Lord Keen of Elie
Main Page: Lord Keen of Elie (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Keen of Elie's debates with the Scotland Office
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 25YX and the related Amendments 28CB, 28CG, 28DV and 28FD seek to impose an express requirement that the public service delivery power may be used to share information only to the extent that it is necessary and proportionate to do so. That covers the changes to debt fraud research and similar civil registration provisions in the Bill. With respect, the amendments are unnecessary as the powers will need to be exercised in line with the Data Protection Act and the codes of practice, which already require that only the minimum data necessary to fulfil the particular objective may be shared. It is therefore unnecessary to amend in accordance with this proposal.
The effect of Amendment 25YYD would be that the list of specified persons permitted to use the public service delivery power could be amended only to add or remove bodies. The removal of the word “modify” would affect the way that minor amendments could be made. I do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, expressly referred to this amendment, but as it is listed in this group as her amendment I just mention the point because clearly it is necessary that there should be a degree of flexibility in how that provision operates.
I apologise; I thought that was in another group, though I received a note later. I would like to understand how extensive a modification might be.
I am obliged to the noble Baroness. I am happy to explain within this group, where I understand the amendment remains. The removal of the word “modify” would affect the way in which minor amendments could be made. For example, where a body changes its name or the description of the category of a body needs to be adjusted, you would then want to modify rather than delete and start again.
Amendment 26A seeks to remove reference to,
“the contribution made by individuals or households to society”,
from the public service delivery chapter. Again, I venture that the amendment is unnecessary because subsection (10) gives examples of “well-being” but does not provide an exhaustive list. Therefore we have three categories by way of example—but only by way of example. In response to the specific observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I respectfully suggest that there is nothing paternalistic or judgmental about any of the examples given in the Bill. Indeed, where a party makes a contribution to society, that benefits the contributor as well as society, which is why it is appropriate that it should be given as an example in this context.
Amendment 28AU would provide a new definition of “personal information” for the purposes of the public service delivery power. This point was raised in Committee as well. The amendment expressly incorporates the definition of “personal data” under the Data Protection Act 1998 into the definition of personal information for the purposes of these powers, as well as making clear that the Bill’s extended definition also includes deceased individuals and companies. We consider that the existing provisions set out the same position, albeit in slightly different words. I note that reference was made to the issue in Committee, and to the provision of codes of practice in that context.
The intention of Amendment 28AY seems to be to provide greater transparency by ensuring that individuals would know when information about them has been shared. Existing provisions in the Bill already require those using the powers to comply with Data Protection Act requirements as to the information that people are given about the usage of their personal data. This, supplemented by the requirements imposed by applicable codes of practice, ensures that the use of these powers will be as transparent as it can be.
Amendments 28AR and related amendments seek to narrow the exceptions to the general rule in Clause 36(1) that personal information received under the public service delivery powers may be used only for the purpose for which it was shared, to the effect that such information may not be shared for the purpose of preventing anti-social behaviour, and to restrict the exception permitting disclosure for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime to “serious” crime, as indicated by the noble Baroness. These amendments would also bring in an offence of disclosing personal information for the purposes of anti-social behaviour. The prevention of anti-social behaviour and the prevention or detection of crime are matters of significant public interest. If information sharing indicates potential criminal activity, public authorities should be able to take action. Similarly, if information received under the powers indicates that anti-social behaviour is occurring or is likely, we consider that this information should be disclosable to maintain public order. Anti-social behaviour may itself be seriously harmful to those who become its victims.
Amendment 28BM seeks to remove the power given by Clause 40(4), which allows regulations to make disclosures by newly specified persons subject to the same conditions that apply to disclosures of information provided by HMRC. That power would be used to require the consent of the original provider to any subsequent disclosures of particularly sensitive information, as is the case for information provided by HMRC under Clause 38. The amendment is undesirable, as it would remove flexibility to give enhanced protection to information from certain sources. I do not believe the noble Baroness read the provision in that form, but it is there so that enhanced protection may be given in a particular circumstance.
