Rule of Law

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Thursday 10th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con) [V]]

I do not accept that. This is not a case of the Executive or Ministers seeking to act contrary to the will of Parliament. This is a case in which Ministers have brought legislation and laid it before Parliament for Parliament to determine whether provision should be made for the contingencies to which I have referred. This shows complete respect for Parliament and if, at the end of the day, Parliament and this House do not wish to confer the ability to deal with these contingencies on Ministers, they will not. It is a matter for Parliament.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Government have used terms such as “clarification” and “safety net” in describing the Bill. It is nothing of the sort; it is a direct abrogation of the withdrawal agreement. This is an issue about national integrity and the rule of law, as Sir Jonathan Jones recognised in resigning as Treasury Solicitor. I ask the noble and learned Lord how he would describe a barrister with whom he had negotiated a detailed written settlement agreement, who then explicitly reneged on that agreement by announcing an intention to act in direct contravention of both the agreement and the law.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con) [V]]

The situation outlined by the noble Lord does not reflect that which exists in the context of a potential tension between our domestic legal obligations to Northern Ireland and the terms of the withdrawal agreement, in the event that we do not achieve the goals that all parties intended, including the ability to ensure the maintenance of the Belfast agreement.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

I welcome these sensible amendments which tidy up the Bill, but I also welcome them for an important reason, which is that in removing Clause 2 this House made an important constitutional decision. I welcome the thrust of much of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said. However, I doubt that we need a thoroughgoing review of delegated legislation or the powers to delegate legislation. What we need is to respect more thoroughly the views of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the principles that it applies, which are well known and are often stated and applied by this House and were importantly so stated and applied during debates on the removal of Clause 2.

I regard it as a shame that the Minister opened this afternoon’s discussion with a reassertion of the position that he enunciated during earlier stages of the Bill— that Clause 2 was constitutionally proper and not inappropriate. This House decisively rejected that view. I hope that the Government will listen to what has been said today and, more importantly, will consider the arguments that were advanced during the earlier stages of the Bill, change their mind and decide not to reinstate Clause 2 and send it back to this House, taking advantage of their majority; and, rather than having a thoroughgoing review, will decide to exercise some self-control in future and not put before us Bills which contain delegated powers that most of us regard as entirely wrong and inappropriate.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and my noble friend Lord Holmes observed, it is important that we maintain the position of English law and the jurisdiction, particularly in London, with regard to commercial dispute resolution just as it is maintained under the New York convention with respect to arbitration. That is why we have made our application to the council of the Lugano convention to join that body, but it is step that can be taken only with the consent of the member states and the EU. We recognise that if our application is accepted it is a matter of urgency for us to draw down that treaty into domestic law, which in part explains the position that we have adopted with regard to Clause 2.

It is not often that I find myself in a position where I have to correct the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. Indeed, I regard this as highly unusual, but I observe that where he said that the Government had decided not to proceed with Clause 2 that was not entirely accurate. It was decided for us, and there is a distinction to be drawn there. As regards the state of play with the Crown dependencies, the provision with respect to the Isle of Man fell with the amendments to the Bill in this House. As regards the Council of Europe, while in theory it may seek to promote some issues in respect of private international law, I do not understand that it has done so or that it imminently intends to do so, but I will make further inquiry and if necessary write to the noble Lord.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, talked about a matter of principle with regard to the introduction of what would amount to a criminal offence of some limited penalty by way of secondary legislation or something other than primary legislation, a situation that has obtained for almost 50 years since the European Communities Act 1972.

The noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, raised prior consultation. I reiterate the points I made at an earlier stage with regard to that. Both the Government of Wales and the Government of Scotland granted an LCM to the Bill in its original form, so they appeared to be relatively content with its provisions.

I am not clear about the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, to Northern Cyprus in the context of the Bill, but I understand the complications that arise with regard there to private international law, and I would be content to speak to him later if there is a further point that he would like to elucidate, and I would be happy to consider it.

The Government are content to support this group of amendments as they relate to elements of the Bill which no longer function without the delegated power previously in Clause 2. However, as I have made clear, the Government’s position on the Clause 2 delegated power has not changed.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames [V]]

My Lords, I addressed this issue in the group on the removal of Clause 2. I agree with everything that has been said so far in the debate on this amendment, which I support. Once again, we have unanimity. Although it might not be directly relevant in the light of the removal of Clause 2, I note the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, as to what will happen should Clause 2 be restored in the other place. I suspect that that would be curable here by passing a similar amendment, but I invite the Minister to consider that position as well.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, clearly, given that Clause 2 is no longer part of the Bill, this amendment would have no effect. However, I understand why the noble and learned Lord moved it—to allow further discussion of the issue. We believe that the inclusion of the provision to which the amendment relates would have been important in allowing the implementation of private international law agreements that necessitate the creation of a criminal offence, particularly in the family law area. I mentioned that in Committee.

In response to the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, I am not aware of any current examples where we have provided for criminal penalties when implementing a private international law agreement. However, that does not mean that it would not be the appropriate step to take in future agreements, for example, on mutual recognition and enforcement of protection measures, where the equivalent domestic orders were enforceable by criminal penalties such as orders under the Family Law Act 1996, or, indeed, injunctions under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. One is looking to the equivalents of such orders made by a foreign court when it comes to enforcement in the United Kingdom.

I continue to suggest that the safeguards on the power that I outlined in Committee, including use of the affirmative procedure as a matter of course, would be effective and appropriate in this regard. However, since the Clause 2 delegated power is no longer part of the Bill, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment. In the event that Clause 2 comes back to this House, it appears that there might be scope for him to revisit this issue.

Probation Services

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 15th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we, too, welcome the thrust of the Government’s change of direction in abandoning the failed community rehabilitation companies and moving back towards provision by a National Probation Service.

I am grateful to the Minister for writing to me last Thursday explaining the Government’s thinking behind the changes, particularly those rowing back on the involvement of the charitable, voluntary and private organisations in probation provision. However, those changes still come as a disappointment, and I regret that his explanation does not justify them.

