(4 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I very much regret the personal experience that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, suffered. However, particularly during the present crisis, the probate service is working effectively. There was a move in the last year to a digital system. That is bedding in and proving successful. Indeed, the average waiting time for a grant of probate in the period January to March this year was about four weeks.
Are not inordinate delays and confusion, applications stuck for four months without explanation, people kept on the line for 50 minutes and staff unable to find relevant documents symptoms of an organisation that was already underfunded and whose staff were undertrained before Covid? Is this service not unacceptable for the families and charities that need assets released? Will the Minister guarantee that fees will not be raised while the performance of the probate registry is so poor?
My Lords, I do not accept that the performance of the probate service should be characterised as poor. No guarantee can be given regarding fees.
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill. Under our normal procedure for Committee in the Chamber, I would have been able to come in earlier when I saw how widely the debates on previous groups were ranging. However, with the rigidity of Virtual Proceedings, I was unable to do so.
I underscore the points made by all noble Lords, all of whom—except the Minister—have objected to Clause 2. This clause is constitutionally offensive on a variety of grounds. The issues that arise in private international law are many, varied and important. They may be complex and technical, but they are not obscure or trivial. In family disputes, questions of divorce, child custody and child maintenance can cause great anguish to all concerned. By definition, if a commercial dispute comes to court, it is of great importance to the parties involved.
What is Parliament for? Our responsibility is not simply to wave through significant new legislation, but to scrutinise it and satisfy ourselves on behalf of the people of our country that it is appropriate. That can be done only through the processes of primary legislation. It cannot be done through our procedures for regulations. Even my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer’s super-affirmative procedure would not be satisfactory. The Minister has suggested that these regulation-making procedures provide ample opportunity, but they do not because there is no scope for amendment and scrutiny is still relatively perfunctory compared to the lengthy process of primary legislation.
Hitherto, new private international law has been incorporated into our domestic law by way of primary legislation. The Minister disputed that, but he was unable to give us convincing examples of when that had not happened. What we are seeing is part of an objectionable behaviour pattern on the part of the Government. They seek to evade full parliamentary scrutiny and arrogate power to themselves to save themselves inconvenience.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was about to discourse on the matter of Henry VIII powers—I hope he will. We see egregious Henry VIII powers in this Bill, including an open-ended power to implement any future international agreement, even if it overthrows existing primary legislation. We see the deployment of those innocent-sounding but weasel words "in connection with", "consequential" or "supplementary" legislation, which would enable this Government to smuggle in very significant legislative changes in an arbitrary fashion.
Clause 2(5)(a) and Schedule 6, concerning enforcement powers, would allow the creation of new criminal offences, the extension of existing ones or increases in the penalties applying to them. Again and again, your Lordships’ House has said that is not an acceptable practice on the part of the Government when legislating. We see in Clause 2(5)(b) the Government taking a cavalier approach to questions of data protection, which are extremely sensitive and important matters in this era of surveillance capitalism and in the context of measures being taken to protect us against a pandemic.
At Clause 2(5)(c) a power to alter the regime for legal aid without scrutiny is brought in. This too is a super-sensitive policy and legal area, as we know from the history of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, in consequence of which, I am sorry to say, the Government forfeited the trust of Parliament, the people and the legal profession.
The Government’s justifications for taking these open-ended, wide-ranging powers in Clause 2 are specious. They suggest that there may be an urgent need to legislate; we have had a significant discussion about the Lugano convention. The intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, made it very clear that, while there may be urgency for us as a country to resolve whether or not we wish to participate in the Lugano convention, that is certainly not something to be dealt with by statutory instrument. It will possibly need to be dealt with by fast-track legislation, though again we should always be wary of that. There is certainly no case for allowing it to go through under the terms of this law.
It is almost comic to see the Government plead that they will be eager to implement Hague conventions. Let me gently remind the Minister that successive Governments of this country took 63 years to legislate to implement in our domestic law the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. It did not get on to the statute book until 2017; despite endless pressure from Parliament, successive Governments refused to make time to legislate for it.
