Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I agree—particularly with the last observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, says, these amendments return us to the debate we had on Monday about the proper construction of the offences in the Bill. We had a good discussion on Monday, and I will not cover the ground in the same detail as I did then.

Amendment 40A would alter the defence provided in relation to the sale of bladed articles. Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that it is an offence to sell, with some exceptions, articles with a blade or point to persons under the age of 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence. Clause 14 modifies the operation of the defence in relation to remote sales to include a number of conditions that must be met as a minimum. Amendment 40A removes the post-charge element of the defence and instead requires the enforcing agency to make a judgment whether the seller took all reasonable precautions before a charge is made.

I understand the noble Lord’s intention, but the defence provided in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 has been in place for quite some time. I am not aware of any problems or concerns with how the police, prosecutors and the courts apply the legislation. It has been in place for over 30 years, so it cannot be said that we are introducing a new construct into the criminal law.

Amendments 42A and 43F provide that failure to take all reasonable precaution in relation to the offence of delivering a bladed product to a residential address would be criteria to be taken into account before a person is charged. This is in contrast to the defence provided under Clause 18, which can be invoked when a person is charged with the offence.

Amendments 57B and 57C apply the same principles to Clause 20, which is concerned with the delivery of bladed articles sold by sellers based outside the UK. Clause 20 applies to delivery companies that have entered into an arrangement with a seller based abroad and provides that it is a criminal offence for a delivery company to deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person under 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Clause 20 to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence.

In practice, the enforcing agency—the police, the CPS or local authorities—will always consider whether the seller or the person who delivers the article has taken reasonable steps and exercised due diligence before bringing a charge. It would not be in the public interest to bring a prosecution if the enforcing agency considers that it is very likely the court will find that the seller had taken all reasonable precautions to avoid committing the offence. As I said before, this type of defence has been in place for some considerable time in relation to the sale of articles with a blade or point, and we are not aware of any issues in its operation.

In short, the approach taken in the Bill both in relation to knives and corrosives is well precedented. The existing law has operated for 30 years without difficulties, and it would further complicate the law and lead to confusion if we now adopted a different approach in the Bill. I suspect—as in the discussion on Monday—noble Lords will want to return to this issue, but for now I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 31st October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is a very interesting history. I know that many Americans claim to be Irish but it is not every day that we get a chance to discuss a law that goes back to 1351. It has been an interesting debate.

[Lord Judge]

Perhaps I may ask a serious question. If we are debating an Act that was enacted in 1351, which has absolutely no application to today, through which, among other provisions, the Chancellor doing his job in his place of work is protected but not if he is slain at a party conference, would it not be a good idea for us to get rid of it altogether?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

If the noble and learned Lord will indulge me, I will come on to the point about hostile state activity and the place for this law in due course.

I share my noble friend’s belief that those who do harm to the United Kingdom and the people who live here should face justice. I am not entirely convinced that introducing a new offence of treason, as proposed by Amendment 34, is necessary. However, as my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, have said, this country has a comprehensive range of terrorism offences and other powers that this Bill will update for the digital age—it is ironic that we are talking about the digital age and 1351 in the same debate—to reflect modern patterns of radicalisation and terrorist offending.

The updated legislation will provide the police and intelligence services with the powers they need to protect the public from terrorism, and we do not consider it necessary also to create a new treason offence for this purpose. For example, the activities covered by subsection 2(a) and (b) of the new clause are likely already to be offences under the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006, in particular the offence of preparation for terrorism in Section 5 of the 2006 Act. This proposed new clause would therefore add little to the existing offences on the statute book. However, it is worth noting that the sentencing guidelines applicable to the Section 5 offence provide that where the conduct was with a view to engaging in combat with UK forces, this is to be treated as an aggravating factor when sentencing.

We are aware of the need to update legislation to keep it relevant for the contemporary and future challenges we face. I do not have to remind noble Lords of the phenomenon we have seen in recent years of people travelling overseas, most notably to Iraq and Syria, to engage in terrorist-related activity. That is why the Bill introduces a new offence of entering or remaining in a designated area: to prevent UK nationals and residents from travelling abroad to take part in or help sustain future foreign conflicts, and to protect the public from the risk of terrorism.

Furthermore, prosecuting terrorists for treason would risk giving their actions a credibility—my noble friend Lord Faulks referred to seeing them as martyrs—glamour and political status that they do not deserve. It would indicate that we recognised terrorists as being in some formal sense at war with the state, rather than merely regarding them as dangerous criminals.

As outlined by the Prime Minister on 14 March in her announcement in response to the Salisbury incident, the Home Office is currently leading a review of all legislation applicable to hostile state activity. It is considering the full scope of hostile state activity and, where relevant, treason offences may be considered as part of this work, which is currently ongoing. My noble friend will recognise the need to get the form of any new offences right. The policy exchange paper published in July was a useful contribution to the debate, but we should not rush it.

