheme to provide subsidies for energy-intensive industries. We were deeply moved by his enthusiasm. He was silent on the clause that follows. He was talking about Clause 177, but Clause 178 sets out how the subsidies are to be paid for—by levies on all electricity users. I do not want this moment to pass without making the old-fashioned comment that I think it is best that subsidies are paid for out of taxation, rather than by levies.
Subsidies are a political decision by the Government; they are absolutely entitled to make those political decisions. But all electricity users are, at the moment, suffering from the political decision to instruct Ofgem to prioritise competition, which has led to the collapse of more than 30 supply companies. The costs of these collapses are being borne by us all in the levies on our electricity bills. You can debate whether it is honest or dishonest for political decisions to be paid for in a concealed fashion of this kind, but what is certain is that it is regressive. I am therefore slightly less enthusiastic about the combination of Amendments 177 and 178 than the Minister was about Amendment 177.
All I would like to say is that, in response to the comments by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, we are interested in keeping the lights on and we are interested in nuclear being part of the mix of fuels that will keep the electricity going, particularly now that coal will no longer be part of the electricity production in this country.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendment 10 and Amendments 20 to 35 in this group, which are consequential to it.
As the UK Government have prerogative powers to negotiate international agreements, Parliament has limited scope to make substantial changes to such an agreement, not least as it has already been formally signed, and opportunities to block ratification are therefore limited. As a result, it is of concern to see the Government waiting so late in the day before tabling the agreement to meet the statutory 21-day scrutiny period. It was not tabled until 15 June, which limited the time available for Members to scrutinise the Bill and for the International Trade Committee to publish its report. The Secretary of State for International Trade also failed to attend a meeting of the International Trade Committee to answer questions on the agreement on 29 June, despite a commitment to do so. This made it impossible for the committee to take account of her evidence on the new agreed date, 6 July, and still publish the report before the end of the scrutiny period.
Furthermore, it is shameful that Ministers have taken such a long time to conclude negotiations and long ago signed the trade deals but have not appeared before Parliament to give a full account. Ministers have been granted significant powers in the trade negotiations. The Labour Party will continue to push for more and wider scrutiny, so that parliamentarians and wider groups can properly impact on the process.
To help achieve this, our Amendment 10 and those that are consequential to it would bring in the super-affirmative procedure where an instrument is, or, as the case may be, regulations are, subject to the super-affirmative procedure. Under the super-affirmative procedure, a Minister presents a proposal for a statutory instrument and an explanatory statement. Committees in the House of Commons and House of Lords consider the proposal and can make recommendations. The Minister can then formally present or lay a draft of the statutory instrument under the affirmative procedure. We consider this necessary due to the limited other opportunities for scrutiny that come from legislation stemming out of negotiations, not least with the Procurement Bill changes that will limit this further and the Government’s steps to avoid scrutiny.
Our other amendments would implement some of these steps individually, such as requiring draft regulations to be laid in advance, but without the requirement for committee consideration that the super-affirmative procedure would bring. Amendments 34 and 35 would sunset the ability to make regulations, either two years after the Bill passes or on the UK’s accession to the CPTPP—which the Government said would happen last year.
My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with those who argue that the regulatory procedure is insufficient for looking at these regulations for all the familiar arguments, which I need not go into.
Our role in the House of Lords in relation to the negative procedure is nugatory. I do not think that that is quite right. The matters we are discussing are quite important, so I support Amendment 20. Part of my concern is that I am worried about Clause 2 itself. I have mentioned this before. I would be very grateful if the Minister would construe what Clause 2(1)(a) means. It says that:
“Regulations under section 1 may … make provision for different purposes or areas”.
What does “different” mean? Looking at it, I see that regulations under Section 1 must be provisions to implement the procurement chapters of these two agreements. So what are the “different purposes” mentioned in Clause 2(1)(a)? This is rather permissive drafting. I want to know what “different” means. Could “different” mean going beyond the scope of the procurement chapters in the free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand? If it does mean that, we are giving the Government a pretty wide power in Clause 2. If it does not mean that, why is it necessary to have the language at all?