Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord McNicol of West Kilbride

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as with the previous groups of amendments, the underlying theme is that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill, but we have to look at these amendments in the context that it does stand part. They would therefore limit the power conferred by that clause—that context is important.

When discussing Amendments 4 and 5, I pointed out that, in the context I have just described, they in turn would result in an unacceptable restriction of the power in Clause 2 and would mean that co-operation on private international law matters between different parts of the United Kingdom family would be significantly less well developed than it is between the United Kingdom and international partners. As a matter of policy, we see no way to justify such a position. Why, for example, should two parties in London and Edinburgh have less legal certainty about the way in which their dispute will be resolved than if the dispute was between parties based in London and Paris or New York? Of course, the point is then made that it is not a question of whether, but how. If you are able to have this regulatory-making power under Clause 2 with regard to foreign jurisdictions, why not intra-UK?

If, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, the concern is the power being perceived as risking imposing a position on Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Crown dependencies or overseas territories without consultation or consent, I would seek to assuage those concerns. Such arrangements under the power would require the agreement of all the relevant Administrations—the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the relevant devolved Administration, Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, such a measure would be considered only after the Government had consulted appropriately with relevant stakeholders, and the statutory instrument to give effect to such a “mirroring” provision—that is what it would be—would still be subject to the scrutiny of the affirmative procedure, as I noted before.

There are examples where such mirroring-type relationships already apply. We apply a modified version of the terms of the 1968 Brussels Convention, an instrument that was the forerunner to Brussels I and the recast Brussels IA regulation, between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. That works perfectly well. Therefore, assuming Clause 2 stands part of the Bill, we do not see any reason why it should be amended in the way suggested.

I now turn to Amendment 18, which would in turn require fresh primary legislation if the UK wished to amend or revoke, at a later date, any declarations it chose to make when it first implemented a new international agreement. This would mean, for example, that if, in implementing the 2005 Hague Convention, the Government decided to replicate the current EU declaration in regard to certain insurance contracts being out of scope of the convention and then wished to review that decision later, primary legislation would be required to implement that change.

Our policy intention is to replicate the current EU declaration in relation to the exclusion of certain insurance contracts when we accede to the 2005 Hague Convention later this year, because this is how the convention rules currently apply here and, given the tight timeframe between now and the end of the transition period, it makes sense to maintain the status quo and then review in the longer term. Under the proposed amendment, if we wished to change our position following that review, we would have to wait for a primary legislative vehicle to give effect to that change. In our view, that would simply create undue delay on a matter which could be addressed through secondary legislation without losing any of the desired scrutiny. It is in these circumstances that I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendments.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

One speaker has indicated that they wish to come in on the amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I note what the Minister said about fears that something might be imposed on Scotland or Northern Ireland, but as I read it, Scotland or Northern Ireland could actually impose something on England. He then went on to say that there would of course be discussion, negotiation and consultation. If that is the case, why does it not say so on the face of the Bill? Would he be minded to give further thought to these provisions and how they are drafted to secure some degree of consultation, which does not, I would argue, detract in any way from the devolution settlement?

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord McNicol of West Kilbride

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 17th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 4, I shall speak also to Amendment 10 in my name. Essentially, Clause 1 provides for a minimum period of 20 weeks between the start of proceedings and when the court can be asked to make a conditional order of divorce. It further provides a delegated power to enable the Government, by statutory instrument, to shorten or lengthen this period, as well as the existing minimum period of six weeks, which will apply between the conditional order and the final order of divorce. Clause 4 similarly makes provision for the Lord Chancellor to change the prescribed periods in respect of civil partnership dissolution.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee questioned the purpose of these Henry VIII powers and recommended their omission from the Bill, or alternatively that they be made subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. At an earlier stage, the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Chakrabarti, spoke of their concern about the lack of clarity surrounding the circumstances in which the Government would seek to use these delegated powers. We have listened to those concerns; it is in the light of this that we move an amendment that will make these powers subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I hope this reassures noble Lords that there will be proper scrutiny of these powers in the event that they are ever sought to be used. I beg to move.

[Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab)]

My Lords, as the Minister has just outlined, these amendments will use the Lord Chancellor’s Henry VIII powers to change the period of time between the commencement of proceedings and the conditional order, as well as between the conditional order and the final order, subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. We are very pleased on this side of the House that the Government have listened to the debates and discussions earlier and moved forward, so we welcome these government amendments. They have been laid in response to the Committee amendments previously tabled by my colleague and noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, who unfortunately cannot be with us for the debate today. We warmly support the Bill. I have not spoken on previous amendments as the contributions—especially those from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton—have been eloquent and insightful, not to mention evidence-based, which is always nice to hear in your Lordships’ House.

I take this opportunity to remind your Lordships’ House again of the consequences of the decade-long underfunding of our justice system and how these cuts have affected family law in many ways, especially since legal aid was removed from divorce cases. This was, I believe, a terrible mistake. We are in many cases failing to protect abandoned people and children. The lack of access to lawyers results in inherently inadequate allocation of resources in the event of separation and divorce. As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti recently highlighted, it seems perverse that, if the state seeks to take your children away, you have access to a lawyer but, if your ex-partner is depriving you of that contact, you do not have that support.

We can try to craft the most perfect divorce legislation but people must have access to early and consistent advice and representation. We urge the Minister to reflect further on the availability of legal aid.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord McNicol of West Kilbride

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 16th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNicol of West Kilbride]

My Lords, I responded to an amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, on day 1 of Committee, so it seems we have come full circle. I offer a brief response to these further amendments regarding the independent monitoring authority. I understand that these are probing amendments, and I am keen to hear the Minister’s response, so I will not detain the Committee after three consecutive days of debate on this Bill, which I hope will not be a trend in future when debating Bills off the back of Brexit.