Many in this House have called for significant reform of the probation service to co-ordinate the services for offenders in custody and for those serving community sentences, all to secure the best possible outcomes—improving rehabilitation, cutting reoffending and turning lives around. The failed CRC arrangements were memorably criticised by Dame Glenys Stacey when she was Chief Inspector of Probation—in no small part because they failed to involve the voluntary sector in supplementing that work and in providing effective through-the-gate services at the end of prison sentences.

Dame Glenys’s report reflected the reality that the system failed to harness the skills and enthusiasm of small and committed private and voluntary sector organisations. Therefore, when the decision was, rightly, made to end the CRC contracts, we were promised more specialist resettlement and rehabilitative support from independent probation delivery partners, as they were to be called, in each region. The new proposals planned in May last year were structured so as to encourage charities and other small voluntary and private sector bodies, many of them with specialist expertise, to get fully involved in providing rehabilitation services, whether in addressing addiction and mental health issues or in providing education, training and employment opportunities.

Sadly, today’s Statement sucks the life out of many of those proposals. The noble and learned Lord has suggested that that is all because of the disruption caused by Covid-19. No one wants to downplay that, but will he explain how the coronavirus crisis demands this retrograde structural retreat? How do the Government think that bringing delivery of all unpaid work and behavioural programmes back within the National Probation Service will work? Dame Glenys’s successor as Chief Inspector of Probation, Justin Russell, has constantly pointed out how understaffed the service is. Now, he has had to stall recruitment, and that has been as a result of the coronavirus crisis.

We all know that morale among probation officers, as their union leaders remind us, is at an all-time low because officers are overloaded with work and have no time to give a proper service. Will the Minister please explain how the Government intend to maintain the present level of service, let alone improve it, by abandoning the commitment to bring in probation delivery partners? Contracts worth £100 million, organised and run by the National Probation Service for the voluntary sector and others, will hardly provide the innovative and morale-boosting changes that probation delivery partners were going to inject into the process. Can the noble and learned Lord explain how much autonomy organisations from within the voluntary and private sectors will have in delivering services under today’s proposals? Will he say how much money these new proposals will save?

Finally, does the Minister share my concern that this change of plan is not really about responding to the coronavirus crisis, nor about improving rehabilitation, but more about delivering on the Government’s commitment to make community sentences tougher and to punish offenders more firmly, just as his letter to me stated?

[Lord Keen of Elie [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his observations, but I say this: I do not consider that we are engaging in a U-turn. We are engaging in a further development of the probation service, prompted by a catalyst—namely Covid-19—that has underlined the need for us to take perhaps greater direct control of the service.

The noble Lord referred to the reforms of 2015 as a failure. I do not accept that. It was part of a journey, and we have now come to a point where we believe that it is appropriate to take direct control, through the National Probation Service, of all matters except rehabilitation and resettlement, and to encourage the engagement of the voluntary and charitable sector in the provision of those rehabilitation and resettlement services, which the noble Lord himself acknowledged were so important. In developing this, we have engaged with the voluntary sector and with Clinks, the organisation for the voluntary and charitable sector.

I am asked what we intend to do to engage with funding for this. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the idea of savings, but that is not what we are concerned with. Here, we are determined that, through the dynamic framework for the provision of rehabilitation and resettlement services, the National Probation Service should engage with the voluntary and charitable sector. We anticipate that, eventually, we will be expending something in the region of £100 million per annum in the engagement of those services.

We have the highest regard for probation service staff, both at the national level and at CRC level. We are encouraged by the idea that many of those who are engaged in CRC probation delivery will move over to the National Probation Service and bring with them their experience and depth of knowledge. We will be encouraging that as we go forward.

On funding, for the 2019 spending round, we have already increased the annual funding for probation by some £155 million above the current spending levels. There is, of course, a case for maintaining that increase.

While I understand that some would regard this as a move away from the existing model, I suggest that it is a proper development of the model and of the way in which we set out the proposals for dealing with CRCs going forward. We believe that the voluntary and charitable sector will continue to have a major part to play in the delivery of probation services.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, on these Benches we are firmly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in opposing Clause 2 of the Bill, in line with the virtually unanimous view of those who spoke on 13 May and for all the reasons stated on day one in Committee. We will support the noble and learned Lord in opposing Clause 2 on Report. Therefore, it is with some regret that I find myself disagreeing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in particular in respect of the creation of criminal offences. He seemed to be suggesting that such offences would derive from the provisions of the international treaties themselves, rather than the provisions of the delegated legislation and, for that reason, the power in the Bill should be accepted.

However, that is not inevitably so. Under the Bill as it stands, new criminal offences could be introduced by the regulations giving the force of domestic law to private international law conventions and the implementation of those conventions, not by the treaties themselves. I therefore agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, on that issue and the possibility that he raised of new offences being introduced under the regulations.

These two amendments are, of course, alternatives to the removal of Clause 2, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out. Both amendments would plainly be right if we came to the position, contrary to what we believe should happen, that we were stuck with Clause 2. Amendment 19 on criminal offences raises an important principle. I agree with and endorse everything said by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, as supported by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. In this country we have always had a strong and principled objection to making new criminal offences or otherwise changing the criminal law by secondary legislation. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, expressed that principle forcefully and eloquently. It is an important principle, which I think we should be very firm about upholding.

Amendment 20 is on the super-affirmative procedure. Of course, it would be better than the affirmative procedure and clearly better than any negative procedure —which is not proposed. However, it is a poor alternative to requiring primary legislation to give international treaties the force of domestic law. Paragraph 31.14 of Erskine May says this about the super-affirmative procedure:

“The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. (It should be noted that the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them.)”


That paragraph is accurate in respect of the super-affirmative procedure proposed by the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 20. It follows that Parliament would have no right to amend, and that is why super-affirmative is still a poor alternative. It ultimately leaves legislative power with Ministers and not with Parliament.

It is also a fact that success in changing delegated legislation by the super-affirmative procedure comes very rarely—a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. We perhaps ought to return to that matter in the future. We should perhaps try to formulate a procedure that goes some way to meet the criticism he made—a procedure that permits Parliament to approve an instrument conditionally on its being amended in a way acceptable to both Houses. That might solve some of the problems that we have with delegated legislation. But I agree that that is for another day. Our position is that we support these amendments if we are stuck with having to use them in place of striking out Clause 2.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, taken together, the amendments relate broadly to either narrowing the scope of the Clause 2 power or increasing parliamentary scrutiny for use of that power, and I recognise the observations made by a number of noble Lords and noble and learned Lords that this is very much secondary to the opposition expressed to Clause 2 itself. I note the observation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that this is essentially a series of probing amendments.

