(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, were we to leave the European Union, the EU would examine our data protection regime to satisfy itself that it would be safe for the EU 27 to continue to exchange electronic data with the UK. This continued exchange of data is essential not only for law enforcement and counter- terrorism purposes but for commercial transactions.
The Government have recently passed the Data Protection Act 2018, which not only provides the necessary infrastructure to enable the UK to comply with the general data protection regulation, a piece of EU legislation, but ensures that the UK complies with EU standards of data protection in relation to law enforcement and national security that are not covered by the GDPR. In other words, the UK is ensuring that it complies with all EU data protection standards, so as to guarantee that it will be issued with a certificate of adequacy that will enable continued exchange of electronic data if we leave the EU.
If, as a result of this Bill or the treaties associated with it, UK companies were required to provide law enforcement agencies in other countries with personal data covered by the Data Protection Act and/or GDPR, and those foreign law enforcement agencies’ data protection standards were deemed by the EU to be inadequate, there is the potential for the EU to withdraw its adequacy certificate from the UK. Basically, if member states of the EU share data with the UK, and the UK shares that data under this Bill with law enforcement agencies that have inadequate data protection standards, the EU might stop sharing data with the UK. This amendment is designed to ensure that this does not happen. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised an issue about which Act would take precedence in the event of a conflict between this Bill—when it becomes an Act—and the Data Protection Act 2018. His amendment makes it clear that, in the case of a conflict, the DPA, along with the GDPR, would take precedence. That seems quite sensible: it gives us certainty on the matter, for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord. I support his amendment.
I thank both noble Lords for their points. There has been nothing in our own domestic law that requires a UK provider to comply with an overseas order. There will therefore be no conflict with domestic law if a CSP decides that complying with a foreign order would put it in breach of its obligations under the GDPR.
The existence of any conflict with UK data protection law does not have the effect of making the order from the other country invalid. Equally, the existence of the order does not compel the UK CSP to ignore its data protection obligations under UK law. It will be for the CSP on which an order is served to reconcile and comply with all legal obligations it is under. It could apply for the variation or revocation of the order, or use the dispute resolution mechanism that we expect all specific international agreements to include. That said, we do not think that this is likely to be necessary in practice. The GDPR contains several “gateways” which permit the cross-border transfer of personal data, including in response to a request or order from overseas law enforcement.
I know the noble Lord’s concerns about data protection, and I absolutely sympathise with him. We have discussed this before, and I think that ultimately we all want the same thing: adequate protection for the privacy rights of individuals. I hope that my explanation will satisfy the noble Lord that the Bill does not in any way threaten data protection rights, which are robustly protected by existing legislation. UK CSPs will continue to be bound by the GDPR and the Data Protection Act. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw Amendment 12.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, until about a year ago I was the Chief Surveillance Commissioner. I shall make a few observations in this debate, largely repeating what I said way back in July.
There are occasions when youngsters can sensibly and safely be used as CHISs. There are occasions when they help in the investigation of crime, and they sometimes work so that crime is prevented. That said, we need to recognise that a number of safeguards are in place—but the question is whether the safeguards are as complete as they should be. They include that an authorising officer in the context that we are considering is always, in every police force, at least at the level of assistant chief constable. This is not a responsibility discharged by relatively junior—or indeed even quite senior—officers. It is a situation in which the inspectors, as they used to be in the surveillance commission, always look at every case involving a juvenile CHIS with particular attention, for all the obvious reasons. However, it is problematic.
The question I have asked, and shall continue to ask, is why on earth we do not have a double-lock system to address all anxieties about whether even assistant chief constables may be as objective as they should be—bearing in mind their responsibilities for the investigation and prevention of crime—in balancing the safety, the welfare and the long-term safety and welfare of the juvenile CHIS. One way is to deal with this process in a way that is perfectly well understood—it certainly was in the surveillance commission and is obviously still understood to this day under the new arrangement. The judicial involvement in this process should not be after the inspection has taken place and the inspectors have reported to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner so that he can make a judgment. Instead, after the senior officer has decided that this is an appropriate situation in which to use a juvenile CHIS, the decision should then be considered by one of the judicial commissioners, who undoubtedly—this is not an implied criticism of assistant chief constables—will be focused more significantly on the protection and the needs of the young CHIS than perhaps a police officer might be.
It is a question of balance. It is a safeguard which could be introduced—unless things have changed dramatically—with little difficulty. Judges are used to giving authorisations for all kinds of elements involved in, if you like, the secret world, and this would be one more. Very few juveniles are used for this purpose and therefore it should not be a burden. I would love to hear the Minister’s answer as to why this should not happen.
The regret Motion, of course, is focused on a different point. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—to whom I forgot to apologise for not being here when he opened the debate: I ask him to forgive me—that there is a failure to keep us informed on this issue, and that is what I regret.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving his regret Motion. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Haskel, who first alerted your Lordships to this issue. The House is also grateful, not only on this issue but generally, for the work of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which scrutinises every instrument that comes before Parliament. It is able to get into what a particular instrument does and then, by engaging with a Minister and through its reports, bring matters of concern to the attention of the House.
Covert surveillance is an important tool that is used to provide the evidence needed to prevent and detect crime. It is necessary, as there may be no other way to get the intelligence needed. Having said that, we have to have proper codes of practice in place and, where that involves young people under the age of 18—who are still legally children—it is of particular concern and importance. We have to ensure that children’s rights are protected and that there are adequate protections in place to take care of their physical and mental well-being and that proper risk assessment is undertaken.
The regret Motion before us rightly expresses regret that organisations concerned with human rights and the welfare of children were not consulted about the decision to extend the maximum length of juvenile covert human intelligence sources authorisations from one month to four months. The Home Office certainly got its presentation of this change wrong. It used terms such as “administrative convenience”, which does nothing to reassure Members that the Government have got the balance right here. What should be of paramount importance is the welfare of the child being used as a covert intelligence source.