The Government make the case that, as there is little or no scope to amend international agreements, scrutiny by Parliament would be otiose. However, it is for Parliament to determine on principle whether or not to adopt important new legislation. If it decides that it is appropriate, it is again for Parliament to determine the manner in which that legislation is to be implemented in the specific circumstances of the United Kingdom—what we might refer to as the vernacular of implementation.
The Minister conceded that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would not permit scrutiny of model laws, but he went on to say that model laws are a very important area of law. Surely, therefore, we need something beyond the zero scrutiny that CRaG would permit. The point has just been made by the noble Lord who spoke previously that statutory instruments fail to provide the same legal certainty as primary legislation. Recourse can be had to the provisions of the Human Rights Act and it may always be possible that what is legislated by way of statutory instrument can subsequently be modified and superseded by the development of the common law.
The Minister sought to assuage the anxieties of some of us that the provisions in the Bill would ride somewhat roughshod over devolution and fail to respect the status and responsibilities of the devolved Administrations. He gave some satisfaction in what he said about Scotland, but I think no satisfaction to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, or myself about how the provisions affect Wales. Of course, in Wales there is no provision for co-decision by Ministers in the devolved territory as there is in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Finally, the Minister, in pleading with us to be reassured, pointed out that, up until now and for a long period, the adoption of private international laws had been a matter for European Union competence. But we have just spent four years in a political convulsion to establish the right to make our own laws in our own Parliament, accountable to our own people, and for Parliament not to be obliged to rubber-stamp obscure deals made on our behalf by people who are not accountable. We have sought in all the agonising political disputes of the last four years to re-establish not executive absolutism but parliamentary governance. Having gone to all this trouble, we cannot accept the provisions of this legislation. Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, this matter has been so fully covered by the speeches already made that I have little to add other than my full support for what has been said. I hope very much that we may be able to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, before the Minister speaks.
I do, however, wish to emphasise two points. First, I refer to what I said in support of Amendments 7 and 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. The lack of clarity about whether it is the Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State who are to exercise the powers referred to in Clause 2(1) and Clause 2 (2) is surely an indication, among others, that this Bill is seeking to do too much. The umbrella phrase “any international agreement”—I stress the word “any”—indicates that it is intended to catch a wide variety of international transactions and model laws relating to private international law. At present, with the possible exception of Lugano, we have very little idea of what they might be. It seems likely, however, that they will not be many. The pressure on Parliament, if we were to proceed by way of public Bills and not statutory instruments, would be quite limited. It is therefore hard to see why we are having to go down this road at all.
Secondly, there is no sunset clause in the Bill. I could understand it, although I would not like it, if the Bill were designed to deal only with measures that needed to be enforced before the end of the implementation period or shortly afterwards. But without such a clause, the Bill is entirely open-ended; committing all international agreements and model laws to the statutory instruments procedure, as a permanent feature of our laws whatever they may be, seems to me to be a hostage to fortune.
(4 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble and learned Lord has made an obviously reasonable and appropriate case for the propriety of the Government consulting with Ministers in the devolved Assemblies. That is not only good politics, it is good manners, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord who will be replying on behalf of the Government will readily accept that that is appropriate. I hope, therefore, that he will be willing to accept Amendment 23.
Amendment 45 is an amendment to a clause that is in any case otiose, so I do not think it is necessary for the Government to accept it, but again I hope that the Minister will affirm that of course the Government will want to follow the usual conventions and established procedures for legislative consent.
My Lords, I wish to speak to three of the amendments in this group. Yesterday I spoke in support of Amendment 15, and those remarks are relevant to Amendment 18 so I will not repeat them. It is important to ensure that our concerns about the Bill are recognised. One is that, as currently written, the Bill can be interpreted as not respecting the union, which becomes extremely important constitutionally.
Amendment 23 relates to Clause 26 and the potential role of the courts, other than the Supreme Court, in the future. The difficulty arises in having due regard to the devolved Administrations, as my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd has outlined. Legislation that has already been passed by the Senedd, the Welsh Assembly Government, reflects European rulings. If those rulings are changed in the future, the Assembly will have to address the changes. The difficulty, of course, is that if it has not been consulted on all the changes to the way appeals can be made, it could find itself in an extremely difficult position.
