Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness McIntosh of Pickering

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I of course am listening to the contributions made to the debate in Committee and will take account of the observations that have been made. I make no comment on the procedural issues that the noble Lord raised.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for his full answer to the concerns that were raised. Perhaps I misunderstood his response, but I think that the thrust of the interventions of noble Lords—nearly to a man and a woman—was that it is inappropriate to seek to put into UK law by delegated secondary legislation a new treaty that the Minister and the Government seek to sign. The thrust of the remarks was that it should require primary legislation. Have I misunderstood my noble and learned friend on that point? Why are the Government resisting the usual procedure of agreeing to implement anything that has been agreed by the Government by way of international treaty through primary legislation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

First, let me make it clear that I do not accept that it is an invariable constitutional practice that the implementation in domestic law of an international law treaty is undertaken by way of primary legislation only. Secondly, when it comes to the implementation of a treaty that has been entered into at the level of international law, the purpose of drawing it down into domestic law is either to accept it into domestic law or not to accept it into domestic law. There is no scope for amending the terms of the treaty that has already been entered into. Therefore, the use of the affirmative statutory instrument procedure is considered appropriate. It gives this House and the other place ample opportunity to debate whether they should draw down the treaty obligations into domestic law. There is, essentially, no real scope for amendment; therefore, we consider the affirmative procedure perfectly adequate for that purpose.