As we have heard, this issue was debated in the Moses Room in July—a debate led by my noble friend Lord Haskel—and during that debate I posed a number of questions to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and I shall pose some more today. I hope she is able to give more reassurance to the House when she responds to the debate shortly.
Can the Minister explain carefully why the decision was taken to extend the term from one month to four months? Can she tell the House how the Government have satisfied themselves that these proposals satisfy Section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1999 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United Kingdom ratified in 1991? Can she say how she has satisfied herself that the safeguarding and protection of the children concerned while they work as covert human intelligence sources is delivered? I am sure that she would not have brought this here if she were not personally satisfied.
Moving on to risk assessments, can the Minister tell the House how the rights of the child are protected? Can she outline what specific training or expertise a police officer or other security professional would have in respect of understanding the needs and rights of the child? In what circumstances would it be acceptable for someone who could represent the interests of the young person to not be present during meetings with the handler?
Can the Minister also deal with the issue of consent? How do we make sure that the consent is appropriately understood and given, both where the child’s parents or guardians are informed and in those instances where the parents are not informed or aware of what is happening? Indeed, they could be the people the child is seeking to monitor. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, also raised important points that need answering by the Minister when she responds.
In conclusion, this is a very sensitive and important area of policy affecting vulnerable young people in some very difficult circumstances. It is right that the House uses every device available to it to assure itself that the Government have put the correct and adequate protections in place. Again, I thank both my noble friend Lord Haskel for raising this issue in the first place and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling the regret Motion that has enabled us to debate it.
I also thank both the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for introducing the debate and the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, for his work in bringing this issue to the committee’s attention in the first place. He may think that I am not really thanking him, but I am—it is important for your Lordships’ House to discuss these matters, particularly one such as this which has been in force for the past 18 years and only recently amended ever so slightly.
The debate allows me to both reiterate the importance with which the Government view the safeguarding of those small numbers of young people authorised as covert human intelligence sources and restate the enhanced safeguards that support the juvenile CHIS authorisation framework. We have recently strengthened those safeguards further, as noble Lords have mentioned.
I recognise the concern about the power more broadly, which has been remarked on before not just by me but by other noble Lords. The deployment involved is very small—it is unlikely to reach double figures. However, it is not a new concept. The 2000 order and the various iterations of the CHIS code of practice have governed the use of juvenile CHIS for almost two decades, ensuring that where it is necessary to authorise juveniles as CHIS, an enhanced authorisation and risk assessment is applied. I hope that the debate will assure noble Lords that the existing regime and our amendments to provide a legal framework place the welfare of the CHIS as the primary consideration; the interests of the child have been and will be paramount.
I will start by addressing the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked me a very similar one—on why we have extended the authorisation for the juvenile CHIS from one month to four months and why we are increasing the period between renewals at a point when CHIS are being deployed in increasingly dangerous situations. Secondly, he asked why, when a monthly review of the case is required in any event, the review could not just continue to consider renewal of the authorisation—that is a question that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has now posed to me twice.
I do not know whether the noble Lord has that right or wrong. I will have to come back to him on that point. Just so he does not think I am derelict in my duty, I did ask that question but I will have to come back to him on it.
I turn to the second question, which was not about the changes that we have made but about the existing distinction in the safeguards, where an appropriate adult must be present in all meetings with a juvenile under the age of 16, but not for those aged 16 and 17. The noble Lord compared this with rules around the interview of juveniles under caution, where interviews of all under-18s require an appropriate adult to be present. I point out that 16 and 17 year-olds can absolutely request that somebody be present—a social worker, an appropriate adult or even a lawyer—but it is not mandated. That probably will not satisfy the noble Lord, but the law recognises that parental responsibility diminishes as a child matures. There are therefore a number of areas where the law treats over-16s differently from under-16s. For example, they can apply for their own passports or join the military.
Internal police guidance on deploying juvenile CHIS contains detail on how to safeguard and promote the well-being of the juvenile CHIS, including how to assess their maturity and capacity to give informed consent, which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned, a requirement to ensure that handlers are properly trained to deal with young people—they have day-to-day responsibility for the CHIS and must raise any issues surrounding matters including the safety and welfare of the CHIS with those responsible for authorising their deployment—and requirements to consider all aspects of safeguarding the young person.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness on that point. Is she saying that the officers concerned get special training in that respect to deal with young people in this situation?
Yes. Any officer dealing with a juvenile will have safeguarding training.
The enhanced risk assessments required before a CHIS is tasked are reviewed and updated throughout the duration of an authorisation, and are also updated after an authorisation is cancelled and where contact is maintained with the CHIS. This applies to all juvenile CHISs, regardless of age, but it really should not be taken that the vulnerability of all those aged under 18 is not taken seriously when considering deployment as a CHIS. Rather, the risk assessments are made on a case-by-case basis by those charged with day-to-day dealings with the CHIS, including on their safety and welfare, and who are charged with relaying this to the authorising officer, who also has a role in this assessment.
In a recent letter to the chair of the JCHR, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Lord Justice Fulford, provided clarity on what his inspectors considered when inspecting public authorities which have authorised juvenile CHISs, and confirmed that the detailed focus of his inspectors is on the “duty of care”.
Turning to the very specific comparison, I think we are probably talking about a different scenario—one where the juvenile could be charged with an offence, and convicted or given a caution. With a juvenile CHIS, we are talking about a very different scenario. A child would need to give or confirm their consent to take on the role, and is under no obligation or pressure to act as a juvenile CHIS.