This amendment, like the others that we have tabled, is therefore designed to prevent avoidable problems emerging in the future. I cannot see that anything in our amendments would undermine the Government’s ability to move forward with their withdrawal Bill, but they would make sure that the legislative powers already held by the Senedd and the Welsh Government are respected.
Our amendment to Clause 38 is necessary because, as written, it fails to refer to the Sewel convention and therefore risks undermining the devolution settlements. If the Government do not wish to accept the amendment, one could suggest another way forward by deleting the entire clause, although I suspect that they are less minded to do that than to insert something short to respect the devolved settlements.
I also signal my support for Amendment 29 in the group, because again it aims to safeguard the devolution settlements from unilateral amendment by Ministers of the Crown. Although the conduct of international negotiations is a reserved matter, which everyone respects, the amendment would ensure that the impact on the devolution settlements are recognised and would give the devolved institutions the responsibility to make arrangements to implement international agreements as they go forward.
Essentially, we are asking to be consulted and to be kept in the loop. We are not asking for a veto, but our amendments ask for the devolution settlement to be respected, as it works at the moment with an intact union.
My Lords, I also serve on the Constitution Committee and share the concerns expressed by my noble friend Lady Taylor and the noble Lord, Lord Beith. The relationship between the Executive, the judiciary and the legislature is a matter of some current controversy. The Executive have been stunned by the judgment made in the Supreme Court in the autumn, and I suspect that in part we are seeing a somewhat petulant response to that circumstance.
At all events, what is proposed in this legislation is a gross intrusion by the Executive into the proper realm of the judiciary. The Executive complain that the judiciary has extended itself excessively into its role; we are now seeing a retaliation on a major scale. Whatever practical motivation otherwise that may have caused the Government to write new subsection (5A)(b) into this clause, it is a foolish initiative on the part of the Government.
This is territory in which the Government ought to walk delicately, like Agag. It sets an appalling precedent, and it intrudes into the proper role of Parliament, because it is not appropriate. Even if it were appropriate for Ministers to interfere at all in this realm of judicial discretion, it is not appropriate for Ministers to do it by regulation. Such decisions ought to be made by Parliament in primary law, ensuring that the sort of very important principles which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has suggested might be interfered with by Ministers under the terms of this legislation cannot be dealt with in this kind of way.
My Lords, I am puzzled by some of the issues that have been raised by this amendment. First, only a year or two ago, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, then president, called for Parliament to tell our judges clearly how rulings of the CJEU are to be dealt with after Brexit. Apparently our noble and learned friend did not see any difficulty about that.
Secondly, to tell courts that they are not bound by something does not mean that they will not follow it. If they are not bound, they may well still choose to follow it if they think it is good law. There are indeed many instances where the Court of Justice of the European Union has not produced good law: for example, over the secret nature of MEPs' expenses, on genetically modified crops and on diplomatic immunity. This is not surprising, because it is a court very unlike our own type of court. Its judges are nominated by sending countries for six years—they have only a six-year tenure. They have enormous salaries and expenses, and I am sure that they are reluctant to lose them after six years, and anxious to be renominated.
There are of course no dissenting judgments. Many of the so-called judges are not judges at all. They have been professors—obviously, I have great admiration for professors—and civil servants, with of course the exception of the British judge. So I am a little sceptical about this court. I think people sometimes confuse it with the European Court of Human Rights. We hear much talk that, if we depart from the rulings of the CJEU, our human rights will be affected. That is not the issue today.
I ask those who put forward this amendment what they mean, or envisage, by binding and not following, and why they think it would be better for citizens to have to go all the way to to the Supreme Court, with all the delay and expense—and lots of nice jobs for lawyers—that will be involved if you can only get a diversion from EU law by going all the way to the Supreme Court.
