All 5 Lord Keen of Elie contributions to the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020

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Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL] Debate

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Department: Scotland Office

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts
2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 17th March 2020

(4 years ago)

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Moved by
Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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That the Bill be now read a second time.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
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My Lords, this Bill underpins the Government’s ambition to deliver a new framework on private international law which has real and tangible benefits for people and businesses in the United Kingdom.

Private international law is viewed by some as a technical and specialist area of law, but it is an essential one. Without private international law agreements, UK businesses, individuals and families would struggle to resolve the challenges they face when dealing with cross-border legal disputes. For example, these agreements can help small businesses which have been left out of pocket by a supplier based in another country to seek redress, or if a family relationship breaks down and one spouse moves abroad, they make it easier to sort out arrangements in the best interests of their children. These are sometimes difficult and challenging situations to resolve, but private international law provides a framework to do that for the benefit of all parties.

Of course, leaving the European Union does not halt cross-border trade, travel or family relationships that cross boundaries. These will endure and indeed grow in the years ahead, and where disputes arise, there continues to be a need for a framework to settle them in a clear, fair and predictable way. By helping to resolve cross-border disputes quickly, international agreements on the private international law framework help to reduce costs for UK businesses, individuals and families who become involved in them. These agreements also provide legal certainty for those travelling, trading or living abroad. They help avoid confusion by preventing multiple court cases taking place in different countries on the same subject and sometimes reaching different conclusions. They ensure that the decisions of United Kingdom courts and relevant competent authorities can be recognised and enforced in other jurisdictions. The Bill will allow us to implement these important and beneficial agreements in domestic law.

During our membership of the European Union, we helped build, develop and refine an advanced framework on private international law. Now that 31 January 2020 marks the first time in over 20 years that full competence in this area of law has returned to the UK, we must address it. Our task is to lead on building such a framework on a bigger scale in a global setting. We will begin by building on and cementing our role in international fora, such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the International Institute for the Unification of Private International Law, with other global partners.

I turn briefly to the detail of the Bill, which has two main clauses. The first clause implements in domestic law three Hague conventions that the UK currently operates due to our previous membership of the EU. In other words, the EU is a signatory of those conventions on behalf of all its member states. We will become an independent contracting party to these conventions in our own right at the end of the current transition period. These three Hague conventions are widely supported by stakeholders in the legal and finance sectors and, I hope, by Members across this House. We need to ensure that these important conventions can continue to operate effectively in the future, so that businesses and individuals can continue to rely on their rules.

The first is the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, which aims to improve the protection of children in cross-border disputes. It deals with issues such as residence of, and contact with, children whose parents live in different countries. The second is the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which aims to ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial transactions. These clauses are common, particularly in high-value commercial contracts. Thirdly, the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and other Forms of Family Maintenance provides rules for the international recovery of child support and spousal maintenance.

The second clause creates a delegated power which allows the Government to implement other private international law agreements in domestic law in future via secondary legislation. I confirm that the Government intend to use this power to implement the Lugano Convention 2007, if our application to accede to that convention in our own right is accepted by our international partners, including the EU. This would provide clear, reciprocal rules on cross-border judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters between the United Kingdom and all the parties to the convention, which include the EU. That would take effect beyond the transition period. However, we also want to use this power to implement other agreements that the United Kingdom may join, both now and in the future. We are already considering joining the Singapore convention of 2019, and the Hague Judgments Convention of 2019.

This power is both well defined and, I suggest, narrow. It only allows the Government to implement agreements in the limited field of private international law, which, as the Bill states, covers areas such as jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. For example, we could not use the Bill to implement an agreement designed to do anything other than facilitate the efficient resolution of cross-border disputes. All regulations implementing a new agreement will use the draft affirmative procedure. Furthermore, where the Government are inclined to enter into an international agreement on private international law, then, at the level of international law, that will still require full compliance with the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. There will, therefore, be parliamentary scrutiny of the international treaty itself before we seek to draw it down into domestic law by using the affirmative SI procedure.

In summary, the Bill enables us to remain at the forefront of promoting global co-operation in private international law, and it will be of significant assistance after the transition period for businesses, individuals and families. I beg to move.

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Lord Collins of Highbury Portrait Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
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My Lords, the Bill is clearly vital to the future of UK private international law, and we on this side of the House strongly support the principle of it. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti would normally be dealing with this Bill but unfortunately, she is self-isolating due to feeling unwell. I am sure Members of the House will join me in wishing her a speedy recovery—certainly, I hope, in time for Committee.

I too am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken. All my favourite lawyers are here, and I have to agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that that has made my task a lot easier, because I can simply say that I totally agree with the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. However, I will come on to some specifics in that regard.

The Bar Council brief, on which I am heavily relying, highlights that we are entering a major period of decision-making—a point amplified strongly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—regarding the future of UK private international law, both nationally and internationally. It is clear that the Bill must be part of a wider government strategy, along with the ongoing negotiations at international level and the statutory instruments under the EU withdrawal Act. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has been very clear about the sequencing of some of the things we need to address.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said, these matters are both highly technical and of the utmost importance in regulating the lives of individuals and businesses, and he quoted the Bar Council’s preference. I too ask the Minister to confirm that the Government intend to consult the specialists and take on board the comments about adapting a strategy.

Part of the problem with this debate is what comes next—what the Government hope to agree with the EU during and after the transition period. When does the Minister foresee the 2019 Hague judgments convention being implemented? The Law Society expressed the hope that it will become a central part of future international, civil and commercial law co-operation. What action are the Government taking to ensure faster uptake of the convention by the EU?

Again, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance: at the end of the transition period, the wide body of EU legislation will cease to be applicable, contingent on reciprocal treatment by member states. Despite the number of international conventions included in private international law, there is still no international convention in many areas. The Minister referred to the Government’s stated intention to apply to join the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, highlighted, would require the agreement of each EU member state. As he made clear, it remains unclear whether the European Union would consent to the United Kingdom joining as a separate contracting state.

The noble and learned Lord also raised the issue of sequencing, which is very important; the default rules of private international law applicable in the United Kingdom after exit day are particularly important.

I do not wish to repeat the contributions that have been made, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I have spent some considerable time on Henry VIII clauses when considering previous Bills, not least the sanctions Bill that we had to deal with as a consequence of leaving the EU. That was a simple Bill —it had only two or three clauses—but it certainly gave the Government huge Henry VIII powers, particularly the ability to create and impose new criminal offences. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti is concerned about those clauses and the power to create the offences that the Explanatory Notes appear to envisage. If that is the case, the affirmative resolution procedure does not provide sufficient parliamentary scrutiny. I understand that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report will be published later this week. I will read it with interest, because I am sure it will make a number of recommendations that we will want to consider in Committee.

We welcome the Bill and its principal objectives but we will seek clarification of several issues, including, as the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, said, future family law provisions.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. I will take some of those points in turn. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, raised Hague Convention 35. Hague, unlike Lugano, for example, can be entered into by a state, but can be ratified and applied in respect of only one jurisdiction within the state. It so happens that Hague Convention 35 was implemented in respect of Scotland, but not of England and Wales, nor, I believe, Northern Ireland. I am not able to explain why it has been in abeyance for a number of years with respect to those other jurisdictions, but I can say that since the noble and learned Lord raised the point with me I have spoken to officials who are addressing that matter. Certainly, our recommendation would be that it should be applied in respect of England and Wales as well.

The noble and learned Lord asked when we last implemented an international treaty obligation without primary legislation. My stock response was going to be that we now have CRaG 2010, but he went on to criticise that. While I understand that some observations have been made about the sufficiency of CRaG, my response is that we now have primary legislation that requires parliamentary scrutiny in circumstances where we intend to enter into an international treaty. It is in that context that we use the affirmative procedure to draw down those obligations and apply them in domestic law. I venture that that is an acceptable mechanism, because it requires parliamentary scrutiny at the stage of international law. It allows parliamentary scrutiny at the stage of drawing it down into domestic law in accordance with the duality principle.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, adopted and advanced the submissions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—which shows courage and, indeed, prescience. He also asked why we refer to arbitration. We do not intend to intrude wholesale on the New York convention or other aspects of arbitration, but it might be that there will be bilateral or multilateral jurisdictional issues where a party wishes to refer to arbitration. If, at that stage in the negotiation, we consider that appropriate, albeit in a limited circumstance, we will want to have the power to proceed with such an agreement. However, we are conscious of the need to keep a dividing line between provisions with regard to arbitration that are generally addressed by wholly different conventions, such as the New York convention, as distinct from those that apply more generally in private international law. We are not endeavouring to cross any lines there.

Schedule 6 is where it is because that is where it should be. It is not hiding. I reassure the noble and learned Lord of that. With regard to Schedule 2, my understanding is that it reflects or replicates the text of the 1996 Hague Convention on child protection and is in that form for that reason.

A question was also raised by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and others about why we have these Henry VIII powers to amend primary legislation. There may be circumstances in which we want to insert implementation provisions into existing primary legislation. I ask noble Lords to notice that that is exactly what we are doing with Clause 1, where we are putting the three Hague Conventions into the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. It might be that we will want to use existing primary legislation and implement using existing primary legislation. That is why that power has been taken.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, gave a very detailed and reasoned distinction between the merits of the Brussels regime, in which we played a very prominent part, and the perhaps deficiencies, to use one term, or the less robust regime we find in Hague and even in Lugano, which essentially reflects Brussels rather than Brussels Ia and Brussels IIa. I have to notice that there are those differences. It is a consequence of us having left the EU on 31 January 2020 —it is as simple as that, is it not? I know the noble and learned Lord recognises that. We cannot be part of the Brussels regime now we have left the EU, and the Government have made it clear that they will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.

Of course, if and when we become a party to Lugano, we will seek to move forward the Council of the Lugano Convention to address its equivalence because Lugano originally reflected Brussels I and Brussels II and it is yet to catch up, as it were, with Brussels Ia and Brussels IIa, but certainly if we were a party to it, we can see that we could drive the direction of travel.

That said, we have to be careful about when we engage in the Lugano process. We have made an application to the Council of the Lugano Convention. We have letters of support from the three existing Lugano states, but noble Lords are quite right to point out that we require the consent of the EU to become a party to the Lugano Convention. There are also questions about the way in which that will interrelate with the provisions of the 2019 Hague Convention, and we will have to look at that. Again, my understanding is that we were a material contributor to the development of the Council provision on the 2019 Hague Convention as well, so we are familiar with it, and we see its considerable benefit, all the more so if the EU were to become a contracting state to the 2019 convention.

However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, is ahead of me. I thought only Uruguay had ratified so far, but he was able to add Ukraine.

Lord Mance Portrait Lord Mance
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It has signed but not ratified.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I apologise—it has signed but not ratified. As the noble and learned Lord will know, it takes a little time for signatures. There has to be a certain number of states signing to the convention and then ratification can take place. Clearly, we are conscious of that. The noble and learned Lord has highlighted a real issue, which is the care we must take in considering our position with regard to Lugano and with respect to the 2019 Hague Convention. If we were not conscious of that before, we are now, if I can put it that way. It may be that the Lord Chancellor’s consultative committee should have sat earlier.