The third question raised by the noble Lord, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is how the needs of the specific child are prioritised, particularly with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in mind. The UK ensures that the principles of the convention are considered and realised through the approach taken in legislation and other measures, ensuring that the child’s rights and interests are safeguarded.
On the previous point made by the Minister about there being no pressure put on a young person to act as a CHIS, is it possible, when a young person has come to the attention of the authorities—or may have committed a crime—that it would be suggested to the child that matters would not be proceeded with if they were to act as a CHIS instead?
I understand the noble Lord’s point. It would be unwise for me to stand at the Dispatch Box and say that that was the case, because I simply do not know. I can find that out. It would be rather cynical to take the view that these children, who are perhaps not perfect in many cases, would be deployed just on the information that officers could get out of them or as a quid pro quo for leniency over other matters in which they may have been found wanting.
I am just trying to understand the situation. It would be nice to hear from the noble Baroness at some point—maybe she can write to us. It should obviously always come to the attention of the authorities through various means, such as intelligence. However the authorities come to it, what are the circumstances such young people would find themselves in with the authorities?
I will certainly write to the noble Lord on that matter.
The legal framework governing the authorisation and the use of the juvenile CHIS, when taken as a whole, is clearly capable of being exercised in a way which is consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 2000 order, the supporting guidance provided in the CHIS code of practice and the internal guidance applied by public authorities seeking to use juvenile CHISs, all ensure that the welfare of any juvenile being considered for deployment as a CHIS is the paramount consideration.
Each part of the legislative framework is designed to ensure that the authorisation of a CHIS under the age of 18 is subject to enhanced safeguards, reflecting the need to consider the welfare of the child. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000 requires enhanced risk assessments to accompany any decision to use a juvenile CHIS, which are updated to reflect developments during the course of the deployment. They take into account the physical and psychological welfare of that young person, and are also updated after the deployment if contact is made.
The police will also have regard to their broader safeguarding responsibilities when making these decisions, which was the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Indeed, the National Strategy for the Policing of Children and Young People, endorsed and published by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in 2015, says:
“It is crucial that in all encounters with the police those below the age of 18 should be treated as children first. All officers must have regard to their safety, welfare and wellbeing”,
as required under Sections 10 and 11 of the Children Act 2004 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the first duty of a Government is to keep their citizens safe and have legislation on the statute book that gives powers to the appropriate authorities to keep people safe. I will always support the work of the Government in this regard. That is not to say that I will not question and probe them and seek to amend legislation when we believe that they are not striking the right balance. That is the point of our being here: to make legislation better and more effective; to fully understand the Government’s intentions; and to avoid as far as possible the problems caused by unintended consequences —a point made earlier by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, speaks with great knowledge and experience of these matters and the House will benefit enormously from his contributions. I hope the Minister will answer the points he made.
It would not be right to respond to a debate on counterterrorism and border security without putting on record our thanks to and gratitude for the members of the security services and the police who have done so much to keep us safe, as well as those of the other emergency services, such as the fire brigade and the ambulance service, who are there when they are needed. They save people’s lives, as do NHS staff—not only doctors and nurses but the other healthcare professionals and ancillary staff who work together to deliver the services we all rely on, particularly in times of emergency.
We have seen terrorism on our streets too many times, most recently on Westminster Bridge and at Carriage Gates, at Manchester Arena, London Bridge and Borough Market, and at Parsons Green. There were also the terrible events in Salisbury—the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, then the poisoning of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley on 30 June, leading to the death of Dawn Sturgess on 8 July. I express my sympathy to all victims of these terrorist incidents and their families. This is very real and we are lucky that many more plots and plans have been prevented, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, mentioned in opening the debate. The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, set out in his contribution the number of offences and convictions and the potential terrorist operations that have been prevented. We thank all those heroes for their bravery and professionalism; they were there when we needed them to keep us safe.
The noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, was right to remind us of the names of parliamentary colleagues who lost their lives and were murdered by terrorists. I would add the name of Jo Cox, MP for Batley and Spen, who was murdered by a terrorist with links to the far right in her constituency on 16 June 2016. The terrorist shouted “Britain First” as he stabbed her to death outside the library in Birstall, where she was due to hold a surgery.
The noble Lord referred to the murder of our parliamentary colleague Jo Cox by a far-right terrorist. He was not a far-right terrorist. He was an unbalanced man who was obsessed with the Nazis, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party—a left-wing party.
We will have to disagree on that point.
As I said, I support the Bill and will always seek to make a contribution in your Lordships’ House that supports the work of those who seek to protect us and to provide constructive opposition to improve legislation before us, as does my noble friend Lord Rosser.
Before we get to the Bill itself, I join other noble Lords in congratulating both noble Lords who made their excellent maiden contributions today. They bring considerable experience from the House of Commons where they served for many years with distinction. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, served as the Solicitor-General in the first part of the coalition Government. I lived and worked in the east Midlands for many years and, although I am a Londoner, I have much affection for my time there and in Leicestershire. I know the noble and learned Lord’s former constituency very well.
The noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, was the formidable chair of the Treasury Select Committee for the last seven years of his time in the House of Commons, having succeeded my noble friend Lord McFall to that position. In a previous life some years ago I appeared before a House of Commons committee. It was a scary experience. I am very pleased that the noble Lord was not a member of that committee; I would have been very worried about his forensic questioning. I am now worried about some forensic interventions in future debates, but I know that we all look forward to both noble Lords’ contributions in this House, which they will make many times.
We can support the Bill in general and will seek to make improvements during its passage through this House, building on issues raised in the other place and in today’ debate. The Bill is in two parts, with the first making changes to the law following reviews by the Government of their counterterrorism strategy and of counterterrorism legislation in force, while Part 2 seeks to provide new powers in respect of the detention and questioning of people at ports and border controls suspected of being involved in hostile acts on behalf of and in the interests of another state outside the United Kingdom.
