Localism Bill

Lord Jenkin of Roding Excerpts

Monday 20th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I look forward to addressing the questions that the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington of Ribbleton, has just raised when we come to the neighbourhood section of the Bill. It is important that for such people, and indeed for Gypsies and others who have traditionally been made unwelcome, we have a system whereby localism does not become exclusion.

I welcome the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves. My noble friend Lady Hanham may remember that in 2006 my brother, Tim Palmer, published a pamphlet with Policy Exchange called No More Tears. If she has read that, she will realise that I am a considerable radical when it comes to localism—I share his views—and I regard the Bill as a small step on the way. In her reply to the amendment, I hope that at this stage of the Bill we shall have a good exposition of where the Government stand on localism at the moment, which will give us a good context for the rest of these debates.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, there was much in my noble friend’s speech in moving the amendment with which one could not but agree. I particularly liked his point that there may be too many provisions in the Bill where it appears that the Government are trying to tell local authorities how to exercise their newly granted general power of competence. I look forward to identifying particular points in the Bill and saying, “Look, this is not necessary”.

Where I have had difficulty with my noble friend’s new clause is that it is not going to achieve anything in the direction that some of us would like to see. You have to look at the individual provisions of the Bill if you actually want to reduce the degree of central control or direction of a locally exercisable power. If my noble friend is seeking to oblige the House to look at the Bill with that in mind then his speech will have made a useful contribution, but I am not sure that the provision that he seeks to put in would add anything. The way that one deals with legislation is that one looks at the provisions in the Bill itself and that is what we will spend a large part of the next four weeks doing.

On the interpretation of the Bill, I remind the House that the courts decided long ago, in the case of Pepper v Hart, that if the provisions of a Bill are unclear, the courts are entitled to see what Ministers said in introducing and debating it. I had to downsize my own household when we moved back to London, and I offered around my bound Hansards, which covered well over 40 years, to see whether anyone wanted them. They are all now in the Supreme Court on the other side of Parliament Square. I have not been to look at them but I am told that that is where they are. They did not cost me or the court anything. That is in order that the Supreme Court judges can have in front of them the Hansard reports of what was said by Ministers to be the purpose of the Bill.

Looking at what Ministers can say about this Bill and what is actually in it, one wonders what the purpose of the proposed new clause is. My noble friend made an interesting exposition of a number of points, but it would not be appropriate to add a new clause of this sort when we have eight days of debate in which we will be dealing with the details. I have to say that if my noble friend sought to press his new clause to a Division, I would have some difficulty in supporting him. I hope that he will forgive me.

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[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and I have known each other for a great many years, but perhaps I may establish at the outset of this Committee stage that there is no “s” on the end of my name. I hope that he will forgive my interruption.

[Lord Beecham]

I sincerely apologise to the noble Lord. I sometimes felt closer to him than to the former noble Lord who does have an “s” at the end of his name. He and other noble Lords referred to the implications of incorporating this amendment into legislation. There are difficulties in that respect. To refer for one moment to my previous argument about the integration of government, that will not be made any easier by the abolition of government offices, which were a very useful mechanism for two-way information flow between central and local government.

I return to the form of the amendment in a constructive spirit and ever willing to help cement relations on the government Benches between the two partners to this coalition. Bearing in mind, of course, that one of the great localists was Joseph Chamberlain—who started life as a municipal socialist and Liberal and became a Liberal Unionist and very much part of a significant coalition which did great damage to the Liberal Party—it is surely possible to bring the two views together. Without necessarily incorporating the terms of this amendment into the Bill, it would be possible to follow the alternative method implied by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins—Lord Jenkin—which was for the Minister to make a statement.

If the Minister were to make a statement saying that these are acceptable propositions about localism and, taken together, broadly constitute a reasonable definition of localism, surely that would suffice to meet the test of legality referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Jenkin and Lord Elystan-Morgan. It would reinforce the import of these propositions as criteria against which, if necessary, the legislation and Acts under it might be interpreted—if necessary, in the last resort—by the courts.

I hope and anticipate that the noble Lord will not press his amendment to the vote, but it would be helpful if the Minister at least indicated support for the principles about which there has been very little difference in today’s debate.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her reply in general but, more particularly, for the last part of it. I think there was widespread support for the denouement to the protracted debate over many months about these two—if the noble Baroness will forgive me for saying it—rather absurd propositions, of which, I think in all fairness, Ministers were not necessarily the authors. There has been a remarkable story around whether the proposal for shadow mayors was on or off, with various statements being made by Ministers and then countermanded, but the final outcome will be warmly received. It augurs well, I trust, for the way in which debate on this Bill will be taken forward. We look forward to even more changes in the direction of good sense and local democracy.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

Without wishing to prolong the debate, I should like to endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has said and to thank my noble friend for the swift acceptance of two of the substantial amendments to which I have put my name on the Marshalled List.

