Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Janvrin and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

The background to Amendment 12 is the effect of automaticity in moving the focus to the Boundary Commissions, which will now make the final decisions. This means that any risk of interference or perception of a lack of partiality or other matters will move to the commission and the process of appointing it. The Constitution Committee suggested we should consider what needed to be done to ensure the independence and impartiality of the commission. I am sure that there is complete agreement that the process must be wholly independent and free from the possibility of political inference or, more importantly, any perception of political interference or influence. Decisions must be independent and be seen to be independent and we must safeguard the process from the US problems of gerrymandering.

The amendment seeks to address this issue in three ways, so that the commission is not only independent and impartial but seems to be so. The first way is the appointment of the deputy chairman. Commissions are chaired by deputy chairmen. In each of our four nations the deputy chairman has to be a High Court judge. In Scotland, the deputy chairman is appointed by the head of the judiciary, the Lord President, and in Northern Ireland by the head of judiciary there, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.

However, that is not the position in England and Wales. The appointment is not by the head of the judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice, but by the Lord Chancellor, a Government Minister. For England and Wales this anomaly predates the change to the position of the Lord Chancellor in 2005. Until then, he was the head of the judiciary in England and Wales and a judge. Now, not only is he not head of the judiciary, he is no longer a judge but a political Minister.

The Act should therefore now be changed so that the deputy chairman is no longer appointed by a Government Minister but, as in Scotland and Northern Ireland, by the head of the judiciary. Although the Lord Chancellor consults the Lord Chief Justice, that is insufficient in the light of the proposed change brought about by the Bill. That is because it is necessary to ensure that the independence of the judiciary is not undermined by any perception of partisanship in the appointment. It must be seen to be wholly independent of the political Minister which the Lord Chancellor now is. That is a small and, I hope, uncontroversial change.

The second matter relates to the independence of the appointment process of the other members. I put forward a process based on the commission used for the appointment of the senior judiciary—the Judicial Appointments Commission—and the appointment process it has adopted. I have done so as the process of the commission will be far more akin to a judicial process. It must be impartial and independent and seen to be so. It must make its decision on the evidence and the decision is then put into effect by the other branches of government, without any power to change the decision.

Therefore, I suggest, first, that the panel must be independent. I propose in my amendment that the panel should comprise the deputy chairman, as that reflects current practice, and two panel members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons. Secondly, the process should be that determined by the panel. If the panel is appointed as suggested, the selection process should be left to it. I am not in favour of automatic disqualifications, as something you decide now can come back and disqualify someone for something they did many years ago. Thirdly, the panel must put forward one name to the Minister, who can object only on a limited basis and must give reasons in writing. That is the practice followed in judicial appointments. This has proved a very effective mechanism for the appointment of judges and exists—I must emphasise—without in any way undermining public confidence in other appointment processes. It is because the appointment process to the Boundary Commission is so similar to the appointment of judges that I put this forward.

The third means that I think should address the question of impartiality and independence is the non-renewable term. It is clear that the members of the commission must be free of any pressure during their work by the prospect of being offered a further term. That is why a number of bodies with special status have fixed terms that are not renewable. Security of tenure, again, is like that given to judges. If they are not liable to reappointment there cannot be subjective pressure or undue influence. In recent years, the trend has been for constitutional watchdogs to be appointed for a single, non-renewable term. A dozen such bodies whose members cannot be reappointed include the following six, which come under the Cabinet Office: the Civil Service Commission, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, the Committee on Standards on Public Life, the House of Lords Appointments Commission, the Advisory Commission on Business Appointments, and the Local Government Ombudsman. It seems to me that if the Cabinet Office believes in the importance of non-renewal terms for these bodies, why would it not apply this logic to the Boundary Commission?

Parliament also believes in the importance of single, non-renewable terms for constitutional watchdogs. The law was changed in 2006 to make the parliamentary ombudsman appointable for seven years, non-renewable; in 2011 to make the Comptroller and Auditor-General appointable for 10 years, non-renewable; and in 2012 to make the Information Commissioner appointable for seven years, non-renewable. Noble Lords will note that I have not recommended the length of the term. That is because I think it remains to be clarified as to what is planned for the activities of the commissioners, bearing in mind, first, that they are likely to be active for only two to three years in the envisaged eight-year cycle and, secondly, the way in which this is done must make the post attractive. Those are the three bones of this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Janvrin (CB) [V]]

I will speak briefly in support of the amendment introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. As was discussed on Tuesday, the Bill introduces automaticity into the implementation of new constituency boundaries following a boundary review. This is a move which I support. This amendment is a further step to ensure that the review process is, and is seen to be, totally impartial. Its aim is to strengthen the independence of the Boundary Commissions themselves by setting out how the appointments of their members can be made independently and without the possibility of political interference. The importance of this was underlined by the Constitution Committee and the arguments in favour of this additional clause have just been well set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas.

I simply add that I hope there will be no temptation to argue that this amendment is unnecessary. If the Minister does take that line when he replies, he would be saying in effect that we can trust the present appointments system. I ask him to reflect on this in the context of the level of public trust in politics today, which was touched on in our debate on Tuesday. When winding up the Second Reading debate earlier this year, the Minister said that the Boundary Commissions

“are independent and neutral; they must and will remain so”.—[Official Report, 27/7/20; col. 96.]

This amendment will surely assist the Government in meeting this worthy pledge.