Rule of Law: Law Officers

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Tuesday 15th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I hope that the noble and learned Lord has not become unwell in view of the noises emanating from him—but, if he has, I wish him well for the future.

Let us be clear that we are in a situation where we have rights under an international treaty. Those rights include our response to any breach of obligations by the counterparty, be that a lack of good faith or such action as would fundamentally alter the obligations under the treaty, giving rise to a position—under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention—where we could withhold our operation of the treaty.

It has been suggested to me by no less a legal authority than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that we can simply rely on Article 16. This has immense novelty value. The idea the Executive can enter into a treaty at the level of international law and then rely on that to displace primary legislation passed by the domestic Parliament is, I respectfully suggest, extraordinary. That requires these mechanisms in the UKIM Bill to address the contingency of a material breach that we need to address.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord told the Scottish Public Law Group in Edinburgh in June 2018:

“If the rule of law is disrespected, and falls into disrepute, elected governments will not be able to govern effectively—any government is simply shooting itself in the foot if it undermines the rule of law.”


The contingent powers in this Bill to change the Northern Ireland protocol unilaterally trash the dispute resolution provisions in the treaty that Boris Johnson signed, and on any sensible reading undermine the rule of law, as Brandon Lewis candidly acknowledged. Will the Minister acknowledge that for him to promote their use by introducing a statutory instrument under these provisions in this House would violate his overarching duty under the Ministerial Code to comply with the law, including international law and treaty obligations, as the Court of Appeal found and as the noble and learned Lord is reported by the Guardian correctly to have advised the Prime Minister? Does he acknowledge that it would also violate the law officer’s oath that he took as Advocate-General of Scotland, and would be a gross dereliction of his duty?

Rape: Prosecutions and Convictions

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Monday 14th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con) [V]]

My Lords, there has been no material change to the CPS’s approach. The evidential stage of the code test remains as it was, despite some suggestions to the contrary. Indeed, the most recent inspectorate report, in 2019, observed that the code test was being applied correctly in 98% of cases. But I acknowledge that we face challenges in this area, and we are seeking to address them, as I say, by way of a joint inspectorate examination of the issue and a cross-government review of how we can improve matters.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

First, the need for corroboration in rape cases was abolished; secondly, sentences were increased to a five-year minimum guideline; and then inquiries into the complainant’s character were forbidden. Then the defendant was barred from cross-examining in person, and video links kept the complainant out of the witness box. Recently, there was an exhortation that complainants are, prima facie, to be believed. Despite all this, conviction rates have fallen. Does the Minister agree that further reform should be evidence-based? Will the Ministry of Justice permit academics to look exceptionally into the way that real-life juries have reached their verdicts, whether guilty or not guilty, in a limited number of rape cases?

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the issue of engaging with juries about how they arrived at their verdicts is complex and difficult. To set a precedent there would be a material step. However, we recognise that it is necessary to address some of the ingrained misconceptions that still exist and persist around reporting these offences. We hope that, by doing that, we will improve outcomes overall.

Rule of Law

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Thursday 10th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

Has a certificate such as the noble and learned Lord referred to a moment ago been given in relation to this Bill, suggesting that it does not comply with international obligations?

The Prime Minister persuaded the Queen to prorogue Parliament unlawfully a year ago, his chief adviser Cummings unlawfully broke the law on his Barnard Castle jaunt, and now the Prime Minister will ask the Queen to give her Royal Assent to what is effectively an unlawful Bill that quite deliberately breaks international law. The Tory shadow Counsel General in Wales, the highly respected David Melding, resigned yesterday, and the head of the Government’s legal service resigned two days ago. Having regard to the oaths of office to uphold the rule of law, why are the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General still in office, even if the noble and learned Lord himself clings to it?

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con) [V]]

My Lords, first of all, the Minister presenting this Bill has given a certificate of compatibility pursuant to the Human Rights Act; that has been done.

As regards the further issues raised, it will be for Parliament to determine whether, at the end of the day, it decides to pass this legislation. That is a matter for Parliament, and the Ministers have presented the Bill to Parliament for those purposes.