Amendment 28CF would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to review the civil registration power after three years, akin to the powers already provided in the debt and fraud powers. This duty was included in the debt and fraud powers to assess whether the powers deliver demonstrable benefit via an initial piloting process. The information gathered in the course of the pilot process will provide evidence for the review. It is our view that a similar duty to review the civil registration power would not be appropriate. First, civil registration information is already a matter of public record. Secondly, the powers are simply looking to update outmoded legislation to simplify and provide the flexibility to share civil registration data within the public sector to avoid the need to enact specific powers whenever a new need arises. The power has been developed to support a range of public authorities at national and local government level to transform the services that they can provide to citizens.
Finally, Amendment 39 is intended to ensure that Part 5 could not be brought into force until after the GDPR comes into effect, which would be in May 2018. This would prevent the use of the powers until that date, which would be unhelpful given that a number of bodies are keen to use the powers to achieve particular objectives, such as extending the warm home discount scheme. As we have said before, we consider that the present provisions are compatible with the GDPR—compliant, therefore, in that context—and we are committed to revisiting the codes of practice before May 2018 to ensure that they reflect the latest best practice of compliance with the GDPR.
In those circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister, but all that will bear some reading. We felt it important to extend some of the comments that we made in Committee to get a more extended response. Noble Lords will be pleased to know that I shall not respond to all those points. On the Minister’s first point about “necessary or proportionate”, I do not know whether he means that I misread the ICO’s comments, that the Government disagree with the ICO, or whether some of the changes to the Bill since its initial form have dealt with them. Perhaps I should just leave that hanging.
The fact that the “contribution to society” is an example does not answer our concerns. I remain anxious about it, as I do about “anti-social behaviour”, which the Minister described as being a matter of significant public interest. I do not dispute that, but data sharing is a matter of significant public interest—I suggest, possibly greater. We are told that anti-social behaviour may be seriously harmful, but it is not criminal in this context, because we have other provisions to deal with crime.
I was indeed confused about the application of the HMRC powers to other bodies, and I remain confused about whether that extension is appropriate.
Finally, of course civil registration information is a matter of public record, but the updating takes us into a very different regime. The ability to share information in bulk is very different from that to look up individual pieces of information. Can the Minister tell the House today whether the consultation to which he referred extended beyond the sharing organisations to the sort of bodies concerned with privacy? He may not know, and I may be quite out of order in asking this on Report. I do not think he is going to leap to his feet—pause—no, he is not. I do not hold that against him. It is probably not in his brief. If there was not such consultation, that answers my point.
However, clearly, I should beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee made a number of recommendations on Part 5 of the Bill. The Government developed the information-sharing powers through consultation and partnership over a process that started over three years ago. These measures are about improving the way the Government operate for the public benefit. Of course, data sharing must be done with transparency, safeguards and oversight. It is in that spirit that we have accepted the bulk of the committee’s recommendations. The way in which Part 5 is structured in seven chapters to deal with different data-sharing powers has meant that it has taken nearly 100 amendments to implement the recommendations, so I will spare the House from referring to every one in turn. I believe that my noble friend Lord Ashton has written previously setting out all that detail.
Our amendments place the lists of specified persons able to disclose and use information under the public service delivery, debt and fraud powers on the face of the Bill rather than in regulations. We then also narrow the powers to amend the lists. For public service delivery, specified persons will be permitted to share information only for the purposes of an objective which has been expressly specified as applicable to that person, rather than any specified objective. We have also narrowed the ability to set and amend data-sharing objectives for public service delivery, so that any specified objective must support the delivery of a specified public authority’s functions.
For water and fuel poverty, we have restricted the powers to amend the list of support measures and to add to the list of permitted recipients of information under the clause, as the DPRRC recommended. Finally, we have adopted the committee’s recommendations to remove Henry VIII powers to make consequential amendments to primary legislation, as well as to narrow the powers to review and amend the fraud and debt powers. We have ensured that any amendments can be only to improve the operation of the fraud and debt powers and there will be no way to use these powers to undo the safeguards that the Bill provides.
In addition to the DPRRC’s recommendations, the Government have tabled amendments on the following matters. Amendments 28FE and 28FF remove repetition in Clause 60(5) relating to the criminal offences which protect personal information originating from HMRC, Revenue Scotland and the Welsh Revenue Authority. By removing this repetition, the amendments avoid any confusion which might otherwise be caused.