Before I look at the various amendments, I note that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and other noble Lords referred to the role of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law and the importance of consultation with it, with which I entirely concur. I am now co-chair of that committee, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. Its recent meeting was extremely useful. We looked at some technical issues surrounding the application of the Hague conventions of 2005 and 2007 at the end of the transition period. We may hear a little more of that in due course.

Amendment 19 deals with the creation of a criminal offence in the implementation in domestic law of a relevant private international law agreement. The use of the Clause 2 power to create a criminal offence there is very constrained. It is true that private international law agreements do not generally require contracting parties to create criminal offences, and there are no such requirements in the private international agreements that the UK is currently considering joining and implementing under the powers in this Bill. However, it remains a very real possibility that we might negotiate or seek to join a new agreement where a power to create or extend existing criminal penalties will be needed to fully implement the international law obligation. Take an agreement on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of protection measures, for example. In England and Wales, protection measures such as non- molestation orders or injunctions may be made by the courts under the Family Law Act 1996 or the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Breaches of those orders are punishable by criminal penalties. Any future private international law agreement in this area on reciprocal recognition of such orders, if successfully negotiated, would particularly benefit those who are most vulnerable in our society and reliant on such protection measures, whether they remain within the United Kingdom or travel abroad, where they would wish to retain the protection of such orders.

If we entered into such an agreement, it would seem reasonable and appropriate to exercise the Clause 2 power so that, for example, we could extend criminal penalties for breach of a UK order to also apply to the breach of an order issued by a relevant foreign court. Breach of an order issued by a foreign court would in effect carry the same criminal penalty as that for breach of an equivalent UK order. But that criminal offence-making ability would of course be subject to the limitations within the Clause 2 power itself as currently drafted. Let me be clear: we could not create an offence under this power which would carry a term of imprisonment of more than two years, for example. That is an important safeguard on the exercise of the Clause 2 powers in this area.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I was not suggesting—and neither, I believe, was the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh—that we can stay in Brussels recast or rejoin it after the end of the transition period. I was merely regretting the loss of the benefits of Brussels recast and pointing out that Lugano, if we joined it after the transition period ended, would not offer us comparable benefits. Apart from conceding that point, the Minister has not addressed the points made—notably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—that joining Lugano may be undesirable, and that we are deprived of the opportunity of debating that in the context of primary legislation. That, I think, is a point that he needs to address.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

On that point, of course I accept that Lugano does not go as far as Brussels Ia and IIa—Brussels restated. We are all well aware of that. As regards the interplay between Lugano and the Hague Convention 2019, one has to bear in mind that Hague has not been signed or acceded to by the EU. We do not know if or when it may intend to do so. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it took the EU 10 years to sign and accede to the Hague Convention 2005. On the other hand, Lugano is there and available as a convention. A number of noble and learned Lords have acknowledged its importance in the context of private international law. Therefore, it is appropriate that we proceed with Lugano at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the question raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness is about how legislation should be made regulating implementation between jurisdictions within the UK and between the UK and other relevant territories. It seems to me that Clause 2(2) and (3) and Schedule 6 infringe the principles of devolution, particularly in the lack of provision for consultation with Scotland and Northern Ireland, as he pointed out. They also infringe the autonomy of the other relevant territories. For those reasons it seems to me that, in addition to the general reasons about the width of Clause 2 and the points already made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, we will support amendments such as these on Report.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as with the previous groups of amendments, the underlying theme is that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill, but we have to look at these amendments in the context that it does stand part. They would therefore limit the power conferred by that clause—that context is important.

When discussing Amendments 4 and 5, I pointed out that, in the context I have just described, they in turn would result in an unacceptable restriction of the power in Clause 2 and would mean that co-operation on private international law matters between different parts of the United Kingdom family would be significantly less well developed than it is between the United Kingdom and international partners. As a matter of policy, we see no way to justify such a position. Why, for example, should two parties in London and Edinburgh have less legal certainty about the way in which their dispute will be resolved than if the dispute was between parties based in London and Paris or New York? Of course, the point is then made that it is not a question of whether, but how. If you are able to have this regulatory-making power under Clause 2 with regard to foreign jurisdictions, why not intra-UK?

If, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, the concern is the power being perceived as risking imposing a position on Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Crown dependencies or overseas territories without consultation or consent, I would seek to assuage those concerns. Such arrangements under the power would require the agreement of all the relevant Administrations—the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the relevant devolved Administration, Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, such a measure would be considered only after the Government had consulted appropriately with relevant stakeholders, and the statutory instrument to give effect to such a “mirroring” provision—that is what it would be—would still be subject to the scrutiny of the affirmative procedure, as I noted before.

There are examples where such mirroring-type relationships already apply. We apply a modified version of the terms of the 1968 Brussels Convention, an instrument that was the forerunner to Brussels I and the recast Brussels IA regulation, between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. That works perfectly well. Therefore, assuming Clause 2 stands part of the Bill, we do not see any reason why it should be amended in the way suggested.

I now turn to Amendment 18, which would in turn require fresh primary legislation if the UK wished to amend or revoke, at a later date, any declarations it chose to make when it first implemented a new international agreement. This would mean, for example, that if, in implementing the 2005 Hague Convention, the Government decided to replicate the current EU declaration in regard to certain insurance contracts being out of scope of the convention and then wished to review that decision later, primary legislation would be required to implement that change.

Our policy intention is to replicate the current EU declaration in relation to the exclusion of certain insurance contracts when we accede to the 2005 Hague Convention later this year, because this is how the convention rules currently apply here and, given the tight timeframe between now and the end of the transition period, it makes sense to maintain the status quo and then review in the longer term. Under the proposed amendment, if we wished to change our position following that review, we would have to wait for a primary legislative vehicle to give effect to that change. In our view, that would simply create undue delay on a matter which could be addressed through secondary legislation without losing any of the desired scrutiny. It is in these circumstances that I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, for some years I had the privilege of serving on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester. That committee has increasingly come to stand as a crucial protector of the role of Parliament, alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whom I was delighted we were able to hear. The committee has acted in attempting to limit the Executive improperly taking powers for government Ministers to change the law by delegated legislation in significant ways and ways for which delegated legislation has never in the past been deemed appropriate.