Royal Commission on Criminal Justice

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Wednesday 15th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we are looking at all the matters addressed by the noble Baroness and we have taken steps to open additional courts across the country. We continue with that endeavour to address the backlog of cases that has emerged since the pandemic.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am aware that soundings have been taken as to the introduction of smaller juries in criminal cases. Whether this is to deal with the pandemic or the backlog of trials, or is for the long term, is it not precisely the sort of issue which a royal commission should discuss publicly and openly before a decision is made?

Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. The Government remain of the view that these amendments would place too much emphasis on findings of mental capacity at a Newton hearing, particularly the findings made for the purposes of sentence.

In sentencing an offender, it is for the court to consider the punitive element of an offender’s sentence and, in doing so, to take into account the failure to disclose information in setting the tariff. By reflecting this in the sentencing remarks, victims can be assured that due consideration has been given to the non-disclosure. Tariffs must be served in their entirety and irrespective of any disclosure of information after a trial, so the tariff cannot be reduced because of subsequent disclosures. This is an entirely sensible approach, as I believe the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, acknowledged when we discussed this matter in Committee. The trial judge is more able to determine the appropriate weighting with regard to non-disclosure when setting the tariff.

On the other hand, the Parole Board’s role is in relation to the preventive element of the sentence. The consideration that the Parole Board must make is whether there should be a continuation of custody or a release on licence if the offender’s risk can be safely managed in the community. The Bill places a statutory duty on the board, when making that wider assessment, to consider the non-disclosure of information by an offender and the possible reasons for it. The board will take a subjective view of what those reasons might be, and what bearing this information may have on the subsequent assessment of suitability for release. When it comes to consider these matters, it must of course take account of the judge’s sentencing remarks. Those, in turn, will be informed by such issues as non-disclosure. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for his detailed analysis of how the court approaches these matters in practice and why, in the context of the Bill, it would not be appropriate to simply import the notion of the Newton hearing for the purposes of the Parole Board’s determination.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has correctly identified that a prisoner’s mental state may be a significant reason for non-disclosure—a point made earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, when she spoke to her own amendments. But to limit this to the specific context of a Newton hearing, and to place that in the Bill, appears to us to be too narrow an approach. The Parole Board should be free to consider all reasons, including those that may arise as a result of a Newton hearing—unusual though they may be—and we should therefore avoid any specific delineation in the Bill.

As new subsection (3) in Clause 1 makes clear, the breadth of matters which the board may take into account is, essentially, as wide as possible. In addition, the board is bound by public law principles to act reasonably in all decisions, so a decision where a relevant Newton hearing or an issue of mental capacity was not taken into account could be subject to judicial review. I venture that this is not the Bill in which to approach the whole issue of sentencing guidelines or findings of fact for the purposes of those guidelines. That is already accommodated, and it is in these circumstances that I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford [V]]

My Lords, it is clear that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, does not like the system of Newton hearings, but the fact that the defendant has refused to disclose is not necessarily part of the offence. The reasons for his refusal to disclose the whereabouts of a body, or the identity of a child involved in indecent images, may not emerge in the course of a trial and may not be discussed before the jury. A jury listening to a case may not investigate the mental capacity of the defendant before them. If that is not an issue in the trial, examined on both sides, then the judge would have difficulty in forming a view of his own without hearing evidence.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to the basis of plea as being the more usual way in which these matters are sorted out. I am completely familiar with the formation of the basis of plea, and the arguments that go on as to whether an agreement can be reached between the defence and the prosecution. However, if a person pleads guilty to murder or manslaughter and there is no trial, and there is a disagreement between prosecution and defence, how is the judge to come to a conclusion as to the degree to which the refusal to identify where a body is buried is to be part of his sentencing process—that it is an aggravating factor which he is to take into account? He has not heard any witnesses. He has just heard that the counsel disagree on what the basis of a plea would be.

Royal Commission on Criminal Justice

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Wednesday 3rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Along with the judiciary, we seek to utilise all the court capacity currently available to us by developing the use of remote hearings. We are also addressing how we can best accommodate jury trials within court accommodation. We will continue to monitor that to see where it can be improved and developed.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

Will the Minister consider recommending to the commission a consideration of the escalating length of sentences, which have probably doubled during my career, and of the impact upon rehabilitation and reoffending?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The manifesto commitment was that the royal commission would address prosecution, trial, sentence and parole, and I have no doubt that within that it will give consideration to the length of sentences and the need for rehabilitation.

Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 20th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply, but I think it is necessary to distinguish where there has been a plea of guilty and where there has been a plea of not guilty in a trial. Very often, when a person pleads guilty, he will, with the assistance of his legal team, put together a basis of plea, which is handed to the prosecution for consideration. If it accepts the basis of plea, there is no problem but, if there is an issue, a Newton hearing will be held to determine whether the prosecution which refuses to accept the basis of plea is correct or whether the defendant who is pleading guilty is correct. The judge will sentence accordingly.

That is one situation. Another is after a trial, when there has been a finding of guilt. Let us take a circumstance where a group of people have attacked an individual and one of the group says, “I didn’t take part”—indeed, I remember a case where precisely that happened; the defence was, “I was trying to discourage them so they’d go away”—but, at the end of the trial, the defendant is found guilty. At that point, the judge says, “I will sentence you on the basis that you are withholding information as to where the body was buried.” The defendant could then say, “I’ve been found guilty, but the others took the body away and I want to be heard on that, because I don’t know where they went and where the body was ultimately buried. You cannot sentence me on the basis of the facts the jury has found—that I was a party to a killing—when I don’t know where the body went.” That situation does not involve mental incapacity at all and such a situation should be investigated at the time and not 15 or 20 years later by the Parole Board doing its best, unassisted by medical evidence because it would not arise. It seems to me that issues of that nature should be determined prior to sentencing for the actual offence, whether there is a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt. That should involve a hearing of the sort that I have proposed.

Obviously, my amendment does not require the Parole Board to order a hearing. As the Minister anticipated, my purpose is to encourage the holding of Newton hearings where necessary. I do not believe that they are quite as rare or unusual as he suggests. In this particular instance, with proper directions being given generally to judges to hold Newton hearings where appropriate, they would be useful and helpful to the board’s ultimate determination. They would be of great significance concerning culpability.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has observed. In cases of this kind, the judge will wish to take into account the disclosure or non-disclosure of the whereabouts of a victim and the circumstances in which the offender can or cannot make that disclosure. There may be circumstances in which that might necessitate a Newton hearing, and so be it. That would be done contemporaneously with the determination of the tariff in the sentence. When later on we get to the preventive element after the tariff has been served, the Parole Board will be able to call for all that material, whether it be a Newton hearing or otherwise.

I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has to say about the importance of determining these issues at the time of trial and sentence; I do not disagree with him at all. It may be that some element of encouragement will be given if it is required, although I take from the observations of the former Lord Chief Justice—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—that there may be little requirement to encourage in a matter that is dealt with in this way day in and day out.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, in his letter of 19 April in response to the report of the Delegated Powers Committee, the Minister said:

“The Committee’s Report implies that the power in clause 2 of the Bill would allow the Government to implement agreements on any aspect of private law with a foreign element, rather than merely agreements on the much narrower subject area of private international law, as defined by clause 2(7) of the Bill. … It will not be possible for matters outside of the areas indicated by the definition of ‘private international law’ in clause 2(7) to be implemented using the power.”


The Minister echoed what was set out in paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes, which state:

“PIL agreements cover a discrete area of law that is narrowly defined.”


One would therefore have expected that the interpretation of Clause 2(7) to be narrowly defined, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, there is a width and uncertainty about these provisions that really do not follow the expressions being used.

For example, the definition clause for “international agreement”, which Amendment 9 deals with, includes,

“an agreement to which the UK is, or is expected to become, a party.”

What does that mean? Does that mean that legislation will be brought forward under these provisions and regulations brought forward in respect of an agreement to which we are not a party? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, what happens if the agreement is not ultimately made and the negotiations fall through? We would then, presumably, have regulations on the statute book dealing with an agreement to which we were not a party.

The definition of “private international law” is also contained in that same subsection, and Amendments 10, 12 and 13 demonstrate the loose wording that is used in case anything has been missed. That is rather typical of the drafting of the legislation. It is so drafted that anything can be bought in and the door is kept open. For example, it includes “rules and other provisions”, and there is to be co-operation in relation to the

“service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures”

not defined. Paragraph (c)(ii) deals with

“anything within paragraphs (a) and (b).”