I hope I have addressed the majority of the points that have been raised so far. There was one point the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, raised about intra-UK powers. We will have powers to implement an agreement intra-UK but clearly we would do so only after engagement with the devolved Administrations because the implementation of private international law is a devolved competence, albeit that entry into the treaty at the level of international law is a reserved competence. I reassure the noble and learned Lord that we would not do that without full consultation with the relevant parties.

I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, is about to rise, but before she does so I shall just say that in the absence of Brussels and in the absence of provision in international law convention under Hague for certain matters, such as jurisdiction on divorce, we will fall back on our previous common-law position, which some will regard as less than entirely satisfactory, but it is a consequence of us having left the EU. I hope that that anticipates the intervention I was going to get.

Given the hour, I will rest my further submissions there. I look forward to further detailed discussion of these matters in Committee.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL] Debate

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Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020

(3 years, 10 months ago)

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Before closing, I would ask the Minister to indicate to us where we are on our application to join Lugano, where we are on securing the necessary consent of the European Union to our joining Lugano, and where we are on European Union states joining Lugano. These can be added to the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, because it seems to me that it would be very difficult indeed to agree to this amendment without going down the route advocated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and removing Clause 2 altogether, until we have clear answers to these questions from the Minister justifying the urgency as well as justification to support the decision taken in principle to join Lugano.
Lord Keen of Elie Portrait The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. I shall of course speak to each of the amendments, Amendments 1, 4 and 5. When taken together, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, observed, they have the effect of restricting the power to implement international private law agreements contained in Clause 2 in the 2007 Lugano Convention. But they not only limit the power of the United Kingdom to implement private international law agreements in this way, they also restrict our ability to mirror any such arrangements as between the United Kingdom’s different legal jurisdictions, and indeed as between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.

Of course we accept, as we have previously, that the most pressing need for the power is in relation to the Lugano convention itself. Our application to rejoin the convention as an independent contracting party was made on 8 April—

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Portrait The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
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We appear to have lost the noble and learned Lord the Minister. Is he still with us?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I think that I am coming back. I apologise, but something happened on the computer.

We have made the application and it is hoped that, subject to agreement, we will be able to rejoin the Lugano convention from the end of the transition period.

I will pause to notice some of the observations made by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with reference to Brussels Ia and IIa restated. My noble friend asked in a number of ways what steps we are taking with regard to what she termed the Brussels convention and what progress is being made on that matter. I think we have to remind ourselves that Brussels Ia and IIa do not form an international convention; they are internal instruments of the EU to which you may be a party only if you are a member of the EU. We of course have the transition period during which we enjoy the benefits of Brussels Ia and IIa until the end of the year, but there is no basis on which we can be members of Brussels, as was suggested, after the end of the transition period. That is why we are concerned to apply for membership of Lugano.

With regard to a number of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, of course I readily acknowledge that Lugano is not as well developed in a number of respects as the Brussels Ia and IIa restated provisions. We are well aware of that. We would hope to advance Lugano once we are a member, but we have to acknowledge that it is not on a par with Brussels Ia and IIa.

However, Lugano is not the only potential use of the power in Clause 2. For instance, Amendment 1 would prevent us joining two other private international law agreements on which the Government are currently considering their position. They are the Singapore convention on mediation and the Hague judgments convention of 2019. I will return to the latter in a moment because it has been mentioned before.

With regard to the Singapore convention, I have shared with noble Lords a copy of an exemplar statutory instrument to demonstrate the sorts of agreements that we may wish to implement under the Clause 2 power. While the final decision on joining that convention is still to be taken, I invite noble Lords to look at that exemplar statutory instrument when considering the ways this power might be used. The instrument contains what are, essentially, technical implementing regulations for a treaty agreed at the level of international law. The choice for this House and the other place at the point of implementation is about not the specific provisions of an agreement, but whether to approve the United Kingdom’s implementation of the whole agreement in domestic law.

Beyond those two examples of private international law agreements which already exist, and which the UK is considering joining, we are actively engaged in work through the Hague conference to develop rules on jurisdiction in international civil and commercial cases. The global arena of private international law is constantly developing. We have been active in it in the past, and hope and intend to take a leading role in the future.

Restricting the scope of the Clause 2 power in the way envisaged by this amendment would, I suggest, prevent the United Kingdom implementing any future agreements in a timely manner. That would in turn delay the benefit of those agreements to citizens and businesses. I regard that as an unsatisfactory position, given that in many cases there is considerable advantage to be gained from such international co-operation in the area of private international law. It would also mean that primary legislation will be needed to insert into a schedule to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 the text of the United Kingdom’s declarations and reservations in relation to the 2005 Hague Convention and the 2007 Hague Convention, in the absence of which the terms of the United Kingdom’s accession to those agreements will be far less accessible to users.

I also point out that it will mean that the definition of “relevant international agreement”, as used in subsections (2) and (3), and presently defined in subsection (7) by cross-reference back to subsection (1), will be unclear. That term is also used in Schedule 6 and defined by cross-reference back to Clause 2. In addition, the way that Amendment 1 has been drafted would not in practice allow us to make implementing regulations in advance of becoming a contracting party but only after joining. In that respect, I venture that it is defectively drafted because, essentially, one has to take these things in a particular order.

I turn to Amendment 4. As drafted, Clause 2(2) allows the terms of an international agreement, subject to suitable modifications, to be applied between United Kingdom jurisdictions: for example, between England and Scotland. Amendment 4 seeks to restrict this power to allow for only the Lugano convention to be applied in this way. International agreements on private international law would not ordinarily apply between the United Kingdom’s three jurisdictions because such agreements apply only between contracting parties and it is the United Kingdom Government, not their separate jurisdictions, who join international agreements. Although the relationship between the different parts of the union are perhaps far deeper than they are between foreign jurisdictions and ourselves, it often means that the rules between different UK jurisdictions need to be detailed and bespoke. Applying the same rules between United Kingdom jurisdictions that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will, not invariably but very often, be desirable. For example, it could reduce the number of sets of rules that courts need to apply in cases raising cross-border issues, making them more efficient and easier for courts, lawyers and litigants to understand. It would also mean that intra-UK private international law rules are at least as effective and up to date as the rules applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(2) allows for such keeping pace but would be exercised only if the relevant jurisdictions agree that it is beneficial to do so.

These sorts of arrangements are not without precedent. All three UK jurisdictions already apply rules that mirror the EU Brussels 1A regulation on jurisdiction for cross-border cases and much of the EU maintenance regulation as between themselves. The fact that, thanks to Schedule 4 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, a modified version of the Brussels 1A rules is applied to cases between Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales means that there might be limited prima facie rationale for suggesting that we replace this with the application of the rules under the Lugano convention. The rules are already substantially similar.

However, in addition, the amendment that I referred to has an altogether more significant deficiency. By limiting the intra-UK application of private international law agreements to the Lugano convention, the amendment may well result in the perverse situation in which the intra-UK rules are out of step, out of date and less effective than those governing the relationship between all three of these jurisdictions and a foreign jurisdiction. If the amendment were accepted, separate primary legislation would be needed to achieve this, potentially resulting in the intra-UK rules being less effective and less comprehensive than the rules that we apply with foreign jurisdictions until such primary legislation was passed.

Perhaps I may give an example. If the United Kingdom decided in future to join a new private international law agreement dealing with cross-border cases regarding children, the inability to implement that agreement between the UK’s jurisdictions at the same time as implementing an agreement between the UK and foreign jurisdictions could lead to families finding it more difficult to resolve disputes where parents live in, say, Northern Ireland and England than where one parent lives in the United Kingdom and the other in a foreign country. That would be a very strange outcome.

Amendment 5 has an effect similar to that of Amendment 4 in that it seeks to restrict the ability, under the Clause 2 power, for the United Kingdom to enter into arrangements with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that mirror, subject to suitable modifications, the provisions of a private international law agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party. As I explained in relation to Amendment 4, the UK Government are the contracting party to international agreements on private international law. As such, these agreements would not ordinarily apply as between the United Kingdom and one of the Crown dependencies or overseas territories.

However, as with the relationships between the different legal jurisdictions of the UK, applying the same rules between the UK and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will sometimes be desirable. It can ensure that the relationships between the various members of the wider UK family can be at least as effective and up to date as those applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(3), as presently drafted, allows for such keeping pace but only if the relevant territorial Government agree that it is beneficial to do so.

I submit that this builds on a significant body of precedent. Both the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 enable the Government, via Order in Council, to recognise and enforce civil and commercial judgments from the Crown dependencies and overseas territories where reciprocal arrangements have been entered into with them. Furthermore, Section 39 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 enables the Government, by Order in Council, to apply a modified version of the Brussels 1968 convention between the United Kingdom and a Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, an order was made in respect of Gibraltar in 1997 to do exactly that: applying a modified version of this convention to relations between the UK and Gibraltar—an arrangement that sustains to this day.

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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Portrait Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)
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I had not intended to intervene at this stage. However, since this, is or ought to be, very similar to Committee if we were sitting in the Chamber, I hope that Members will understand why I do so. It is not to deal with questions that the Minister raised about Crown dependencies and overseas territories—although he answered the question that I had intended to ask later on, on other amendments, so that will shorten the debate later—nor indeed about the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. Again, that will be dealt with in subsequent amendments and I can come back to that during that debate.

I want to say two things. First, I agree totally with what my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said; that will surprise neither him nor the Minister. Secondly, the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, made important points, which the Minister just touched on. As the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said, we should note the significance of this being the first Committee stage of a Bill that we have held virtually. It is very important that we see that it operates properly.

As it happens, two members of the Procedure Committee are in this debate: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and me. At the committee’s last meeting, we asked for a report on the workings of this Committee stage—that is, how it will proceed. At its next meeting, the committee will discuss the procedure for virtual voting. If my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer hopes to divide the House on Report, as he indicated—I hope that he will—that cannot be done without virtual voting. It would be improper and unconstitutional for that to take place. My noble friend Lord Adonis should be reassured by that.

Finally, I hope that the Minister will treat this Committee stage just as he treats Committee stages on the Floor of the House—that is, take account of what has been said, be prepared for a challenge on these issues on Report and bear all this is mind before bringing the Bill in its present form back on Report. I hope he takes note of that.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, I of course am listening to the contributions made to the debate in Committee and will take account of the observations that have been made. I make no comment on the procedural issues that the noble Lord raised.

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Portrait Baroness McIntosh of Pickering
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My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for his full answer to the concerns that were raised. Perhaps I misunderstood his response, but I think that the thrust of the interventions of noble Lords—nearly to a man and a woman—was that it is inappropriate to seek to put into UK law by delegated secondary legislation a new treaty that the Minister and the Government seek to sign. The thrust of the remarks was that it should require primary legislation. Have I misunderstood my noble and learned friend on that point? Why are the Government resisting the usual procedure of agreeing to implement anything that has been agreed by the Government by way of international treaty through primary legislation?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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First, let me make it clear that I do not accept that it is an invariable constitutional practice that the implementation in domestic law of an international law treaty is undertaken by way of primary legislation only. Secondly, when it comes to the implementation of a treaty that has been entered into at the level of international law, the purpose of drawing it down into domestic law is either to accept it into domestic law or not to accept it into domestic law. There is no scope for amending the terms of the treaty that has already been entered into. Therefore, the use of the affirmative statutory instrument procedure is considered appropriate. It gives this House and the other place ample opportunity to debate whether they should draw down the treaty obligations into domestic law. There is, essentially, no real scope for amendment; therefore, we consider the affirmative procedure perfectly adequate for that purpose.