The committee usually expresses itself, or certainly has until recent years, in circumspect terms and the Government have traditionally accepted its recommendations. The committee has left it to the House to implement its recommendations if the Government do not agree to do so. The clarity and decisiveness of the recommendation in paragraph 15 of the committee’s report on this occasion is anything but circumspect. The conclusion speaks for itself:

“We are of the view that clause 2 represents an inappropriate delegation of power and we recommend that it should be removed from the face of the Bill.”


The committee is forcefully supported by the report of the Constitution Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, from whom we have heard, and includes the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, from whom we have also heard. Paragraph 19 of that report contains the kernel of its conclusion:

“We are not persuaded by the arguments the Government has made in support of this power. If the balance between the executive and Parliament is to be altered in respect of international agreements, it should be in favour of greater parliamentary scrutiny and not more executive power.”


Another important point made by the Constitution Committee, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is that delegated legislation is amenable to judicial review so that future regulations implementing international treaties could be the subject of challenge. It is entirely right that delegated legislation, which involves an exercise of executive power of itself, should be capable of being challenged as unlawful.

However, it would be a highly undesirable consequence of the Bill if, when enacted, the lawfulness of conventions entered into by the United Kingdom Government as a matter of our domestic law could not be guaranteed to our international convention partners until such challenges were determined.

I also agree with the point made by the Constitution Committee, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that the CraG procedure is at present inadequate and ineffective as an instrument of parliamentary scrutiny.

In the light of all that, can the Minister say whether, given the Constitution Committee’s report published on 4 May, he is prepared to go away and reconsider his extremely negative response, dated 17 April, to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report? I ask, because if these important committees of your Lordships’ House are going to be routinely ignored by government, parliamentary democracy is entering treacherous territory, in which the conventional boundaries between executive power and parliamentary sovereignty are roughly and unceremoniously shifted by the failure of government to adhere to well-established, valuable and principled conventions.

The central point is this. As it stands, the Bill involves moving a whole area of legislation—that of implementing private international law treaties in domestic law—from Parliament to the Executive. That is a dangerous extension and an unwelcome trend—noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—in our constitutional arrangements from parliamentary democracy to government by an overmighty Executive. If it is private international law agreements this year, what might follow next year? This House has rightly sought to resist the trend, which is dangerous and must be stopped. As parliamentarians, and respecting the traditional role of this House as a guardian of the constitution, we have a responsibility to stop it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their contribution to this part of the debate. Since the commencement of this Committee, the matter of whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill has in a sense been the elephant in the virtual Chamber—or perhaps the virtual elephant in the Chamber. I therefore do not intend to rehearse or repeat the arguments that have been made repeatedly in Committee. However, I want to make it clear that the Government regard the powers in Clause 2 as essential to achieving their objective to build up the United Kingdom’s position in private international law, not only in the immediate future but in years to come.

Of course, there is one particularly pertinent example of our ambition; namely, our ambition to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the desire—indeed, the need—to do that before the end of the transition period. It would be gravely unfortunate if a gap was to emerge between the end of the transition period, when we continue to look to the Brussels I and IIa regime, and the application of the 2007 Lugano Convention. We are concerned that that should be avoided.

Briefly, first, we consider that the proposal in Clause 2 is not only essential but proportionate. International law agreements are generally uncontroversial and technical in nature, and the detailed content of the private international law agreements to which the Bill will apply will already be determined at the international level; they are by their very nature clear and precise in their terms.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I will first address Amendments 7 and 17A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer. These would prevent the commencement of financial provision proceedings, except for maintenance pending suit, for 20 or even 12 weeks on his alternative, in the absence of the consent of the other party.

I suggest that these amendments—like earlier amendments that restrict the choice and autonomy of parties to a marriage that has failed—are patronising. As I understand it, they are supposed to allow for periods of reflection. I am all for periods of reflection where they will do any good, but they usually do good if they happen before any divorce proceedings are under way.

There are many cases where, by the time divorce proceedings are commenced, a financial provision application has become urgent. This is particularly so where one partner to a broken marriage has remained in an unhappy marriage or is enduring financial hardship, and even in cases where both parties agree to a divorce, but not to the timing or the form of financial provision. One example is when a home should be sold.

It is very important not to hold up financial provision applications on a blanket basis, given that parties frequently stay together long after their marriages have in reality failed, either because they have to live together in one home for financial reasons, or because they decide to stay together for the sake of their children. Why should parties in their position then be made to wait further for financial relief, when delay may cause considerable hardship and unhappiness?

There is, of course, no compulsion on a party to commence financial provision proceedings immediately. I suggest that the timing should remain within the choice of the parties and—where there are such—their advisers.

There are many other cases where, by the time the proceedings are commenced, the parties are living apart. One spouse may be with someone else. Generally speaking, such parties know of the issues between them relating to financial provision before proceedings are brought.

Take for example a currently well-known case. It would be appallingly high-handed to tell a practicing QC, married to a prominent figure—who was very publicly living with someone else, whom he had committed to marry and who was expecting his child—that she would have to delay for 20 weeks before taking steps to secure financial provision in divorce proceedings without his agreement.

There is no good reason to debar financial proceedings once divorce proceedings are under way, so I oppose these amendments.

On Amendment 20, which calls for the review to which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has spoken so eloquently, I agree that a review of the law on financial provision is desirable. However, I do not think that the statutory requirement for such a review sits comfortably within this legislation, which is, and should be, limited to removing fault from the divorce process.

I take the view, eloquently expressed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that the process of divorce ought generally to be kept separate from issues of financial provision. I would be happier for the Minister to commit to commissioning, in the near future, a wide-ranging consultation with a review of financial provision on divorce, with a view to updating an area of law that has become, for many, out of date and out of step with modern social mores.