When I had the opportunity to discuss matters very briefly with the Minister’s right honourable friend the Secretary of State, he said that he thought that we were going to be able to reach accommodation on some of the points that had been made at Second Reading. My noble friend has done exactly that, and I express my gratitude.

[Lord Greaves]

My Lords, the Minister’s last two announcements are extremely welcome and I am quite prepared to trade my amendment for them. It is good news all round. As the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, has just said, it bodes well for future debate.

It is only in the House of Lords that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, or anyone else, would raise in evidence events that took place more than 100 years ago. While the short-term effects of Joe Chamberlain’s and the other Liberal Unionists’ defection was extremely damaging to the Liberal Party, the slightly longer-term result of it was that the Liberals gained their greatest ever victory in the 1906 election, in which Joe Chamberlain and his allies in the Conservative Party were roundly trounced. If we are looking for historical precedents, there is one.

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Debate on whether Clause 4 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

I did not give notice of my intention to ask a question about Clause 4, but I have listened to the discussion on the previous group of amendments with some interest. Clause 4(1) gives me a certain amount of anxiety. The provision describes,

“power on a local authority to do things for a commercial purpose only if they are things which the authority may, in exercise of the general power, do otherwise than for a commercial purpose”.

Does that really just mean that if it is illegal to do it otherwise, they may not do it for a commercial purpose, or is there some inwardness here which perhaps I have not appreciated? It sounds almost tautologous. If a local authority cannot do something, presumably it cannot do it whether for a commercial purpose or otherwise, in which case why put it in the Bill? If there are differences or some distinction is being drawn here, I would be most grateful if my noble friend could explain it to me.

[Baroness Scott of Needham Market]

My Lords, I want to join this brief exchange because I am developing an increasing sense of Alice in Wonderland. It feels as though we are operating in two worlds: the old world in which local authorities were only allowed to do things that were in statute, and the new world in which they are free to do anything unless they are barred. It is beginning to feel, in the context of this debate and future debates, that there is a real problem about being caught in the middle where local authorities will be stopped from doing a lot of the things that previous legislation allowed them to do. I am sorry, but I find it difficult to express the point, but I am sure that noble Lords are beginning to get a sense of what I mean. The question of how significant the general power really is, if local authorities are continually hampered by previous legislation, will become very important. It is an issue to which we will keep coming back.

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[Lord Greaves]

I apologise. I shall explain it all again, because there is a mess-up in the groupings and it is best to discuss the questions under the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, rather than under mine that come later. I keep referring to mine because my notes obviously refer to them.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

If my noble friend objected to the grouping and thought that the amendments should have been put together differently, he had plenty of opportunity over the weekend to put that to the Government Whips. As it is, surely to goodness he must debate those amendments in the group in which they are listed on the amendment paper—otherwise it becomes extremely confusing.

[Lord Greaves]

I agree entirely, except that I did make changes to the grouping. As a result of this, we are where we are. I attempted to make sense of it, but in the end it did not come out that way. Let me be absolutely clear: I am talking to the two amendments in the group that starts with Amendment 12 as moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I apologise for the confusion in the numbers, which is entirely in my head and in my notes. I shall attempt to be much clearer.

I am talking now about Amendment 22, which is in the group that we are debating. The amendment, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and which I entirely support, reflects the analogous condition in Section 3(2)(a) of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. This additional safeguard is needed and is not covered by the other conditions—for example, the requirement for proportionality. The reason is that Clause 6(2)(a) refers to the proportionality of the “effect of the provision”, while Amendment 22 relates to the means of achieving that objective. The Secretary of State would have to be satisfied that the particular amendment or repeal proposed is the only way of satisfactorily securing the objective; it would require him to consider whether there were other possibilities—for example, by issuing guidance to local authorities or by amending or repealing a less significant provision. This is an extremely complicated matter. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to give us an answer that can satisfy us all, but again perhaps further discussion, either by letter or in person, can take place.

Amendment 23, which relates to the Human Rights Act and similar Acts, would add a further condition to Clause 6(2). Section 8 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 makes a specific exception for the Human Rights Act. The Minister in the House of Commons stated that Clause 6(2)(e) would preclude the making of an order repealing the Human Rights Act or any part of it, but that paragraph relates to the provision—in other words, what the order proposes to do. This is different from whether the statutory provision itself, which is the subject of the order, is of “constitutional significance”. The point is that the 2006 Act recognises that distinction. The Bill as it stands does not recognise it and the question is why not. Why the change? The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would restore the distinction, which would be a very sensible thing to do.