Lord Mance Portrait Lord Mance
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I have just a few points to raise with the Minister. At one point, he said that the first amendment would prevent us joining two other measures, the Singapore mediation convention and the 2019 Hague Convention. It is too easy to slip into that sort of language. What he really means is that it would prevent us joining those measures without proper parliamentary scrutiny by primary legislation.

In response to the Minister’s last point, yes or no can be a very important question, even if you cannot amend an international treaty once it is made; Lugano is a classic example. It is a difficult decision, as has been illustrated. It is also very easy to say that we would be prevented from implementing future measures in a timely manner, but there is no real evidence for that at all.

The Minister took various rather minor—if I may call them that— drafting points on, for example, the definition of related international instruments and ancillary provisions. Those would all be sorted out if the principle of the first four amendments was accepted.

On that principle, the Minister also took various points about the intra-UK relationship, suggesting that Amendments 4 and 5 raised complexity. As I see it, those amendments are perfectly simple. They ensure that the general power marches in tandem with the specific power to legislate Lugano into the intra-UK jurisdictional relationships and interrelationships with overseas territories. They are “keeping pace” amendments and there is nothing inconsistent or complicated about them.

As to the 1920 and 1933 Acts, I pointed out in my previous remarks that they are quite different, minor and limited measures relating to recognition of superior court judgments overseas, coming either from UK overseas territories or from territories with which we have reciprocal arrangements. Those judgments would have been recognised as common law by action on the judgments, which would operate as an estoppel in any event, so they are minor amendments.

It is true that the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act contained some provisions for delegated legislation in respect of, for example, Gibraltar. However, it was a piece of primary UK legislation in the first place, and it is no doubt a tribute to the quality of the UK Parliament’s consideration of that legislation if overseas territories are willing to accept that they should be legislated for on a delegated basis.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, for his further observations. I simply notice this: for the last 20 years, Parliament has had no oversight of the drawing down of these obligations into domestic law because it has been an EU competence. That has not led to any dramatic constitutional issue, as far as I am aware.

In the meantime, however, we have introduced CRaG, which means that the entering into a treaty at the level of international law is now subject to scrutiny by Parliament. After that scrutiny, the Executive can enter into the relevant treaty. Then, when it is drawn down into domestic law, the affirmative statutory instrument procedure ensures that both Houses of Parliament have an opportunity to scrutinise and debate this. There is no difficulty about that; it is the outcome that matters.

However, I notice the noble and learned Lord’s observation that there is little that can be done by way of amendment at that stage. That is why we would suggest that the affirmative procedure was a perfectly adequate mechanism, as distinct from primary legislation.

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Portrait The Deputy Chairman of Committees
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My Lords, before I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I should say that the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, have indicated their wish to speak after the Minister. I shall call them in that order after the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
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My Lords, I was not suggesting—and neither, I believe, was the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh—that we can stay in Brussels recast or rejoin it after the end of the transition period. I was merely regretting the loss of the benefits of Brussels recast and pointing out that Lugano, if we joined it after the transition period ended, would not offer us comparable benefits. Apart from conceding that point, the Minister has not addressed the points made—notably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—that joining Lugano may be undesirable, and that we are deprived of the opportunity of debating that in the context of primary legislation. That, I think, is a point that he needs to address.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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On that point, of course I accept that Lugano does not go as far as Brussels Ia and IIa—Brussels restated. We are all well aware of that. As regards the interplay between Lugano and the Hague Convention 2019, one has to bear in mind that Hague has not been signed or acceded to by the EU. We do not know if or when it may intend to do so. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it took the EU 10 years to sign and accede to the Hague Convention 2005. On the other hand, Lugano is there and available as a convention. A number of noble and learned Lords have acknowledged its importance in the context of private international law. Therefore, it is appropriate that we proceed with Lugano at this stage.

Lord Adonis Portrait Lord Adonis
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I took the Minister’s response to my noble friend Lord Foulkes to mean that he did not recognise the constitutional doctrine that international treaties could take effect in UK law only by primary legislation. I took him to speak of “recent precedents”. Can he tell the Committee what those recent precedents are?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I mentioned them earlier in my observations with regard to the 1920 and 1933 Acts, which, by Order in Council—not even a statutory instrument—can draw these matters down into domestic law.

Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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An important part of the Minister’s argument is that an affirmative procedure suffices because all that Parliament is doing is approving, or not approving, an international agreement which cannot be amended. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has already made the point that this may involve very detailed and important policy questions. Can the Minister comment on a further point that, in any event, Clause 2 confers power on the Minister, not only to make regulations for the purpose of implementing the international agreement but in connection with implementation? He will know that implementing legislation often includes provisions which may be of some importance, which are not mandated by the international agreements but arise from them.

There may be discretionary decisions to be taken—for example, in relation to the creation of criminal offences. Therefore, I put to the Minister that it is not good enough to say that all Parliament is doing is implementing an international agreement which has already been negotiated and agreed. There are policy decisions that the statutory instrument will contain, and primary legislation is required so that Parliament can debate these policy choices in a proper, effective way and, if necessary, seek to amend the provisions, which are distinct from those contained within the agreement itself.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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There may of course be incidental policy issues that arise when we come to draw down into domestic law an obligation, or obligations, undertaken at the level of international law. Clearly, in circumstances where there were policy choices to be made, a Government would consult upon those matters to bring forward policy choices that were acceptable to stakeholders. If they were not acceptable to Parliament, even after consultation, Parliament would not pass the affirmative SI in question. I do not accept that it is necessary in each and every instance to bring forward primary legislation for this purpose. In those exceptional cases where there may be consequential issues to be addressed, clearly they will be addressed at policy level. They will be consulted upon and the matter brought forward. The Government will not bring forward a policy proposal for an incidental measure without realising that Parliament would be prepared to accept it. That would be a pointless exercise.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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This very interesting debate has raised, in effect, two substantial questions: as a matter of principle should there be the Clause 2 power at all and, if not, should we nevertheless make an exception for the Lugano convention?

First of all, should there be this power at all? In a speech that might be described as a Scottish smokescreen —because it dealt primarily with drafting issues and issues about the dependent territories and, important as those are, did not really address the principle at all—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, gave one line to justify this unprecedented power. He said that not having this power under Clause 2 would prevent implementation of any international treaty “in a timely manner”. I forgive the noble and learned Lord for putting it in such wide terms and assume he means private international law treaties only. With respect, what he says is plainly wrong.

The noble and learned Lord was given the opportunity on two occasions to provide evidence that it would prevent the implementation of private international law treaties in a timely manner, once before the Delegated Powers Committee of this House and once before the Constitution Committee. The Delegated Powers Committee said that the Ministry of Justice

“offers no empirical evidence that delay has been caused to stakeholders by late implementation of private international law agreements … The argument from delay, apart from involving unsubstantiated assertion, might justify dispensing with Acts of Parliament in other areas where governments need to legislate quickly.”

It rejected it on grounds of lack of evidence and on grounds of principle.

The Constitution Committee also looked at the very same assertion made to it, and said:

“However, the Government offers no evidence to support this argument. The UK has become a party to only 13 Hague Conventions over the course of nearly 60 years. In respect of some of the Conventions the UK has signed, full ratification and implementation has taken years to complete. The Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults … was ratified for Scotland in 2003 but has not been ratified for England and Wales or for Northern Ireland … While there may or may not be an increase in the number of PIL agreements that are made in the coming years, there is nothing to suggest that PIL agreements will be produced at a rate that would preclude implementing them via primary legislation, nor that there are exceptional circumstances so urgent that resort to a fast-track bill would be impossible. It is therefore difficult to give weight to the Government’s argument that reputational damage will result from not having the power.”


Anybody who has looked at this in detail thinks the Minister’s argument is rubbish. It is not surprising that he never mentioned it at Second Reading.

The Minister then cited occasions when it has been done before, in particular two primary Acts of Parliament: the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. Reading those is worth while. The 1920 Act refers to a provision whereby a judgment obtained in one dominion can be enforced in other dominions as long as the dominion passes a power to agree to that. The 1920 Act—the 1933 Act is the same, but not in respect of the Empire—says that if another country agrees to this convention, we can add the name of that dominion or country to the list, having approved the convention by primary legislation. The idea that those two Acts give support to the proposition that we can now import wholesale into our domestic law every international treaty we enter into is absolute nonsense. They provide no sort of precedent at all. I really hope the Minister has noted that every single person who spoke took the view that Clause 2 was inappropriate.

As far as Lugano is concerned, I thought the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, were powerful. I do not know whether they are right or wrong, but they illustrate that we need a proper debate about Lugano: we cannot just import Lugano into our law by secondary legislation. Our debates about Lugano today—which, as one speaker identified, were not answered by the Minister; we never debated Lugano, we simply debated the principle of whether Lugano could be an exception to the deletion of Clause 2—illustrate that this very important convention, about which two views prevail, should be the subject of primary legislation. Of course, I will come back to this on Report.

The important point that was made about procedure, and which is worth emphasising, is that we cannot change a Bill unless there is consent, or as a result of a Division which agrees to change that Bill. It means that we cannot proceed with legislation until we have the ability to divide on legislation, whether remotely or in person. We cannot get to the next stage of this Bill until we have the power to divide. With the permission of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Thomas of Gresford Portrait Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
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My Lords, in his letter of 19 April in response to the report of the Delegated Powers Committee, the Minister said:

“The Committee’s Report implies that the power in clause 2 of the Bill would allow the Government to implement agreements on any aspect of private law with a foreign element, rather than merely agreements on the much narrower subject area of private international law, as defined by clause 2(7) of the Bill. … It will not be possible for matters outside of the areas indicated by the definition of ‘private international law’ in clause 2(7) to be implemented using the power.”


The Minister echoed what was set out in paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes, which state:

“PIL agreements cover a discrete area of law that is narrowly defined.”


One would therefore have expected that the interpretation of Clause 2(7) to be narrowly defined, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, there is a width and uncertainty about these provisions that really do not follow the expressions being used.

For example, the definition clause for “international agreement”, which Amendment 9 deals with, includes,

“an agreement to which the UK is, or is expected to become, a party.”

What does that mean? Does that mean that legislation will be brought forward under these provisions and regulations brought forward in respect of an agreement to which we are not a party? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, what happens if the agreement is not ultimately made and the negotiations fall through? We would then, presumably, have regulations on the statute book dealing with an agreement to which we were not a party.

The definition of “private international law” is also contained in that same subsection, and Amendments 10, 12 and 13 demonstrate the loose wording that is used in case anything has been missed. That is rather typical of the drafting of the legislation. It is so drafted that anything can be bought in and the door is kept open. For example, it includes “rules and other provisions”, and there is to be co-operation in relation to the

“service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures”

not defined. Paragraph (c)(ii) deals with

“anything within paragraphs (a) and (b).”

It is so loose and ill-defined.

So the purpose of the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is to define the scope of regulation-making powers of the Bill so that the regulations should be confined exclusively to the field of private international law. Any provisions that trespass into any other territory could not be incorporated into domestic law by these regulations. I wholly support what he says about that.