I find in the terms of the noble Baroness’s amendment, borne out in her speech, and discerned and spoken to by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Walker and Lord Mackay, an element of prejudgment of what should come out of such a review. I am not sure that picking out the desirability of importing something like the Scottish provisions, the term of periodical payments and the enforceability of prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements, into what should be a wide-ranging and full review is the best path to conducting it.

I do not share the noble Baroness’s cynicism about the Bar, my profession, nor her view that no barristers support reform of the law in this area. Indeed, I support reform of the law in this area, in many ways on the same basis that she does. I certainly support her view that the law on financial provision is too complex and expensive. I endorse her view and that expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, that there is scope for some kind of a framework or model for use in the generality of cases.

However, there is room for discussion on the extent of judicial discretion, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, pointed out. On the term of maintenance payments, I am particularly concerned about the position of older applicants or those in ill health who would normally expect and be entitled to long-term provision. Cutting maintenance off in the short term might be a bad idea.

While I support the idea of a general review of financial provision, I hope the Bill will not be amended to incorporate a statutory requirement in the terms of the noble Baroness’s amendment—but I would welcome a commitment from the Minister to carry out a consultation and review.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin with Amendments 7 and 17A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, which seek to allow one party to block applications for financial provision on divorce throughout all the new 20-week minimum period referred to in the Bill. That is an entirely new restriction for which we have seen no justifying evidence. Nor do we know the potential financial impact it could have on people’s lives. These amendments would still allow financial applications by agreement of the other party, of course, and would also allow applications for maintenance pending suit, but financial orders are not there just for one or the other party to the marriage. They are also there to make sure that, for example, the children’s needs can be met. I appreciate that applications for financial provision in respect of children can be made at any time under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989, but we hardly want to promote a solution that pushes people towards yet a further set of legal proceedings.

There is no reason to delay applying for an order that in most cases can come into effect only when the divorce order is made final. Of course, the financial adjustment between the parties has to be made at some stage, but it is in no one’s interests to restrict when an application can be put in train. Indeed, it is worth noting that only once an application has been made can the court direct the parties to undertake full and frank disclosure of their assets and liabilities. Furthermore, these amendments could have the rather perverse effect of allowing one party to effectively coerce or control the other by frustrating attempts to secure a financial settlement and essentially to use that as a delaying tactic.

We are not in favour of this amendment at all. The Bill seeks to set out a very clear revised process for divorce within the existing legal framework. That is what we are anxious to implement, without being diverted by additional qualifications or controls.

I turn to Amendment 20 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech. As I said at Second Reading, the Government are considering how to approach any reform of the law with regard to financial settlement. My officials on this Bill are already at work on how best to take this forward. Drawing on that, it will be necessary to essentially lay the parameters for a review that will require, among other things, knowledge and expertise from outside government, to build an evidence base and to assess the problems that the present situation creates.

I hear what is said about the wide diversity of awards that can be made under the existing law, and the potential benefits of embracing a system such as that reflected in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 as a solution, but it is not a case simply of abandoning the present process of financial provision in the law of England and Wales and embracing that of another jurisdiction. There will be a great deal more than that to do. Therefore, to set a fixed period for review is not, I suspect, helpful, because we are going to have to produce very robust recommendations and proposals that will pass in this House and the other place, and that will require detailed consideration and detailed evidence. I cannot say that such a process would be concluded within a year.

Prisons: Radicalisation

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I mentioned earlier that 22 imams were engaged in the chaplaincy intervention programme; there is also one Sikh chaplain engaged in that programme. Each of those chaplaincy employees has undergone specialist training with regard to intervention and counterterrorism work. They are subject to vetting and due diligence checks. I am content to meet the noble Lord in due course to discuss this further.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned the enlightened separation units recommended by Ian Acheson for serious terrorist offenders, to assist their deradicalisation and prevent the radicalisation of other prisoners. The Government accepted the recommendation, the Prisons Minister describing it as

“a crucial part of our wider strategy”.

Now, more than three years on, only one is open—at HMP Frankland—causing Mr Acheson to express his dismay on BBC radio in January. When will there be more, and why the delay?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, there has been no delay in this matter. There are currently three separation centres available—at HMP Frankland, HMP Woodhill and HMP Full Sutton, which are all high-security prisons. They have capacity for 28 individuals. However, given the number of individuals selected for that separation, only one of those facilities is actually in use.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage & Report stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this Bill is only one element in a much broader response to terrorism, which includes both legislative and non-legislative measures. The Government’s view is that it would be inappropriate to consider just one element of those measures in isolation. We have announced our intention to introduce a counterterrorism (sentencing and release) Bill, which has been referred to. That will make wider changes to the release arrangements governing terrorist prisoners, as well as the penalties available to the courts. The provisions of this Bill—hopefully by then enacted—and the questions surrounding discretionary release for terrorist offenders will no doubt form part of that ongoing debate.

Last month, the Government launched an independent review of the multiagency public protection arrangements. This review is being led by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, Queen’s Counsel. The release and supervision arrangements for many of the prisoners to whom the Bill applies will inevitably be included in that review. A report following the MAPPA review will be provided to the Home Secretary and Justice Secretary for publication as soon as is practicable.

Taking up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, we anticipate that, in the course of his routine duties as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall will scrutinise the new release legislation for terrorist offenders in his annual report; that is a statutory commitment. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, observed, the Independent Reviewer has already said in his comments on the Bill that he envisages doing just that in a future report. I would certainly accept that that falls well within the boundaries of his responsibilities, and it is in these circumstances that we say that a further review is unnecessary.

The Government are clear that we want to see an end to the automatic early release of terrorist prisoners. In the forthcoming counterterrorism Bill, we will make further changes to the law surrounding the release of these offenders. In addition, later in this Session we intend to introduce a sentencing Bill that will cover wider areas of sentencing and release policy. Again, that will provide an opportunity to discuss sentencing and release arrangements. In these circumstances, we consider that there is no requirement for the further review proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I urge him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I turn first to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the question that he asked me. I accept, of course, that the independent reviewer Jonathan Hall, QC will be looking at the way this Bill is working; but he will do so in a much wider context—that of his annual review and his MAPPA review. An issue of serious principle is involved. What is needed here is a precise review of how the provisions of this emergency legislation, passed with inadequate scrutiny, are working.