Amendments 28FG to 28FN correct an unintended consequence of measures that were agreed during Lords Committee stage to prevent disclosures by journalists in the public interest being caught by the anti-disclosure offences in Chapter 5. The unintended effect is that the criminal offence which protects personal information disclosed under Clause 60(1), and which originates from one of the tax authorities, now applies only to disclosures made by the person who first receives the information but not those within the accreditation system who subsequently receive the information—for example, to undertake peer review or via intermediaries. These amendments therefore restore a key safeguard to the research power, which ensures that information is protected in all parts of the process.
Amendments 28FW, 28FX, 37 and 38 provide new data-sharing powers for Scottish Revenue and the Welsh Revenue Authority. Clause 70 provides the power for HMRC to share de-identified data, allowing HMRC to share aggregate and general information more widely, for purposes in the public interest. Following discussions with the Welsh Government and the Scottish Government, as requested by them, we are providing equivalent powers for devolved tax-raising bodies.
Amendment 28FY, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt, is supported by the Government. There is a recognised sound public policy argument for supporting the more effective operation of the Employers’ Liability Tracing Office, referred to as ELTO. The discussions at Lords Committee sparked further conversations between HMRC and ELTO officials, resulting in an agreement to take this amendment forward. This Bill has offered a timely opportunity therefore to legislate. The current clause meets the objective of helping ELTO improve its records of employers’ liability insurance policies, making it easier to identify insurers and so enable claimants to pursue compensation. Both parties recognise that there remains some work to do and it is currently unclear as to how effective HMRC data may be in helping to populate missing data. However, an enabling provision would allow more robust testing of the possibilities, with the opportunity to take these forward.
Amendments 40 and 41 enable commencement of measures by area so that the Government can ensure that measures are not commenced for Northern Ireland in the event that the Northern Ireland Assembly has not given legislative consent. Consent from the Northern Ireland Assembly is required on a number of measures, including the extension of public lending right to e-book loans, Part 5 of the Bill on digital government, the Northern Ireland provision in relation to Ofcom and, should the government amendment be agreed, the offence of breaching limits on ticket sales.
In consequence of the potential need to commence the Bill by area, these amendments also provide the power to make necessary transitional provision. The transitional powers will also be used to define small businesses in the statistics chapter of Part 5 until definitions in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 come into force. I beg to move.
I declare my interest as a partner in the global law firm DAC Beachcroft, and other interests set out in the register, including chairing the British Insurance Brokers’ Association and being president of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Occupational Safety and Health. Taken at face value, Amendment 28FY would appear somewhat technical, but the Employers’ Liability Tracing Office is working well, but it could work better, and this amendment would help to facilitate that.
I am so grateful to the Minister and his colleagues for the support that they have given to this amendment, which could make a substantial difference to the capacity of the office to help to secure compensation, expeditiously and effectively, for those afflicted by industrial illnesses. When someone faces a reduced quality of life and possibly an avoidably and unnecessarily early death because of an industrial illness innocently contracted, the least that we can do is to deliver compensation as quickly as possible in the hope that the individual with the illness can enjoy at least some benefit from it. I believe that in some small way the amendment will serve to make this a more civilised and compassionate country.
My Lords, we have two amendments in this group. The Minister was just a little previous in answering Amendment 25YYD on modification, so we do not need to go back to that. Amendment 33ZYD would remove several organisations from the list of specified persons for the purposes of fraud provisions, and the amendment is here to enable us to ask whether all these require the data-sharing gateway or, conversely, whether there are many other government-related organisations; I am not quite sure what the correct term might be for organisations such as the National Lottery or the British Council, but I shall use the term government-related organisations tonight. Are there not others that might use the power? What were the criteria used to select the ones that are in the schedule?
I am obliged to my noble friend Lord Hunt and note what he said with regard to the amendment. On the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, Amendment 33ZYD, which seeks to remove a number of non-departmental public bodies listed in the schedule for the fraud power, I accept that the list in the schedule is long but the fact is that many public authorities are at serious risk of fraud. Each of the bodies was considered individually before being added to the schedule, and the NDPBs have been included because they each administer many millions of pounds in grant expenditure each year, which exposes them to a significant risk of fraud.