I hope that, having had the opportunity to debate this important and interesting issue, my noble friend will be content to withdraw his amendment, in the knowledge that there is ongoing work in the Home Office to examine whether there are further gaps in our law, and in order to help us counter hostile state activity.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I look to the cavalry behind me to answer that as I am not an expert in criminal law, but noble and learned Lords might wish to say whether such offences exist.

[Lord Judge]

I do not see myself as a horse and therefore I am not the cavalry, but some hate crimes are rather seriously deficient in relation to these issues.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Yes, the noble and learned Lord is quite right. Many of them would be caught, particularly in an online context, expressing an opinion quite poisonous in nature and intended to cause harm.

As a result of the gap, it has not been possible for the police to act against prolific and high-profile preachers of hate—as the noble and learned Lord has just pointed out—who have made highly inflammatory public speeches that are very clear about the speaker’s support for a terrorist organisation and that are, on any reasonable assessment, likely to cause the audience to be influenced to support the organisation. Prosecution has not been possible in these cases because the statements made cannot be proven to amount to an “invitation”—a deliberate act of encouragement—to support the group. The gap that the law needs to address concerns individuals who are reckless as to whether they will cause harm to arise.

Under Amendments 3 and 4, however, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones, this gap would not be addressed. They would remove the recklessness test and replace it with one that effectively repeats the existing position, so it would still be necessary to prove the same deliberate act of encouragement. To be clear, Amendments 3 and 4, both of which would have the same effect, would effectively nullify the utility of this clause and, as such, if they are made we might as well strike the whole clause from the Bill—and I know that some noble Lords want to do that.

Reckless activity such as I have described can have a powerful and harmful effect in initiating or moving along the process of radicalisation. We have seen time and again that engagement with radicalisers, hate preachers and organisations such as that headed by Anjem Choudary has been a prominent feature in the backgrounds of those convicted of planning or carrying out terrorist attacks.

In giving evidence to the Bill Committee in the House of Commons, Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu provided two powerful examples—Mohammed Shamsudin and Omar Brooks—to illustrate the type of case where this gap arises. I urge noble Lords to consider carefully that evidence. Both examples are senior figures within al-Muhajiroun, both have an extensive history of involvement in radicalisation and the spreading of extremist propaganda, and one has previous terrorism convictions. Both individuals gave public speeches that were clear about the speakers’ own support for Daesh, its ideology and its actions—including, for example, throwing gay people off buildings—and both voiced their approval of past terrorist attacks, including the murder of Lee Rigby and the 2015 Sousse attack in which 30 Britons and eight others were killed.

I do not need to explain to noble Lords how such speeches can cause great harm, spreading hatred and poison and radicalising vulnerable individuals, potentially to the point of carrying out attacks. But Assistant Commissioner Basu reported that, despite this, it was not possible to prosecute either individual in relation to the public speeches he had described. This is because, on the specific facts, neither could be proved to have invited their listeners to support the proscribed organisation they were speaking so vehemently in support of. This surely is not the right answer.

It cannot be right that we do not give the police and the courts the power to take action in the face of such poisonous rhetoric and such unmasked and virulent support for terrorism, in circumstances where there is, on any objective assessment, a real risk that individuals to whom it is directed will be influenced by it. Clause 1 does just that and would close this gap. Specifically, it amends Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 so that it will be an offence for an individual to express support for a proscribed terrorist organisation when that individual is reckless as to whether another person will be encouraged to support the organisation. The crux of the amended offence will be the introduction of the recklessness test, which Amendments 3 and 4 would remove.

Children: Covert Human Intelligence Sources

Debate between Lord Judge and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 13th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I am sure my noble friend will know, where there are safeguarding issues around children, information is shared, and certainly if the child moves from one local authority area to another. As the IPC has pointed out, the duty of care in the case of these children is absolutely paramount.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

Would the Minister reflect that one possible way of alleviating understandable concerns about the use of young people in the way that is currently under discussion would be to extend the oversight and authorisation responsibilities of the judicial commissioners of the IPC?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for our conversation on this matter. Of course, that would require a change in the legislation, but we consider that this enhanced authorisation, which has been in place for 18 years and approved under the leadership of successive Governments, is robust. It is subject to enhanced safeguards and strong and effective oversight. It should command confidence.

Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Judge and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I understand it, while we do not distinguish between different age groups, we know from discussions with public authorities that the number of juvenile CHISs is low as young people would not normally be deployed in this role, unless there is absolutely no other way to achieve the same result. That is how we know that the numbers are low.