I turn now to the observations of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am afraid that if this House always took the view that the House of Commons might kick back amendments we make, we would lose a great deal of our usefulness. The points that we make and the amendments we pass are often very influential to a much wider audience. I am not deterred by the fact that my colleagues in the House of Commons, who are slightly less numerous than my colleagues here, failed to get their amendment through that House, or by the fact that the Labour Party’s amendment did not succeed. I suggest that it is for us to form a view of this amendment.

When the noble Viscount went on to explain the kind of review that he foresaw as necessary and should take place, and indeed when the Minister responded to these amendments, they were both considering a much wider, more comprehensive, fuller review of the treatment and punishment of terrorists, including the Acheson recommendations on how to secure rehabilitation and the whole issue of deradicalisation. Those issues are crucial, and my regret Motion was concerned with the lack of those provisions. The very fact that the reviews that the noble Viscount and the Minister have in mind are so general and broad-reaching deprives them of the specific accent that a review of this legislation ought to have.

We should not forget the emergency nature of this legislation: it is just over three weeks since the awful atrocity in Streatham High Road. We will have passed this legislation tonight—as I am sure we will—in response to a promise made by the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Justice, the very next day. We have done it in double-quick time. Question after question was raised in today’s Second Reading—a very good debate—by noble Lords who know a lot about the subject but have had insufficient time to consider the provisions of this Bill and their consequences. As a matter of principle, it is important that post-legislative scrutiny is directed urgently at Bills that are passed as an emergency, and with this Bill, where the liberty of the subject—however undeserving many of the subjects may be—is at stake, that principle is of great importance. I have not heard anything said today that addresses the requirement for a review of emergency legislation of that kind, and I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My understanding is that under the present legislative regime, there is a duty on the Secretary of State to release the prisoner at the halfway point. We require a regime in which the Parole Board is able to act in determining whether it is satisfied that the prisoner could be released—but you could not hold the prisoner simply on the view that the Parole Board might take a few months to get round to considering his case. That is why it is necessary to look at what was referred to as a breathing space: the requirement to allow time to implement this process. As I say, it is also consistent with other sentences, where release is at the two-thirds point, and it allows for the incapacitation of the terrorist offender for a slightly longer period—which in turn, we suggest, assists in maintaining public confidence in the way in which we are dealing with these offenders.

While I understand the concern about retrospection, it has to be seen in its proper context. The Bill will not achieve its intended objective unless there is that element of retrospectivity in it. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, alluded to a situation in which a prisoner might remain in custody until the very end of their sentence and then be released without licence. It is in those circumstances that one can find provision for TPIMs, for example. I acknowledge that they have been utilised only to a very limited extent until now, and it may be that their use has to be looked at again. They are very resource-intensive, which may explain to some degree why they have been employed only in limited numbers until now. Again, we are looking at the need to employ such procedures.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, also raised Northern Ireland, which I believe the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also referred to. The Justice Minister felt that she would like to see the legislation extended to Northern Ireland. We have discussed the matter with officials in Northern Ireland, and there are very real technical difficulties regarding the way in which sentencing policy is implemented in Northern Ireland. It is quite different to sentencing policy in England and Wales in a number of respects. We fully intend to take forward this legislation, which is why we intend to look at this in the context of the counterterrorism Bill that we intend to bring forward—but at present we feel that it would be too complex an issue to try to deal with in the context of this emergency legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked why, if this is emergency legislation, there is no sunset clause. The Government’s view is twofold. First, it could create uncertainty and confusion, because a prisoner would not know whether they were to be subject to the regime that we are introducing. Secondly, we are intending to bring forward a more substantive and wide-ranging counterterrorism Bill, properly addressing these issues, when the various committees of the House are available to examine the proposed legislation. I hope that that goes some way towards satisfying the noble Lord.

I am conscious of the time, so let me say this in conclusion. In extending parole release to all terrorist offenders, the Bill provides a sensible and proportionate safeguard against the problem of automatic release. The consequences of such automatic release are reflected at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham. Further releases of prisoners are due within a matter of days. If the Bill is to achieve its desired effect, early commencement of the provisions, including retrospection, is vital. We are concerned not only with public confidence, but also with public safety. That is the first duty of any Government and one that we take extremely seriously. I invite the House to do likewise.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, my regret amendment does not ask the House to reject the Bill. If the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, or anyone else understood it as so doing, that was not intended. I fully agree with the many noble Lords who said that the Parole Board should carry out a safety assessment before terrorist prisoners are released. I agree with the Minister that that is sensible and proportionate.

Let me briefly take up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to which I do not accept that the Minister had a satisfactory answer. If the Bill were to achieve Parole Board assessment prior to release but did not increase the minimum time in custody from half to two-thirds of the original sentence, the breathing space for which the Minister asked would be achieved. As soon as the Parole Board had decided that release was safe, release would follow.

I also agree that automatic release is not appropriate in the case of terrorist prisoners. My amendment is confined to expressing some regrets that the Bill will do nothing to improve deradicalisation and rehabilitation, that Ian Acheson’s recommendations are hardly being implemented, that without further measures we risk radicalisation of non-terrorists in custody and that the Bill may cut down the time for supervision of some lower-grade terrorist offenders, who will spend more time in custody and less under supervision, thereby losing the benefits of significant periods of supervision.

On the Bill’s retrospective effect, I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, except when he described his reasoning as “simplistic”. I also agreed with the noble and learned Lords, Lord Falconer and Lord Garnier, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and other noble Lords that, whatever the position under Article 7, where a six-year sentence meant three years in custody under the 2003 Act when passed but after this Bill will mean four years in custody, it is mere sophistry to assert that this is not a retrospective change. Similarly, it is mere sophistry to draw legalistic distinctions between a presumption against retrospectivity and a principle against retrospectivity and mere sophistry to draw a legalistic distinction between the sentence passed and the time to be spent in custody. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that such a retrospective change will rightly seem unjust and unfair to serving prisoners, their families and those around them and may fuel further radicalisation.

