European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2018 Lords Chamber

Motion D

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Moved by

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 5, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 5A.

5A: Because none of the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be part of domestic law on or after exit day.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will speak also to Motions P and Q.

These are complex matters which, for understandable reasons, have raised particular concerns across the House. Nobody on any side of this House wants to see our rights and protections diluted when we leave the European Union. I therefore appreciate why your Lordships asked the other place to think again about the exclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and rights of action based on the general principles of EU law. The Commons has done just that and has made it clear—for the third time in the passage of this Bill, and by increasing majorities each time—that it does not want these elements of the EU legal system retained when we cease to be under obligations as an EU member state. In line with established convention, we should now respect the will of the elected House on these matters.

Let me say a little more to address directly some of the concerns that I know some noble Lords still have, and to respond directly to some observations that have been made. The simple fact is that the Charter of Fundamental Rights was not intended to, and did not, create any new rights. As protocol 30 makes clear, it reaffirmed the rights that were already recognised in EU law: that is, law that is being retained in the United Kingdom under the terms of the Bill. As the illustrative analysis we have published sets out in greater detail, most of the fundamental rights protected in the charter are also protected in UK law, most notably under the Human Rights Act 1998, in the common law and via specific statutory protections—for example, those in equalities legislation. Rights saved by the Bill and many of the issues currently justiciable via the general principles of EU law will continue to be justiciable without rights of challenge based specifically on the charter or general principles being retained, because other sources of rights will continue to exist and operate in UK law. This includes, for example, the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, which will continue to be protected by existing, long-standing domestic rights of action.

By contrast, as we have said, keeping rights of challenge based on the charter or general principles, which could result in disapplication of primary legislation, would be inconsistent with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. It would also directly undermine the legal certainty provided by the Bill if these rights are retained way into the future but in relation only to a limited and reducing body of law.

The Government have gone to considerable lengths to listen and respond to concerns, particularly in relation to accrued rights. We want to get the balance right. Therefore, in rejecting this House’s amendments, the other place has agreed to a significant additional delay to the prohibition on certain general principles rights of challenge to three years after exit. This approach seeks to strike a balance and a fair compromise between strongly held views on all sides. Inevitably, some noble Lords will still disagree and argue that we should go further, or indeed that we should not go so far, and I understand the range of views. It is, however, for the elected House ultimately to determine these matters and that is what it has done. I suggest that we should now respect that decision.

I turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, in respect of validity challenges. He is absolutely right to draw attention to this technical yet important issue and I am grateful for the diligent and constructive way in which he has done so. The Government’s view is that it would not in general make sense to create for our domestic courts an entirely new jurisdiction in which they are required to, in effect, step into the shoes of the CJEU and consider, for example, questions around whether the relevant EU institution misused its powers or complied with the applicable procedural requirements. It is nevertheless important to have a mechanism to enable Ministers, with Parliament’s agreement, to provide a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in some circumstances. The original amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, made on Report, would have removed that right, which is why we could not agree to it and why the elected House has rejected that proposal. I urge the noble Lord and this House to agree with the Commons in that decision. In doing so, however, perhaps I can also try to reassure him and other noble Lords on this point and say a little about the amendment in lieu that he has proposed.

We have always recognised that there may be some circumstances where there is good reason for the validity of an EU instrument to be challenged in a domestic court. One possible example is where a decision of an EU institution or body is addressed to an individual or business in the United Kingdom but later overturned by the CJEU in so far as it applies in the EU. That individual or business will continue to be bound by the decision in the United Kingdom, unless the United Kingdom courts could overturn it as well. We have not proposed—and I do not suggest that we do so today—that regulations would deal only with circumstances where, for example, a public interest test is met. That is, however, an interesting suggestion which we are happy to consider as we discuss with Parliament and others the potential content of any regulations. But I can confirm, for the avoidance of any doubt, that the Government in no way intended to cherry pick which individual cases would be allowed to continue before domestic courts. Any regulations we make would be most likely to specify certain types or class of case that could be brought after exit. To be clear: this is about preserving rights and protections.

This is a technical issue that may specifically impact individuals and businesses and we are therefore keen to listen to and take into account the views of Parliament and undertake consultation with stakeholders. Following that, and subject to parliamentary approval, our intention would be that regulations would be in place before exit day. However, such a right of challenge may be appropriate in circumstances that we cannot accurately predict at this stage—or, indeed, before the point of exit—and the power would therefore permit further regulations to be made after exit if Parliament agrees.

Turning specifically to the amendment in lieu of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I appreciate the constructive spirit in which he has tabled it but we cannot accept it. The effect of the noble Lord’s amendment would be that in the event that Parliament did not approve any regulations allowing for certain validity of challenges to be available, or if by the point of exit no class of case had arisen that the Government considered—and Parliament agreed—should be permitted, all such challenges would as a default be permissible in domestic law. As I noted, allowing for a right of challenge to the validity of retained EU law would be to hand our domestic courts a wholly new jurisdiction. These are not cases they are able to hear at present. Simply saying that they can now hear all such cases without saying any more would raise uncertainty—for example, which courts would hear these cases and, crucially, who would defend any challenges.