Were any organisations considered and discarded for that purpose?
I am not in a position to say what number of bodies were considered and discarded, but I will undertake to write to the noble Baroness on that point. All the public bodies included in the schedule must, of course, comply with the data-sharing safeguards in the Bill. Clearly, public authorities may not enter into data sharing lightly. They will have to follow the codes of practice, comply with the Information Commissioner’s requirements on data sharing and privacy and have in place all necessary protections to prevent unlawful disclosure.
The list of public bodies in the government amendments is shorter than the lists we have previously published in draft regulations although, as I indicated to the noble Baroness a moment ago, I do not know how many bodies were considered and removed before the process of listing them in the draft regulations took place. Care has been given to ensuring that we share only where there is a clear benefit, as required by the legislation. I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I will take this opportunity to briefly comment on this group of amendments. These Benches did submit a series of amendments in Committee. The Minister responded that the Government were giving due consideration to the Delegated Powers Committee report, so there was no opportunity to go through some of those issues in detail. We welcome the Government’s amendments and the fact that they have responded to the Delegated Powers Committee. I have read the Information Commissioner’s briefing for Report, and I welcome the fact that she strongly supports the Government’s adoption of these amendments, which she believes will strengthen parliamentary scrutiny and government accountability.
The next group of amendments deals with the code of practice, on which we had lengthy debates in Committee, but I believe that the Government are now striking the right proportional balance between improving public and government services and the need to protect data.
My Lords, in Committee I had my name to an amendment regarding the status of the codes of practice. At that time, the noble and learned Lord referred to the appropriate level of legal obligation. He certainly persuaded me that the wording “having regard to” or “complying with” did not relate to whether a public authority could ignore a code, but whether there were reasons for doing so. I was persuaded about that level of flexibility.
Of course, we were really concerned about what the codes of practice would ultimately look like, what the engagement of the Information Commissioner would be and what the Information Commissioner’s view was. On these Benches we were pleased to see not only the Government’s amendments but the Information Commissioner saying that she was extremely pleased that the Government had accepted her recommendations on there being references in the Bill to codes of practice and the privacy impact assessments.
In the light of the Information Commissioner’s overall comments and the fact that the Government have responded, we certainly welcome these amendments. However, I give notice that—the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to this—what is in the codes and how public authorities operate them will be very important, and parliamentary scrutiny of and engagement in them will be critical in the future. I hope that we will see further drafts of the codes before they are ultimately laid before Parliament. It is really important not only that there is the highest level of consultation on them but that Members of Parliament are properly engaged in them.
I thank noble Lords for their observations on these matters. There are of course government amendments in this group as well and perhaps I may begin with those.
This group of amendments concerns the codes of practice issued under Part 5 and those issued by the Information Commissioner’s Office. It includes the government amendments that implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, observed, the recommendations of the Information Commissioner’s Office. In addition, there are some opposition amendments on similar points.
We have already published draft codes of practice on data sharing. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that the first codes of practice and the UK Statistics Authority’s statement of principles should be laid before Parliament in draft and should not be brought into force until they had been approved under the affirmative procedure. Revisions were to follow the draft negative procedure. We agree and have tabled amendments to achieve this, and it is intended that Parliament should have a suitable opportunity to consider these drafts and any amendments thereto in due course.
A further series of government amendments will require persons disclosing personal information under relevant chapters of Part 5 to have regard to the Information Commissioner’s codes of practice on privacy impact assessments and privacy notices, transparency and control in so far as they apply to information which is being shared. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, observed, the Information Commissioner called for explicit reference to these two codes to be made on the face of the Bill. We have worked with her office to develop these amendments, which supplement the existing requirement that the codes of practice prepared under the Bill must be consistent with the commissioner’s own code on data sharing, and I understand that she is satisfied with the steps we have taken in that regard. I hope that this will provide further assurance to noble Lords that we are committed to ensuring that best practice concerning compliance with data protection and transparency will be applied to the exercise of powers under Part 5 of the Bill.
I now turn to the opposition amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I hope I can persuade them that their amendments are no longer necessary, as the government amendments fully address the concerns of both the Information Commissioner’s Office and the DPRRC.