I also support what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Manse, on arbitral awards and model laws.

But I am interested in Amendment 6. Perhaps the Minister will share his thoughts about any proposed regulations concerning legal aid. What proceedings in the field of private international law does he envisage? To what is this directed? Would these be additional provisions to existing legal aid regulations? Would there be more hoops or fewer? Would there be more generous or less generous provision, and in what fields?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, I begin with Amendment 2, which as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, noted, would seek to limit the scope of the Clause 2 power to implement agreements to those that relate exclusively to private international law, whereas of course in its present form of drafting it is clearly intended to extend to the implementation of private international law provisions in wider agreements. In previous correspondence, as noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, I referred, as an example, to the jurisdiction of the provisions of the 1961 Warsaw Convention, which is concerned with international carriage by air. The point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, was: why would you seek a power to implement such a private international law provision outwith the wider terms of the relevant international agreement? There may be some force in that point. It is one that I would like to consider further, and I will do so before we reach Report.

Amendment 6, which was just referred to by noble Lords, seeks to remove legal aid from the scope of the matters about which Clause 2 regulations can make provision. In the light of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, perhaps I should explain that the Bill as presently drafted does not expressly include legal aid in the scope of the definition of private international law. However, under Clause 2(5)(c), it allows for regulations that implement or apply a private international law agreement to make provision for legal aid. This would mean that, where a private international law agreement to which the UK chose to become a party included obligations in relation to legal aid, those could be given domestic effect through Clause 2 regulations.

The reason for that approach to the matter of private international law and legal aid in the Bill is that, although there is some doubt about whether legal aid is typically encompassed in the scope of what is referred to as private international law as generally understood by practitioners and academics, there are circumstances in which a private international law agreement could contain specific legal aid provisions. This normally arises, as one might expect, in the field of family law. For example, there is a requirement in the 1980 Hague Convention on international child abduction for a contracting state to apply the same legal aid rules to citizens of, and persons habitually resident in, other contracting states in matters covered by the convention as it would to its own citizens and residents. It is therefore the Government’s view that, should similar conventions arise in the future providing for critical cross-border co-operation in matters of private international law, it would be unfortunate if there were to be a delay in people benefiting from the provisions of such an important convention.

Where a private international law agreement imposes requirements relating to legal aid that go beyond the sorts of areas for which the United Kingdom Government currently provide such funding domestically, we would need to think very carefully before proceeding. However, the normal process of consultation during the development of, and before taking the international steps to join, a convention of this nature would provide an opportunity for consideration of any legal aid implications.

In short, the amendment would create unhelpful doubt around whether the Clause 2 power could be used to implement a private international law agreement that included provisions relating to legal aid, and indeed it might even render that impossible.

Amendment 9 seeks to restrict the Clause 2 power to implement in domestic law only the private international law agreements to which the UK is already a contracting party and nothing further. It will not be possible for the Government to take the final steps necessary under international law for the United Kingdom to become bound by a new agreement in this area, such as depositing an instrument of ratification, because, in order to do that, the necessary implementing legislation must already have been made and, as a result of this amendment, it would need a different legislative vehicle.

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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
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My Lords, the question raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness is about how legislation should be made regulating implementation between jurisdictions within the UK and between the UK and other relevant territories. It seems to me that Clause 2(2) and (3) and Schedule 6 infringe the principles of devolution, particularly in the lack of provision for consultation with Scotland and Northern Ireland, as he pointed out. They also infringe the autonomy of the other relevant territories. For those reasons it seems to me that, in addition to the general reasons about the width of Clause 2 and the points already made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, we will support amendments such as these on Report.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, as with the previous groups of amendments, the underlying theme is that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill, but we have to look at these amendments in the context that it does stand part. They would therefore limit the power conferred by that clause—that context is important.

When discussing Amendments 4 and 5, I pointed out that, in the context I have just described, they in turn would result in an unacceptable restriction of the power in Clause 2 and would mean that co-operation on private international law matters between different parts of the United Kingdom family would be significantly less well developed than it is between the United Kingdom and international partners. As a matter of policy, we see no way to justify such a position. Why, for example, should two parties in London and Edinburgh have less legal certainty about the way in which their dispute will be resolved than if the dispute was between parties based in London and Paris or New York? Of course, the point is then made that it is not a question of whether, but how. If you are able to have this regulatory-making power under Clause 2 with regard to foreign jurisdictions, why not intra-UK?

If, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, the concern is the power being perceived as risking imposing a position on Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Crown dependencies or overseas territories without consultation or consent, I would seek to assuage those concerns. Such arrangements under the power would require the agreement of all the relevant Administrations—the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the relevant devolved Administration, Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, such a measure would be considered only after the Government had consulted appropriately with relevant stakeholders, and the statutory instrument to give effect to such a “mirroring” provision—that is what it would be—would still be subject to the scrutiny of the affirmative procedure, as I noted before.

There are examples where such mirroring-type relationships already apply. We apply a modified version of the terms of the 1968 Brussels Convention, an instrument that was the forerunner to Brussels I and the recast Brussels IA regulation, between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. That works perfectly well. Therefore, assuming Clause 2 stands part of the Bill, we do not see any reason why it should be amended in the way suggested.

I now turn to Amendment 18, which would in turn require fresh primary legislation if the UK wished to amend or revoke, at a later date, any declarations it chose to make when it first implemented a new international agreement. This would mean, for example, that if, in implementing the 2005 Hague Convention, the Government decided to replicate the current EU declaration in regard to certain insurance contracts being out of scope of the convention and then wished to review that decision later, primary legislation would be required to implement that change.

Our policy intention is to replicate the current EU declaration in relation to the exclusion of certain insurance contracts when we accede to the 2005 Hague Convention later this year, because this is how the convention rules currently apply here and, given the tight timeframe between now and the end of the transition period, it makes sense to maintain the status quo and then review in the longer term. Under the proposed amendment, if we wished to change our position following that review, we would have to wait for a primary legislative vehicle to give effect to that change. In our view, that would simply create undue delay on a matter which could be addressed through secondary legislation without losing any of the desired scrutiny. It is in these circumstances that I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendments.

Lord McNicol of West Kilbride Portrait The Deputy Chairman of Committees
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

One speaker has indicated that they wish to come in on the amendment.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Portrait Lord Wallace of Tankerness
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I note what the Minister said about fears that something might be imposed on Scotland or Northern Ireland, but as I read it, Scotland or Northern Ireland could actually impose something on England. He then went on to say that there would of course be discussion, negotiation and consultation. If that is the case, why does it not say so on the face of the Bill? Would he be minded to give further thought to these provisions and how they are drafted to secure some degree of consultation, which does not, I would argue, detract in any way from the devolution settlement?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
- Hansard - -

Let me be clear: I do not accept the underlying premise of the noble and learned Lord’s argument. However, I am perfectly content to look at this before the next stage of the Bill in order that I can, again, reassure him of the position. There is no intent here to proceed to regulatory-making power without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration. That would be wholly inappropriate, and I accept the noble and learned Lord’s observation that it would conflict with the devolved settlement. However, I am perfectly willing to look at this again.

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Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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I simply underline the points made by my noble friend Lord Foulkes and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Hope. As far as my noble friend Lord Foulkes is concerned, the purpose of these amendments is to probe; as far as I am concerned, they illustrate the lack of thought that has gone into Clause 2. They simply underline the sense that there should not be a Clause 2.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for tabling what he very candidly pointed out were probing amendments. I am also obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, who drew on his experience of the devolved Administrations and was able to outline the position in this matter. I will come in a moment to address the questions raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in the context of these provisions.

As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out, two authorities are identified in this part of the Bill that might proceed to implement matters of private international law in Scotland. That is consistent with legislation in other areas. The Secretary of State might decide, with the consent of the Scottish Ministers, to make UK-wide provision for implementation. That is why he is one of the identified national authorities, because there are circumstances in which the Scottish Ministers would be entirely content for there to be UK-wide provision.

Alternatively, if that is not the case, Scottish Ministers may themselves then proceed as a national authority to implement the matter in domestic law. That is because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, pointed out, the position is that—I am sorry, something came up on another phone and rather distracted me—the implementation of private international law is a devolved issue under the Scotland Act, so allowance is made for both provisions.

As regards this Bill, an LCM was discussed between officials. The Scottish Ministers have recommended that such an LCM should be provided, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, pointed out the terms of the recommendation that Scottish Ministers have made to the Scottish Parliament with regard to this matter. Indeed, there was prior discussion about these proposals last year, when the Lord Chancellor, for example, was in communication with the Scottish Government on matters of the convention. Perhaps I can clarify this by reference to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Secretary of State may be a national authority with the consent of Scottish Ministers because Scottish Ministers may, as sometimes happens, wish to see UK-wide regulations made here for implementation. Alternatively, as the national authority, they may choose to do that for themselves. The Secretary of State clearly does have the power to do that because under the Scotland Act there is the power to legislate for the entirety of the United Kingdom as regards the implementation of a matter that is otherwise within the devolved competences, so that does not raise an issue either.

With regard to the matter of whether or when it would be one national authority or the other, that is simply a matter that will be discussed, as it is in other contexts, between the United Kingdom Government and Scottish Ministers. If Scottish Ministers are content that the UK Government should legislate UK-wide on this matter, that will happen. If they are content for that to be done, then Scottish Ministers will deal with the matter. The Secretary of State cannot deal with the matter without the consent of Scottish Ministers, so I hope that that puts minds at rest in this regard.

As regards the identification of the Secretary of State as an authority and the reference, for example, in the Scotland Act to a Minister of the Crown, I accept that the reference in this Bill is more limited. Because I cannot answer immediately, I will consider why it was thought appropriate to limit it to the Secretary of State as opposed to the wider reference to a Minister of the Crown. But I will look at that to see whether there is an issue there that needs to be addressed.

As regards consultation on the implementation of international treaties, that is not an issue, but as regards entering into international treaties, that is of course a reserved matter. I recognise that it is appropriate that Scottish Ministers and others should be consulted on these matters for their interests when they arise. I do not understand that to be a difficulty in this context, nor a matter that would require express provisions in the terms of this Bill.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for his probing amendment and I hope that I have been able to put minds at rest as regards why there are two identified national authorities for the purposes of Clause 2. In the event that Clause 2 stands, these are appropriate alternative mechanisms for the implementation of these provisions.

One final matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was the issue of contract, but of course, where you have a contract, it will have a choice of jurisdiction and a choice of law. If the contract has Scotland as a choice of jurisdiction and Scots law as the choice of law, that will be binding if we have a situation in which, for instance, the Lugano provision applies. I hope that that answers the query in so far as I have understood it.

I cannot give a precise date for the provision of the LCM, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, himself indicated, Scottish Ministers have recommended the granting of an LCM, and it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulty. With that, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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I have nothing to add.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for what I understand are, again, probing amendments. As I perhaps explained, the Crown dependencies and overseas territories have a constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom whereby the United Kingdom is responsible for their foreign relations. This means that the Crown dependencies and overseas territories do not generally themselves join international agreements, including agreements in the area of private international law, which we are concerned with here. Instead, an agreement that applies in the United Kingdom can usually be extended to apply also in a Crown dependency or overseas territory. We work with those Crown dependencies and overseas territories to determine where and when they would wish to have a private international law agreement apply between them and other contracting parties. The scope of the United Kingdom’s ratification of that agreement is then extended to them. This means that multilateral agreements extended to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories apply only between those jurisdictions on the one hand and the other contracting parties on the other, but not between the Crown dependencies and overseas territories and the UK. To apply the agreement with the UK, there needs to be a separate mirroring arrangement, as it is sometimes termed. I referred to that in responding to earlier amendments.