It is so loose and ill-defined.

So the purpose of the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is to define the scope of regulation-making powers of the Bill so that the regulations should be confined exclusively to the field of private international law. Any provisions that trespass into any other territory could not be incorporated into domestic law by these regulations. I wholly support what he says about that.

I also support what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Manse, on arbitral awards and model laws.

But I am interested in Amendment 6. Perhaps the Minister will share his thoughts about any proposed regulations concerning legal aid. What proceedings in the field of private international law does he envisage? To what is this directed? Would these be additional provisions to existing legal aid regulations? Would there be more hoops or fewer? Would there be more generous or less generous provision, and in what fields?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin with Amendment 2, which as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, noted, would seek to limit the scope of the Clause 2 power to implement agreements to those that relate exclusively to private international law, whereas of course in its present form of drafting it is clearly intended to extend to the implementation of private international law provisions in wider agreements. In previous correspondence, as noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, I referred, as an example, to the jurisdiction of the provisions of the 1961 Warsaw Convention, which is concerned with international carriage by air. The point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, was: why would you seek a power to implement such a private international law provision outwith the wider terms of the relevant international agreement? There may be some force in that point. It is one that I would like to consider further, and I will do so before we reach Report.

Amendment 6, which was just referred to by noble Lords, seeks to remove legal aid from the scope of the matters about which Clause 2 regulations can make provision. In the light of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, perhaps I should explain that the Bill as presently drafted does not expressly include legal aid in the scope of the definition of private international law. However, under Clause 2(5)(c), it allows for regulations that implement or apply a private international law agreement to make provision for legal aid. This would mean that, where a private international law agreement to which the UK chose to become a party included obligations in relation to legal aid, those could be given domestic effect through Clause 2 regulations.

The reason for that approach to the matter of private international law and legal aid in the Bill is that, although there is some doubt about whether legal aid is typically encompassed in the scope of what is referred to as private international law as generally understood by practitioners and academics, there are circumstances in which a private international law agreement could contain specific legal aid provisions. This normally arises, as one might expect, in the field of family law. For example, there is a requirement in the 1980 Hague Convention on international child abduction for a contracting state to apply the same legal aid rules to citizens of, and persons habitually resident in, other contracting states in matters covered by the convention as it would to its own citizens and residents. It is therefore the Government’s view that, should similar conventions arise in the future providing for critical cross-border co-operation in matters of private international law, it would be unfortunate if there were to be a delay in people benefiting from the provisions of such an important convention.

Where a private international law agreement imposes requirements relating to legal aid that go beyond the sorts of areas for which the United Kingdom Government currently provide such funding domestically, we would need to think very carefully before proceeding. However, the normal process of consultation during the development of, and before taking the international steps to join, a convention of this nature would provide an opportunity for consideration of any legal aid implications.

In short, the amendment would create unhelpful doubt around whether the Clause 2 power could be used to implement a private international law agreement that included provisions relating to legal aid, and indeed it might even render that impossible.

Amendment 9 seeks to restrict the Clause 2 power to implement in domestic law only the private international law agreements to which the UK is already a contracting party and nothing further. It will not be possible for the Government to take the final steps necessary under international law for the United Kingdom to become bound by a new agreement in this area, such as depositing an instrument of ratification, because, in order to do that, the necessary implementing legislation must already have been made and, as a result of this amendment, it would need a different legislative vehicle.

Legal Services Act 2007 (Chartered Institute of Legal Executives) (Appeals from Licensing Authority Decisions) Order 2020

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Monday 9th March 2020 Grand Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I venture that this is also a straightforward and, I hope, uncontroversial measure. The order relates to the functions of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives which, for ease, I will refer to as CILEx. In summary, the order—if approved—enables the First-tier Tribunal to hear and determine appeals against CILEx in its role as a licensing authority.

As the Committee is aware, the Legal Services Act 2007 defines six reserved legal activities that only individuals and firms regulated by one of the approved regulators can provide to the public. CILEx is an experienced regulator under the 2007 Act and authorises and regulates individuals and firms in respect of five of the six reserved legal activities: the conduct of litigation, rights of audience, reserved instrument activities, probate activities and the administration of oaths. In February last year, an order designated CILEx as a licensing authority as well as an approved regulator. This meant that, as well as regulating individuals and firms, it can now license alternative business structures. ABSs are legal firms that are partly or wholly owned or controlled by non-lawyers. They were introduced by the 2007 Act to encourage competition by allowing, for the first time, lawyers to join with non-lawyers, for example accountants, to raise external capital. Notable ABSs include Co-op Legal Services and the big four accountancy firms.