Any regulations the Government brought forward would be able to address these finer points in the specific circumstances they cater for, but the effect of the noble Lord’s amendment would be to provide for a situation where none of this is clear and our courts would, in effect, be left to try and work it out themselves. The core purpose of the Bill is to minimise legal uncertainty as we exit the EU. This amendment therefore works directly against that. I appreciate that may not be the noble Lord’s intention. He wishes to avoid a lacuna in the event that any regulations that allow for challenges are not made before exit. However, I repeat my firm assurance that the Government’s clear intention is to have regulations on this in place before exit day. In the light of that, the amendment is unnecessary. I hope that, in clarifying the Government’s intentions, I am able to address the concerns expressed in both Houses. I beg to move.

Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D)

Tabled by

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[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I hope the Government will keep an open mind in the future about the charter in the terms in which the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was framed—that is, as a guide to interpretation of retained EU law. While the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, said that most of the charter rights are found in other sources of law, not all of them are. This may prove to be an issue in the Brexit negotiations, which is why I hope that the Government might have cause and justification to revisit it.

I suggest that in the context of security co-operation and data transfers for the tech industry, this may be a factor in the extent and scope of our co-operation with the European Union in the future. I therefore make a plea that the Government do not totally close their mind to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a guide to interpretation because I think that could be well received by those whom we have to persuade on the scope of co-operation.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, for their observations about engagement with the Government over these matters. The Government have listened and the other place has agreed to significant amendments in respect of certain challenges based on general principles of EU law. Given that, I hope that the House will endorse the decision today.

Motion D agreed to.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 10, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 10A.

10A: Because it inappropriately restricts the power in Clause 7(1).

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will speak also to Motion L and Motion M. The scope of the powers in this Bill is not an issue that either House has taken lightly, and it is not one that the Government take lightly, either. Before the Bill was introduced, the Government set out the shape and size of the task ahead and why it could be achieved only by the use of relatively broad delegated powers. I do not believe that any noble Lord rejects the premise of that task. All of us here today accept that our law must be corrected so that it works properly when we leave the EU and EU law ceases to apply in the United Kingdom. None of us wishes to face a scenario, once we leave the EU, where the law does not work or where it is left so complex, confusing and convoluted that we spawn a new generation of legal cases that inherit the mantle of Jarndyce v Jarndyce.

My ministerial colleagues in the other place have given examples of where this might come to pass if our law looked as if it was still referring to the EU. We have a duty to do everything we can to provide legal certainty, and I know that I share that goal with Peers across the House. We want a sensible solution, accepting that the powers should be as wide as is required but no wider. The Government have honoured their commitment on this front with the limits we have already put on the correcting power, and indeed the total removal of one of the key powers in the Bill now that further analysis has weakened the case for it.

We have followed the recommendation of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee and have required Ministers to make, alongside any exercise of the key powers in the Bill, a statement that they have “good reasons” for their course of action and an explanation of this to Parliament. We are happy to have been able to do as recommended by the committee, and we are grateful for its constructive and expert approach to this issue.

Noble Lords asked the Commons to consider again the test that should circumscribe the breadth of the correcting power. They have done just that and they have found that a stark test of necessity, while perhaps understandable in everyday language, is not acceptable on the statute book. Indeed the Commons have now voted four times in favour of “appropriate”—I repeat, four times. Given that, I do not think it would be the right course for this issue to return to the Commons yet again, when their view has been so clearly expressed. I ask noble Lords to consider that.

Having accepted what the task ahead is and the principle of how to approach it, we must ask ourselves today what statutory wording will permit the sensible, logical and common-sense corrections we all support without giving unnecessary discretion to Ministers? For example, our approach will permit us to end inappropriate reciprocal arrangements such as those established by the directive on the return of cultural goods, which could leave the EU 27 able to force UK nationals into court to demand the return of cultural objects brought here, with no power for the UK to take legal action in similar situations overseas.

Other potentially unnecessary but sensible and appropriate corrections to deficiencies would include folding the EU’s authorisation process for controlling the export of devices that risk being used for torture into the UK’s own more responsive and effective domestic export control regime. We looked at this important issue and, by sending our amendments, we asked the Commons to look again. As I said, they have done so. They have debated at length and they have decided that it remains clear that only the original wording of the Bill will suffice. I hope that noble Lords will respect the decision they have made. I beg to move.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for setting out the Government’s case with such precision and care. I am very grateful, too, to the number of noble Lords who voted in substantial majorities for the three amendments covered by the three Motions in this group.

The Minister and his colleagues have been rather critical of what I might call the family of amendments that seek to bolt on to the Bill issues of policy. They have said, “No, this Bill has a central theme”. Of course, these three amendments address that central theme. They are about the balance of power between Parliament and the Executive. I am quietly disappointed that, despite the degree to which the Government have moved in terms of explanatory statements and other matters, the Commons did not take this view. I did not see any new material or arguments deployed in the Commons. In particular, I did not see an acknowledgement that a definition of what might fall within the category of necessity—that is, “necessary”— might prevent Ministers being overly constrained by the use of that term. However, I think that, if one were to craft an interpretative provision of that sort, it would solicit a very similar answer from the House of Commons.

So I feel that the argument has been made, and perhaps that is where it should rest for the time being—but with a weather eye, which I know will be exercised by your Lordships, on how “appropriate” is interpreted by Ministers in the use of these provisions.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions. On the last point, it is not the Government’s intention to cut corners anywhere in the legislative process. I hope that noble Lords will take some comfort from that.

As the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, observed, no new arguments were raised in the Commons, which underlines its view on the current state of the legislation. Following the theme of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in response to the point on the matter of interpretation raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, it will of course be necessary to interpret the legislation in an appropriate manner.

Motion E agreed.