The general power within Clause 2(3) allows the United Kingdom to maintain and develop a private international law framework with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories as well as with foreign partners. That is the intent here.

The noble Lord asked about consultation. There was consultation, not with the governors of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, but with each attorney-general and their officials. My understanding is that they were entirely content with the way in which these provisions are extended to the benefit of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.

The noble Lord raised the question of entrustment. It does not directly arise in this context, but entrustment is where the United Kingdom essentially consents to a Crown dependency, for example, entering into an agreement at the level of international law. That can sometimes happen where, for example, a Crown dependency wants a reciprocal agreement with a foreign partner.

The behaviour of the overseas territories is monitored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and there are instances in which, for the purposes of good governance, the United Kingdom will intervene in the affairs of an overseas territory. The noble Lord himself gave an example in respect of the Turks and Caicos Islands where that has been done.

As regards the choice of court or arbitration that the noble Lord referred to, in so far as I understand his point, I would respond that it is up to parties to a private contract to determine how their disputes, if any, will be resolved. For that purpose, the parties can choose a law or legal system to apply to their private contract and the jurisdiction in which their disputes will be resolved. That is an issue that arises only in the context of their private contract and in the context of what we are dealing with here, which is private international law. At the level of private international law, we are concerned with the way in which other jurisdictions respect that law, respect the choice of jurisdiction and, indeed, then respect the judgment of that jurisdiction when it comes to enforcement.

I hope that answers the points raised by the noble Lord. I thank him for the probing amendments, but I invite him to withdraw Amendment 14.

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Portrait The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
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My Lords, I am not aware that any other noble Lords have expressed a wish to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock.

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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
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My Lords, for some years I had the privilege of serving on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester. That committee has increasingly come to stand as a crucial protector of the role of Parliament, alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whom I was delighted we were able to hear. The committee has acted in attempting to limit the Executive improperly taking powers for government Ministers to change the law by delegated legislation in significant ways and ways for which delegated legislation has never in the past been deemed appropriate.

The committee usually expresses itself, or certainly has until recent years, in circumspect terms and the Government have traditionally accepted its recommendations. The committee has left it to the House to implement its recommendations if the Government do not agree to do so. The clarity and decisiveness of the recommendation in paragraph 15 of the committee’s report on this occasion is anything but circumspect. The conclusion speaks for itself:

“We are of the view that clause 2 represents an inappropriate delegation of power and we recommend that it should be removed from the face of the Bill.”


The committee is forcefully supported by the report of the Constitution Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, from whom we have heard, and includes the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, from whom we have also heard. Paragraph 19 of that report contains the kernel of its conclusion:

“We are not persuaded by the arguments the Government has made in support of this power. If the balance between the executive and Parliament is to be altered in respect of international agreements, it should be in favour of greater parliamentary scrutiny and not more executive power.”


Another important point made by the Constitution Committee, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is that delegated legislation is amenable to judicial review so that future regulations implementing international treaties could be the subject of challenge. It is entirely right that delegated legislation, which involves an exercise of executive power of itself, should be capable of being challenged as unlawful.

However, it would be a highly undesirable consequence of the Bill if, when enacted, the lawfulness of conventions entered into by the United Kingdom Government as a matter of our domestic law could not be guaranteed to our international convention partners until such challenges were determined.

I also agree with the point made by the Constitution Committee, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that the CraG procedure is at present inadequate and ineffective as an instrument of parliamentary scrutiny.

In the light of all that, can the Minister say whether, given the Constitution Committee’s report published on 4 May, he is prepared to go away and reconsider his extremely negative response, dated 17 April, to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report? I ask, because if these important committees of your Lordships’ House are going to be routinely ignored by government, parliamentary democracy is entering treacherous territory, in which the conventional boundaries between executive power and parliamentary sovereignty are roughly and unceremoniously shifted by the failure of government to adhere to well-established, valuable and principled conventions.

The central point is this. As it stands, the Bill involves moving a whole area of legislation—that of implementing private international law treaties in domestic law—from Parliament to the Executive. That is a dangerous extension and an unwelcome trend—noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—in our constitutional arrangements from parliamentary democracy to government by an overmighty Executive. If it is private international law agreements this year, what might follow next year? This House has rightly sought to resist the trend, which is dangerous and must be stopped. As parliamentarians, and respecting the traditional role of this House as a guardian of the constitution, we have a responsibility to stop it.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, I thank noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their contribution to this part of the debate. Since the commencement of this Committee, the matter of whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill has in a sense been the elephant in the virtual Chamber—or perhaps the virtual elephant in the Chamber. I therefore do not intend to rehearse or repeat the arguments that have been made repeatedly in Committee. However, I want to make it clear that the Government regard the powers in Clause 2 as essential to achieving their objective to build up the United Kingdom’s position in private international law, not only in the immediate future but in years to come.

Of course, there is one particularly pertinent example of our ambition; namely, our ambition to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the desire—indeed, the need—to do that before the end of the transition period. It would be gravely unfortunate if a gap was to emerge between the end of the transition period, when we continue to look to the Brussels I and IIa regime, and the application of the 2007 Lugano Convention. We are concerned that that should be avoided.

Briefly, first, we consider that the proposal in Clause 2 is not only essential but proportionate. International law agreements are generally uncontroversial and technical in nature, and the detailed content of the private international law agreements to which the Bill will apply will already be determined at the international level; they are by their very nature clear and precise in their terms.

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Earl of Devon Portrait Earl of Devon (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I understood that I would get an opportunity to speak before the Minister rather than after him, as I have been on the list for the past few days, but I shall proceed none the less with what I was going to say. At the risk of flogging rather a dead horse at this stage, I wish to add that while I support the basic aims of the Bill, I do not support Clause 2.

Private international law and our membership of the Hague and other global jurisdiction and enforcement conventions are an essential part of our global standing and our ability to welcome and to home families from overseas. They are essential particularly to the professional and legal services markets in which we are world leaders. I note my interests in the register, and particularly my work as a dual-qualified, cross-border litigator, whose practice touches variously on this area.

I shall not speak at length because pretty much all the issues have been addressed in some detail. However, I thought that your Lordships might appreciate some stories from the front line. Unlike many of our eminent jurists in the Lords, I am currently active in this space and spent 10 years as a litigator in California, as a California-qualified litigator, in which capacity I advised often on jurisdiction clauses and dispute resolution provisions.

For the most part, the most popular forum for these was the courts of England and Wales, irrespective of the parties—typically, one of them was an American party, but we dealt with parties from all around the world. There were plenty of reasons for this, not least the English language, our time zones, our excellent legal services, our use of the common law and precedent, the independence of our judiciary, and the broad membership we have of cross-border conventions, such as those under consideration in the Bill.

Finally, and perhaps most important, is the rule of law—particularly the transparent, thorough and long-established legislative process by which our laws are passed. This is the reason that England and Wales is so often chosen as the preferred third-party forum for jurisdiction and dispute resolution clauses. That is directly threatened by Clause 2. Indeed, by seeking to short-circuit the long-standing practice of passing treaties by primary legislation, the Government are in danger of undermining one of the most important pillars that supports the UK’s pre-eminence in the provision of dispute resolution services in the global market.

I note that the US-UK trade negotiations started recently. Can the Minister give us any indication as to whether the subject of private international law has been raised within that forum? Is any pressure being brought to bear on the UK Government to align their cross-border enforcement and jurisdiction regime towards that of the US, which obviously takes a very particular line in these matters? We know, for example, that the current US Administration disfavour cross-border co-operation. I understand that in recent rounds of Hague conference negotiations, the US has become increasingly reluctant to engage. It is taking a back seat while burgeoning economies, such as China, are increasingly engaged.

Finally, before we reach Report on this crucial Bill, we must have either mastered virtual voting or returned to a normal practice. This is too important an issue to slip through at such a procedurally challenging time. I appreciate your Lordships’ indulgence.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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As regards the UK-US negotiations, I say only that I am not in a position to comment on how far they have gone, or on whether they have engaged the issue of private international law at all.

Lord Adonis Portrait Lord Adonis
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Perhaps I may add to my earlier contribution to the Committee, since it looks as if we will vote on this issue on Report. We are all agreed that it is a hugely important constitutional issue.

The House of Commons, which has been conducting its first online votes this afternoon, has descended into complete chaos on its latest vote. I can report to the Committee that on what was, I think, the third vote it held—after its Members had had an opportunity to get to know the system—there were 22 Tory rebels, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, who accidentally voted the wrong way. The Deputy Speaker, Eleanor Laing, pointed out that some MPs are struggling with the new electronic voting system but, she added, there was no need to rerun the vote because there was a majority of 51 for the Government.

I will point out two things for the benefit of our colleagues on the Procedure Committee. First, there is no natural government majority in the House of Lords, so how are we to know whether people have voted the wrong way accidentally? The constitution of our country could be rewritten because people did not understand the system of voting. Secondly, although I have the highest regard for all our colleagues in the House, if Members of the House of Commons are struggling with the new electronic voting system, it is fair to say that some colleagues in our House may also struggle with that new system.

I see not just a flashing orange light but a flashing red light about moving to electronic voting at any early stage in our proceeding, and certainly on a matter as grave and serious as this. If this were to be our first vote and it descended into chaos, as in the House of Commons, nobody could say that we were not warned.

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Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has made a number of extremely telling and important points. We are clearly in a situation where we must ensure either that we have an entirely reliable voting system in the upper Chamber, or alternatively a clear and telling government majority. I suspect that it is more likely that we will seek to secure the former.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Portrait The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I shall now put the question that Clause 2 stand part of the Bill; all microphones will be opened until I give the result. As many as are of that opinion shall say “Content”.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL] Debate

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Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd June 2020

(3 years, 9 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 101-R(a) Amendment for Report - (3 Jun 2020)
Moved by
17: Clause 4, page 4, line 17, at end insert—
“( ) Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for section 2 (including Schedule 6) and section 3(2) and (3) to extend, with or without modifications, to the Isle of Man.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a new subsection into Clause 4. This allows Her Majesty by Order in Council to extend Clause 2 (including Schedule 6) and subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 3 to the Isle of Man.
Lord Keen of Elie Portrait The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
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My Lords, this government amendment seeks to allow certain provisions of the Bill to be extended to the Isle of Man through what is commonly known as a permissive extent clause. This is a well-established method of enabling UK legislation to be extended to the overseas territories and Crown dependencies.

I should clarify that the amendment was explicitly requested by the Isle of Man Government due to the legislative pressures that Tynwald, the island’s parliament, currently faces. I want to be clear with noble Lords that I am moving the amendment to allow debate and to put on record the request from the Isle of Man Government. I recognise that some noble Lords expressed concerns in the earlier parts of this Committee stage about both the scope and purpose of Clause 2, to which this amendment relates. I will therefore seek to withdraw the amendment once noble Lords have had an opportunity to speak to it.