As my noble friend Lord Rosser pointed out, a number of amendments to the Bill were tabled fairly late in the day in the Commons and were added with little scrutiny. Those amendments in particular will require detailed examination by the House. There are Members on all Benches, many of whom have spoken today, who are expert in providing scrutiny and challenge. In particular, I refer to the amendments made to the Bill in the other place covering entering and remaining in a designated area, the publication of images, obtaining or viewing material over the internet, increases in maximum sentences and extended sentences for terrorism offences.
My noble friend Lord Rosser outlined concerns about proportionality, particularly arising from amendments introduced in the House of Commons. The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, drew out some contradictions in the Bill that will need to be examined further. The noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, made a very important point about people being radicalised in prison. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, will address that in her reply. That is not to say that we do not agree with the proposals but they need proper scrutiny, which they have not received so far.
Legitimate concerns have been raised by Bond, the UK network for organisations working in international development, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding. Can the noble Baroness tell us what the protections for aid workers in high-risk jurisdictions are? She may not think that these proposals pose any risk to them, but that view is not shared by everyone: we need to address the legitimate concerns raised by NGOs in this regard.
It would also be useful if the noble Baroness addressed the protection afforded by “reasonable excuse”. Is she really satisfied that it provides protection to mitigate the impact on individuals? The wider point was made about banks and other financial institutions taking derisking measures such as stopping bank payments and closing the bank accounts of NGOs. Journalists and foreign correspondents of UK news organisations can sometimes find themselves in very difficult and dangerous places. What they find and report on is vital, shining a light on those individuals, organisations and Governments, including dictatorships, who work in the dark, who abuse, oppress, terrorise and murder people, and who do not want their activities to be widely reported on. These activities can be against their own citizens or citizens of another country.
I made the point earlier about unintended consequences of legislation. We must be very mindful of that during the passage of the Bill, which I hope the whole House can see could have far-reaching effects on both international aid and journalism if not handled properly. I very much support the protection of press freedom and journalistic sources, as I support the victims of press abuse and their right to proper redress. Again, it will be important to clarify the intention of some of the clauses so that legitimate investigative journalism and reporting is not caught up and criminalised. It may be that, through regulation and guidance, protections will be sufficiently strong, but this is an important area for our deliberations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, made a powerful speech which the Government would be wise to listen to carefully. Getting the balance right on this legislation will be crucial. I was very sorry to hear about the abuse the noble Baroness has received on social media, which I condemn. The internet and social media is a wonderful thing and can enrich our lives, but the darker side and the abuse must be stopped. The Government really have to address that issue separately from the Bill.
Of course, we fully understand that the Government have to deal with the issue of foreign fighters returning from abroad, but any suggestion of updating and using the concept of treason, a law dating from 1351 and not used since 1945, is misplaced. There are other, more appropriate means of addressing these issues. I also think that we undermine, not uphold, the rule of law by removing the right to private legal advice. My honourable friend in the other place, Nick Thomas-Symonds MP, reminded us that the Appeal Court upheld this principle recently in the case of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation. Lawyers are subject to professional standards and it is right that they are. Illegal activities should be dealt with appropriately, but we should not lose the principle of being able to seek advice from a lawyer in private. Proposals in the Bill seek to change that, and the reasons given are that the person in question may want to contact someone in order to alert them that they have been stopped at a border crossing, or that a lawyer would not adhere to proper professional standards and would pass information on or would leak information inadvertently. There is a better solution, which is to establish a panel of lawyers, subject to proper rules and regulations, who would be able to give legal advice. The advice would remain private, retaining an important legal principle but also safeguarding against a person misusing the right to seek advice from a lawyer in private.
My noble friend Lord Rosser referred to the European arrest warrant and the important role it plays in bringing suspects quickly into the criminal justice system. We need a deal to secure the European arrest warrant and it will be a disaster if this cannot be assured. Criminals will be the only beneficiaries. It is worth noting that the Government sought a European arrest warrant against the suspects in the Skripal incident.
I fully endorse the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate: there must not be even one hour’s gap in the work of sharing information with other European partners, as to allow this will benefit only the terrorist who is seeking to harm our country, citizens and residents.
The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, made an important point about getting the balance right and the importance of co-operation with our partners. I accept the point she made about the pace and scale of operations and the need to plug a number of gaps in our legislation to address certain issues.
My noble friend Lord Rosser spoke about the Prevent programme and I fully endorse his comments.
In conclusion, this is an important Bill covering many serious issues for this House to consider over the coming period. I look forward to working with others to improve what is before the House today and to send a much better Bill back to the other place for its agreement. With that in mind, I hope the Government will continue to work in the consensual manner they have demonstrated to date.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble and learned Lord for our conversation on this matter. Of course, that would require a change in the legislation, but we consider that this enhanced authorisation, which has been in place for 18 years and approved under the leadership of successive Governments, is robust. It is subject to enhanced safeguards and strong and effective oversight. It should command confidence.
My Lords, can the Minister tell the House how the safety of the child is ensured when they are put in these dangerous situations where serious criminality is suspected of taking place? That can include the children providing information about their parents and other close family members to the authorities.
The noble Lord asks the right question. The child’s safety remains paramount. Enhanced risk assessments are required before the CHIS is tasked and are reviewed and updated throughout the duration of an authorisation. They are also updated after an authorisation is cancelled where contact with the CHIS is maintained. In the case of children aged 16 to 17, the law recognises that these assessments must be done on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the presence of a responsible adult may or may not be required at that stage.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I cannot second-guess the thinking behind some of the decision-making, but it might be to protect some people’s names. However, as I have just said, the Prime Minister has committed to publication, whether in a redacted form or not.
