(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI have no doubt that that will be taken into account, as will the general conduct of IPSO, when it comes to determining and reporting on the terms of the consultation itself.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord acknowledged that the work that had gone into the cross-party agreement and the subsequent royal charter was intended to set up a body and a mechanism as far removed from political interference as possible to ensure press freedom. By refusing to commence Section 40 and now by having a consultation on the matter, have the Government not brought it right back into the field of political play, undoing all the work done to try to remove political interference from this very important area for those of us who want to see freedom of the press?
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions from your Lordships in respect of this matter. I will not seek to repeat the arguments that were rehearsed so fully in Committee and on Report but I wish to make some observations.
The Smith agreement was explicit in its reference to putting the Sewel convention on a statutory footing, and that is what has been done—essentially as the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, noted—in a declaratory sense.
Mention has been made repeatedly of the case of Pepper v Hart. I am not going to go there in any detail, but the starting point for that case is ambiguity. A number of noble Lords indicated that there was no ambiguity. I am inclined to agree with that—but not necessarily for the same reasons. However, it appears to me that if there were room for ambiguity then of course Pepper v Hart might come into consideration.
Reference was made to the LCM—the legislative consent Motion—process and the suggestion that it should be incorporated into the clause. With respect, the LCM is a process of the Scottish Parliament, not of this Parliament—it is what the Scottish Parliament does in response to us applying the Sewel convention—and therefore it would not be appropriate to bring it into Clause 2.
There is then the question of what is or is not a devolved matter. This point—and indeed the difference that I have with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace—is perhaps highlighted by the amendment that he originally proposed. The last part of that amendment says:
“For the purposes of subsection (8), the words ‘devolved matters’ means any matter not reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament under this Act”.
With respect, the Scotland Act 1998 is a great deal more sophisticated than saying that all matters listed in Schedule 5, which are reserved, are the only matters not requiring the consent of the Scottish Parliament. It entirely ignores the fact that, for example, it is not within the competence of the Scottish Parliament to modify any of the protected enactments listed in Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Scotland Act.
Rather than read out his brief, will the noble and learned Lord acknowledge that I said that parts of Schedule 4 also exclude matters from being within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament? If I have not, with my own resources, got the amendment right, can the noble and learned Lord, with all the great resources that he has in his office—I know the expertise that he has there—say what definition he would give of “devolved matters”?
There is no strict requirement to go into the definition of “devolved matters” at this stage, but it is perfectly clear from the amendment that the noble and learned Lord originally intimated that he contemplated it listing only the matters in Schedule 5 to the Act. I appreciate that in making observations in this House he qualified that statement, but the point is that the question of what is reserved goes well beyond Schedule 5 and includes all those protected enactments in Part 1 of Schedule 4.
The point that I was going to come to is this: one of the protected enactments is the Human Rights Act. This Government were elected upon a manifesto to address the Human Rights Act and to amend its terms by way of a Bill of Rights. That matter will be addressed in due course, but this is not the time or the place to consider what the implications of that may or may not be in the context of all the devolved Administrations in the United Kingdom. I would not consider it appropriate to go there.
I am not asking the Minister to tell us what is going to be in it but, if a proposed new British Bill of Rights confers new responsibilities on Scottish Ministers, does he believe that is a matter to which Devolution Guidance Note 10 would apply and that the United Kingdom Government would respect it as such and expect a legislative consent Motion in the Scottish Parliament? He can clear this matter up if he is prepared to say yes to that. If he is not, we can only suspect the worst.
There is no reason to suspect the worst. What we have to do is await the relevant Bill of Rights. Then, when we have considered its terms, we shall see whether it does or does not intrude upon matters covered by DGN10. If it does, then DGN10 will be addressed, as it always has been. There is a clear and consistent record of the United Kingdom Parliament and this Government proceeding in accordance with DGN10 in the context of devolved issues. I do not anticipate, and have no reason to anticipate, that that will change in the future. However, I am not going to comment on a Bill that is not before this House and the terms of which have not yet been finalised.
In these circumstances it appears to us that Clause 2 is sufficient for the purpose of expressing, essentially, a declarator of the Sewel convention in accordance with the Smith commission agreement.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am obliged to the noble and learned Lord and I can express it only in these terms. It is the Government’s considered position that the clause implicitly determines that point in any event. It would therefore not be necessary to express it in the terms proposed in the amendment.
The Minister says that the Government think that it is implicit in the clause. What is the problem in making it explicit? It would be interesting to consider whether their view is that there is a problem in making it explicit, because if there is not it would be very much to their advantage to accept the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey.
I note the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, but I can observe only that it is not appropriate to layer legislation with unnecessary detail and that if the matter is to be regarded as implicit in the present clause, it would be inappropriate to add a further clause. I cannot elaborate upon the point at this stage.