As the noble Lord is aware, there is a level of courts, for example the Sheriff’s Court in Scotland, which is not bound by each other’s judgments, and therefore at that level one could arrive at inconsistency of decision-making, and we are conscious of that. The question is where we should best place the determination, and the whole point of this clause is to allow for the flexibility that is required, upon consultation with the appropriate parties, to determine how we can best achieve the outcome that everyone seeks. I am not in a position to say that it will be just the Supreme Court, as it is under Section 6, or to say that it will be just the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. However, one can see a rationale behind the approaches, both of which have been supported by various noble and learned Lords in the course of this debate. What we want to be able to do is to resolve that debate and achieve a consensus that will bring about the best result for the law of the United Kingdom, given its different legal systems. What we are seeking in the end is certainty for those who seek to litigate in our courts, and we would achieve that by coming to a consensus on how we should look at EU case law going forward.
I cannot accept the amendment and at this time I would urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
How does the Minister defend—if he conceivably can—the violation of the principle of separation of powers embodied in this clause?
I do not consider that this clause in any sense violates the principle of the separation of powers.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we appreciate the work done by the Justice Committee, which was published in April 2018, and have taken up some of its recommendations already. There are discrepancies over the number of complaints, but that may in part be explained by difficulties that some people perceive in following through on complaints. We are concerned when enforcement officers do not comply with the law and with regulations, but we must remember that there is not only a group of people out there who are “can’t pays” but a very large group who are “won’t pays”. Individuals and small businesses need the ability to recover money lawfully due to them. I am happy to meet the noble Baroness and her experts and associates to discuss the matter further.
My Lords, while creditors are entitled to take steps to obtain money properly due to them, does the noble and learned Lord agree that what is not legitimate is the harassment and bullying perpetrated by some bailiffs and some of the profit-driven organisations that employ them? Will he go beyond an expression of concern and tell the House more fully what the Government intend to do to improve this culture and to ensure that those bailiffs who commit excesses are brought to book?
My Lords, there are regulations in place and there are those—a minority—who do not comply with those regulations. The position at present is that there are about 2,500 civil enforcement agents. They have to appear before a county court judge every two years, where their conduct will be the subject of consideration. We are looking at further regulation and at the means of ensuring that a small minority of enforcement agents do not break the law. Clearly, we do not condone aggressive and inappropriate behaviour, no matter what the circumstances may be.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I say again that I am not going to anticipate the outcome of a review that is due to be published before the end of this year.
My Lords, does the Minister accept that justice delayed is justice denied? Does he also accept that, following the Chancellor’s Budget Statement, we are looking at the prospect of justice indefinitely denied, with further real-terms cuts to the already ravaged budget of the Ministry of Justice, continued gross underfunding of the courts and—the most flagrant systemic injustice—the continuation of the Government’s scorched-earth policy on legal aid?
My Lords, we face economic challenges. I remind the noble Lord opposite that it was the last Labour Prime Minister who announced the end of boom and bust. He did so without consulting either the markets or even the Delphic oracle. One Labour Minister pithily observed as he left government that,
“there is no money left”.
The coalition Government had to pick up the pieces of an economy blown to pieces by the last Labour Government and we have been putting it back together. We are doing so responsibly. We are not the cause; we are the cure.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not familiar with the evidence to which the noble Lord refers, but I assure him that at present Ministers have the highest regard for the work of the Law Commission, and that I have the highest regard for those who carry on that work. We are always amenable to its proposals. In its current, 13th programme, we were happy to approve a list of 14 projects that it submitted.
In that case, why have one-third of the recommendations not been implemented?
Not every recommendation made by the Law Commission is accepted by the Government as appropriate for legislation. There may be circumstances in which the Government have a policy on legislation that is not entirely in parallel with its recommendations. That does not take away in any sense from the quality of the recommendations made.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise with a considerable amount of hesitation because I am very conscious of the level of experience in this House on matters pertaining to Northern Ireland, not least my noble friend Lord Patten, who spoke with considerable eloquence in introducing his amendment.
I utterly reject the views expressed in some parts of the media that noble Lords, including my noble friend, should not be allowed to express their views on this issue. That is what we are here to do, it is what we should do, and we should not face the opprobrium of the media in so doing. The issue is whether we get the balance right between advising and scrutinising this important piece of legislation as opposed to blocking it and thwarting the will of the people. That is an issue that I am sure my noble friends have very much in mind as we debate this amendment and all others.