My Lords, on the compensation scheme that is out for consultation, has the Home Office considered emergency payments to those who have been treated wrongfully and unfairly? I am thinking particularly of those in hardship.
The noble Lord brings this up again and it is an important point, because we have heard anecdotal evidence of hardship. The Home Secretary recognises that. His immediate priority has been to help some of those affected to establish their immigration status but also to support people in advance of the compensation scheme being put in place. Where there is an immediate need—he outlined such a case to me the other day—we are supporting people to access housing and benefits and deal with immediate problems while removing immigration obstacles to their finding work. In addition, the noble Lord might want to know that we have signed an agreement with Citizens Advice, which can provide some of the professional bespoke advice that people might need.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the extent to which the implementation of immigration policy has led to the separation of children from their parents.
My Lords, the family Immigration Rules and the policy on exceptional circumstances provide a clear basis for considering applications to remain in the UK. Individuals with no leave to remain are expected to leave voluntarily. We may enforce their removal if they do not. Our family separation guidance makes clear that staff must consider the best interests of any children, including their needs and caring arrangements, before taking enforcement action.
My Lords, how many children are presently separated from their parents or carers in the UK as a result of decisions taken by the immigration authorities to implement the policies of the Government?
I am afraid that I cannot provide the noble Lord with that exact detail, as it is not available. However, we have done dip sampling in the cases of 84 foreign national offenders from July 2017 to July 2018, and two family separations were detected. It is not clear whether they were temporary or whether we were seeking to remove one parent from the UK.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI do not suppose that that will trouble us in Grand Committee.
Clause 10 deals with the retention of data and its use as evidence. Clause 10(1) provides that data,
“may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. This includes retaining it so that it may be used as evidence in proceedings in respect of an offence”.
“Necessary in all the circumstances” is quite a wide term. It may be unkind of me but, when I reread it yesterday, it felt as though the writer had run out of steam. One example is given but I would have expected more information about protections and clarification; otherwise, how does one challenge this? Therefore, the amendment is intended to ask the Minister how the Home Office envisages that this clause will operate in practice.
Given the example included, I wonder whether the Home Office anticipates producing guidance regarding retention, and that is the subject of Amendment 31. Amendment 32 is intended to probe the term “an offence”. Does this mean any offence? In particular, if an offence other than the object of this exercise is disclosed, is a fresh application needed or can this be—I will use the extreme term—an unending fishing expedition? I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raises three important amendments here and I look forward to the Minister’s response. She is right that, as written, the provision appears to be very wide in scope, and it would be better to have more clarification. The terms “in all the circumstances” and “an offence” are very wide, and it would be good to hear what they are. As the noble Baroness said, it would appear that there could be a never-ending fishing expedition, which in itself would not serve justice. I look forward to hearing the response to the very valid points raised.
I thank the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their points. I turn to the first point that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made—I am sorry, he did not speak, so it must have been the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee; they do not look anything like each other. Where material is provided in compliance with a PACE production order, police are in principle able to use that material where it is relevant and necessary for another policing purpose, including a separate criminal investigation. The intention behind the overseas production order is basically to replicate the powers available to law enforcement under current domestic production powers. Under the Bill, the same will apply to electronic data obtained under overseas production orders. This ensures that law enforcement officials can use their independent discretion to consider what is appropriate to help with the conduct of their duties.
The effect of Amendment 32 would be to restrict the retention of the evidence produced in respect of an overseas production order to the offence for which the order was made. The Bill’s provisions do not dictate when an officer should apply for a new production order in respect of data received that is to be used for a different purpose. Again, this is consistent with existing practice. The Bill simply makes the same provisions in relation to orders which can be served on an entity outside the UK, where a relevant agreement is in place, as in relation to orders which can be served on a company based here.
It will always be appropriate for law enforcement officers and prosecutors to consider what can be used in an investigation and for evidential purposes. They will assess the likelihood of challenge in court where evidence produced in relation to a production order is adduced for a separate criminal offence. That is already their bread and butter. In all likelihood in those situations an appropriate officer may well decide that it would be more appropriate for a new production order to be obtained for the material produced that points to a separate offence.
A question was asked about guidance. The Government will consider whether it is necessary to produce policy guidance to assist an appropriate officer in these circumstances but, given that the Bill reflects existing practice in relation to production, I do not see that it brings about a new challenge for our law enforcement or prosecution professionals and I do not think it is necessary to mandate it in the Bill. For these reasons, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
That was a very long explanation of why the clause is as it is and I thank the Minister for it. She referred to how this in effect mirrors what we have in PACE. Is guidance provided on PACE?
There is a code of practice for PACE. We will look at whether some guidance is necessary for this replicated process.
I thank the Minister for saying she will look at those points. If we are mirroring PACE then we can mirror the guidance as well.
My Lords, I think I am going to have to spend some time between now and Report familiarising myself with PACE or hand this over to my noble friend Lord Paddick, whose bread and butter it was at one time. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, but I remain faintly uneasy about how open this is. Nevertheless I thank the Minister and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 39 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I am grateful for the briefing from techUK, which raises concerns about how this legislation might affect a deal between the EU and the UK on adequacy should the UK leave the European Union. We are unsure how to address those concerns and this amendment is very unlikely to be the means by which to do so, but at this stage it is a means of raising them. It is a bit of a Second Reading amendment, if noble Lords get my drift.
Throughout our debates it has been emphasised that the sole purpose of this legislation is to enable UK law enforcement agencies to find a faster legal means to secure data held overseas that may contain vital evidence in serious criminal cases being prosecuted in the UK than the current mutual legal assistance treaty process. Data handled in the UK is subject to the protections of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the EU general data protection regulations. Indeed, the Data Protection Act ensures that the GDPR continues to have effect, even if the UK does leave the EU.