As the noble Baroness has explained, the amendments in their names seek to ensure further consistency with the ICO’s codes and to strengthen the role of those codes in the regime set up by Part 5, as well as providing for greater parliamentary oversight of the Government’s codes, and I believe that we are now there. The Bill already requires that codes of practice issued under Part 5 of the Bill must be consistent with the ICO’s data-sharing code of practice. The government amendments further require persons to have regard to the ICO’s codes on privacy impact assessments and privacy notices, transparency and control when exercising relevant powers under Part 5. So we are now referencing all the codes which the ICO felt were critical for the operation of Part 5.
Of course, this is not the first time we have discussed amendments that seek to strengthen enforcement of the codes of practice by requiring authorities that use the powers of determined specified bodies to “comply with” rather than “have regard to” these codes. The Government’s position remains that “have regard to” is the right weight to give to codes of this type. That is itself a legal obligation, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, noted. Moreover, the public law will expect those who are subject to the codes to follow their stipulations unless there are cogent reasons why they should not. We note that the Information Commissioner’s own codes are themselves advisory. A requirement to “comply with” the codes could lead to their being applied in a tick-box fashion, without due regard to whether the recommendations are actually applicable to and desirable in the context of the specific data share.
On the issue of adding additional persons to the consultation obligations for the codes, since Ministers have committed before Parliament to consult publicly on the Part 5 codes of practice, we suggest that such a requirement is unnecessary. The present provisions reflect what the noble Baroness noted to be the normal position.
Finally, on parliamentary oversight, the Government’s amendments fully implement the DPRRC’s recommendations, including, exceptionally, the use of the affirmative procedure for the first codes and the draft negative procedure thereafter. They go further than the noble Baroness’s amendment, and I hope that that will be welcomed by all noble Lords. I therefore invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that response. I had forgotten to say that I was glad to see the government amendments about the affirmative procedure—it was because of looking at those that we got those two stray amendments that were tabled in error.
The noble Lord, Lord Collins, is absolutely right about the codes of practice. I simply say, before begging leave to withdraw, that it will not be possible for amendments to be made once the codes are put formally to Parliament. That is why wide consultation and—I do not like the term—an iterative process is very important on what will be significant documents. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I hesitate before intervening in this group of amendments because, the last time I intervened, my noble friend said that I must be slightly confused, as I was talking about electoral rolls, bread rolls and toilet rolls. We are, of course, conflating a number of issues in this group, but I think that there is a really good point. My noble friend has raised an important area where the public good can be served not by sharing confidential information but by ensuring the availability of information that will serve a specific purpose in relation to fuel poverty. We on these Benches are very sympathetic on that point. In Committee we tabled amendments on the common-law duty of confidentiality, and the noble and learned Lord responded to those amendments. The only point I would make now is that it is vital that medical records remain confidential. They contain information that can affect not only people’s health but their access to jobs and to insurance. Access to a whole range of things is at risk if it is felt that this information will not remain confidential. Of course, the consequence of that is another public health issue, because if people do not have confidence that their records will remain confidential, they will not go to their doctor, they will not tell their doctor and they will not seek the treatment that they perhaps should. So there is a very strong case here.
One other point—it is not related to this group of amendments so I ask for forgiveness—is that there is a balance between maintaining confidentiality and security. Many of the problems in the health service, and why people lack confidence in it, are not about policies and procedures but about the health service’s ability to maintain a secure IT system. I hope the noble and learned Lord will be able to address those issues. The assurances that my noble friend has sought about future ability are really important. The ability to communicate—not the details of people’s confidential records but one government department to another and one public agency to another, to serve a very clear public need—is vital.
I am obliged to noble Lords, and in particular I thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for his continued interest in this area and for taking the time to meet and discuss this matter at some length with me and the Bill team. Clearly, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, observed, this is an important part of the fuel poverty agenda. That is why it takes on such considerable importance even when faced with issues such as medical confidentiality.