The concluded position of the Government is that Clause 2 as drafted delivers what was required by the Smith commission agreement by placing the Sewel convention, as it is properly understood, on a statutory footing. It is in these circumstances that I invite your Lordships to withdraw or not move their amendments.
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble and learned Lord has not addressed Amendment 52H and what other tribunals it is anticipated may be covered in future.
That is, as it were, a known unknown at this stage. There are no particular tribunals in mind so far as that is concerned. However, if further tribunals are created, it is contemplated that they should not transfer automatically but should be subject to the same conditionality that is thought appropriate for existing tribunals. It is at that level of generality. It is not contemplated that there is any particular tribunal that will be addressed by that provision. I hope that answers the noble and learned Lord’s question and invite him to withdraw the amendment.
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. First of all, of course, we are dealing with reserved matters. If we were dealing with immigration, for example—a matter of reserved law—there could be circumstances in which the application of Scots law led to a different outcome from the application of English law. I notice that new sub-paragraph (11) in Clause 37 talks about the meaning of a Scottish tribunal, but that, on the face of it, does not appear to determine the scope of its jurisdiction to hear cases from outside Scotland. It is more a question of what is a Scottish case in that context. That is something that can be looked at, I suggest, in the context of each Order in Council for the transfer of each tribunal. There may be room to facilitate the transfer of cases in the manner suggested. That is something that we will take away and consider.
My Lords, I very much thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for his response and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, for his comments. On the question of fees, which we both raised in relation to employment tribunals, I think we probably believe that we got a satisfactory answer from the Minister. Indeed, I am very grateful to him for the replies that he gave us. In his further elaboration in his response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, he indicated that the Government would be looking at—and, I hope, achieve—a situation whereby the Orders in Council will allow for the transfer of cases between jurisdictions to alleviate backlogs. It may well be that it applies the other way, too. Then we might be faced with a situation where a Scottish case could be heard in a jurisdiction furth of Scotland. No doubt, an Order in Council would be sufficiently well crafted to deal with that situation as well. The noble and learned Lord is right: I suspect that at the moment there is no statutory provision to allow reciprocity of the judiciary because, of course, we have a Great Britain tribunal system. Where there is legislation, it relates to Northern Ireland—for example, in relation to social security. I would hope to see the kind of provision that has been made for reciprocity with Northern Ireland apply in any orders that are brought forward with regard to the transfer of tribunals to Scotland.
With regard to the term “or otherwise”, the noble and learned Lord suggested that that related to judicial expertise. I think elsewhere in his response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, he accepted and acknowledged that there could be situations where Scots law was different. That is reassuring. While I think it is absolutely right that there should be a common approach—indeed, the Smith commission recognised that when you are dealing with UK statutes, it is desirable that there should be a common approach—nevertheless there will be circumstances where the respective courts take a different view. It would be unfortunate if that were closed down.
I apologise that I had not seen the draft Order in Council before coming into the Chamber. I am not sure that the Law Society of Scotland had seen it either. If the Minister would like to indicate where one might find it, that would be very helpful. If he cannot do so today, he can certainly write to us and that will be satisfactory.
I undertake to advise the noble and learned Lord as to where a copy of the draft Order in Council can be obtained.
That would be helpful. In these circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMaybe I can help the Minister. Perhaps he is saying that this is all just declaratory, because after all it does not matter what you put in new subsection (3). That subsection just makes the permanence referred to in new subsection (1) conditional because there are conditions there which, if fulfilled, would not make it permanent.
If I can complete the journey around the houses that the noble and learned Lord has begun on that point: it appears that new subsection (3) simply underlines the political structure—the declaratory statement contained in the clause as a whole. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed that of course it goes a step further in so far as it introduces conditionality to the abolition of the Scottish Parliament, which I acknowledge. As to it being,
“a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”,
that term is capable of clear and objective definition in due course. Respectfully, however, it appears that that wording is sufficiently clear for these purposes.
I notice what the noble and learned Lord says with regard to new subsection (3) in Clause 1.
Section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 also refers to the fact that it is a declaration that:
“Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section”.
Subsection (2) goes on to say:
“But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland”.
Obviously there is a context to that, but does the noble and learned Lord think that it might be helpful to add a further subsection indicating that, if a wish is expressed by a majority in a poll of the people of Scotland that the Scottish Parliament should be repealed, the Secretary of State will bring forward the necessary legislation to give effect to it?
With respect, it does not appear to me that the two situations are immediately comparable. In those circumstances, it does not appear to me that that would add to new subsection (3) in Clause 1. I renew my submission that the noble Lord should withdraw the amendment.