Returning to the detail of the amendment, this permissive extent clause provides for the addition of a narrow delegated power that, when activated, will allow certain provisions of the Bill to apply in the Isle of Man. The power is exercisable by an Order in Council, which can be made at a time agreed between the UK Government and the Isle of Man Government.

Once made, the Order in Council would extend the Clause 2(1) power to the appropriate authority on the Isle of Man. This would enable the Isle of Man to make its own regulations to implement international agreements on private international law. This power could be used only to implement agreements that the United Kingdom has extended to apply in the Isle of Man, which means that both the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man would be able to operate the agreement between their own jurisdictions and the other contracting parties.

In addition, the amendment would enable the Isle of Man to implement an arrangement to apply the terms of a private international law agreement, subject to necessary modifications, between the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom. Clause 2(3) already provides this power to the United Kingdom. The amendment will enable that power to be extended to the Isle of Man to give it the power to do the same, alleviating the need for it to enact its own primary legislation to implement such an arrangement. Of course, in both cases, the arrangement will be about operating a private international law agreement that the United Kingdom has joined, as anything else would fall outside the scope of the power.

The amendment would not affect the United Kingdom directly. It would require the Queen to approve an Order in Council at a meeting of the Privy Council and would allow the Isle of Man also to make use of this important legislation. Should there be any effect on the UK, it is likely that any agreed arrangement relating to applying private international law agreements between the UK and the Isle of Man could be implemented efficiently both here and in that dependency by mutual agreement.

As I have already stated, this measure is limited to the Isle of Man simply because it issued a formal request for the Bill to include this permissive extent clause. We have engaged with the other Crown dependencies and overseas territories on the Bill; they have not requested that this provision be extended to them. In these circumstances, I beg to move.

Lord Adonis Portrait Lord Adonis (Lab)
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I have an obvious question relating to what the noble and learned Lord said. Why does he think that the Isle of Man wants this power but other Crown dependencies do not?

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Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
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I am grateful to the Minister for indicating that he is not going to proceed with this amendment today and that he has moved it simply to open it for debate. We oppose the amendment because we oppose in principle Clause 2, which inappropriately gives the Government the power by secondary legislation to introduce important changes to domestic law to reflect private international law agreements. At the moment, if that is the principle that we stand on, in our view it is wrong to say that the Isle of Man, of all the parts of the Crown dependencies, should have a special right to do it by statutory instrument. That, as previous Lords have indicated, would differentiate it from everyone else. We are against it for that reason.

We are also against it because this change would allow for differential application of international agreements as between the various parts of the United Kingdom and, for the reasons we gave the previous time this Committee met, we are against that. So, we oppose the amendment.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I am obliged to noble Lords for their contribution to the debate, and note what has been said. Perhaps I may respond to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Mann, and touched upon by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—although I have a correction to make there. The reason why this is being done only in respect of the Isle of Man is that the Isle of Man has specifically requested that this mechanism should be available, so that we can proceed by way of an Order in Council from the Privy Council. It will be for the other Crown dependencies to determine whether and when they wish to implement primary legislation within their own legislatures to come within the ambit of such international agreements as the United Kingdom draws down.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, referred to variation between parts of the United Kingdom but of course the Crown dependencies are not part of the United Kingdom. They have a unique status and it is for them to determine whether and to what extent they wish to become a party to legislation that draws down into domestic law international treaty obligations. I continue to believe that this amendment is important and respect the request of the Government of the Isle of Man. However, I recognise the concerns expressed about the links between this amendment and the Clause 2 power to which exception is taken. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, made that point. In these circumstances I will therefore withdraw the amendment, but I intend to continue this discussion at a later date. For present purposes, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 17 withdrawn.
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
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My Lords, on these Benches we are firmly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in opposing Clause 2 of the Bill, in line with the virtually unanimous view of those who spoke on 13 May and for all the reasons stated on day one in Committee. We will support the noble and learned Lord in opposing Clause 2 on Report. Therefore, it is with some regret that I find myself disagreeing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in particular in respect of the creation of criminal offences. He seemed to be suggesting that such offences would derive from the provisions of the international treaties themselves, rather than the provisions of the delegated legislation and, for that reason, the power in the Bill should be accepted.

However, that is not inevitably so. Under the Bill as it stands, new criminal offences could be introduced by the regulations giving the force of domestic law to private international law conventions and the implementation of those conventions, not by the treaties themselves. I therefore agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, on that issue and the possibility that he raised of new offences being introduced under the regulations.

These two amendments are, of course, alternatives to the removal of Clause 2, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out. Both amendments would plainly be right if we came to the position, contrary to what we believe should happen, that we were stuck with Clause 2. Amendment 19 on criminal offences raises an important principle. I agree with and endorse everything said by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, as supported by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. In this country we have always had a strong and principled objection to making new criminal offences or otherwise changing the criminal law by secondary legislation. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, expressed that principle forcefully and eloquently. It is an important principle, which I think we should be very firm about upholding.

Amendment 20 is on the super-affirmative procedure. Of course, it would be better than the affirmative procedure and clearly better than any negative procedure —which is not proposed. However, it is a poor alternative to requiring primary legislation to give international treaties the force of domestic law. Paragraph 31.14 of Erskine May says this about the super-affirmative procedure:

“The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. (It should be noted that the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them.)”


That paragraph is accurate in respect of the super-affirmative procedure proposed by the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 20. It follows that Parliament would have no right to amend, and that is why super-affirmative is still a poor alternative. It ultimately leaves legislative power with Ministers and not with Parliament.

It is also a fact that success in changing delegated legislation by the super-affirmative procedure comes very rarely—a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. We perhaps ought to return to that matter in the future. We should perhaps try to formulate a procedure that goes some way to meet the criticism he made—a procedure that permits Parliament to approve an instrument conditionally on its being amended in a way acceptable to both Houses. That might solve some of the problems that we have with delegated legislation. But I agree that that is for another day. Our position is that we support these amendments if we are stuck with having to use them in place of striking out Clause 2.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, taken together, the amendments relate broadly to either narrowing the scope of the Clause 2 power or increasing parliamentary scrutiny for use of that power, and I recognise the observations made by a number of noble Lords and noble and learned Lords that this is very much secondary to the opposition expressed to Clause 2 itself. I note the observation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that this is essentially a series of probing amendments.

Before I look at the various amendments, I note that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and other noble Lords referred to the role of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law and the importance of consultation with it, with which I entirely concur. I am now co-chair of that committee, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. Its recent meeting was extremely useful. We looked at some technical issues surrounding the application of the Hague conventions of 2005 and 2007 at the end of the transition period. We may hear a little more of that in due course.

Amendment 19 deals with the creation of a criminal offence in the implementation in domestic law of a relevant private international law agreement. The use of the Clause 2 power to create a criminal offence there is very constrained. It is true that private international law agreements do not generally require contracting parties to create criminal offences, and there are no such requirements in the private international agreements that the UK is currently considering joining and implementing under the powers in this Bill. However, it remains a very real possibility that we might negotiate or seek to join a new agreement where a power to create or extend existing criminal penalties will be needed to fully implement the international law obligation. Take an agreement on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of protection measures, for example. In England and Wales, protection measures such as non- molestation orders or injunctions may be made by the courts under the Family Law Act 1996 or the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Breaches of those orders are punishable by criminal penalties. Any future private international law agreement in this area on reciprocal recognition of such orders, if successfully negotiated, would particularly benefit those who are most vulnerable in our society and reliant on such protection measures, whether they remain within the United Kingdom or travel abroad, where they would wish to retain the protection of such orders.

If we entered into such an agreement, it would seem reasonable and appropriate to exercise the Clause 2 power so that, for example, we could extend criminal penalties for breach of a UK order to also apply to the breach of an order issued by a relevant foreign court. Breach of an order issued by a foreign court would in effect carry the same criminal penalty as that for breach of an equivalent UK order. But that criminal offence-making ability would of course be subject to the limitations within the Clause 2 power itself as currently drafted. Let me be clear: we could not create an offence under this power which would carry a term of imprisonment of more than two years, for example. That is an important safeguard on the exercise of the Clause 2 powers in this area.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL] Debate

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Department: Scotland Office

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts
Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th June 2020

(3 years, 9 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 101-R-I Marshalled list for Report - (12 Jun 2020)
Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, makes a very strong case. It is extraordinary that this has not yet been incorporated into the law of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. I very much hope that the noble and learned Lord, the Minister, will explain why that is not the case and, at the very least, give us a timetable for it becoming part of our domestic law.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
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My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, not only for his contribution to the debate but for engaging with my officials and me on this matter.

As noted, the amendment seeks to deal with the ratification of the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults in respect of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Of course, the United Kingdom has ratified this convention, but the extent of this is limited to Scotland. I am pleased to confirm to the noble and learned Lord that it is our intention to extend the ratification of this convention to England and Wales. Discussions have commenced with officials in Northern Ireland to ascertain whether the Northern Ireland Executive would require the extension to apply to Northern Ireland.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 largely implements the convention and contains powers to make any additional provision required. Schedule 3 to that Act provides for the recognition and enforcement in England and Wales of protective measures made in respect of vulnerable adults by the courts of other contracting states. Some Schedule 3 provisions are already in force and some will come into force upon ratification, at which point reciprocal recognition of domestic protective measures by other states will also come into effect. There remain some outstanding matters that require further implementation; largely, additional operational arrangements for the location or placement of vulnerable adults as between contracting states.

It is the Government’s view that the most appropriate way to implement these remaining matters is to make any additional provision required in or under the 2005 Act, using the powers provided for in that Act for this specific purpose. We will proceed with this as soon as we reasonably can, taking account of the need to take the Northern Ireland Executive with us if it is their wish that the matter be extended to Northern Ireland. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw this amendment.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Portrait Lord Wallace of Tankerness [V]
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I thank my noble friend and the noble and learned Lords who contributed to this debate for their support for what I seek to achieve by it. I thank the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland for his positive response, and for his clear and unequivocal commitment to ratification. I recognise that there is already in place a substantial body of primary legislation in the 2005 Act, which will allow that to proceed. I very much hope that the engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive will continue, so that when ratification takes place it can apply to the whole of the rest of the United Kingdom. On that basis, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, we debated Clause 2 at great length at Second Reading and in Committee, and I note the further observations made by noble, and noble and learned, Lords with regard to the issue. As I have explained, the Bill is about implementing in domestic law treaties that we have already determined to join. Parliament will be afforded scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—CRaG—process prior to ratification. If it is not content, ratification will not occur.

While I acknowledge that there are differing views as to how effective CRaG has been to this point, it is perhaps important to recognise that, as of 28 January this year, Parliament has decided to strengthen its procedures around the CRaG process by agreeing to create a new sub-committee of the European Union Committee to focus on treaties laid under the procedure. This should provide additional opportunities for scrutiny in this area. The Government look forward to engaging with the committee on these matters. I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, but I observe that ratification will ultimately be a matter for Parliament before implementation of an international agreement could ever take place.