I stand shoulder to shoulder with all noble Lords who wish to see the Good Friday agreement remain intact as we leave the EU. None of us, whether we voted to leave or whether, like me, we voted to remain, wishes to see Brexit undermining that agreement, nor do any of us wish to see Brexit undermining the union of our nation itself. I would find it very difficult—I almost say impossible—to vote for any withdrawal agreement that contained a backstop whereby in the event of no deal a new border or unacceptable new barriers were to arise between Northern Ireland and mainland Britain. My fear is that come the autumn the agreement on the future arrangements will be fudge, but it must not and cannot be fudge containing the poison pill of that backstop. People voted to leave the European Union; they did not vote to break up the union that underpins our nation.
The doublethink of the December agreement, in which paragraph 49 says one thing and paragraph 50 another, cannot be allowed to seep into the final agreement, but there is clearly a risk that it might. Given that risk, if this House were to pass the amendment in the name of my noble friend, it would seem odd not to pass another one preventing this Government from creating such a border in the Irish Sea or creating new barriers to trade between one part of the United Kingdom and another in the event of no deal. For if we treasure the Good Friday agreement, as we all clearly do, surely we treasure the union just as much. Would it not be odd for Parliament to stop the Government from erecting new borders on the Irish border only to leave them free to erect them in the Irish Sea? After all, this too is government policy, and it would be unacceptable.
However, I argue that now is not the time to do any of this. We should not pass the amendment nor anything else on this sensitive topic for two simple reasons: first, the Bill is one of process; and, secondly, we must remember where the negotiations stand. We are hurtling towards a reckoning. The EU appears to reject the Government’s concept of a free trade agreement, rejects their approach to customs, is insisting on frictionless trade between Northern Ireland and Ireland and is committed to this dreaded backstop as a contingency. Meanwhile, our Government are rejecting membership of a customs union and rightly refusing to accept the EU’s definition of a backstop. As of Monday, this Parliament may be given the power to stop the UK leaving the EU without a deal.
We are approaching a deadlock. The Brexit negotiating chamber is, I fear, beginning to resemble the Little Ease in the Tower of London: so tiny that there is no room to move. As a remainer, I believe that we must honour the referendum result and negotiate an agreement to leave the EU that is in our national interest. The key word in that sentence is “negotiate”. As my noble friend said, in any negotiation there must be compromise. If your Lordships agree on that, it surely follows that we must give the Government room and space to make compromises. The more we put constraints on what the Government can and cannot do in any eventuality, the more it will hinder the Government’s room for manoeuvre.
Rather than put this into legislation, I simply ask your Lordships to think of this. Would it not be better to reserve judgment until we see what the negotiations actually produce? To vote against the amendment is not to vote for a hard Brexit, it is certainly not to vote against the Good Friday agreement, it is simply to vote to give the Government the space they need to negotiate, and then we can and we must decide.
My Lords, we are told that unless we remain in the customs union, there will be a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, which would be contrary to the Good Friday agreement and endanger peace in Northern Ireland. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, spoke to us illuminatingly just now about the reality of the historical border.
The future of Northern Ireland and of peace in Northern Ireland is of course hugely important, and we have very serious responsibilities with regard to Ireland, but the future of Britain, the future interests of Britain and the future economic opportunities for Britain are just as important—I would contend, more important, as the noble Lord, Lord Spicer, said earlier. The intransigence of Monsieur Barnier and of some remainers, and their ruthless exploitation of the border issue in order to coerce us into remaining in the customs union is inappropriate. Neither should we be coerced by the threat of hypothetical violence, should some border changes need to be made.
As someone who has had family members on both sides of the border and spent a great deal of my life in Ireland, I am fully aware of how terrible the Troubles were and of the extraordinary blessings of peace that the Good Friday agreement has brought about. One of the virtues of the Good Friday agreement is that, through it, the people of Northern Ireland have learned to live with complexity and uncertainty. With the spirit of compromise advocated by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, with pragmatism, good will and the smart use of technology, a workable solution can be found. The noble Lord, Lord Patten, was somewhat dismissive of the possibilities of creating a virtual border, but I understand that the Cabinet sub-committee is, quite rightly, looking at that very issue this afternoon. I think it would be wise of the Republic of Ireland to look equally seriously at that option, which would be very much in the interests of the economy of Ireland.