On the point about common-law confidentiality, and medical confidentiality in particular, it is not an absolute; there are already statutory gateways through which information can and must flow on occasions, and therefore one must not take it that medical confidentiality is somehow completely ring-fenced and separate from the world that we actually live in. There are circumstances where there should be, has to be and is disclosure. It may be possible—I put it no higher in terms of this Bill—to address a further gateway. However, one should not confuse any mechanism within the Bill with the consequences of human or IT failure, however regrettable they may be. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that one has to have regard not only to the structure within which information is shared but to the need to ensure that the sharing process is itself secure. But they are separate issues.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, acknowledges that some parts of his amendment may not be necessary. Amendments 27 and 28 would provide that information can be shared with licensed electricity and gas distributors for the provision of fuel poverty assistance. They can already be added to the data-sharing arrangements in Clause 32 by regulations. The Government will consider whether to exercise this power in the context of considering the future role of electricity and gas distributors in delivering fuel poverty schemes. I reassure the noble Lord that the provision made by Amendment 26 is already covered by Clause 31, which provides powers to share information for,
“the improvement of the well-being of individuals or households”.
Of course, this includes,
“their physical and mental health and emotional well-being”.
While we do not consider the noble Lord’s amendment necessary in this instance, the objectives that he highlights are an example of how in appropriate circumstances information held by healthcare providers could, in future, be valuable to support the more effective delivery of public services to those in need. It underlines why the Government are unable to accept Amendments 28AV, 28AW and 28AX, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Hamwee.
The Government do recognise the particular sensitivities with identifiable health information, as highlighted in the National Data Guardian for Health and Social Care’s recent review of data security, consent and opt-outs. Health bodies in England are therefore not included in the list of bodies now in the Bill that will be permitted to use these powers. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, noted, health issues are a key factor in the complex social problems faced by people, whom we are aiming to support with these powers. Excluding the use of identifiable health information altogether would remove the possibility of including such information in the future without amending legislation. It would be premature to take this step in advance of the implementation of the National Data Guardian’s review and the public consultation that that will engage.
An amendment to maintain the common-law duty of medical confidentiality is not considered necessary. Those powers enable information to be shared only where it is already held by specified persons, acquired in a different context from the patient-doctor relationship. Any information that would have been subject to medical confidentiality would have found its way into a specified person’s hands only through an existing gateway. As I indicated earlier, there are already statutory gateways through which such information can move. Of course, we are dealing with permissive powers.
At this late hour, I will attempt the impossible: to satisfy the interests of all parties in the context of these provisions. Beginning with the inquiry from the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, health bodies are not presently included in the schedules. As drafted, it would be possible for health bodies to be added to the schedules at a future date but—and I emphasise this—no decision will be taken until, first, the Government publish their response to the Caldicott review and any recommendations have been embedded and assessed; secondly, there has been a public consultation on the issue and the views of the National Data Guardian and appropriate representative health bodies such as the GMC and BMA have been sought; and, thirdly, there has been a debate in both Houses pursuant to the affirmative procedure required to add bodies to the schedule. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that it can be done, although it has yet to be done, and that there are steps that we will take to reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Hamwee, before any such step is implemented.
If health bodies or information were to be expressly excluded in the Bill, it would require primary legislation to enable those bodies to share information under the powers. If and when we decide that it would be helpful to have those powers—in implementing the fuel poverty initiative, for example—it would be most unfortunate if we were delayed by literally years before we could actually achieve the objective, when in fact there is provision here to do it by way of the affirmative procedure so that both Houses have ample opportunity for debate.
If we take those steps, there will be safeguards. When considering whether to add any health bodies to the schedules in the public service delivery, debt and fraud chapters, clear safeguards will apply. First, before a new body may be added to the schedule, it must show that it fulfils the relevant criteria relating to that specific power designed to ensure that only bodies with relevant functions for holding or requiring information relevant to that particular power may be added. The Minister must consider the procedures in place for secure handling of information before any new body can be added to the schedule—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Collins. A decision will be taken on whether it is in the public interest and proportionate to share identifying health information in order to achieve a specified objective. There would be no question of simply sharing this information more widely. The powers must be exercised in accordance with the Data Protection Act, which requires that only the minimum information necessary to achieve the objective may be shared. Under the Bill—and under the Data Protection Act—personal information may be used only for the purpose for which it was shared and data must be stored securely to ensure compliance with that Act. Again, this point was raised a moment ago.