Throughout our debates on this legislation we have expressed our concerns that the designated international co-operation arrangements that enable overseas production orders to have effect in the target state will give as much right to overseas law enforcement agencies to demand data from UK service providers as the right this legislation will give UK law enforcement agencies to demand data from a service provider in a foreign state. Those foreign states, such as the United States of America, are not bound by the Data Protection Act or the GDPR.
For a third country to exchange data with the EU it must persuade the EU that it has adequate protections for personal data equivalent to or exceeding the standards that EU countries have to comply with under the GDPR. Indeed, EU states are not bound by EU regulation relating to data used for national security purposes, but third-party states are. For the first time, if we leave the EU, the EU will scrutinise the way we handle data in relation to national security because we will become a third-party country, involving more scrutiny than currently takes place. I think that is called “taking back control”. Whether in relation to national security or not—we have already debated the weaker safeguards proposed in relation to terrorism offences—such arrangements could result in personal data from an EU country and shared with a UK service provider being passed to a law enforcement agency in a state that falls short of the protections provided by the GDPR.
In summary, our concern is that, by entering into international co-operation agreements enabling overseas law enforcement agencies directly to access personal data held in the UK by UK service providers, sensitive personal data will be accessed by overseas law enforcement agencies whose standards fall below those set out in the Data Protection Act and the GDPR, thereby jeopardising the EU granting the UK an adequacy certificate. Could the Minister explain what discussions have taken place with the EU on this issue and how the UK’s adequacy status will be protected? I beg to move.
My Lords, I fully support the amendment moved by the noble Lord. I recall our debates in the Chamber on the GDPR and how important it is to get the adequacy certificate to make sure that we are compliant with all these regulations, and we cannot put that at risk in subsequent legislation. I am looking for the Minister to address that point. The noble Lord has raised a very valid point. We need to get this right before this legislation reaches the statute book.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for the point that he has made, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for backing it up. I smiled when the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about countries that fall short of our data protection laws. We are probably at the top of the EU league table in terms of the rigour of our data protection legislation—I can think of some countries that might fall into the category that the noble Lord talks about—but the Bill will put on an equal footing the means by which UK law enforcement officers or prosecutors can apply to the court for access to electronic evidence, irrespective of whether the data is held by an entity based in the UK or based elsewhere in the world. UK law enforcement will be bound by the very robust Data Protection Act 2018 when processing personal data obtained pursuant to an overseas production order or where access has been given to data pursuant to such an order.
The noble Lord asked what discussions have been taking place. Those discussions are above my pay grade. I have not been involved in them personally but I know that they will have been going on, certainly in the background. However, the noble Lord makes a very good point about the adequacy decision. He also asked how we will ensure that data is used for the correct purposes. That is all part and parcel of what our Data Protection Act provides for. I am absolutely convinced that we in the UK have the right data protection safeguards in place and, when it comes to data protection and other countries, we will ensure that the same rigour is in place in the country with which we have made an agreement.
Clause 6(4)(c) states that an overseas production order,
“has effect in spite of any restriction”.
The noble Lord asked whether that means that UK CSPs do not need to comply with data protection. Having effect “in spite of any restriction” relates only to the effect of an order served on a CSP outside the UK, so the restrictions can only be in UK law, as we obviously cannot seek to override laws in other countries.
It might be helpful to reiterate that, when making a production order, a judge must consider the requirements set out in Clause 4. In doing so, he or she will need to consider whether the evidence is of substantial value to the investigation or proceedings and whether it is in the public interest to produce the information, balancing these factors with the right to privacy. It stands to reason that the more sensitive the data, the harder it will be for the applicant to justify the public interest test. I hope that the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to put it into the Bill that, in cases of dispute, the GDPR shall prevail. Is the noble Baroness saying that this is implied anyway, or not necessary? If we end up with this on the statute book as it is now, and the matter of which Act applies were to become a matter of dispute in the courts, that is not where we would want to be.
I agree with the noble Lord, but I am saying there would be an underlying basis for data protection, which is the Data Protection Act. Therefore, while there are many things we could put on the faces of many Bills, it is not necessary in this case—we already have laws governing the protection of data.
With that comment, is the Minister saying that, actually, GDPR will prevail?
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Grand CommitteeTo deal with the first point on the death penalty, I thought I had made it clear but clearly I have not. We have meetings scheduled and I would like to discuss it further before Report. I hoped that I had explained that the OSJA process was effectively a risk assessment process that sought protections and risk assessment on such things as the death penalty and other human rights issues, but I would be very grateful if we could discuss that before Report. On the other issue, that of compliance, UK companies are not compelled by UK law but they may be compelled by the other jurisdiction—that is the point that I made at Second Reading—depending on the country in question.
It is not only my noble friend Lord Rosser who is confused about the death penalty, as I am confused as well. It is not just that the Minister has not been clear with us; it also involves some of her right honourable friends in the department and the comments they have made. We need to address the problem there. Comments are made but then if we look at the policy on paper, they do not add up. That is the problem we have.
I understand the point that the noble Lord is making. I, not least, look forward to the discussion that we are going to have.
My Lords, our exchange on the previous group of amendments, when the Minister gave a lot of assurances, makes me even keener on Amendment 5, which would require writing into the Bill that a designated international co-operation agreement must be in the form of a treaty. I understand that that is what was intended, so I think it would be more than appropriate to say so. Taking only the discussion about the death penalty, it argues for the amendment, given that the procedures for dealing with the treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 include safeguards to be met before a treaty can be ratified which include transparency, debate in public, and so on.
The Minister gave a list of matters—I failed to write down all of them—to which the Government would have regard. I got down trust, mutual respect, judicial oversight and “must be compliant with HMG guidance”. The reference to guidance has my antennae twitching in this context. We do not want to rely on guidance; we want to rely on legislative certainty and the involvement of Parliament.