Furthermore, as with other powers to implement international agreements by way of secondary legislation that exist in the fields of, for example, taxation or social security, we are talking about private international law agreements that are, by their nature, quite technical in their terms. The details of any rules contained in these sorts of agreements will already have been determined at the international level and are usually, by their very nature, clear and precise. The power seeks to allow Ministers to bring forward regulations to effectively implement rules that have been agreed with our international partners and to bring them into domestic law.

It is our view that the level of scrutiny afforded to the implementation of new agreements on private international law is reasonable and proportionate. The implementation of any such agreements would require an affirmative statutory instrument. Noble Lords will be aware that affirmative SI debates in this place are often very thorough, as they should be. There is no reason to suppose that there would be anything other than rigorous debate on the issue of implementation, just as there would be regarding ratification under CRaG.

It was argued in Committee and touched on this afternoon that there was a risk, under our approach, of a statutory instrument made under Clause 2 being struck down as non-compliant with, for example, the Human Rights Act 1998. Of course, that is true of any secondary legislation that the Government bring forward. However, the risk in respect of private international law agreements is not likely to be great. Indeed, I struggle to envisage a situation where the United Kingdom and its international partners would collectively agree a private international law treaty that was not compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.

It remains the view of the Government that, in spite of the concerns raised, this power is necessary if we are to achieve our objective of building on the United Kingdom’s leadership role in private international law in the years to come. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, mentioned the importance of the choice of English law and jurisdiction, and if we are going to maintain that important role, we must ensure that we are in a position to move effectively—and that may mean rapidly—in the implementation of private international law agreements. That would allow us to make the most of the competence that will return to us at the end of the transition period.

As has been noted by noble Lords and noble and learned Lords, in the immediate term we have specific concerns about accession to the Lugano Convention 2007, and there are further issues with regard to other conventions that have been mentioned. We may not know the outcome of the United Kingdom’s application to accede to the Lugano Convention for some months, and we cannot implement this convention unless and until the terms of our accession are agreed with the existing contracting parties, including the European Union. So there is a very real concern that there will not be sufficient parliamentary time for bespoke primary legislation to be drafted and taken through Parliament before the end of the transition period. That would mean a delay in our ability to implement the Lugano Convention, with serious adverse effects on United Kingdom businesses, individuals and families with regard to cross-border disputes after the end of the transition period.

Beyond the implementation of Lugano, the power is essential also, in our view, for future private international law agreements. Mention was made of the Singapore Convention on Mediation and the 2019 Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in Civil or Commercial Matters. I acknowledge, as a number of noble and learned Lords observed, that the pace with which such conventions proceed can be relatively slow, but as and when there is the necessary conclusion and ratification, it may be necessary to find appropriate time in which to ensure implementation in domestic law. If that is not possible by way of primary legislation, we are liable to find ourselves at a distinct disadvantage in that respect.

The extension of this to the matter of arbitration was also mentioned, I believe by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. The rules on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards do of course fall within the definition of private international law. We recognise the success of the New York Convention, and that arbitration more broadly is an important matter approached by reference to that convention. The Government are not planning any change to our approach to arbitration, nor are we aware of any planned updates to the New York Convention, which is the leading international instrument in this area. We acknowledge that arbitration is a sensitive area, and that the current arrangements work well. I reassure noble Lords that, if there were any changes to the current arrangements for arbitration, that would be a matter on which we would consult extensively.

I return to the matter of precedent, which was touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. It has been argued that taking a delegated power of this sort is unprecedented. However, we do not accept this. Our approach to Clause 2 broadly reflects the way in which we have implemented private international law agreements in recent years as an EU member state, under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. Delegated powers have been taken to implement international agreements on private international law and in other contexts. That has been touched on already.

Of course, there are more recent instances—for example, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, raised the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which contains extensive and important delegated powers in this area, concerning the ratification of the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults, and the extension and ratification of that for England and Wales.

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Moved by
4: Clause 4, page 4, line 18, leave out “Except as provided by subsection (3),”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on another amendment which omits subsection (3).
Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, Clause 1 implements important Hague private international law conventions, including the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the 2007 Hague Convention on the international recovery of child support. These six government amendments aim to provide a clearer and simpler approach to the implementation of the transitional provisions in the 2005 and 2007 conventions. In particular, they aim to make further amendments to the 2018 EU exit SIs which were originally made in respect of the 2005 and 2007 conventions in the event of a non-negotiated withdrawal from the EU.

The Government are bringing forward these amendments following correspondence on the Bill from stakeholders and from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. There was concern that the approach set out in Schedule 5 to the Bill was causing uncertainty for stakeholders. The approach involved continuing to rely on the transitional provisions of the EU exit SIs, which themselves relied on the saving of rights and obligations under Section 4 of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. Concerns were also expressed about inconsistencies between the EU exit SIs and the transitional provisions of the conventions, to which the Bill gives legal effect under Clause 1. Furthermore, it was considered helpful to make it as clear as possible from which dates the conventions should be considered as applying in the United Kingdom.

Government Amendments 7 and 8 concern the savings provisions of the two 2018 EU exit SIs and make more extensive changes to them than originally set out in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 5 to the Bill. The amendments revoke the savings provisions in the EU exit SIs in their entirety rather than retaining them in an amended form. Instead, reliance is placed on the transitional provisions in Article 16 of the 2005 Hague convention and Article 56 of the 2007 Hague convention which are given legal force by Clause 1. Amendments 4 and 6 are consequential on these changes to the EU exit SIs.

Amendment 9 makes it clear that the conventions should be interpreted as coming into force for the United Kingdom on the dates when the UK originally became bound by them—that is, upon the EU accession to the conventions—and that when the UK joins the conventions in its own right after the end of the transition period, it should be treated as having been bound by the conventions without interruption. This means in particular that in proceedings that take place after the UK rejoins the 2005 Hague convention in its own right, UK courts will apply the 2005 Hague convention rules to all relevant exclusive choice of court agreements made from 1 October 2015 in favour of the courts of an EU member state or the UK courts.

The content of these amendments was discussed at length at the main meeting of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law and the drafting has also been considered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and other members of the committee. They have asked us to make sure that we provide a full explanation of the way in which the amendments are intended to work when we update the Explanatory Notes for the Bill before it passes to the other place, and I am happy to confirm that we will do so. Besides this, they were satisfied that the drafting properly gives effect to the policy intent, and I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and to the other members of the committee for their expertise in relation to this matter and for the time that they have spent considering these amendments.

I hope that this serves to reassure the House that these are sensible, proportionate and necessary amendments. I consider that they provide a clearer approach to the implementation of the transitional provisions for both Hague 2005 and Hague 2007 at the end of the transition period, and I hope that they will find support across the House. I beg to move.

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Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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My Lords, I support the amendments. I will make two points. First, had the noble and learned Lord had his way in Clause 2, he could not have made these amendments, which indicates the importance of primary legislation. Secondly, I hope that he heeds what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, said in his closing remarks. They were important. In the future, it would be more sensible to consult the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law before producing primary legislation, rather than after.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, I am most obliged, particularly for the contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. As he noted, as co-chair of the Lord Chancellor’s Private International Law Advisory Committee, he and I discussed this very point in detail at the May committee. I greatly appreciate not only his contribution but those of the other members of the committee, who have an in-depth understanding and knowledge of how these international agreements work and how the choice of court clauses work.

I am conscious of the issue of choice of jurisdiction and choice of law clauses arising in contracts made before 1 October 2015. I am also conscious of our need to do what we can to simplify the process in regard to that matter and, indeed, the matter of serving out of a jurisdiction, which we would have to look at in the context of the rules. These matters have been raised and I have them in mind at present, so I am most obliged to noble Lords for their contributions.

Amendment 4 agreed.
Moved by
5: Clause 4, page 4, line 20, leave out subsection (3)
Member’s explanatory statement
Subsection (3) provides for certain consequential amendments in Schedule 5 to come into force by regulations. Those consequential amendments are omitted by other amendments. Therefore subsection (3) is no longer needed.
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Moved by
6: Schedule 5, page 66, line 1, leave out sub-paragraph (2)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the saving provision for rights etc under section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 deriving from the 2005 or 2007 Hague Convention. The saving is no longer needed because another amendment ensures that the relevant Convention continues to apply after IP completion day to those cases to which it applies before IP completion day.
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames [V]
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My Lords, I addressed this issue in the group on the removal of Clause 2. I agree with everything that has been said so far in the debate on this amendment, which I support. Once again, we have unanimity. Although it might not be directly relevant in the light of the removal of Clause 2, I note the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, as to what will happen should Clause 2 be restored in the other place. I suspect that that would be curable here by passing a similar amendment, but I invite the Minister to consider that position as well.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, clearly, given that Clause 2 is no longer part of the Bill, this amendment would have no effect. However, I understand why the noble and learned Lord moved it—to allow further discussion of the issue. We believe that the inclusion of the provision to which the amendment relates would have been important in allowing the implementation of private international law agreements that necessitate the creation of a criminal offence, particularly in the family law area. I mentioned that in Committee.

In response to the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, I am not aware of any current examples where we have provided for criminal penalties when implementing a private international law agreement. However, that does not mean that it would not be the appropriate step to take in future agreements, for example, on mutual recognition and enforcement of protection measures, where the equivalent domestic orders were enforceable by criminal penalties such as orders under the Family Law Act 1996, or, indeed, injunctions under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. One is looking to the equivalents of such orders made by a foreign court when it comes to enforcement in the United Kingdom.

I continue to suggest that the safeguards on the power that I outlined in Committee, including use of the affirmative procedure as a matter of course, would be effective and appropriate in this regard. However, since the Clause 2 delegated power is no longer part of the Bill, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment. In the event that Clause 2 comes back to this House, it appears that there might be scope for him to revisit this issue.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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The only example that the noble and learned Lord has given of the need for a criminal offence is in relation to family law—for example, making it a criminal offence not to comply with an order made by a foreign court. I think that is a very sensible power to have. What the level of criminality should be, and whether we should recognise those sorts of offences, is plainly a matter on which Parliament should properly take a view in primary legislation. I was extremely struck by the fact that he gave no examples in answer to the question of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance.

I am absolutely bewildered as to why the Government are doing this. The amendment does not stop them doing what they want to do in relation to private international law; all it requires is that Parliament gets a say and can amend things, as we have just done in relation to the implementation of the three treaties that we are dealing with today. What is wrong with that? It does not cause problems. It means that you get much higher-quality implementation, as we discovered this afternoon through the amendments being debated.

Is it a knee-jerk reaction on the part of the Government that they want to keep Parliament out of things as much as possible? The Minister gives fatuous justification for this by saying that it is “necessary” and “essential” for the UK to remain in its pre-eminent position. This is obvious tosh, as we have been in a pre-eminent position without this existing power before.

I am not going to press this amendment because, as the noble and learned Lord impliedly accepts, Schedule 6 will drop out at Third Reading, which means that there will be nothing to amend. I am very surprised that he is being a dog in the manger about that—of course that schedule has to come out once Clause 2 has come out. I would be interested to hear whether he accepts that; if he does not accept it, I will think that he is behaving slightly childishly.

I am not sure whether our rules allow the noble and learned Lord to come back at this stage. I see noble Lords indicating that they do, so could he confirm that he will agree that Schedule 6 will come out before the Bill goes to the other place?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, it appears to me that Schedule 6 is quite distinct to Clause 2 as a part of the Bill, but, clearly, it is entirely dependent upon the existence of Clause 2. Beyond that, I do not really comprehend what the noble and learned Lord is talking about.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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I will explain the question. Does the noble and learned Lord agree that, now that Clause 2 has been deleted, Schedule 6 should also be deleted?

