Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Lord Howell of Guildford Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 26th June 2023 Lords Chamber

For these two reasons, this is a very important amendment, and I am glad to hear that the Government are now sympathetic to its purpose.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, support this amendment, so powerfully moved by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Butler. I realise that behind the amendment is the wider concern of protecting the Carltona principle from being undermined—and I shall come to that a bit more in a moment.

It may help your Lordships if I explain some of the detailed background of how we operated during this period in Northern Ireland and Belfast after the fall of Stormont in 1972. In doing so, I draw from extensive personal notes that I made of almost every occasion during the two or three years I served there, and what they emphasise and remind me of. I will share with the House a brief picture of how we worked and the plan that we had to devise in order to operate in a very violent, dangerous and fast-moving situation.

There was the Secretary of State, the late Lord Whitelaw, and three Ministers with him, of whom I was one, with about 12 or 13 departments that we had to take over between us in the Northern Ireland Government. We each had quite a lot of departments to cover. The plan was always to have one duty Minister at Stormont right through the weekend at all times. During the week, there was one Minister usually out in the field, visiting hospitals, victims, violent situations and communities, doing the work of their departments. We tried to keep one Minister at Westminster, constantly accountable and ready to meet Members of Parliament and Members of your Lordships’ House, answer PNQs and so on.

This was a very dangerous moment; the violence was very great indeed, and people were being killed all the time. At all times, the four of us—the Secretary of State and the three Ministers—kept in very close contact with each other; my notes refer to a lot of telephone calls that we had with each other and our constant movements. One moment the Secretary of State would need to be in the Cabinet and the next moment he would have to fly back to Belfast—then the next moment he would be in his own constituency. The same applied to the two others of us as well. Of course, Lord Windlesham was a Member of this House at the time.

This is a recorded picture of an extraordinary situation, which I do not believe has ever been repeated, for British Ministers or a department of government. Just to give an example, I see that I noted in my memoirs that one week I crossed the Irish Sea five times—and I am sure that my fellow Ministers were having the same experience of constant movement, all the more so as the Government at the time had quite a narrow majority and the Whips were saying, “Why aren’t you here instead of in Belfast?” You had to be in two places at once.

Throughout all of this, dependence on the Carltona principle and being able to conduct matters in accordance with that principle was absolute and unquestioned. We could not possibly have managed without that principle operating. It was for that reason—and this has possibly been missed by some commentators—that, when we put the provisions about Carltona in the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972, we strengthened it—it is a strengthened principle there, because it limits the permission to sign to Ministers rather than to officials, referring specifically to Ministers and Under-Secretaries of State. The provision is absolutely crystal clear; it is in print and a parliamentary clear wish, passed without any opposition at all and applied in good faith, because we knew that that was the law and the wish of Parliament.

I have no doubt, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has wisely reminded us, that, if the judgment is allowed to stand unreversed, it would severely constrain normal government operations. Looking backwards in the rear-view mirror, as it were, it would have made our work in Northern Ireland absolutely impossible, as we moved towards the power-sharing agreement of 1973, which is said to have been the foundation for the Good Friday agreement some 20 years later. We could not have conducted affairs in that atmosphere of violence and killing—indeed, the IRA called it a war, although we did not—without the Carltona principle being applied. Of course, the judgment opens the door to all sorts of meritless litigation and unreserved compensation, which would be completely wrong.

I am astonished, frankly, that such a legal error could have been made. If the Government are not able to meet this—as I hope that they are, from indications by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—and are not able to respond in a positive way, I shall be even more astonished that such an error could be perpetuated.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, when I asked a question about this some six months ago I was assured that something would be done to sort it—I think that was the word used—so I am very pleased to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Godson. I am pleased and waiting to hear what the Minister will say, because I am very hopeful now that this will get sorted and that we will not have to have a vote on it. It would be good if he were able to make it very clear that the legislation will definitely be amended, so that we get the result before Third Reading. I think it is useful to remind noble Lords; the noble Lord, Lord Howell, gave a very clear view of what things were like back in 1972.

In the judgment, Lord Kerr said that the law said that it had “to appear” to the Secretary of State that the person in question was suspected of organising terrorism. Ironically, the case of Gerry Adams was one where it could unquestionably have appeared to Mr Whitelaw that a custody order was appropriate; his personal consideration was just not recorded in the archives. I am sure that the Secretary of State knew, rather than suspected, that Adams was a key figure, because he had him flown over for negotiations with the IRA at Cheyne Walk in 1972, a year earlier. Lord Kerr also said that Mr Whitelaw should have been able to sign all such custody orders, as

“there was no evidence that this would place an impossible burden”

on him or be “unduly onerous”, given that Merlyn Rees, his Labour successor from March 1974, managed to.

I think this is a reflection of an unhistoric assertion lacking context, given the terrible violence outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, of 1972 and 1973, let alone the logistics involving Ministers, one of whom had to be in England and one in Belfast. Furthermore, it took no account of the differing political circumstances involving Secretary of State Merlyn Rees, who was very keen to end internment and sought to minimise the number of orders being placed in front of him. In fact, internment ended a year later.

Noble Lords should also remember that the Supreme Court President, Lord Reed of Allermuir, in effect supported a correction when he spoke to the House’s Constitution Committee in March 2021. There he said, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Howell:

“I cannot say very much about the particular case because I did not sit on it myself. Lord Kerr wrote the judgment. The Lord Chief Justice and some other justices were sitting with him. I am well aware that it is a controversial judgment ... I really cannot remember the details of the case. From what you say, it sounds like a wayward judgment, in which case it will be put right in another case”.


I believe that this amendment and what the Government are now going to do are a valuable substitute for such another case at the Supreme Court, which could otherwise take years to appear.