The Minister said either at Second Reading or in a meeting before Second Reading—we are always grateful for such discussion—that the Government would not enter into an agreement with North Korea. I could add to that nightmare not a treaty but a memorandum of understanding with North Korea, which would come nowhere near Parliament. Our laws have protection against a mad Executive and we should commit to using them.
We have had a long but inconclusive discussion about how human rights would be protected. A statement to Parliament under the 2010 Act procedure would deal with this. It might also set out standard clauses. I am unclear whether we should expect standard clauses in different co-operation agreements. They should be relatively straightforward in most cases.
For similar reasons, Amendment 38 would apply the affirmative procedure to regulations designating the co-operation arrangement. We all know about the problems with scrutinising secondary legislation.
Amendment 6 is to ask what is meant by participation in this context. Clause 1(5) refers to an arrangement,
“to which the United Kingdom is a party or in which the United Kingdom participates”.
What is participation in this context? I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Baroness has done her usual forensic job of going through the Bill and done a service to the Grand Committee. It is important that we are clear about what we are agreeing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. It is right that Amendment 5 makes it clear that we are talking about the treaties which are subject to the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. It is a sensible move.
Amendment 6 is a probing amendment at this stage. What is meant by participation? If you are a party to something, then there is what you are participating in, so clearly the Government think that there are two different things. It will be good to hear the Minister’s view on the difference between those two things and why they both need to be in the Bill. I am sure that “form of a treaty” needs to be in the Bill.
Finally, Amendment 8 ensures that whatever regulation is agreed will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure in the House. Again, I think that is important. Will the Minister confirm that the Government would do that anyway and, if so, say why it is not in the Bill?
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for their points. I turn first to Amendment 5. Clause 1 outlines the circumstances in which an overseas production order can be made. This includes that an application must specify a designated international co-operation arrangement. This is defined in Clause 1(5), to which the noble Baroness has proposed her amendment. The amendment would ensure that only treaties as defined by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would be capable of designation as an international co-operation arrangement under the Bill.
The definition of “designated international co-operation arrangement” in Clause 1(5) has been drafted to take into account that there may be circumstances in which a relationship with another country is established which would not attract the procedures set out in Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. Those procedures require that, prior to ratification, a treaty is to be laid by a Minister of the Crown before Parliament for 21 sitting days without either House having resolved that it should not be ratified. The process does not apply to certain types of treaties including those covered by Section 5 of the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, which include treaties that amend the founding EU treaties.
Also, some treaties can come into force on signature and do not require formal ratification and are therefore not subject to the Part 2 procedure. The definition of “treaty” in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act also excludes instruments made under a treaty, so EU instruments would not be capable of being designated. Without necessarily knowing which countries the UK may choose to operate this arrangement with, the clause had been intentionally drafted to be wider than the definition of “treaty” under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act to ensure that the UK can enter into arrangements with international partners where both have committed to remove any barriers to compliance for an overseas production order. In reality, it is unlikely for either the UK or another country to commit to complying with orders that have extraterritorial scope without acknowledging this through a formalised agreement or arrangement.
The noble Baroness also mentioned the point about standard clauses in all international agreements. This is a new approach to cross-border data access for law enforcement purposes. Actually, there are no templates to follow. If she means something different by “standard clauses”, perhaps we could have a further discussion. We are working with the US to develop an agreement as a matter of priority and we hope that this will act as the template for future arrangements with other appropriate countries.
On Amendment 6, the definition of an international co-operation arrangement is expansive to account for a situation where the UK itself is a contracting party to an arrangement, in the form of a bilateral treaty or multilateral convention, as well as a situation where the UK is a member of a supranational body and that body is a contracting party to such an arrangement in its own right, or has created its own internal rules which apply to its members. In the latter case, those rules would be the international arrangement in which the UK participates. Current membership of the EU is a good example whereby, in many cases, the EU—not the individual member states—is the party to an arrangement between it and a non-EU country. Further, the EU creates internal rules in the form of regulations and directives in which the UK participates as a member state. In both these scenarios, the UK participates by virtue of its membership of the EU. I hope that is as clear as mud to everyone.
I accept that with the UK’s imminent departure from the EU, a scenario in which the UK participates indirectly in an arrangement through its membership of a supranational organisation is less likely to happen. However, until that time and as long as the UK remains an EU member state, legislating along these lines recognises the status quo as now, which is that the UK can be a participant to an arrangement without necessarily being a party to it.
On Amendment 38, I refer noble Lords to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee memorandum, which sets out our justification for the approach that we have taken. In the memorandum, the Government state that:
“The Bill specifies in full what the implications of a designation are, and does not permit the implementation into UK law of any international arrangement in relation to the investigation or prosecution of offences, but only one that reflects the terms of the Bill. The provisions of the Bill will ensure that an order is only served where it meets the requirements of the designated international co-operation arrangement … Further, most international arrangements entered into will be subject to the procedure in Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, so Parliament will have had an opportunity to scrutinise the arrangement before it is ratified by the Government … Accordingly, since any exercise of the power is subject to the safeguards set out in the Bill and Parliament will already have had an opportunity to scrutinise the arrangements, the negative procedure is proposed”.
For the purposes of outgoing requests which the Bill is to be used for, any international co-operation arrangement would set out the terms of our UK law enforcement being able to make requests from another country. Although the terms will set out the reciprocal process, the arrangement will also be designated under regulations made under Section 52 of the IP Act 2016, which is how the UK will recognise any international arrangement for an incoming request. Regulations under Section 52 are also subject to the negative procedure, so the approach taken here is consistent. With those words, I hope that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness might feel happy to withdraw or not press their amendments.