I am particularly interested in Amendments 49 and 50, which would prevent the Secretary of State from appointing a person to the IMA against the wishes of the relevant body. This suggestion strikes me as entirely sensible. Given previous ministerial assurances on the issues of devolution, I would be very interested to hear from the Minister in what circumstances the Government would seek to force through an appointment that had been opposed by a devolved Minister. If that were to happen, the current sub-paragraph (7) requires the Secretary of State to make a statement outlining the reasons for proceeding with that appointment. Can the Minister confirm what form this statement would take, and what opportunities, if any, the relevant devolved legislatures would have to hold the Secretary of State to account?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lords, Lord Greaves and Lord McNicol of West Kilbride, for their contributions.

As was the case during Tuesday’s debate on Clause 15, we have noticed the importance of the IMA’s role and functions interacting properly with the devolved settlements. I seek to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, and the House, that the IMA has been designed in a way that takes into account the individual interests and circumstances of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, England and indeed Gibraltar.

In addressing the amendments, I begin by showing the Committee that the Government’s approach to establishing the IMA, as set out in Clause 15 and Schedule 2, was reached following detailed and extensive engagement with the devolved Administrations. As a result of this consultation, we have ensured on the face of the Bill that the IMA’s board will contain members with knowledge of relevant matters in relation to citizens right across the United Kingdom. Those relevant matters include not only matters reserved for the United Kingdom Government, but also matters that are devolved to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Administrations. Therefore, we have provided a full and robust role for Ministers of the devolved Administrations in the appointment of candidates to board positions. Of course, parts of the citizens’ rights agreements that the IMA will monitor, such as provisions covering healthcare, welfare and education, are already devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which has been taken into account. That is why there is a requirement for expertise in these areas.

However, I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, that the IMA will also possess the same expertise specifically in relation to England. He refers to Amendment 48 as seeking to achieve expertise in that area, but I draw his attention to paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 2, which states that

“the Secretary of State and the non-executive members must have regard to the desirability of the IMA’s”

board possessing relevant expertise in relation to citizens’ rights across the United Kingdom. It should embrace both reserved areas which are pan-UK and those devolved areas specific to the particular devolved Administrations. We can ensure by default that regard is had to the desirability of the IMA possessing expertise in relation to England. It is for that reason that Amendments 48 and 51 are unnecessary and I shall in due course invite the noble Lord not to press them.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord McNicol of West Kilbride

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNicol of West Kilbride]

No, it is. The noble Lord is correct.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

I should correct the noble Lord. Amendment 59 is part of this group, and therefore if he wishes to speak to it, he should do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNicol of West Kilbride]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 58 and 60. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, has touched on many of his probing amendments, and there has been much debate about Amendment 59, so I do not need to cover that.

The establishment of the independent monitoring authority is an important step in implementing the UK’s obligations to EU citizens under the withdrawal agreement. However, the Government’s approach to the IMA leaves a number of important questions unanswered, hence the large number of probing amendments in this and other groups. There are concerns regarding the delegated powers, allowing Ministers to transfer the IMA’s functions—or even wind the organisation up—by statutory instrument, hence the amendment in my name.

At ministerial briefings, the Minister has explained that, later in the withdrawal process, it may make sense for the IMA’s functions to sit elsewhere. Can the Minister give an example of where those functions may be moved to, and why this would be preferable to maintaining an independent body? Can he also confirm that in the event of such transfers there will be no practical impact on citizens? Finally, can he provide assurances that, in the spirit of co-operation, the Joint Committee will be fully briefed regarding any changes to the IMA or the exercise of its functions? To touch very briefly on Amendment 59, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, again many important issues are raised regarding the transfer of functions, aiming to ensure that the new executors of such functions would need specific knowledge of UK nations and the regions.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to all noble Lords who have contributed. Like many noble Lords who have already spoken, I am conscious of the sensitivities that surround the devolved settlement that could impinge upon its success in the future.

Let us be clear: Clause 15 is essential to implement our international legal obligation under the withdrawal agreement and under the EEA-EFTA separation agreement, which requires that we establish an independent monitoring authority. I hope that it also demonstrates our commitment to protecting the rights of those citizens covered by the agreements. Therefore, it is necessary for Clause 15 to stand part of the Bill.

Of course, the IMA will offer an important layer of additional protection over and above the wide range of complaint and appeal routes that already exist for EU citizens in the United Kingdom. However, expanding the IMA scope through Amendment 57—as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves—would, I fear, divert the body’s resources from its important role monitoring citizens’ rights and obligations. Therefore, I would resist such an amendment. It also risks creating unhelpful duplication, with all the confusion and wasted resources that could accompany that, so I invite the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, to withdraw that amendment.

The withdrawal agreement requires that the IMA be established by the end of the implementation period; that is the goal. The appointment of an interim chief executive to the IMA—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves—is considered vital to meeting that deadline, as it will be essential from the point of view of staffing and procurement decisions that will need to be taken in advance of that date. Indeed, there have been other examples of interim chief executives being appointed to such bodies in order that suitable preparation can be made for them to be up and running at the appropriate time. Removing that provision through Amendment 47 would jeopardise the timely establishment of the IMA, and risk putting us in breach of our international law obligations. I hope that I have explained the rationale for that approach.

In order to give full and proper effect to our obligations in international law, we have designed the IMA to be robust and independent, in line with the best practice for the establishment of new public bodies. While I understand the intention behind a number of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, which he perceives as strengthening the independence and robustness of the IMA, I hope I can assure him that they are unnecessary. I appreciate that they are essentially probing amendments in order that we can explain the position.