Queen’s Speech

Debate between Lord Kerr of Kinlochard and Lord Butler of Brockwell

Tuesday 15th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I was not planning to speak about Brexit at all today, on the grounds that my views on Brexit are very well known to the House, and I rather suspect that whatever I say today will not greatly affect the negotiation in Brussels—although I am sure they are following our debate intently.

The third reason I was against speaking about Brexit is because I am sure that we will have plenty of time. It is impossible that by 31 October there will be a completed treaty ready for ratification by the two Parliaments: this Parliament and the European Parliament. It is also, in my view, inconceivable that our Government will have acted illegally and against the Benn Act. It follows that will we have plenty of time.

I want to talk about foreign affairs. I am, however, tempted by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and invited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, so I will touch lightly on Brexit at the end. Your Lordships may leave before the end.

On foreign policy, I am struck by the tone and the content of the Speech. Of course, it says very little about foreign policy and of course that is wholly understandable because this is not a legislative programme or a programme for a Parliament; this is an election manifesto, and elections are not usually won on foreign policy, so of course there is not much there. What is there, however, is much less than is traditionally there.

I have been thinking about why, and I would like to go back into history a bit. In April 1991, John Major persuaded the European Council, meeting in Luxembourg, to declare a safe haven in Kurdistan. The Kurds were then under attack by Saddam Hussein and hundreds of thousands of them were fleeing into the mountains. It was a major humanitarian disaster. John Major persuaded the European Union that it should not stand idly by and that we would be prepared to send forces. The United States did not react. John Major spoke to the President of the United States. Three days later the United States came on board the initiative. US, British, Australian, French, Spanish and Italian forces went in, and the RAF flew in the skies, as did the US Air Force. Some 450,000 Kurds returned to their homes within three months. The operation was a remarkable success.

What is happening today? The General Affairs Council met in Luxembourg yesterday. Did the Foreign Secretary come up with an initiative? Well, actually, he did not go. He sent Dr Andrew Murrison, who is, I understand, a junior Minister in the Foreign Office. I have seen no reports of what he said. At the General Affairs Council, Foreign Ministers listened to the Foreign Minister of Ukraine talking about the continuing occupation and civil war in part of his country, fomented and funded by Moscow. I have seen no reports of what Dr Murrison said to him. Some in Ukraine remember the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, drafted by the British and agreed by John Major with his Russian, American and Ukrainian counterparts. In exchange for the Ukrainians giving up their nuclear weapons, we guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine. Some in Ukraine remember that now. The negotiations, such as they are, over Ukraine’s future now take place in what is known as the Normandy format. We are not a party to it. The negotiations on our side are led by Chancellor Merkel, with President Macron. I find this rather shaming. We have excluded ourselves.

Then we read in the Speech that,

“my Government will ensure that it continues to play a leading role in global affairs, defending its interests and promoting its values … My Government will be at the forefront of efforts to solve the most complex international security issues. It will champion global free trade and work alongside international partners to solve the most pressing global challenges”.

I am not sure we are playing a leading role. I am not sure how we could ensure that we continued to do so unless we changed our views.

On Hong Kong, I very much agree with what the Foreign Secretary said in the other place on 26 September:

“Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy is what guarantees its future prosperity and success”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/9/19; col. 864.]


But in Hong Kong they are saying: what are the UK signatories of the 1984 joint declaration doing—as distinct from saying—to help preserve that autonomy? Are we playing a leading role? Hardly.

“Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back,

Wherein he puts alms for oblivion …

Those scraps are good deeds past

… perseverance, dear my lord,

Keeps honour bright”.

How persevering are we now and how persevering can we be, despite the hubris of this Speech, as the twin pillars of our foreign policy crumble?

We say that we will champion free trade, but the greatest challenge to the global trading system is President Trump’s attack on the WTO and his belief that trade wars are good and easy to win. We say that we will be at the forefront of efforts to solve the most complex international security issues, but what are we doing to stop President Trump’s dismantling of the international arms control architecture which his predecessors—mainly his Republican Party predecessors—built? What are we doing to persuade him that alliances are not transactional but based on trust, and that NATO still matters to all of us, including America? Or that concerted action against global warming is not a conspiracy against America, but deserves American support? Or that help to Ukraine should not be held hostage to digging dirt on a political rival? Or that the Kurds should not be betrayed—or, come to that, that the Turks should not be totally destroyed and obliterated, according to the whim of his “great and unmatched wisdom”, to cite his weekend tweet? Of course, our apparent inability to influence a capricious White House may not be for want of trying—heroic efforts may be being made behind the scenes—but I wonder whether they are enough:

“perseverance, dear my lord,

Keeps honour bright”.

