Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Anderson of Ipswich

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

My Lords, this amendment goes to the purposes for which the Schedule 3 power can be used. It raises what I believe is an important point of principle, to which there may, however, be a pragmatic solution. Schedule 3, like Schedule 7, contains perhaps the most extensive police powers anywhere in the statute book, extending to questioning, with no right to silence, detention, the taking of fingerprints and DNA samples, and the downloading of mobile devices and the long-term retention of their content, all without the need for any objective or even subjective suspicion of wrongdoing. Those powers are already used under Schedule 7 by police of all ranks, at very short notice, in seaports and airports both large and small, and anywhere within a mile of the Northern Irish border. Their extraordinary strength makes it all the more important that the purpose for which the powers can be used is clearly defined and understood.

Schedule 7 is limited to the purpose of determining whether someone is a terrorist. Having learned from intelligence reports that it was in practice being extensively used also for the purpose of determining whether people were involved in proliferation or espionage, I suggested some years ago, as independent reviewer, that the reach of the power could usefully be extended to these other purposes. This would have put practice in accordance with the law, and it would have avoided the absurdity of having to pretend that David Miranda, stopped under Schedule 7 when carrying documents through Heathrow Airport stolen by Edward Snowden, might have been a terrorist, when more obvious explanations, falling outside the scope of Schedule 7, suggested themselves.

After the Salisbury incident, this suggestion found favour with the Government. Schedule 3 powers, it is proposed, may be used for counterproliferation and counterespionage, and to determine whether persons crossing the border are involved in other forms of hostile activity, such as assassination, whether or not with biological weapons. For myself, I entirely support that objective. Where I part company with the Bill is in the suggestion that these very extensive powers, memorably described by my noble friend Lord Carlile in his regular talks to the police as a Ming vase—precious and to be treated with very great care—should be used in order to determine whether a traveller has been engaged in activity which is perfectly lawful.

That is the consequence of paragraphs 1(6)(a) and 1(6)(b) of Schedule 3. National security, as is well known, is nowhere defined in legislation, or even in the draft code of practice. The concept of threats to the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is more nebulous still and as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, it is not even linked in Schedule 3, as it is in other contexts, to the concept of national security, let alone to a concept as specific as the critical national infra- structure, to which the Minister referred earlier. Acts falling into these categories need not be crimes. Indeed, they need not even be carried out for or on behalf of a foreign state; it is enough that they are judged by the officer on duty to be in the interests of such a state.

It is quite true that MI5 is tasked by Section 1 of the Security Service Act 1989 with the functions of protecting national security and safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom from foreign threats. No one would quarrel with that. My unease stems from the proposal that the police be given new and very strong coercive powers, powers that intrude into civil liberties and that are not allowed to our intelligence agencies, for the purpose of determining whether persons may have acted in ways that are not contrary to the law.

I am concerned by that. The police are entrusted with executive powers for the purpose of detecting crime and enforcing the criminal law. We have a wide range of offences relating to CBRN materials, espionage, sabotage and other types of hostile state activity. If that range is insufficient, or if the sentences are too short, as the Minister indicated she thought might have been the case with some of the lesser offences under the Official Secrets Act 1989, it is open to the Government to seek change. They could change the law on official secrets or change their own definition of serious crime for the purposes of the Bill, as they apparently had no difficulty in doing in the Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations. I see the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, nodding ruefully: those regulations were considered only very recently by the House. I think that in that case the definition was reduced to 12 months, so if the issue is the sentences of only two years for lesser offences under the Official Secrets Act 1989, that is worth thinking about.

The Bill as it stands would allow these strong coercive powers to be used by any police officer for the purpose of defining whether people have acted in undefined ways that the Government may not like but have not chosen to make unlawful. I am not sure that I can think of any precedent for this, and I would be grateful if the Minister would tell me if she knows of any. In their human rights memorandum, the Government rely heavily, in relation to Schedule 3, on the majority decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Beghal on Schedule 7, but in Schedule 7 the scope of non-consensual police powers is strictly defined and limited to the detection of serious criminal activity. That is certainly not the case here.

My noble friend Lady Manningham-Buller, who I know cannot be in her place at the moment, thought that the current version of the schedule could perhaps be swallowed as a temporary patch—perhaps pending the amendment of the Official Secrets Act or a change to the definition of serious crime. I am not very reassured by that. Temporary patches sometimes have a way of turning into slippery slopes. I shall listen carefully to the Minister, but I wanted to signal by this amendment that I am troubled.

[Lord Judge]

I support this amendment, as I have supported every one of my noble friend Lord Anderson’s amendments to the Bill. Every time he has spoken during our debates and said things that are agreeable to the Government, he is wise and elegant—I cannot think of all the many complimentary adjectives that have rightly been paid to him. When he raises a point with which the Government do not agree, can they please reflect that he is wise, elegant and so on and so forth, so that his submissions to the Government are taken with the seriousness they merit? I entirely support the noble Lord’s expressions of anxiety about the breadth of this provision. If I may say so, we could make life much easier for everybody who has to administer it, not least the examining officer, if we just reflected on a way of amending it slightly.