Identifying health information will constitute sensitive personal data and so to ensure fair and lawful processing, it must fulfil one of the more onerous Schedule 3 conditions as well as the Schedule 2 condition under the Bill. In addition, new criminal sanctions have been included for wrongful disclosure with a maximum penalty of up two years’ imprisonment, a heavy fine or both. Further steps can of course also be taken to remove a body from the schedule if it does not comply with the requirements of the Act.
I do not suppose that I have satisfied anyone with that explanation at the end of the day. But, if nothing else, I hope that it has assisted in informing your Lordships as to why we consider that these amendments are not appropriate and that it would be appropriate to retain the ability to introduce health bodies by way of appropriate regulation. We feel that there will be appropriate safeguards and extensive consultation before any such step is taken, so I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
May I ask for clarification over one issue? Would a statutory instrument, when brought forward, envisage adding health bodies to the Bill in a blanket way, or would it be envisaged that there would be statutory instruments for specific purposes, such as health bodies for the purposes of identifying fuel poverty, and that when something else emerged it would require a separate statutory instrument so as to keep that gateway as narrow as possible?
With respect, we clearly intend to maintain any gateway in as narrow a manner as is reasonable. The point that the noble Baroness raises is really a question for another day. We are not there yet; health bodies are not included in the schedule. If and when it is contemplated that they will be, there will be extensive consultations on the very issues that she raises.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his ability to deliver a compromise position between what appeared to be diametrically opposed attacks in this group of amendments. He has done very well and almost satisfied me—I thank him for that and for his previous discussions.
Clearly, my amendments envisage a fairly narrow gateway, and in her latest remarks the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was responding to that. I am very grateful to the Minister for his assurance that the procedure could add health authorities and health bodies to the list in specific circumstances. When we come to the statutory instrument phase, I am arguing for only a relatively narrow inclusion, which may well be carried by the form of the statutory instrument which we eventually have to consider. I also recognise that the Minister has to await the outcome of these other considerations.
On the other hand, I would impress on the Minister that fuel poverty is a really big issue and that the lack of communication between the health and social security sides, and the other interventions, has proved a major inhibition in tackling fuel poverty. The information to be shared is in two directions. It would also allow a medical GP, for example, to access DWP information as to whether people in a household qualified for help. It is not simply a matter of disclosing medical information; it is one of ensuring that the medics actually understand the broader context of the household with which they are concerned.
I thank the Minister for his help in this direction. We will no doubt return to this at some subsequent stage but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.
Briefly, the ground has been well covered by the noble Lords, Lord Foster and Lord Aberdare, and I have little to add. Three things strike me. I recalled in Committee that this was one of the areas where we had received the most external notifications and correspondence. It is still something that we need to take carefully. As has just been said, it is surprising that almost the entirety of the industry affected by the judgments of Ofcom have joined up to make the case.
Following on from both speeches, what is required is a statement from the noble and learned Lord. I am sure he is straining at the leash to give us all another compromise solution that will do the trick. He is shaking his head; maybe there are other things he has to cover as well. However, the situation seems to hinge on whether Article 4 of the EU directive applies sufficiently well after this Bill goes through, as before. Yet, as has been mentioned, there will be an opportunity, presumably in the great repeal Bill, to cover exactly this point. So what is the hurry?
My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed, there have been quite a lot of external communications on this. Indeed, I notice that the quotation that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, gave on my observations in Committee was identical to that quoted in a letter from Towerhouse LLP to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport on 17 March. Everybody seems to be singing from the same hymn book.
At present, Section 195 of the Communications Act 2003 requires that appeals against Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are decided by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on the merits. I shall come back to “on the merits” in more detail in a moment.
Appellants argue that appeals “on the merits” should allow for a bottom-up review of the decision, inviting the tribunal to substitute its own view for that of the regulator—in effect, two tiers doing the same thing. Appeals are therefore seen as an opportunity to rerun arguments that were considered and rejected by Ofcom in reaching its decision, or to put forward swathes of new evidence to persuade the tribunal to reach a different decision. Such appeals can lead to extremely lengthy and costly litigation, with extensive cross-examination of experts and witnesses. This depletes the regulator’s resources and means that other regulatory action by Ofcom is inevitably delayed, allowing for the potential for providers to frustrate the regulator with speculative or even spurious appeals, causing considerable uncertainty in the market and delay to other regulatory decisions.