Consideration will always be given to whether the same result could be achieved by other means, and only if it cannot is it necessary to authorise a CHIS. The police and other public authorities must conduct a risk assessment before a juvenile is deployed as a CHIS. That assessment must take into account the risks to their physical and psychological health, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. The codes of practice make it clear that the welfare responsibilities continue after the deployment ends.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about amending the combined warrant provisions. We are making this amendment because one effect of the IP Act is that certain combined warrants that include an authorisation for intrusive surveillance that has been signed by a senior official rather than the Secretary of State would last for only two days. The shorter duration is appropriate under pre-existing legislation, RIPA, where the signature and issue of such an authorisation personally by the Secretary of State is a key safeguard. When that does not happen, the warrant has a shorter duration unless renewed by the Secretary of State personally. However, in the context of such an authorisation being included as part of a combined warrant under the IP Act, which is subject to the additional safeguard of judicial commissioner approval, it is not necessary or appropriate to limit the duration of the warrant to two days.

On consultation with organisations involved in safeguarding, there is no requirement to consult publicly on changes to the 2000 order. We did consult broadly with the operational community and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s office, which was involved in these discussions. All those who use juvenile CHISs have a duty of care to the CHIS and duties to safeguard children and young people. This was taken into account as part of the consultation with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. We consulted on the changes to the code of practice in late 2017 and, while that version of the code did not reflect the changes we have since made in respect of juvenile CHISs, no respondents to the consultation commented or raised any concerns about the use of juvenile CHISs more generally.

I think that I might finally be able to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about who can be a responsible adult for a juvenile under the age of 18. The existing 2000 order puts in place a requirement that all discussion with a juvenile CHIS under the age of 16 must take place in the presence of an appropriate adult, who must be a parent or guardian of, or person with responsibility for, the young person, or any other adult. The order strengthens the safeguard by amending the definition of “appropriate adult” to prevent a person with no links to the young or any appropriate qualification from acting as an appropriate adult. In future, an appropriate adult would have to be a parent, guardian or person, such a youth social worker, who is otherwise qualified to represent the young person’s interests. The appropriate adult is an important safeguard to ensure that the young person is comfortable with what they are agreeing to. I have talked about the distinction between 16 year-olds and 18 year-olds and those aged under 16. Although there is no statutory requirement for those aged over 16 to be accompanied to meetings, the decision on whether to inform a parent or guardian of a source aged over 16 is taken on a case-by-case basis.

All noble Lords have referred to human rights. All public authorities must act in compliance with the ECHR as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998. The human rights obligation has been in force since 2000. As a result, the human rights of the CHIS must be complied with.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, asked about the double lock of a judicial commissioner’s approval. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 followed three reviews into powers relating to obtaining communications. The Act, and therefore the safeguard of judicial commissioner approval, relates to those powers and does not extend to the powers being debated today.

[Lord Judge]

I thought that these draft regulations were meant to make things better. If it was thought to be a good idea, surely it would not be beyond the bounds of regulation-writing to write the regulation accordingly. I am on my feet, which I know I should not be. It will not be beyond the bounds of difficulty or take very long for a record to be made of every CHIS aged under 18—although not to find out how many CHISs have been aged under 18 in the past, because no records have been kept. Then we will know the facts. Next year, we should know and be able to come back and say, “Good heavens, there are far too many”, or, “Okay, there were only two, and they have been looked into”. I should have limited myself to my first point.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I take the noble and learned Lord’s point.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about undercover police work. The CHIS code confirms that police officers deployed as undercover officers in England and Wales must comply with and uphold the principles and standards of professional behaviour as set out in the College of Policing code of ethics introduced in 2014. The code specifies that officers must,

“not engage in sexual conduct or other inappropriate behaviour when on duty”,

and,

“not establish or pursue an improper sexual or emotional relationship with a person with whom you come into contact in the course of your work who may be vulnerable to an abuse of trust or power”.

Of course, this instruction applies as much to undercover officers as to any law enforcement officer.

The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, asked about the best interests of the child. The code of practice requires that any public authority deploying a CHIS takes into account the safety and welfare of that CHIS and that a risk assessment is completed by the authorising officer before any tasking takes place. The order retains the requirement of the 2000 order that these risk assessments for juvenile CHISs are enhanced risk assessments. Furthermore, the code requires that the ongoing welfare and the security of the CHIS after cancellation of the authorisation be considered and reviewed throughout the duration of the deployment and beyond. These authorisations must be reviewed at least monthly and records maintained for at least five years.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether we are changing this because of law enforcement agencies. This is not about seeking to legitimise practice that was non-compliant with previous codes of practice; it is about reflecting the fact that new investigative techniques are being used by the police. He asked about the code changes. The overall impact of the changes to the codes will be to strengthen the safeguards provided in the codes and improve the guidance for practitioners. The changes reflect current practice and aim to improve operational practice, including expanded guidance to assist investigators in their use of these powers in an online context. It is important that investigators are able to make full use of the internet to assist their work, and equally important to take into account the privacy of people using the internet.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked a very pertinent question about why parents might not be involved. It is true to say that in some circumstances it may not be appropriate that parents of a young person deployed as a CHIS are informed: for instance, where they support the ideology or, indeed, the criminal intent of those against whom the juvenile might be employed. He asked whether it is just for serious offences. There is no specific limitation on seriousness, but the strict tests of necessity and proportionality apply—the point about shoplifting should be seen in that context. He asked about the differentiation between “should” and “must”. The 2000 order requires that an appropriate adult “must” be present, and we have not changed that requirement.