[Lord Best]

I have not spoken in the Committee stage, so I declare my interest as president of the Local Government Association. In that capacity, let me say that the earlier remarks from the Minister on shadow mayors and mayors acting as chief executives will be extremely well received at the LGA this evening.

I wanted to say one or two things in support of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Newton. The underlying intention is honourable—that if the general power of competence is inhibited by any other legislation, the Secretary of State has what could be rather draconian powers to overrule other legislation. But that clearly needs to be hedged around with some safeguards. A number of us have received representations from an alliance of disability groups, which are particularly concerned that some of the legislation that relates to their rights and entitlements might be diminished. That came to us from Age UK, Scope, which is involved with people with cerebral palsy, the National Autistic Society, the RNIB and Mencap. All these organisations are deeply concerned that some of the protective legislation that surrounds the world of disability might be done away with for the possibly good reason that it got in the way of the power of general competence —but that would seem a lesser priority. So we need reassurances here, and I support this bunch of amendments.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

My Lords, I wish to add something to what my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree and the noble Lord, Lord Best, have said. The anxiety is not so much that any Government would be so stupid as to try to repeal essential provisions on welfare of the sort that have aroused some alarm but that this Government might be succeeded by another who are not so keen on the whole process of localism, devolution and subsidiarity and might therefore use the powers in a way that would restrict the general power, which might go contrary to the purposes of this legislation. I declare once again that I am joint president of the London Boroughs Association, which is certainly concerned about this possibility. The chances of any Government wanting to make material inroads into the welfare legislation to which reference has been made, and much of which is in the list in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, are a little unreal. No doubt, however, reassurance will be necessary, and I hope that my noble friend on the Front Bench will be able to reassure those who have expressed anxieties that that is not the intention.

As I understand it, the purpose of this clause—the whole of the purpose of the power that is given—is simply to enable a local authority to exercise its general power of competence. If there are obstacles in previous legislation that prevent that, or if there is overlap, then to that extent the order may then remove the obstacle. It cannot just sweep away whole legislation; as I understand it, the provision in question has to be specifically related to the general power. I have had a lot of representations as well, and it is right that these fears should be aired on the Floor of the House so that reassurances can be given. However, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made the point that there is a distinction between the clauses as to whether the resolution is affirmative or negative.

I have two things to say. The first is that if the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments makes a recommendation—I, too, read the wording that the committee recommends strongly that it should all be affirmative—it would be very unusual indeed for a Minister not to accept it. I have been through a number of Bills, most recently the Energy Bill, where that has been accepted. The whole range of recommendations was accepted, and government amendments were put down to achieve that. The second point is that if you have sufficient parliamentary supervision, that should be a sufficient assurance of protection. The power is necessary if you are going to make a reality of the general power of competence but it has to be defined, as I think it is intended to be, and it has to be subject to affirmative resolutions as recommended by the Joint Committee.

[Lord Dixon-Smith]

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene but I am tempted because I need to ask the Minister one question: could this subsection not be used by some other Secretary of State at some point in future to amend this legislation because it has a power in it to which he or she objects?

[Baroness Hanham]

My Lords, in reply to that last question, the powers to amend legislation are relative to the use of the general power. Under Clause 1 the Secretary of State will be empowered to sweep away any legislation that is standing in the way of the power of competence—that is what that clause is about. The answer to my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith is that I do not think that that would be possible. The provision does not get rid of any legislation at all; it is only any legislation that stands in the way of the general power of competence.

I hear the concerns that have been raised regarding this clause and I hope that I will be able to reassure noble Lords on some of it. I say at the outset that the power is normally subject to the affirmative procedure, as set out in Clause 209. There are limited exceptions to that, but we are taking on board and considering the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee as we have on other matters. We will come on to that in due course, but noble Lords may feel reassured that the general view that the Delegated Powers Committee is not overridden will probably be maintained.

Unlike Clause 1, where the Secretary of State can take away legislation, Clause 5(3) and (4) provide reserve powers to allow the Secretary of State to restrict what a local authority may do under the general power or to set conditions around it. We believe that these powers are a necessary safeguard, given the breadth of the new power, to ensure, for example, that risks to both local government finances and the Exchequer are properly managed.

The powers will be of the most limited use. The Government have no plans to use the powers in subsections (3) and (4) and expect them to be used extremely rarely, if at all. However, they might be used to deal with, for instance, any risks that might arise from authorities’ use of the new general power to engage in novel financial transactions. They are therefore a tug back if local authorities seem to be going well beyond their brief under the general powers.