Lord Duncan of Springbank Portrait The Deputy Speaker
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Does the Minister wish to respond?

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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It may well be that it should be deleted, but it is for the noble and learned Lord to move his amendment if he wishes it to be deleted.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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As the noble and learned Lord knows, I do not have such an amendment down. Obviously, what I was saying was that I would put down an amendment at Third Reading. Does he agree that that would be agreed to by the Government?

Lord Duncan of Springbank Portrait The Deputy Speaker
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It helps if I can make the announcement so that people can capture this on camera. Does the Minister wish to respond?

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Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton
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I support the principle of this amendment. It is all of a piece with the way this legislation has been conducted. My noble friend Lord Hain described the attitude of the Minister when this was raised with him in Committee as “high-handed” and “cavalier”. Prior to that, as my noble friend said, there had not been proper consultation with the devolved Welsh Administration. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, indicated that the Northern Ireland Assembly did not feel it had been consulted. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said earlier that the devolution aspect of this had not been thought through. As became apparent during the earlier stages of this Bill, the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law was not consulted at all before the Bill was laid before Parliament.

This is not the right way to legislate. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on the failures properly to deal with this Bill and the inadequacies in it as a result, in particular Clause 2 and the need significantly to amend Clause 1. Both Clause 1, which has broad support throughout the House, and the need for its amendment indicated how misjudged Clause 2 is. If the Minister has any respect for this House, he will properly respond to the points raised on this amendment.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for meeting with me after Second Reading, when we discussed what he termed the copper-bottomed guarantee that he had sought in that debate. I explained to him the difficulty I had with that demand, given that it conflated the position of the Welsh Government with that of the Northern Ireland and Scottish Governments in circumstances where there was a quite separate and distinct divorce settlement with regard to the latter two, in contrast with the position in Wales. I understood him to appreciate that—indeed he even mentioned amending his amendment. I indicated that I did not think that necessary, because of course we are dealing here with a point of principle, and an important one.

Before I turn to the detail of the amendments, I stress to noble Lords that Ministry of Justice officials are in regular conversation with their counterparts in the devolved Administrations, not only about the matters contained within the Bill but whenever private international law issues arise that touch on areas of their devolved competence more generally. We are very conscious of our responsibilities under the devolution settlements, and our approach in this area is always to seek to engage early and often when any questions arise. It is my view that such an approach of early engagement is the best way to make consultation genuinely meaningful.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, referred to an earlier observation by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, with regard to his concern over the devolved aspects of the Bill. I have to say that I am perplexed by the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and perhaps I should have responded earlier. There are two distinct ways in which these matters can be dealt with in the devolved context of Scotland. One is by the Scottish Ministers and the other is by the Secretary of State with the consent of the Scottish Ministers. The latter avenue is of course there because there are circumstances in which the Scottish Government will say to the UK Government, “We are quite content that you should implement these provisions throughout the United Kingdom without us having to replicate your efforts”. I hope that that assists in clarifying that point.

The Government have fully honoured the devolution settlements in this area as we approached the drafting of the Bill, including, I may add, the Clause 2 power itself and how it can be exercised in particular in relation to Northern Ireland and Scotland. It is important to point out at the outset that the devolution settlement is different in distinct parts of the United Kingdom, as I said before, and that difference is reflected in the Bill.

Amendment 11 affects Scotland and Northern Ireland, where private international law is a devolved matter, differently to Wales, where these matters are almost entirely reserved. For Scotland and Northern Ireland, there are already two designated “appropriate national authorities”, as I just mentioned, which may exercise the Clause 2 power for those jurisdictions: either the Scottish Ministers or a Northern Ireland department, or alternatively, the Secretary of State acting with the consent of those Ministers or the Northern Ireland department. Either way, the ultimate decision on use of the Clause 2 power in Scotland and Northern Ireland rests with the devolved Administrations, and that is reflected in the Bill.

In principle, I have no objection to consulting before the Secretary of State can make regulations which apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Indeed, it is something that would happen, because he can make those regulations only with the consent of the Scottish Government or of the Northern Ireland department. I refer also to Clause 2(7)(b)(i) and (c)(i), which provide that the Secretary of State already needs the consent of the Scottish Ministers or a Northern Ireland department to legislate for those parts of the United Kingdom. I do not see how one would gain such consent without consultation. It goes without saying that if you are to secure consent, you must consult and engage.

The Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Administration have been fully engaged in the drafting of the Bill, including the Clause 2 power, and there is strong support from both devolved Administrations on the Clause 2 power as currently drafted. That is reflected in the fact that a legislative consent Motion has already been granted by the Northern Ireland Assembly, and another has been laid before the Scottish Parliament, with both the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee recommending that consent be granted. There we have a clear picture of what is happening in the devolved Administrations with regard to the Bill, and in particular Clause 2, and their welcome of these developments. They are the product of consultation and of consent.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL] Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Scotland Office

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts
3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th June 2020

(3 years, 9 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 115-I Marshalled list for Third Reading - (24 Jun 2020)
Moved by
1: Clause 2, page 2, line 33, leave out subsections (2) and (3)
Lord Keen of Elie Portrait The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to the House for Members’ engagement on the Bill throughout its passage. The amendments in this group are all consequential on the removal of the delegated power contained in the former Clause 2 of the Bill. I am moving Amendment 1, and support Amendments 2 and 3, as the provisions to which they relate do not function without the delegated power.

Before I turn to the detail of the amendments, I wish to make clear from the outset that we believe that the delegated power contained in the former Clause 2 of the Bill was a necessary, proportionate and constitutionally appropriate measure, for the timely implementation in domestic law of future private international law agreements which the Government had decided that the UK should join. Subject to a successful application, this could have included the Lugano Convention 2007.

Any decision for the United Kingdom to join a treaty or agreement in this area of law would still have been subject to successful completion of parliamentary scrutiny procedures under the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The former delegated power in the Bill did not alter the well-established approaches to parliamentary scrutiny of treaties and wider ratification processes under CRaG. Instead, it was simply a mechanism to draw down the treaty obligations into domestic law in readiness for ratifying the treaty.

I will now speak to Amendment 1, in my name, which seeks to remove from the Bill subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 2, formerly Clause 3, which establishes the Crown application of the Bill. These provisions were consequential on what was, originally, Clause 2, containing the delegated power. They provided that regulations made in the exercise of the delegated power in former Clause 2 could bind the Crown, subject to exceptions which reflect those contained in Section 51 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, as referred to in subsection (1).

The Government are bringing forward this amendment to remove these subsections from the Bill, as these two interlinked provisions were originally intended to apply to regulations made under the delegated power and therefore serve no function following its removal. As I have indicated, this is purely to ensure that the Bill is workable for its introduction into the other place, given the outcome of our deliberations in this House.

I have also put my name to Amendment 2, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The amendment seeks to remove Schedule 6 from the Bill. It details how the delegated power could be exercised in practice, including the parliamentary procedures to be followed for making regulations. I accept that the House has made its view clear, and without the delegated power in the former Clause 2, Schedule 6 serves no useful purpose. In these circumstances, purely to enable the tidying up of the Bill, we support the amendment to remove Schedule 6 from the Bill at this point.

Amendment 3, also in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, seeks to amend the Long Title of the Bill. Again, this is a consequence of the removal of the delegated power. Given that the new title more accurately reflects the content of the Bill as amended by the House, namely the implementation of the 1996, 2005 and 2007 Hague Conventions under Clause 1, in these circumstances the Government are content to support the amendment.

I beg to move.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
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I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. There is no dispute between us; all three amendments should be approved, to reflect the changes resulting from removing the wider power. The Minister repeated his argument for why that power should be there. We have had this argument three times now. It was rejected when he put it to the Delegated Powers Committee, rejected when it was put to the Constitution Committee, and massively rejected when it was put before your Lordships’ House, so there is no point repeating it again.

The Minister said that we should be dealing with subsequent conventions by secondary legislation. We have made amendments in this Bill to the three conventions that we are bringing in today. We could not have done so if his Clause 2 powers had been there. I hope that he will bring back what was the view of everybody in the Chamber, apart from him—namely that the Clause 2 power should not be there.

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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
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I welcome these sensible amendments which tidy up the Bill, but I also welcome them for an important reason, which is that in removing Clause 2 this House made an important constitutional decision. I welcome the thrust of much of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said. However, I doubt that we need a thoroughgoing review of delegated legislation or the powers to delegate legislation. What we need is to respect more thoroughly the views of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the principles that it applies, which are well known and are often stated and applied by this House and were importantly so stated and applied during debates on the removal of Clause 2.

I regard it as a shame that the Minister opened this afternoon’s discussion with a reassertion of the position that he enunciated during earlier stages of the Bill— that Clause 2 was constitutionally proper and not inappropriate. This House decisively rejected that view. I hope that the Government will listen to what has been said today and, more importantly, will consider the arguments that were advanced during the earlier stages of the Bill, change their mind and decide not to reinstate Clause 2 and send it back to this House, taking advantage of their majority; and, rather than having a thoroughgoing review, will decide to exercise some self-control in future and not put before us Bills which contain delegated powers that most of us regard as entirely wrong and inappropriate.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and my noble friend Lord Holmes observed, it is important that we maintain the position of English law and the jurisdiction, particularly in London, with regard to commercial dispute resolution just as it is maintained under the New York convention with respect to arbitration. That is why we have made our application to the council of the Lugano convention to join that body, but it is step that can be taken only with the consent of the member states and the EU. We recognise that if our application is accepted it is a matter of urgency for us to draw down that treaty into domestic law, which in part explains the position that we have adopted with regard to Clause 2.

It is not often that I find myself in a position where I have to correct the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. Indeed, I regard this as highly unusual, but I observe that where he said that the Government had decided not to proceed with Clause 2 that was not entirely accurate. It was decided for us, and there is a distinction to be drawn there. As regards the state of play with the Crown dependencies, the provision with respect to the Isle of Man fell with the amendments to the Bill in this House. As regards the Council of Europe, while in theory it may seek to promote some issues in respect of private international law, I do not understand that it has done so or that it imminently intends to do so, but I will make further inquiry and if necessary write to the noble Lord.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, talked about a matter of principle with regard to the introduction of what would amount to a criminal offence of some limited penalty by way of secondary legislation or something other than primary legislation, a situation that has obtained for almost 50 years since the European Communities Act 1972.

The noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, raised prior consultation. I reiterate the points I made at an earlier stage with regard to that. Both the Government of Wales and the Government of Scotland granted an LCM to the Bill in its original form, so they appeared to be relatively content with its provisions.

I am not clear about the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, to Northern Cyprus in the context of the Bill, but I understand the complications that arise with regard there to private international law, and I would be content to speak to him later if there is a further point that he would like to elucidate, and I would be happy to consider it.

The Government are content to support this group of amendments as they relate to elements of the Bill which no longer function without the delegated power previously in Clause 2. However, as I have made clear, the Government’s position on the Clause 2 delegated power has not changed.

Amendment 1 agreed.