On 13 November 2016—just after the presidential election, President Trump’s victory—European Foreign Ministers met informally at an extra meeting to discuss the likely foreign policy consequences of the election. They thought them potentially serious. Our Foreign Secretary, Mr Johnson, chose not to go and denounced the meeting in public as a “collective whingearama”. Why? Perhaps he thought—wrongly, as it has turned out—that his colleagues’ worries were unnecessary, in which case, it should have been his duty to attend the meeting to persuade them of that. Perhaps he thought that deliberate distancing from continental Europe would bring future rewards in Washington. Perhaps it was the mirage of a generous free trade agreement with mercantilist Mr Trump. If so, it was a serious misjudgment. Whatever the reason, the fact is that we cut less ice in Washington today than at any time since Suez.

So too in Europe, where deliberate distancing from continental partners continues. We now have a senior adviser in No. 10 who feels licensed to tell the 27 that if they do not give us the Brexit terms we need we shall withdraw defence and security co-operation. That is an extraordinary statement. We boycotted the September General Affairs Council. We do not know what Mr Murrison said this week about the Kurds or Ukraine, but I do not think he put forward any initiatives. Are we really playing the leading role that the Speech tells us that we do?

Of course, a continuing aspiration towards a leading role in global affairs, even if we are not up for it, is perhaps a good thing, but ambition has to be matched by ability. We have chosen not to be centre stage in Brussels. If we leave the stage altogether we will have even less influence on policy decisions there. The twin pillars were mutually reinforcing: America listened because America believed that we could move Europe; Europe listened because we stuck by our friends and were thought to have America’s ear. I worry that the economic damage of Brexit will be accompanied by a further enforced retreat from a global leadership role into a truculent, transactional mercantilism in this country.

Perhaps the country is weary of well-doing. Perhaps perseverance is passive. Perhaps we do not care about keeping honour bright. I hope not, but what are the great global challenges that we should address if we are to live up to what the Speech says? I would say that the three biggest are: defending democracy and human rights in an age of authoritarianism; integrating China, the new economic superpower whose economy doubled in the previous decade, into the rules-based system; and maintaining our societies as open societies while climate change drives major population moves.

Clearly, we can do little against any of those three challenges on our own, so we need multipliers. We need to use the Commonwealth; curiously, it was not mentioned in the Speech, despite the Queen being the Head of the Commonwealth. We need to use what position we can still salvage in Europe and recreate that position in the United States. Then again, we might be able to make a contribution commensurate with our Security Council status, although I hope that we will talk about that less hubristically when it is real than we do now, in this Speech, while it is unreal.

I was almost invited to speak about Brexit by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. His reading of Article 50 is, of course, absolutely correct. The divorce negotiators are to take account of the framework for the future relationship; by definition, that is a separate document and a separate issue. However, if they were to take account of it, it follows that it should have existed and come first in the sequencing. Like Sir Ivan Rogers and Mr David Davis, I spoke up for not triggering Article 50 until we had some agreement on the future relationship—at least on what we wanted it to be. That advice was not followed so we ended up with an unsatisfactory, non-binding political declaration and the phrase about taking account of the framework was ignored in practice. Both sides of the negotiation were wrong in that, but I must say this to the noble and learned Lord: I fear that we are where we are and we cannot expect the negotiators to down tools and go back.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

Would it not be possible, if an agreement appears to emerge this week but cannot be put into legal form, to go ahead with the departure agreement, which leaves out that aspect, and thus satisfy the requirement to leave by 31 October? That seems to be the very valuable conclusion of the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

It would not be wise, on either side, or feasible to depart on the basis of an understanding that was being turned into a legal agreement but without that legal agreement existing. Legally, we would move into a very strange status. It is perfectly possible to envisage a deal that can be turned into a legal agreement during an extension period but it is impossible to do that by 31 October and it is unwise—I do not think that either side would want to do so—to go on the basis of a political understanding with no validity in law. I am afraid that I do not agree with the noble Lord.

On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, the idea that a 2016 vote, three Prime Ministers ago, can be permanently determinate does not seem to be the will of the people today. You can ask, “Do you want to be consulted or do you want to leave it to Parliament?” If you assume that there is a deal and you ask, “Do you want to be consulted?”, they say by a margin of almost two to one, “Yes, we want to be consulted”. If you assume that there is no deal and ask, “Do you want to be consulted or should it be left to Parliament?”, they say, “Yes, we want to be consulted”, by a margin of more than two to one. Moreover, it is a fact that since September 2017, the opinion polls have consistently shown that the country is now of the view that it would prefer to remain. This year more than 70 polls have been taken of which one gave a victory for leaving. I do not think that a second referendum is just the least worst way out of this fix; it is now the will of the people.