For the reasons explained by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, my noble friend Lord Beith and others, I will support the amendments to be moved in Committee to introduce pre-release assessment by the Parole Board at the halfway point for terrorist prisoners already serving sentences with the prospect of release, if the Parole Board considers their release is safe. That said, I do not intend to press my amendment to the vote and I therefore beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment withdrawn.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 14) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 11th February 2020 Grand Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with a short apology for the delay in commencing. The purpose of this draft instrument is to enable the Secretary of State to make the alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement available across England and Wales.

This legislation gives the court a new tool directly to address alcohol-related offending. As part of a community sentence, judges and magistrates will be able to impose a ban on drinking alcohol for up to 120 days, and we will monitor this using continuous electronic monitoring, which is referred to as alcohol tagging. I am grateful for the comments made by the Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and intend to address them below and in the course of this debate.

Alcohol-fuelled crimes put a huge strain on front-line services. Problematic alcohol consumption is associated with crime, particularly heavy or binge drinking and violent crime. The latest published figures from the Crime Survey for England and Wales, in 2018, estimated that in 39% of violent incidents the victim believed the offender to be under the influence of alcohol. Alcohol-related crime is estimated to cost the taxpayer up to £13 billion per year. Public Health England estimates that the total social and economic cost of alcohol-related harm was £21.5 billion in 2018.

AAMRs have a punitive effect on offenders by restricting their ability to drink alcohol while the requirement is in force. In addition, the pilots have shown us the potential of this measure to address the purposes of sentencing more widely. Where the criminal behaviour is driven by alcohol, an alcohol ban has the potential to reduce crime and provide the opportunity for reform and rehabilitation. Through enforcing abstinence, AAMRs are designed to mitigate offending behaviour which is driven by alcohol. Where alcohol is driving or triggering criminal behaviour, the AAMR will interrupt it and should give individuals and communities a break, reduce the number of victims, protect the public and save the costs of dealing with the crimes.

The monitoring will be continuous and delivered via electronic ankle tags, providing assurance with compliance. If alcohol is detected, or attempts are made to avoid the monitoring, the offender can be returned to court. These requirements may not be imposed on dependent drinkers or alongside an alcohol treatment requirement. They are only for adult offenders.

Harnessing innovative technologies such as alcohol tags can not only punish offenders but help turn their lives around. This legislation plays an important role in a wider package of reforms of community penalties that the Government plan to bring forward in due course, which will ensure that community sentences can offer an appropriate level of punishment while effectively tackling underlying drivers of offending.

The alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirement was introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. This legislation creates a new requirement within the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that can be used where a community order or suspended sentence order is imposed. The 2012 legislation requires the order to be piloted before it can be rolled out. This requirement has been met. There have been two pilot schemes: one in London, initiated by the Prime Minister when he was mayor, and the other in Humberside, Lincolnshire and North Yorkshire. These pilots have shown us that this new measure will be welcomed by criminal justice partners.

The two AAMR pilots were run respectively by the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in London, and by the police and crime commissioners and the Humberside, Lincolnshire & North Yorkshire Community Rehabilitation Company. I appreciate that the absence of published findings was criticised by the Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I am pleased to say that findings from the pilot in the north-east have now been published and I am happy to be able to highlight some of them during this debate. Some 1,500 orders were imposed during the pilots.

The pilots had significant differences in how they were run, but the compliance rates are very similar, which gives us confidence in the utility of this measure. Compliance was very high indeed—the figure for the requirement itself was 94% for both pilots; and for abstinence from alcohol it was 98% in the London pilot and 97.4% in the Humberside pilot. That is the percentage of monitored days that were free from both alcohol and interference with the equipment. There was significant use of the order in the sentencing of violent offences in the pilots. In London, 45% of requirements were for violent offences, and in the north-east 31% were for domestic abuse offences.

This measure is welcomed by those on the front line. Indeed, as the Humberside police and crime commissioner Keith Hunter said:

“The period in which the offender is tagged will give rehabilitation agencies a real opportunity to work with the individual and get them to recognise and change their behaviour, hopefully for good. I would like to see these orders available nationally as a standard feature of the Criminal Justice System.”


Sentencers in the London pilot were frustrated that they were unable to impose the order on offenders who fell outside the pilot area.

Reports from the pilots demonstrate that offenders also recognised benefits. They were generally optimistic about the requirement and felt that it had a positive impact on their lives, particularly around their health, well-being and offending behaviour. In the north-east, 81% of those surveyed at the end of the requirement reported that they thought they would drink less or no alcohol when the tag was removed.

The scrutiny committee commented on a lack of information about rollout of the new measure. We plan to begin the introduction of the order later this year. Our intention is to take a similar approach to that used for the successful rollout of location monitoring and so avoid disruption to the core electronic monitoring service. We will balance an incremental rollout that allows us to respond to learning from early deployments and further findings from the pilots if necessary, alongside opportunities to prepare stakeholders and inform decision-makers appropriately, with ensuring that the tool is available across England and Wales as quickly as possible. We estimate that when the requirement is fully rolled out and in use nationally, in around 2023-24, some 2,300 people will be sentenced to these orders each year. This will mean that approximately 400 orders will be active at any given point in time.

The order’s requirement imposes an alcohol ban of up to 120 days, while continuous monitoring provides assurance regarding compliance with the sentence of the court. We believe that the introduction of this measure strengthens the community sentence response to alcohol-related offending and is a powerful message that we are tackling this issue. We should not lose time in introducing a new measure which means that our courts can directly address a driver of crime and stop the drinking of those who cause misery, damage and fear by their behaviour, for up to four months. We strongly believe it is in the public interest to introduce this measure. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, there is widespread agreement that a great deal of crime is related to and fuelled by alcohol. Indeed, Members of your Lordships’ House have been saying for many years, in debate after debate, that much offending in this country is related to excess alcohol and drug abuse, so the passage of Section 76 of the LASPO Act was unsurprising. There is also widespread agreement that we all should support measures to reduce the consumption of alcohol in relation to crime, and thus alcohol-related crime.

The alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirements, which I shall call simply alcohol monitoring requirements, use electronic tagging technology to ensure that offenders reduce or eliminate alcohol consumption for a period. The essential elements for the application of Section 76 of the LASPO Act are: first, that the offences concerned are alcohol-related; secondly, that during the period of the order the offender will take no alcohol, or alcohol reduced to a specified level; thirdly, that the consumption of alcohol will be electronically tagged; fourthly, that the period of the requirement will not exceed 120 days; fifthly, that it can be imposed only together with a community order or suspended sentence; and finally, that a breach of the requirement is punishable by a sentence for that breach.