On Amendment 14, the general power of competence is designed to give local authorities real freedom to innovate and act in the interests of their communities, although not to be too innovative in financial terms, as I have just said. However, there is continuing misunderstanding about the scope of Clause 5(1). This provides the Secretary of State with powers to remove or change statutory provisions that prevent or restrict use of the general power—that is, restrictions or limitations that bite on the general power by virtue of Clause 2, the clause where the Delegated Powers Committee considers that there should be an affirmative order. The whole clause is about removing barriers to the legal capacity of authorities to act, so that they may act innovatively and in the best interests of the community. It is not aimed at removing duties, nor is it a general purpose tool to remove any legislation that places burdens on local authorities.

Until now, there has been no comprehensive list of the legal duties placed on councils. To remedy this, the Government agreed with the Local Government Association that we should compile such a list—the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to this—so that everyone is clear what legal obligations local councils have and to check whether the duties are relevant.

The review is ongoing. Once it is completed, it will be decided whether any changes are necessary to the statutory duties, but neither the review nor the barrier-buster power that is in Clause 5(1) is aimed at removing statutory duties protecting vital front-line services, so there is no link between these processes.

The Clause 5(2) power can be used only to remove English authorities’ powers that are obsolete because they are overlapped by the new power. Its purpose is to tidy up the statute book and simplify the law, but there will be no practical effect on the scope of local authority powers or duties.

Amendments 15, 16, and 17 are unnecessary; they attempt to gold-plate the consultation arrangements already in this clause. The existing wording in the clause does exactly what it says it does—it will ensure that anyone who needs to be consulted will be consulted—so no further elaboration is needed. The consultation must be carried out properly and in accordance with general public law principles. This means that the Secretary of State must act reasonably in deciding whom to consult and must act in accordance with equality duties, which were also mentioned, and he can be challenged if he does not.

We believe that the more specific a list becomes, the more likely it will inadvertently exclude people who need to be included. We have seen this many times in legislation. I well remember trying to get more and more people put on to the face of a Bill, but that is not always helpful. We believe that it is better that these matters are left to be judged in the particular circumstances, as quite often the consultation list will change, depending on what is being proposed. We believe that the consultation requirements are comprehensive and we do not think that these amendments are necessary.

On Amendment 22, the power is a power to remove statutory restrictions. If the same thing can be achieved in a different way, it is hard to see how they can be statutory restrictions in the first place. I am sure that, if an order is unnecessary, that will be brought to attention of the Secretary of State during consultation.

Amendment 23 raises a concern about the Human Rights Act. We want to make it very clear that an order under Clause 5(1) cannot be used to repeal the Human Rights Act. It is unlikely that the power is wide enough, as it is a power to remove restrictions and limitations that prevent a local authority from acting as a natural person and a natural person could not get rid of the Human Rights Act. It is not a general purpose tool to remove any obligation placed on local authorities. Furthermore, the third condition requires that the provision made by the order does not remove any necessary protection, which means protection afforded by measures such as the Human Rights Act. The fourth condition requires that the provision made by the order will not prevent any person from continuing to exercise any right or freedom that he might reasonably expect to continue to exercise. Any right conferred or protected by the European Convention on Human Rights is a right that a person must reasonably expect to keep. Finally, and most significantly, the fifth condition is that the provision made by the order is not constitutionally significant. I think that we can agree that repealing the Human Rights Act would be constitutionally significant. The DPRRC has signified that it is content with the safeguards on this power. In addition, we have provided for a stringent parliamentary procedure. Therefore, we do not think that anything further is necessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Newton, and others have raised concerns about the conditions on the use of the power. It may be useful at this stage to say that Clause 6, which limits the power under Clause 5(1), was introduced in the other place as a result of the concerns expressed. We believe that a list would need constant updating. If something was inadvertently left off the list, that would not mean that it could be amended. We believe that Parliament, when considering orders made under these powers, will be able to judge whether the use of the power is appropriate.

I hope that I have covered all the amendments, although I think that one or two got muddled into the next group—certainly, Amendment 22 appears in my notes twice. I hope that I have responded to noble Lords’ questions satisfactorily and that they will not press their amendments.

[Lord Jenkin of Roding]

Before my noble friend sits down, will she confirm that she has repeated the explanation that was given in the memorandum to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments about the difference between subsections (1) and (2), which the Joint Committee expressly and firmly said that it did not accept? Is she now firmly saying that she will nevertheless insist on the difference—an affirmative resolution for an order under subsection (1) but a negative resolution for an order under subsection (2)? If so, I would find that difficult to accept.

[Baroness Hanham]

My Lords, I hope that I said in my remarks that I understood what the recommendation was and that we would look at it further. It is almost inconceivable that a recommendation from that committee would be ignored.