There are other possible solutions to this problem. This is perhaps not the moment to elaborate on them, but I just note—my noble friend encourages me. One possibility would be for us, when we are no longer members of the European Union and not in a customs union, to decide to abolish tariffs. That would be good for our own people and would very satisfactorily address the border issue.
Another solution—I would not wish events to play out in this way, but it would be entirely within the letter and spirit of the Good Friday agreement—would be for there to be a referendum in Northern Ireland, in which the people of Northern Ireland could decide for themselves whether they wished to be reunited with Ireland. After all, 56% of them voted to remain; it would be an opportunity to test how serious they are about that. If that was the decision that they took, that, too, would solve the problem of the border. I emphasise that it is not a resolution that I would like to see—but it is nonsense to say that there are no policy solutions other than staying in the customs union.
I finally note that it is a curiosity to me that Amendment 88 effectively gives the Government of Ireland a veto on the list of policy options in relation to the border that is set out in the amendment. Since this Government of Ireland take their instructions from the EU, it effectively gives a veto to the EU. The noble Lord, Lord Patten, mentioned in the debate on the customs union the other day that he has experience of international negotiations. I would just ask him whether he really thinks that it is wise to legislate to give to the people you are negotiating with a veto on crucial issues that you are negotiating on. I do not think that that is sensible, realistic or appropriate, and I do not think that we should support this amendment.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberWhen the coalition Government introduced tribunal fees to employment tribunals, they did so in the belief that they were taking a proportionate step to meet the costs of our courts and tribunals. Indeed, the totality of fees income is still less than half the cost of our courts and tribunals. Going forward, we will be conscious of the need to ensure access to justice—a point made by Lord Reed in his judgment in the UNISON case.
My Lords, is the Minister aware that there is considerable sympathy for him having to keep returning to this House to defend the indefensible situation that the Treasury, being apparently unaware that justice delayed is justice denied and that access to justice is beyond price, has imposed on his department? What does he think of the Treasury’s custom of hiding behind the skirts of the spending departments?
My Lords, in what may be my last statement from the Dispatch Box, I observe that the Treasury has had to respond to the dramatic economic turnaround that occurred after 2008. That has had an impact on spending departments, but we require to maintain a coherent economic policy for the whole country.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the matter of third-party litigation funding is of course a matter of contract between two parties, and the Government would be slow to interfere in that contractual process.
My Lords, further to the excellent question from my noble friend Lord Beecham, will the Government now at last admit that they have denied access to justice to hundreds of thousands of people, with cuts to legal aid taking people with social security, homelessness, mental health and other extremely important issues out of scope; widespread confusion as to who remains eligible; difficulty in proving financial eligibility; and a very damaging fall in the number of legal aid providers? How does the Minister explain the collapse in the number of private practice and not-for-profit organisations undertaking legal aid work? Will the Government now act to restore access to justice as a basic right of citizenship?
My Lords, we recognise the need for access to justice; it is a fundamental common-law right. We seek to ensure that there is a legal aid scheme that is affordable but allows for access to justice. That scheme is currently the subject of review by the Ministry of Justice.
(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I live in Norfolk. The Norfolk Community Law Service—NCLS—is staffed by people who believe deeply in the right to justice. A small paid staff are supplemented by volunteers: 65 experienced solicitors and barristers and a team of 45 law students from the University of East Anglia. With their moral energy and practical resourcefulness, the people at NCLS provide services across a wide range of legal advice needs. The most severe problem areas are family issues, debt, welfare benefits and housing. NCLS says there is a perfect storm created by austerity, legal aid cuts, reductions in public funding for advice services, welfare reform and falling incomes.
The case load of NCLS has increased year on year since LASPO. In the current year, it is projecting a 21% increase. Increasing personal debt is being driven by stagnant incomes, zero-hours contracts and the benefits cap. Welfare benefits cases, after increasing by 19% in 2016-17, are on course to increase by 65% in the current year. With the assistance of the UEA students, NCLS is winning no fewer than 83% of appeal cases that go to tribunal, which shows there is something seriously wrong with DWP decision-making.
