(3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these amendments address important gaps in the Bill, ensuring fairness, clarity and accountability in the enforcement of employment rights. Amendment 267A relates to Clause 89 and the delegation of the Secretary of State’s functions. Currently, the Bill allows delegation of functions, including enforcement, but does not explicitly restrict the delegation of the decision to bring proceedings to employment tribunals.
This amendment would ensure that while the Secretary of State is delegating the conduct of proceedings, the crucial decision to initiate legal action remains with the Secretary of State. Without this safeguard, delegated bodies could independently decide whether to bring legal claims, potentially leading to inconsistent decisions, lack of ministerial accountability and confusion about who holds ultimate responsibility. Maintaining ministerial control over such decisions is essential to preserve political accountability and to ensure decisions are made with proper oversight.
Amendment 271B focuses on Clause 113 and seeks to clarify the scope of claims that the Secretary of State may bring. The Bill currently refers broadly to “any enactment”, which risks allowing the Secretary of State to bring claims on a wide range of employment issues, including individual employment rights traditionally pursued by workers themselves. This amendment narrows that scope to relevant labour market legislation and Parts 1 to 4 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, ensuring that government enforcement targets systemic labour market regulation issues such as pay and working conditions, rather than individual employment rights or disputes. Without this restriction, there is a risk of governmental overreach into private employment matters, diluting resources and causing confusion about the limits of state intervention.
Amendment 271C addresses a practical and vital issue regarding claims that workers have already lawfully settled. Under current law, individuals can settle employment claims following independent legal advice, providing certainty to both employers and employees. This amendment prevents the Secretary of State bringing claims that had been settled in accordance with Section 203 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Without this amendment, there is a danger that settled claims could be reopened by the Government, undermining the finality of agreements and subjecting employers to repeated litigation, even after fulfilling their obligations. Such uncertainty would damage trust in settlement processes and could discourage both workers and employers from entering into settlements.
Amendment 272ZA concerns the financial protection of workers in tribunal proceedings brought or conducted by the Secretary of State. It ensures that where an employment tribunal orders costs against a worker, such as legal costs or wasted costs, these costs must be met by the Secretary of State rather than the individual worker. This protection is critical, because workers who had not themselves initiated proceedings should not bear the financial burden of litigation costs. Without this safeguard, workers could face significant personal financial risk, deterring them from seeking support from the Secretary of State and ultimately restricting access to justice. Employers might then attempt to recover costs from these workers, imposing unfair hardship and undermining the purpose of public enforcement. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have Amendment 272 in this group. When an Act of Parliament creates rights and duties, it usually then allows those who benefit from the rights and duties to enforce them in law, which in the case of employment matters is via the employment tribunal.
This Bill fundamentally changes that and inserts the Secretary of State whenever he or she wants to intervene to take up cases that employees do not themselves want to pursue. It also interferes in the order of things by providing a back door route to legal aid for employees, which is not covered by the normal legal aid system. This part of the Bill is simply going to increase the number of cases heading towards the employment tribunal. As has been debated on several occasions, that system is already under massive stress, and it does not make any sense to stress it any further. I therefore support all the amendments in this group.
My own Amendment 272 merely states that the Secretary of State has to meet a public interest test if he or she wants to use the Clause 91 power to take over a case that an employee does not wish to pursue themselves. As drafted, there is no constraint whatsoever on the Secretary of State’s use of the power. The Secretary of State can simply find out one morning that an employee has a potential case and is not going to do anything about it, and decide to take it over. A public interest test would at least make sure that the Secretary of State intervenes in matters where there is a genuine national interest in the case being pursued.
I suspect that the Secretary of State will be pursued and lobbied by various organisations, quite possibly trade unions, who will see this provision as another weapon in their armoury to have a go at certain large employers, particularly where those employers have not been particularly interested in playing along with whatever trade unions want to do with them. The power is an important departure from the normal way of enforcing rights and duties, so guardrails in the legislation surrounding the use of the power are essential. There is absolutely nothing in the current Bill.
My first instinct was to delete Clause 91 entirely. As far as I can tell, no case has been made for its existence. But I can just about construct a scenario in which the Secretary of State concludes that there is a genuine public interest in overriding the wishes of an employee and pursuing the case in the circumstances I have described. I would expect such a case to be very unusual, and I hope the Minister agrees. Because of that, we should be looking to restrain the power in some way. The words I have used may not be the right words, but the essence of what I am trying to achieve is to reduce into something more reasonable an unconstrained power to completely subvert the normal way in which rights and duties are specified by Parliament and open to enforcement.