I added my name to the noble Lord’s amendment. I support it. But I have listened to the debate this afternoon and I see that there are problems with it, in particular the problem raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who, as has just been said, is not now in her place. But we really could turn sub- paragraphs (6) and (7) into a much simpler piece of legislation by saying that an act is a hostile act if it is an act of serious crime and then at sub-paragraph (7)(d) defining serious crime—I know it is defined differently in different parts of terrorism legislation, but this is a new power, in effect producing a new scheme and a new way of administering it—if on conviction the offender would be liable to a term of imprisonment of two years. That, I think, would cover all the various matters raised earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and it might make life much easier for everybody.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Anderson of Ipswich

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

My Lords, I am sure that all noble Lords will agree that it is unjust to expose a person to prosecution for supporting a proscribed organisation when that organisation does not meet the statutory condition for proscription. That condition is being “concerned in terrorism”, a phrase defined in the Terrorism Act 2000 and elucidated by the Court of Appeal in the PMOI case—the only case on deproscription to have reached a final judgment. The Bill does not seek to amend that condition. Yet precisely such an injustice exists today and will be worsened by the Bill, and in particular by Clauses 1 and 2, which extend the substantive reach of the proscription offences, and by Clause 6, which extends their geographical reach.

No sensible person would deny that the likes of al-Qaeda, Daesh or indeed National Action, three of whose adherents were convicted this morning, are concerned in terrorism. However, our ever-lengthening list of terrorist groups features quite a few that, to put it bluntly, simply should not be there. In June 2013, as independent reviewer, I reported publicly that a preliminary analysis by the Home Office itself had identified 14 groups, some of them already removed from equivalent lists in other countries, that no longer met—or appeared no longer to meet—the statutory test.

Some of them had not done so before the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force. To the 14 should no doubt be added some Northern Irish groups. I cited the example of the women’s group, Cumann na mBan—any involvement in violence far in the past and its centenary celebrations recently attended by the Irish President—in debate on Amendment 32.

Confronted with this evidence and recognising that there was no track record of deproscription by the Home Office, even in those rare cases when someone was brave enough to ask for it, the then Home Secretary, the current Prime Minister, came up with a principled solution: a programme of deproscription to be completed during the first part of 2014 and to be informed by the internal reviews that were, at the time, still conducted every year, and which a High Court judge had described as,

“certainly a practice that the Secretary of State should continue to adopt”.

But principles were not enough. The solution failed, despite the best efforts of the Home Office, because proscription of international organisations, particularly separatist organisations, is seen in some quarters as a cost-free way to please foreign Governments—although I suggest that it could not be described as cost free for members of the relevant communities in the UK, who are liable to find themselves under enhanced suspicion when an organisation claiming to represent their community is deemed to be a terrorist group. I reported also on that.

Furthermore, in Northern Ireland, where, as far as I know, there has never been a system of annual review, the non-statutory solution was never even attempted. Embarrassed by its failure, the Home Office discontinued even its former practice of annual review, because it was apparent that reviews determining that the statutory condition was not met were simply never acted on.

This sorry state of affairs persists today. I described it in my final report of December 2016—I am sorry if the phrase is strong, but it is the strongest phrase I ever used in six years as independent reviewer—as an,

“affront to the rule of law”.

Fortunately, there is a solution—and by no means a radical one. The amendment would reinstate the internal reviews that the Home Office always used to operate and extend them to Northern Ireland. By placing the Home Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary under a statutory duty to publish and act on the conclusions of their reviews, it would allow them to resist those who, for reasons of foreign policy or because the topic is simply too difficult, would frustrate the clear application of the law.

The amendment will do nothing to endanger us. On the contrary, it will preserve us from the unfortunate tendency, born of misplaced expedience, to use anti-terrorism powers in circumstances where Parliament itself has decided that they should not apply. I beg to move.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, it is very simple really, is it not? We spent time in Committee rightly debating the problems of trying to criminalise expressions of opinion or belief and identifying that a proscribed organisation should be one that none of us should support or encourage. Fine. The essence of the problem, however, is this. We should be allowed to express opinions and beliefs about organisations which are not proscribed. That is elementary, and this House will not need a disquisition from me about the importance of being able to do so. The problem is this. We are not in a position to express opinions about organisations which are currently proscribed which should no longer be proscribed or whose proscription should have been removed years ago. That is an affront to the rule of law, and I therefore support the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Anderson of Ipswich

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 24 and 25 would recognise the highly exceptional nature of the designated area offence by ensuring that there is an additional limitation on the designation of areas as out of bounds. Their effect is to make the designation of areas dependent on a proscribed organisation being engaged in armed conflict in that area. I understand that in both Australia and Denmark, where similar conditions are in force, the designations actually made have been extremely limited in their scope, confined in Australia to Mosul district and Al-Raqqa province and in Denmark on a similar basis. The Australian independent monitor, to whose report on their law I referred earlier, expressed no objection to the condition that a listed terrorist organisation is engaging in hostile activity in that area of a foreign country, which is how it is phrased there. He translated the Danish law as referring to “armed conflict”.

On Report, the Security Minister referred to the possible use of the Clause 4 power in Syria, parts of Africa and parts of the Philippines. He acknowledged, quite rightly, the importance of full parliamentary scrutiny of any designation. However, Parliament may not be privy to the full security picture and if this highly restrictive offence is to be justified at all, it must surely be to protect British citizens and residents from the physical or psychological consequences of being in war zones where terrorist organisations are operating. I hope that the Minister will consider making this clear on the face of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Judge]

I agree and have nothing to add.