ABSs have been permitted by the Legal Services Act 2007 since October 2011, and there are now over 1,300 in England and Wales. Most of the other legal services regulators, including the Law Society and the Bar Council, are already licensing authorities. The 2007 Act stipulates that there must be an independent body to determine appeals against decisions of licensing authorities, and this order enables the General Regulatory Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal to fulfil this role.

Over the last 12 months, since CILEx became a licensing authority, there has been an interim appeals procedure—agreed by the Legal Services Board—in place. However, it is more appropriate that the First-tier Tribunal determines any appeals against CILEx in its role as a licensing authority. The First-tier Tribunal has judges with experience in considering regulatory appeals.

Furthermore, similar orders have been made in the past in respect of appeals against decisions of the Bar Standards Board, the Council for Licensed Conveyancers, the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, the Chartered Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, when they are each designated as licensing authorities.

I assure the Committee that, although Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service will face additional costs associated with the potential increase in cases to be determined by the First-tier Tribunal, CILEx will meet the set-up and operating costs, so there will be no net financial impact on the public sector.

In conclusion, this statutory instrument is necessary to regulate better in the consumer and public interest. I commend the draft order to the Committee.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I support the order. I declare an interest in that a close family member is a judge in the First-tier Tribunal—but not, I believe, in the General Regulatory Chamber.

I have been a strong supporter of CILEx from its inception. Indeed, I addressed some of its early conferences due to, as I mentioned in relation to the previous order, my experience 50 years ago of the integrity and probity of legal executives who needed a body to represent their interests in the way that that has happened. I am delighted to see that it has been given this particular power. The strange thing is that there was a temporary appeals provision with a panel set up by CILEx itself; clearly that was unsatisfactory. Far better that it should go through the tribunals system. What are the fees of the tribunal likely to be? Will they be more expensive than the present appeals system, unsatisfactory as it is?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, again I will be completely uncontroversial, and I can be very succinct: the First-tier Tribunal is undoubtedly more appropriate than the interim arrangement.

Legal Services Act 2007 (Approved Regulator) Order 2020

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Monday 9th March 2020 Grand Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I venture to suggest that this order is straightforward and uncontroversial. It designates the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales—for ease, I will refer to it the institute—as an approved regulator under the Legal Services Act 2007 for the reserved legal activity of the administration of oaths.

In summary, the order, if approved, will allow the institute to authorise and regulate individuals and firms administrating oaths within the scope of the Commissioners for Oaths Act 1889, the Commissioners for Oaths Act 1891 and the Stamp Duties Management Act 1891.

As the Committee is aware, the Legal Services 2007 Act defines six reserved legal activities, which only individuals and firms regulated by one of the 11 approved legal regulators can provide to the public. The administration of oaths is one of these activities.

The institute is already an approved regulator and licensing authority under the 2007 Act, but only in respect of probate activities, which is also a reserved legal activity. It regulates more than 300 firms providing probate services and wishes to expand the range of legal services its members can provide. As such, it made the required application to the Legal Services Board, seeking to expand its functions. Following a recommendation from the Legal Services Board, the then Lord Chancellor confirmed in May 2019 that he agreed to make an order to designate the institute as an approved regulator for the reserved legal activity of the administration of oaths. It is envisaged that expanding the institute’s remit will improve consumer choice, enhance competition and enable firms who are regulated by the institute to expand their practice.

This order fulfils the statutory objectives in the Legal Services Act 2007 and is supportive of better regulation in the consumer and public interest. I commend the draft order to the Committee.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has just pointed out, this is uncontroversial. I have no objection to it. It took me back to my years as an articled clerk in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the perk that one had was to take clients to another solicitor who would administer an oath on probate papers. This would cost the individual 10 guineas, and the shillings in those guineas were for me. There were only 10 shillings, but at a time when I was earning £4 a week, which was extended to £5 a week when I got married, that was quite a considerable sum.