I apologise once again for the less than satisfactory quality of the Explanatory Memorandum and for my inability to answer certain questions, but at this point I beg to move.

Criminal Finances Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 3rd April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I had intended to speak at a little length but the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has said everything that I wished to say about the dangers of creating criminal offences by secondary legislation.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to be able to return today to our debate in Committee, beginning with the very important issue of corporate criminal liability. Through this Bill the Government are building on the efforts of the last Labour Government, when they created the Bribery Act, by creating new corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. These are significant proposals and I look forward to debating them further shortly. The amendments in this group relate to corporate criminal liability for other types of economic crime—that is, other than bribery and the facilitation of tax evasion. This issue has, of course, arisen a number of times in both Houses during the passage of the Bill, and these amendments have allowed us to have an insightful and constructive debate.

As noble Lords have said, the damage caused by economic crime perpetrated on behalf of or in the name of companies—to individuals, businesses, the wider economy and the reputation of the United Kingdom as a place to do business—is a very serious matter. As this House will be aware, the Bribery Act is widely respected as both a sound enforcement tool and a measure that incentivises bribery prevention as part of good corporate governance. As I have said, this Bill makes similar provision in regard to the facilitation of tax evasion. That provision has followed a process of full and lengthy public consultation, as did the implementation of the Bribery Act. As my noble friend Lord Leigh alluded to, these are very complex legal and policy issues with the potential for significant impact on companies operating in the UK.

I hope noble Lords will agree that this level of detailed consideration of both the existing legal framework and any proposals to extend it was crucial. That is why the Government announced, at the time of last year’s London Anti-Corruption Summit, that we would consult on the creation of new forms of criminal liability. The Government’s public call for evidence on corporate criminal liability for economic crime was published on 13 January. It openly requested evidence for and against the case for reform, and sought views on a number of possible options, such as the Bribery Act’s “failure to prevent” model, as an alternative to the current common law rules. The consultation closed only last week, on Friday 31 March. The Ministry of Justice is now assessing the responses received, but, as noble Lords will appreciate, it is too early to confirm the outcome. Should the responses received justify changes to the law, the Government would then consult on a firm proposal, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, articulated. I hope that reassures him that we are continuing to explore this issue as his amendment proposes. I trust noble Lords will agree that it would be wrong to rush into legislation, or to commit to doing so in the future, prior to giving the matter the appropriate consideration, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson said.

Amendment 161 provides for the novel approach that we could add additional offences to the legislation by regulations. I commend the noble Baroness on her ingenuity—I was promised she would show it—but, as I have said, these are complex issues with potentially significant implications for companies across the country. The Government do not, therefore, believe that it would be appropriate to extend the failure to prevent offences via secondary legislation, which would not allow for the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny of proposals such as this.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked about the timing of the failure to prevent measures and why the Government do not act now. She said we cannot afford to delay and made a point about the upcoming Brexit legislation. I remind noble Lords that the Bribery Act offence has been on the statute book for a number of years, allowing us to assess its effectiveness. We are now legislating on tax evasion and already looking closely and openly at the question of extending it to wider economic crimes. The Government are not delaying, we are acting—and we are doing so in a sensible and considered way.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, asked about the standard of proof for the failure to prevent economic crime. Her Amendment 163 allows for the defence of reasonable procedures to be satisfied by the civil standard—that is, the balance of probabilities. I can confirm, as she wanted, that it mirrors the approach in the Government’s proposed offence of corporate failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether HMG will legislate to create corporate liability for failure to prevent serious harm or human rights abuse. I wrote to the noble Lord about this—it is obviously seared in his brain or, probably, was passed straight to his outbox. All businesses are expected to comply with the legislation that comes under the jurisdiction of the UK, including that which relates to human rights. While the Government have no ability to regulate UK businesses operating in overseas jurisdictions, we encourage them to honour the principles of internationally recognised human rights wherever they operate. More broadly, in 2013, we were the first country in the world to produce a national action plan in response to the United Nations guiding principles on business and human rights.

Large UK-domiciled businesses must also comply with laws that require them to report certain human rights issues, including the Companies Act and our world-leading Modern Slavery Act, which requires them to produce annual statements on what they have done to ensure that such issues do not occur in their business and supply chains.

I hope I have fully answered noble Lords’ questions and that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will feel free to withdraw the amendment.