The Government consider that appeals in the communications sector need to be rebalanced to ensure that Ofcom is held properly to account for its decisions, but also enabled to regulate in an effective and timely manner in the interests of citizens and consumers, as it is required to do. Clause 80 does just that; it requires that instead of merits appeals, the tribunal must decide appeals against Ofcom’s decisions by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on a judicial review. Judicial review is generally a well-understood standard of review against which very significant decisions made by most public bodies are tested. Importantly, this will ensure that appeals are focused on identifying errors in Ofcom’s decisions, rather than simply seeking to persuade the tribunal to reach a different conclusion.
Those affected by Ofcom’s decisions will remain able to challenge them effectively. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said that judicial review was,
“solely concerned with whether the decision is unlawful in a technical sense—that is, was the correct process followed?”.—[Official Report, 8/2/17; col. 1734.]
I hope I can reassure him that this is simply not the case. First, appellants are able to argue that Ofcom’s decisions are based on material errors of fact or law. Material errors will therefore be identified and corrected in a judicial review process. Secondly, judicial review is a flexible standard of review, which allows the court to decide on the appropriate intensity of review according to the individual circumstances of the case. For example, there may be more intensive review processes in the context of matters pertaining to human rights. In particular, Ofcom has various statutory duties to ensure that its decisions are proportionate—in other words, that they go no further than is appropriate and necessary to attain a legitimate aim. In reviewing whether a decision is proportionate, the courts can carry out a closer and more rigorous review of the decision.
Of course, appeals in the communications sector are required to ensure that,
“the merits of the case are duly taken into account”,
as a matter of EU law under Article 4 of the EU framework directive. That will remain the case under a judicial review standard. I understand that there is uncertainty about the extent to which requirements in EU law may become a part of UK law after the United Kingdom leaves the EU, but that will be a matter for Parliament to determine when the great repeal Bill is introduced, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed, and will be looked at in the context of the overall future regulatory framework for electronic communications, including the appeals regime, once the UK has left the EU.
A number of Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are already appealable only by way of judicial review, and the Court of Appeal confirmed as long ago as 2008 that judicial review is capable of taking account of the merits of the case, as required by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the EU directive. Lord Justice Jacob in the Court of Appeal in the T-Mobile case in 2008 said that it,
“is inconceivable that Art. 4 in requiring an appeal which can duly take into account the merits, requires Member States to have in effect a fully equipped duplicate regulatory body waiting in the wings just for appeals. What is called for is an appeal body and no more, a body which can look into whether the regulator had got something material wrong”.
He also held that,
“there can be no doubt that just as JR was adapted because the Human Rights Act so required, so it can and must be adapted to comply with EU law and in particular Article 4 of the Directive”.
Indeed, in a more recent case involving judicial review and Article 4 in 2016, Mr Justice Cranston observed that, as the Competition Appeal Tribunal had said:
“Ofcom enjoys a margin of appreciation on issues which entail the exercise of its judgment”,
and that,
“the Tribunal should apply appropriate restraint”.
It is not a second-tier regulator, and the fact that it might have preferred to give different weight to various factors in the exercise of a regulatory judgment would not in itself provide a sufficient basis to set aside Ofcom’s determination. It should not interfere with Ofcom’s exercise of a judgment unless satisfied that it was wrong.
These are the relevant judicial review standards that will be applied in these circumstances. We do not want a complete retrial—if I can call it that—or a situation in which, at two levels, we begin at the beginning and end at the end with an entirely different opinion and approach to the evidence, and, perhaps, entirely new arguments being advanced evidentially in support of the merits of a case. That is a never-ending process and is not common to any other area of regulation by a public authority.
The judgments I have referred to have been considered in a number of subsequent cases and it is clear that a judicial review standard is consistent with the requirements of Article 4 of the framework directive. In these circumstances, it is not considered that there is any real need for this amendment. It is appropriate that we proceed with Clause 80 and I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.