The Committee has heard from the Minister that there have been two pilots. The London pilot ran from 2014 to June 2018, while the Humber, Lincoln and North Yorkshire pilot—which I shall call the northern pilot—ran from after the 2017 election until April last year. There were different methodologies. The London requirements were imposed on a stand-alone basis, whereas the northern pilot imposed the orders together with community orders, while monitoring and fitting of the tag was carried out by probation staff. In addition, the northern pilot included domestic abuse offenders whereas the London pilot did not.

The only question that warrants the Committee’s attention at this stage is whether enough evidence has been gleaned from the two pilots that alcohol monitoring requirements are or will be effective to justify Parliament’s commencing the section now and rolling out alcohol monitoring requirements. Your Lordships’ Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee clearly concluded that there was not. Central to its view was that the results of the northern pilot had not been published, although we have heard from the Minister that they have been now; that was predicted for this month. But published or not, it follows from their recent nature that the results cannot have been publicly evaluated.

The Ministry of Justice sought to justify its position in its Explanatory Memorandum at paragraph 7.3, which bears reading because, I suggest, it is unconvincing. It says that the evaluation of the northern pilot

“is not due until February 2020 but sufficient learning has been shared with the department, through ongoing involvement with the pilot and its evaluation, to indicate findings consistent with, and complementary to”,

the London pilot, and that:

“In addition, the department conducted a proof of concept for using the alcohol monitoring technology for suitable offenders released on licence. This has provided considerable insight into how alcohol monitoring can support the management of risk and rehabilitation. On this basis, we consider that we have a good evidence base around the utility and practice”


of alcohol-monitoring requirements

“which has informed our plans for England and Wales roll-out.”

What the Ministry could not assess was the impact of alcohol monitoring requirements on reoffending. Indeed, paragraph 29 of the committee’s report quoted the department’s response to Questions. It said:

“Reoffending findings will be available well in advance of commencing roll out and will inform the delivery of AAMR. However, it is our view that the findings we already have from the”


pilots

“indicate that AAMR is an effective sentence option. It is the department’s intention to assess impacts much more substantially, including to inform the better targeting of resources to address alcohol harms, when we roll out AAMR.”

The reality is that assessing the effect on reoffending will have to await medium-term evaluation of the behaviour of offenders who have been placed under these monitoring requirements. The Government appear to have accepted that in their impact assessment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I will address a number of the points that have been raised. First, the results of the second pilot in Humberside were known to the ministry as it brought forward this order. The results have now been published and they are quite compelling. We are talking about a compliance rate well over 90% in both pilots. Indeed, it was 98% in the case of the London pilot and 97.4% in respect of Humberside. They were carried out over different periods and applied in the context of different offences. That gave us a spectrum of results, but all were very encouraging. Of course, we should consider not only the immediate importance and impact of the orders—because they stop people taking alcohol for a period of up to 120 days—we should like to be informed whether there is an ongoing impact. In the Humberside pilot, about 81% of those who had undergone such an order were contemplating either stopping taking alcohol or reducing their alcohol intake at the end of the period. It was clearly having an impact, therefore, on people’s intentions—but they were only intentions, of course.

As regards reoffending, it will take time to go through that process. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, himself said, that is something for the middle term, not something we can immediately analyse. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the primary legislation was enacted in 2012. The pilots were completed only last year. For how many more years are we to analyse the data before we commit to rolling out what appears on the face of it, and on the basis of the pilots already carried out, to be a very successful programme?

On the issue of resuming alcohol consumption, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, yes, that is always a risk, but there are two benefits. First, there is the immediate benefit of taking someone off alcohol for a period after they have committed an offence, one that may well have been induced by excessive alcohol consumption. Secondly, there is the potential for them to learn from the experience that they do not wish to imbibe alcohol to excess in future, in order to modify their behaviour. However, I accept that you cannot guarantee that.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised the question of medical assistance. Let me be clear: an order of this kind will not be made where an individual is alcohol dependent. It is difficult to see how you could bring in and use doctors in the context of someone who is not alcohol dependent but is being taken off alcohol for 120 days because of a violent crime committed under the influence of alcohol. I find it difficult to understand what their contribution would be. On the other hand, in cases where someone is alcohol dependent, provision is made through the Community Sentence Treatment Requirement Programme for Health and Justice partners to work together to deal with such dependency, be it on alcohol or drugs.

At the end of the day, we have to bear in mind that we intend to roll out this programme on the basis of the probation areas, so we will learn even as we roll out the programme between now and 2023 how effective it is being. But we have already seen the results of the original pilots, and I suggest that they really are impressive. In the circumstances, we consider that now is the time for us to respond to the issue of alcohol-related offending and alcohol-related violent crime by taking the steps proposed in the order. It is in these circumstances that I commend the draft instrument—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord sits down, is it intended that the alcohol monitoring requirements be imposed as a generality in the first stages of the rollout, together with rehabilitative requirements, so that the probation service will be involved, or is the stand-alone imposition of alcohol monitoring requirements likely, as in the London programme? It seems to me that there may be a substantial difference in the effect on future behaviour.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My understanding is that the monitoring will not be carried out by or related to the probation service; it will be carried out independently. But clearly, the justice system will have an overall picture because, where someone is in breach of the order, that individual will be brought back to court.

May I just clarify a point I made earlier? The period 2023-24 is when we intend to reach steady state and to have completed the rollout. The rollout itself is intended to take place over the next 12 months. I hope that assists noble Lords.

Crime: Support for Children and Young People

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 5th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Keeping Children Safe in Education statutory guidance provides that every school and college should have a designated safeguarding lead, who should be a senior member of staff.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the recent briefing on the Queen’s Speech reported that only 18% of victims were aware of the victims’ code at all. What steps are the Government taking to improve education among young people and children in particular about the existence of the victims’ code and their rights under it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we will shortly be consulting on changes to the code, and we have committed to developing targeted, less complex and more accessible guidance aimed particularly at children, young people and their families.