I thank the Minister very much as I have learned something today about participants, which is useful and very good. I think the Minister was saying that Amendment 5, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was too restrictive—that it would remove other treaties and arrangements. Can she maybe say a bit about what would then be the parameters if the Bill stays as it is? If I accept her point about it being too narrow, what parameters are the Government actually asking for? It is important that we are clear what we are passing.
Put simply, I think the parameters we are discussing are that there might be circumstances in which a relationship with another country is established, which would not attract the procedures set out in Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. In my view, that would therefore appear to be the scope of this. The noble Lord does not look entirely convinced.
My Lords, the amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall speak also to Amendment 10.
Clause 2 lists appropriate officers who can make an application for an overseas production order. The list clearly indicates what this legislation is about: securing evidence to present before a court. It is not, for example, a search for intelligence; intelligence officers are not listed. Clause 2 is a list of law enforcement officers and, as such, subsection (1)(a)(vii) and (b)(v), which allow the Secretary of State by regulation to specify others as appropriate officers, should be restricted to specified law enforcement officers and not simply be left open to any person of a description specified in regulations. Our amendments would place such a restriction on the regulating powers of the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord raises an important point. In response, I am sure that the noble Baroness will explain to us why the Government deem it necessary to take this wider power and not restrict it, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has sought to do, to officers from wherever who are actually enforcing law enforcement functions. On the face of it this seems a very sensible amendment, and I look forward to hearing why the Government think they need this wider power in this context.
My Lords, I hope that this amendment will not require any further meetings or probing on Report. The Bill provides that an appropriate officer is able to apply for an overseas production order where an indictable offence has been committed, where proceedings in relation to that indictable offence have been instituted or investigated, or where the order is sought for the purpose of terrorist investigations. Therefore, the clause is already limited to officers who are exercising law enforcement functions. In fact, the clause already makes clear that where a listed appropriate officer has functions other than for law enforcement purposes, it is only where the appropriate officer is exercising functions in relation to the investigation or prosecution of criminal conduct that they may apply for an overseas production order. For example, a person appointed by the FCA can conduct both civil and criminal investigations and the clause ensures that they can apply for an overseas production order only in connection with criminal investigations or prosecutions. I hope that that provides reassurance.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for repeating the Answer given in the other place by the Immigration Minister earlier today, outlining what the Government are doing to deal with this frankly appalling scandal. I have a number of questions for the noble Baroness. What action is the task force taking to help individuals who have been deported to return to the UK, and does that include paying their travel costs? Why have only 18 apologies been issued so far? Surely everybody wronged by this scandal should receive an apology. Finally, can she assure the House that the Home Office has taken the required action to ensure that no new victims of this scandal are being created today and as we go forward?
The noble Lord asked about the actions of the task force to help people to return to the UK. The task force will help where it can and in whatever way is appropriate in a particular case. I cannot give the detail as every case will be different. The noble Lord also asked why only 18 people had been apologised to. Of all the people whom the task force is considering, those are the 18 most likely to have suffered detriment. Eleven of those people left voluntarily; clearly, they are being helped to return to this country if they wish to do so, in whatever way might be appropriate.
We were all shocked at the death of those three people. Without talking about the individual cases, I know that two were removed post 2010 and one previously. None was detained and all left the country voluntarily, but that does not diminish in any way the sadness at the fact that they have died. The whole House will share the noble Baroness’s shock. She gave some descriptions of the approach of the Home Office to the Windrush generation and other immigration cases. As I have said to her and to the House before, it is worth bearing in mind that the new Home Secretary made it very clear when he arrived in post that the new approach would be to treat people as people, not as cases—a more humane approach. I hope that, since he became Home Secretary, he has demonstrated his commitment both to the Windrush generation and to that more humane environment, including by dropping the term “hostile environment”.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, she did not answer the last part of my question. I will not pursue it here, but can she confirm that she will write to me on that?
Was it about why the Home Secretary apologised only to those 18 people? Will the noble Lord remind me?
I asked whether we are absolutely clear that we are not creating new cases for the future, because that would be the worst thing that could happen.
I apologise to the noble Lord; I did not write that bit down. It is the first day back—I am just getting into the flow of it. On whether it will ever happen again, the “lessons learned” review will teach us a lot, and the independent assurance review of the whole process will be very helpful. All these things have taught all political parties why this whole process, which took place over successive generations, should never happen again. It also teaches us something about identity assurance and the importance of getting that right, certainly as we leave the EU and in the future, so that people are not caught out by these unintended consequences of what was originally a welcoming approach to our Windrush community, whose work over the years we value.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have seen an 11% increase in recorded crime, police officer numbers at a record low, only 9% of recorded crime resulting in anyone being charged or summoned to court, offences involving knives and sharp instruments up 16%, gun crime up 2% and murder and manslaughter up 12%. These are appalling figures. Will the noble Baroness tell the House what responsibility the Government accept for letting the public down so badly?
My Lords, I have said that the Government recognise the genuine increase in serious, violent crimes. I have talked about our serious violence strategy. This very week my honourable friend in another place, Victoria Atkins, will be going out to schools to talk about the initiative #knifefree and the importance of young people not getting drawn into knife crime. We have a number of initiatives around this, including Operation Sceptre. I have outlined not only the funding settlement for this year but the Home Secretary’s priority for the next spending round, because he recognises the sheer strain that police have been put under—the changing face of the types of crime that people are committing and, of course, the strain that they have been under in terms of terrorist attacks. I will say something about police numbers in relation to serious violence. At the national level, most types of serious violence were far higher in 2000, with higher police numbers compared with the 1950s and 1960s, when police numbers were far lower. That is not to denigrate the points made about the police and the pressure they are under. I take this opportunity to thank the police for the very important work they do in keeping our communities safe.