With the loss of legal aid, demand for the family court support service of NCLS has soared, increasing six times between 2015-16 and 2016-17. Nine volunteer family court supporters at NCLS help clients to gain a realistic view of their prospect in court. They attend hearings with them and help them to complete court forms and draft complex statements. Clients also get legal advice from the domestic abuse service of NCLS. The situation in Norfolk is made worse by the lack of solicitors doing legal aid work for domestic abuse, so even where the client would be eligible for legal aid, no one is available to take on their case because of the reduction in funding by the Government. Volunteers, however, cannot represent clients in court: they can provide only practical support during the very stressful experience of appearing as a litigant in person. Organisations such as NCLS can limit damage but they cannot substitute for professional legal advice and a properly funded justice system.How right my noble friend Lord Bach’s commission is to recommend that the Government bring legal aid back into scope for all matters concerning children and widen the scope of legal aid for certain family cases. It is profoundly depressing that Ministers could ever have taken legal aid away from people with few resources in such unhappy situations.
In a debate in Westminster Hall on 29 November, the Minister of State for Courts and Justice, Mr Dominic Raab, was, however, unrepentant. He intoned:
“The Government have a responsibility to make sure that those in the greatest hardship, at the times of greatest need, can secure access to justice, that the most vulnerable are catered for, and that the resources are made available to do that. That is a responsibility that we take very seriously”.
These are fine-sounding words but a world away from the reality the Government have created. The report by Amnesty International, Cuts that Hurt, describes how homeless people and those with mental health difficulties, learning disabilities, low numeracy and literacy levels, language problems, alcohol and drug dependency and even terminal illness are now without entitlement to legal aid as they attempt to engage in legal processes.
Why, anyway, should the responsibility of government be confined to those in the greatest hardship? We cannot claim to be a society that lives under the rule of law if swathes of the population cannot in reality avail themselves of legal remedy. It would appear that the Minister had not read the judgment of the Supreme Court in Unison v The Lord Chancellor.
Mr Raab then observed that post-LASPO spending on legal aid per person in England and Wales was the highest of all Council of Europe members. This argument is disingenuous. Our legal system, adversarial rather than inquisitorial, cannot be compared in this way to systems in other Council of Europe countries. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, made some very interesting observations in that regard. Anyway, what other countries choose to do should be neither here nor there. We can still do what is right according to our proper constitutional tradition, as developed in the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 and the expansion of legal aid in the 40 years that followed.
Mr Raab’s third defence was that,
“the financial pressures in which the LASPO reforms were introduced remain with us today … We in the Government have the responsibility to ensure that taxpayers get the best value for money”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/17; cols. 168-71WH.]
I do not question the need to reduce the deficit but I absolutely reject the appropriateness of doing it by undermining the rule of law. I do not question the need to achieve efficiencies in the justice system, provided they are well judged, but too many have not been. Nor do I question the desirability of discouraging unnecessary and adversarial litigation but the reduction in the number of solicitors holding a legal aid contract has led to a fall, not an increase, in the use of mediation. The principle of access to justice for all should have been non-negotiable. The purported saving, a fall in spending on legal aid of £600 million since LASPO, though large enough to have wreaked havoc on access to justice, is trivial in the context of total public spending of £814 billion. The cost of the justice system is not to be compared with the costs of health or defence.
As for value for money, the saving has been overstated if not illusory. The commission of the noble Lord, Lord Low, the National Audit Office, the Law Society and many others have demonstrated how the removal of funding for early advice has led not just to increases in human misery but to new costs for the Exchequer. We shall see whether the MoJ’s post-implementation review of LASPO, now promised for next summer, makes an honest assessment of this.
I hope that today, the Minister will not use the stale and discredited arguments paraded by his ministerial colleague in Westminster Hall. I endorse the analysis in the report of the Bach Commission, The Right to Justice. Its proposals for reform deserve serious and urgent consideration.